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Abstract 
This thesis assesses British naval and military co-operation in the form of combined 
operations during the Nine Years War, 1688-1697, and the War of the Spanish 
Succession, 1702-1713. The operational history of the joint actions is related and used to 
drive forward the determination of two inter-related themes. These are, how combined 
operations might be defined as an instrument of warfare during this period; and secondly, 
the place of such operations within the military component of Britain's wartime Grand 
Strategy. With respect to the former, previous definitions embodying the benchmarks of 
objectives and composition of force are set against the history and bunt upon to 
incorporate three ftirther categories of definition: theatre of war, bureaucratic control and 
command structure. As a result, it is argued that no blanket definition for combined 
operations can be arrived at, but that any one of the five categories can provide insights 
into combined operations as an instrument of warfare. The second theme places the 
strategic objectives of these operations within the context of British war policy and 
explores their relationship to the 'Maritime' and 'Continental' strategic traditions. While 
it becomes clear that combined operations were thought to possess neither an independent 
nor a war-wfiuýiing strategic capability, they do appear to have consistently filled a role in 
Grand Strategy which acted either simultaneously or separately in support of the naval 
and military strategic interests. With the categories for definition and a strategic role 
established for such joint anny-navy ventures, the thesis concludes by considering whether 
during these wars there were any factors common to the more successful, and conversely 
to the failing, combined operations. Although a pattern or mould for a successful 
combined operation cannot be established, it is shown that the origins of the developed 
historical practice of this type of warfare - demonstrated to such effect later in the 
eighteenth century - can be traced to the two wars considered in this study. 
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Introduction 
1: The Revolution of 1688 as a Combined Operation. 
At only six old pence, A New Map of Sea Coasts ofEngland, France and Holland, might 
have been shrewd investment for James VII & 11 in the late autumn of 1688. It would have 
provided him with an increased knowledge of the coastal topography to better defend his 
kingdom from the invasion by his daughter's husband and Stadholder of the United 
Provinces, William, Prince of Orange, which was completed within four days of the map 
being advertised. ' 
On I November 1688, the Prince of Orange's military and naval force of three 
divisions comprising about 50 warships and less than half that again of fireships along with a 
transport flotilla of near 300 vessels with excess of 15 000 'fighting men" on board made a 
second and successful egress from Hellevoetsluis in the River Maas. The fleet had previously 
set out on 19 October only to be forced back by a heavy lightning storm, thus prompting fears 
that possible losses and damage would make any future attempt doubtful? The whole fleet 
had though - save arguably for one fly-boat - made it back to the Dutch coast, albeit 
dispersed throughout a variety of ports. ' Gargantuan efforts were made within the following 
ten days to effect the necessary repairs, replace a good number of the horses that had 
suffocated when the holds in some transports had been secured at the start of the storm, and 
reassemble the fleet. Crucially, the Prince also held his nerve in the face of a renewed 
representation of doubts by his colleagues as to the sense of the operation at this late time of 
the year. That he did so was a tribute to the assiduousness of his preparations and a firm 
belief in the role he perceived for himself within the international states system as champion 
of a coalition of states to balance the power of Louis XIV's Catholic and absolutist France. 
1 London Gazelle, No. 2395,29 Oct. to I Nov. 168 S. 
2 j. Carswell, The Descent On England. A Study of the English Revolution of 1688 and Its European 
Background (London, 1969), p. 170, uses 'fighting men' to denote the fact that the number does not just 
represent the rank and file but also officers and 'gentleman' volunteers. 
3 NUL, PwA 2195, unf: 'Verdeelinghe van's Landts Vloote'; NUL, PwA 2196, unf.: 'Liste van't 
Embarquement vande Iniuntiriern de Dragonders'; Carswell, The Descent On England, pp. 168-70,170 n. *, 
176-7; S. B. Baxter, William 111 and the Defence ofEuropean Liberty, 1650-1702 (London, 1966), p. 23 7. 
4 There seem to be differing views on whether any of the fleet were lost. Whittle, An Exact Diary, p. 22, and 
Original Letters Illustrative ofEngfish History, ed. IL Ellis (Second Series, 1828), iv. 137: Letter CCCLXI11, 
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Prior to the Prince of Orange issuing the C. -in-C., Admiral Arthur Herbert, his orders 
on 6 October, there had occurred a debate amongst William's colleagues as to how the fleet 
should cross the Channel in order best to effect a landing. Bumet recorded that John 
Wildman was prominent in marshalling the arguments for a two phase crossing: the men-of- 
war would secure command of the sea, either by fighting the English fleet or hastening them 
back into port; then the transports would make a safe and unimpeded passage. The Prince 
however rejected this in favour of a one step crossing, with the warships and transports 
comprising one naval entity. In this respect, he was probably conscious of the potential for 
further delay that might occur under the two phase conception, recognising that the fleets 
might lie in sight of each other for sometime and that each day longer the army and horses 
were at sea reduced their capability. ' Implicit in this decision was William's - albeit 
unexpressed - desire to avoid engagement. Politically, it was important that he avoided the 
image of 'invader-conqueror', while it was also recognised that a campaign which set out to 
spill blood would most probably invoke recent memories of the Anglo-Dutch Wars and 
galvanisc the English of whom it was said, 'our countrymen love no cause, nor man, so well 
as fighting'. ' William's decision for a single phase dash for the coast was however largely a 
product of the debate as to which English coast he was headed for and the exact landing site 
thereon. 
Arthur Herbert's sailing orders were less than specific. There has always been a 
question as to whether the Prince knew himself, and kept his colleagues guessing in deference 
to operational secrecy; or whether he was also uncertain about his intentions when he set sail. 
It is easy to identify the factors which would influence such a decision; and the Prince's 
preparations did not omit compiling important information on the state of the country, 
including detailed information about the garrisons. Obviously, wherever the critical mass of 
King James's troops were would carry significant weight in any decision. This is clear from a 
survey of potential landing sites completed prior to sailing which stated that if disembarkation 
was to take place on the north-east coast then Yorkshire was the most southerly point at 
which it could be effected due to the strength of James's army in London and its immediate 
27 Oct. 1688, both state that a ship was lost and yet Carswell, The Descent on Engl=4 p. 178, states that no 
ships were lost. He might, however, have been referring only to capital ships. 
3 G. Burnet, History ofMy Own Time, ed. M. J. Routh (Oxford, 1833), iii. 324-5. 
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environs. This document was not however prescriptive, and another assessed coasts and sites 
as far apart as Tynemouth and Falmouth! 
Dr Clyve Jones has produced a most concise summary of the landing site question, by 
looking at how it was conceived on both sides of the Channel. 8 His was an attempt to move 
the debate on from the Whig myth that the Protestant wind brought William to Torbay and 
Professor J. P. Kenyon's contention that political considerations - namely the need to avoid 
being dependent upon Thomas Osborne, earl Danby and his band of northern supporters 
including the Earl of Devonshire in Derbyshire and Lord Lumley at Durham - dictated the 
choice on the south-west coast. Dr Jones agrees with Professor Kenyon that William had 
decided prior to departure to proceed in that direction but suggests that his motives were as 
much military as political. Dr Jones argues that the need to avoid an engagement both at sea 
and at land (upon landing) meant that - to the extent that the wind would allow - William had 
decided upon the south or south-west coast. 9 
The relevant document is a memorandum of a meeting aboard Herbert's flagship on I 
November. The memorandum indicates that the discussions were partly counter-factual as 
the participants outlined various contingencies. "' Dr Jones views the important passage as 
that which deals with the point of disembarkation. He argues that, although no explicit 
landing site is mentioned, the fact that a southerly course was to be set evidences a decision 
by William for the south or south-west coast. The course was for 'de Hooffden' - (Dutch for 
the southerly part of the North Sea which stretches down around into the Channel) - and then 
to continue along the English coast to such places as Cowes, the Southampton river, Poole, 
and even as far as Exmouth. " However, arguably, Dr Jones derives more from the evidence 
6 Buckingham, John Sheffield, Duke of, The Works ofJohn Sheffield, Earl ofMulgrave, Marquis of 
Nornumby and Duke ofBuckingham (fourth edn, 1753), p. 70. 7 NUL, PwA 2204, unf.: 'Instructie, Bij Sij Hoogheijtjejaren ainden Heer Arthur Herbert'; NUL, PwA 2082, 
unf: Letter to Bentinck containing the numbers thought to be employed in the English Garrisons; NUL, PwA 
2083, unf: Document detailing the Governors/Commanders of different Garrisons in England; NUL, PwA 
2185-6, unf : Papers Relating to the State of England, 1688; NUL, PwA 2199, unf.: Paper Relating to the 
Fleet and Troops for Embarkation, 1688; Correspondenlie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Benfinck, ed. 
N. Japikse, ('s-Gravehage, 1927-1928), ii, no. 570, pp. 617-18: 'Memorie Van De Plaetsen, Die Bequaem. 
Geoordeelt Worden In Engelandt', [? ] Oct. 1688; E. B. Powley, The English Navy in the Revolution of 1688 
(Cambridge, 1928), pp. 20-1,62. 
8 Clyve Jones, 'The Protestant Wind of 1688: Myth and Reality', ESR iii (1973), 201-21. 
9 ibid., pp. 201-9. 
10 Correspondentie van Willem III en van Ilans Willem Bentinck, ii, no. 576, pp. 623-4: 'Memorie Met Den 
Luitenant-Admirael-Generael Herbert En Den Luitenant-Admirael Eversen', II Nov. 1688 [NS]. 
" Jones, 'The Protestant Wind', p. 211. 
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than it bears. Undoubtedly the south and south-west coasts were strongly mooted as 
potential landing sites, but this was not to the exclusion of other options. Indeed, the 
contingent nature of the other decisions taken during this meeting also extended to the south- 
westerly option. This is a point that J. L Anderson makes clear when he argues that the wind 
was the detennining variable. He develops this further, arguing that too many historians have 
assessed the operation in purely naval terms by focusing on the general coastal area without 
looking at the operation's combined character. This put a premium on the effect of the 
weather conditions at the actual point of disembarkation in determining whether the landing 
would take place under a weather or lee shore. " Both J. L Anderson and Dr Jones agree that 
the Dutch fleet's tack to the south on the night of 2/3 November did not represent, as Bumet 
states and Whittle implies, a change of mind by the Prince. " Though, given the poverty of 
the contemporary evidence, J. L Anderson's flexible argument is more appropriate. For what 
is certainly true is that the wind greatly shaped the two key moments of the naval crossing. 
Firstly, the strong easterly gale allowed the Dutch to proceed to the south and then along to 
the south-west coast, while the same wind trapped the English fleet, commanded by Lord 
Dartmouth, at the Gunfleet. Secondly, it was a change in the wind to the west which allowed 
the fleet to come safely to anchor in Torbay Bay under a lee shore, thus permitting a secure 
embarkation on the 5 November; a day redolent with positive religious symbolism for 
William. 
While theoretically of equal importance, William's subsequent military operation was 
on this occasion of less interest. it comprised a near unimpeded march by William at the head 
of his force to London which he entered on 18 December in a commanding political and 
military position. No pitched battle occurred and little blood was shed aside from around 50 
men killed at skirmishes at Wincanton and Reading. " Three factors can perhaps be isolated 
as of significance in shaping the history of the land campaign in 1688. Firstly, the Prince was 
well prepared with detailed marching routes and plans where to quarter troops. " Also, the 
12 J. L. Anderson, 'Combined Operations and the Protestant Wind: Some Maritime Aspects of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688', GC ix (1987), 96,99-107. 
13 Burnet, History ofMy Own Time, iii. 325-6; Whittle, An Exact Diary, pp. 29-34. 
14 Whittle, An Exact Diary, pp. 57-9,68-9; FIMC, Seventh Report, Graham MSS, p. 417: Grahame to [his 
brother] Preston, 21 November 1688; The Portledge Papers, eds. R. J. Kerr and 1. Coffin-Duncan (London, 
1928), pp. 50-2: Lapthome to Coffin, 17 Nov., II Dec. 1688. 
15 NUL, PwA 2207-11,2214, unf: Papers Connected with the Voyage to England of William, Prince of 
orange and Marches of Cavalry, Nov. and Dec. 1688. 
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Prince made a similar effort on land as at sea to avoid a battle. A period of indecision at 
Exeter where he held up progress for ten days proved useful in allowing political support 
within the country to gather momentum; but of greater significance was William's decision at 
Salisbury over the course of two days (4 to 6 December) to proceed to Oxford rather than to 
seek to crush the King's army which had just been disordered by James's retreat. This 
decision is rarely remarked upon for it is correctly assumed that the significance of Oxford 
was as a gateway to securing the west, and that ultimately the Prince never went through the 
University town as the pace of events drove him directly on from Abingdon through the 
Thames Valley to London. " Yet militarily, the decision was important, for to have proceeded 
otherwise would have led to a tactical repositioning of his army in order to fight. William 
must have recognised that this would serve no other purpose than to alter a strategy which 
had to that point proved effective. King James's pusillanimous decision to retreat from 
Salisbury and then his despairing order to his commander, the Earl of Fevcrsham, to disband 
his army prior to his first attempt to flee the country, is the second significant factor which 
aided the Prince on his march. James may have been psychologically weakened by the 
desertion of senior members of his officer corps, including his most able Lieutenant-General, 
John Churchill. Certainly, the confidence of the Prince's camp as to the potential for 
disloyalty within the English army was such that Bentinck had even prepared a note on the 
towns to which deserting English troops were to be sent. However, above all else, the 
military campaign was never going to amount to more than a tense march if the King did not 
offer battle. Finally, as the Prince's army drew much of its power and supply from the lines of 
communication leading back to the fleet and which also kept open an exit route, the dispersal 
and disabling of the English navy by a storm on the 19 November when it neared the Dutch 
vessels was of critical significance for the security of the march upon London. " It has been 
noted that there is a lack of awareness of this final point, " yet it truly underscores the 
essential character of combined operations: the mutual support and interplay of the army and 
navy. 
'6 Burnet, History ofMy Own Time, iii. 330,338-9,550-1. 
17 NUL, PwA 2212, unf: Papers Connected with the Voyage to England of William, Prince of Orange and 
Marches of Cavalry, Nov. and Dec. 1688; FMC, Dartmouth MSS, iii. 57-9,66-7: Journal of Captain 
Grenville Collins; Entry Book of Correspondence of Lord Dartmouth from the Fleet. 
18 L. K. J. Glassey, 'Introduction', in L. K. J. Glassey (ed. ), 7he Reigns ofCharles HandJames VII &H 
(London, 1997), p. 5. 
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11: British Warfare 1688-1713: William of Orange's Invasion as Pattern and 
Precedent. 
Undoubtedly, the Prince of Orange's successful combined operation was a prelude and 
essential precipitant to the important constitutional and political watershed in the early 
modem history of the 'British' archipelago: an event that has been labelled the 'Glorious 
Revolution'. Though one might lay to one side the implication of the word 'glorious' that the 
Revolution was necessarily a positive and celebratory event, it is difficult to deny the radical 
nature of the changes which followed. Most obviously, with the flight of James from his 
kingdoms on 23 December, it produced a change in the monarch and recast Parliament to a 
strengthened position within the polity. These changes and the other alterations contained 
within the subsequent Revolutionary Settlement" have ensured the operation's place within 
the enduring Whig historiography. " 
The historical narratives of these political and constitutional changes - content to 
afford the Prince's operation the role of harbinger and of trigger - ignore any potential 
significance for the military and naval history of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. To suggest otherwise is not to make a claim for the Prince of Orange in terms of 
originality in mounting such an operation for the occurrence of combined operations can be 
dated from Caesar's time. " Rather, it points to the fact that the Prince's operation 
inaugurated a dual role for British warfare over the course of two 'World' Wars between 
1688 and 1713, which requires explanation. Immediately it gave rise to a continental 
commitment and an increased emphasis on the primacy of the battlefleet. Both trends became 
manifest as orthodoxy throughout the Nine Years War, 1688-1697 and the War of the 
Spanish Succession, 1702-1713; and yet, there also occurred throughout these wars several 
combined navy and army operational deployments. " Such a bald analysis of the history of 
warfare may belie a more subtle and variegated role for combined operations as they 
19 This is the label generally given to the legislation of the 'Convention Parliament' which sat from January to 
the end of February 1689 before declaring itself a Parliament, which was not dissolved till 6 February 1690. 
20 See for example Lord Macaulay, Ihe History ofEngland From the Accession ofJames The Second, ed. 
C. H. Firth (London, 1913-15), iii. 1304-12. 
21 T. M. Molyneaux, Conjunct Fxpedtions: or Expeditions 7-hat Have Been Carried On Jointly hy the Fleet 
and the Army, with a Commentary on Littoral War (London, 1759), Part II, pp. 1-2; J. Keegan, A History of 
Warfare (Pimlico edn, London, 1994), pp. 255-7. 
22 Obviously there were other wars during this period like the Great Northern War (1700-21), but the two 
identified are those in which Britain was a principal participant. 
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developed throughout this period. A step can be made towards determining this by 
considering two complimentary lines of enquiry which the Prince's operation gives rise to. 
The suggestion that the operation has significance for military and naval history 
presupposes that in the late seventeenth century, combined operations were perceived as a 
form of warfare, just as an explicit naval deployment, a set piece land battle or counter- 
insurgency methods might be. Thus, the first line of inquiry will seek to arrive at an 
appropriate definition which comprehends all aspects of combined operational form, including 
strategic objectives and administrative base. The consideration of the distinctiveness of 
combined operations also requires an assessment of how they were conceived of as an 
instrument of warfare even if not deployed. Again the Prince of Orange's operation provides 
a springboard. By setting it within the diplomatic context, it will be possible to comprehend 
the role it fulfilled in the wider strategy of opposition to what the Prince perceived were the 
continental ambitions of the French King, Louis XIV. Hence, the second line of enquiry will 
comprise a strategic theme with an assessment of the role of combined operations as part of 
British war policy from 1688 through to 1713. 
Together, these two themes cannot provide a comprehensive operational history of 
the two wars concerned with here; an operational narrative will however drive forward the 
determination of the themes to illustrate the perceptions of combined operations held by 
Britain's military and political elite from 1688 to 1713. An understanding of how successive 
ministries and their senior service personnel comprehended the operational form and strategic 
function of combined land and sea actions during wartime will help explain the dual role for 
British warfare (referred to above) inaugurated by the Prince of Orange's combined operation 
in 1688. In so doing, it will account for the increased British practice of this type of warfare 
in the wars following the 1688 revolution and, in addition to the development of its military 
form, the political motivations underpinning combined operations within war policy will be 
elucidated. In turn, this will raise the significance of combined operations as a strategic form 
of warfare, fulfilling a vanguard role in the imperial development of Britain as a world, and 
particularly Atlantic, power. The geographical scope and territorial breadth of Britain's first 
empire up to the loss of the American colonies in 1783 was secured and remained dependent 
upon the combined projection of land and sea forces. Significant advances in respect were 
undoubtedly made in the mid-to-late eighteenth century but it will be shown that these were 
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dependent upon the development of contemporary perceptions of this type of warfare earlier 
in the century. However, before these arguments can be advanced, it is necessary first to 
elucidate the two themes from which they will derive. 
III: A Distinct Form of Warfare?: The Problems of Definition. 
The presupposition that in 1688 a combined operation was considered a specific form of 
warfare should mean that it possess certain recognisable features when set against more 
orthodox forms. At first glance, it might be argued that there was no specificity in 1688 
because the distinctive features of combination were actually illusory-, that the navy was 
merely providing a taxi service to a body of troops which were then to undertake a standard 
military land campaign. This suggests a minimal level of administrative and operational 
interdependence for each service which the history of the invasion of November 1688 does 
not bear out. It does nonetheless, correctly demonstrate that definitions are central in the 
case for distinctiveness. 
There is not a substantial body of historiography solely interested in combined 
operations for the period immediately concerned with here. This study hopes to make some 
contribution to filling that lacuna. Instead, taking their cue from J. S. Corbett's England in 
the Seven Years War, " historians have largely concentrated on assessing the combined 
operations of the second half of the eighteenth century, with the Elder Pitt's use of them as 
strategy proving of enduring interest. "' Arguably, a product of this scholarship has been a 
distorted view of the history of warfare such that it is not considered odd to make the claim 
that it was during the Seven Years War, 1756-63, and the War of the American Revolution, 
1775-83 that the British determined to achieve proficiency in the 'complex skills and 
techniques"' of this type of operation and that the methodology of this warfare originated 
then . 2" An attempt to revise this consensus has nonetheless begun. Professor Harding's 
, 4mphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century focuses on the disastrous expedition to the 
23 J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War. A Study in Combined StrateU (2 vols., London, 1907; 2nd 
edn with introduction by C. Duffy, London, 1992). 
24 C. Duffy, 'Introduction', in Corbett, England in the Seven Years War, i, pp. v-xxxiv, provides a review of 
the subsequent trends in the literature and includes a useful bibliography. 
25 D. Syrett, 'The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations During the Seven Years and American 
Wars', MM lviii (1972), 269. 
26 ibid., pp. 269-80; D. Syrett, 'The British Landing at Havana: An Example of an Eighteenth-Century 
Combined Operation', MM tv (1969), 325-3 1. 
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West Indies conducted by General Wentworth and Admiral Vernon between 1740 and 1742, 
providing a reinterpretation of its failure from which more general points about amphibious 
warfare are advanced. " Most obviously this pushed the analysis into the first half of the 
eighteenth century; but also it includes a penultimate chapter which recognises a historical 
lineage of some length for combined operations like the failure of the plan to descend on the 
French coast in the summer of 1692 and the attack on Cidiz in 1702. " It is however 
Professor Harding's emphasis on the importance of definitions which is of particular interest 
for the argument concerning the distinctiveness of this type of warfare. " 
The first point to make is that linguistically the combined operational deployment of 
an army and navy can obviously be denoted as a 'combined operation', but that its generic 
combat term should be 'amphibious warfare'. This term though, as Professor Harding has 
made clear, lacks definitional exactitude and suggests only the participation of an army and 
navy of an undefined size and scale. It has already been made plain that this remains 
unsatisfactory; amphibious warfare so defined might merely comprise the navy providing a 
transport service. As this study concerns the history of an archipelago, this could therefore 
arguably cover all military and naval operations undertaken or, at least, mean that each had a 
dominant amphibious component. " It is thus unhelpful as a means of achieving a greater 
historical understanding of the component characteristics of a combined operation. 
Theorists of warfare are generally of little help in seeking a working definition of 
combined operations. Few theoretical treatises on combined operations as amphibious 
warfare appeared before the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Colonel 
Charles E. Callwell began to publish his work. " There was one exception to this trend 
namely, Thomas More Molyneaux, who had his work on what he termed 'Conjunct 
Expeditions' published in the year that Britain conquered Canada by taking Quebec through a 
combined operation. " While this text is singularly instructive, its historical treatment is based 
27 R Harding, Amphihious waoýwe in the Eighteenth Century. The British Expedition to the West Indies, 
1740-1742 (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 199 1). 
28 ibid., pp. 150-97. 
29 Harding, Amphihious Warfare, pp. 1-2. 
30 ibid. 
31 His principal historical-theoretical works on amphibious warfare are C. E. Callwell, 7he Effect ofMaritime 
Command on Land Campaigns Since Waterloo (Edinburgh, 1897) and C. E. Callwell, Military Operations 
and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and Interdependence, ed. C. S. Gray (Annapolis, Maryland, 
reprint, 1996). 
32 Molyneaux, Conjunct Expeditions.. 
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almost wholly on naval sources and thus overlooks the army's input. Consequently, it tends 
to conceive of amphibious warfare as merely an appendage of naval strategy which in turn 
does not provide a firm ground from which to establish the lineaments. This is a trend 
detected in other theoretical treatises such as P. H. Colomb's work on naval warfare; a 
thoroughgoing Mahanite text" in its promotion of seapower, it conceived combined 
operational success to be solely determined by regional sea command. "' In this genre, J. S. 
Corbett's Some Principles ofMarilime Strategy should be considered an anomaly. Its 
rejection of a purely naval strategy, in favour of a maritime strategy which did not dismiss the 
use of armies as part of a continental commitment meant that Mahan's contempt of combined 
operations, was eschewed. " Instead, amphibious warfare was written of positively as a 
central component of British combat. "' Overall though, the significance of these works (and 
in particular Corbett's) for amphibious warfare lies mainly in its role within strategy which 
will be treated in this study but does not in the first instance provide a working historical 
definition of combined operations. 
one person's definition entails another's omission, however. Drawing on an 
explanation by the sailor-scholar, Admiral Richmond, Professor Harding argues for its 
33 That is a text following the notion that 'command of the sea' was the principal end of naval warfare as 
outlined in A. T. Mahan, The Influence ofSeapower Upon History 1660-1783 (New York, reprint of 5th edn 
1894,1987). 
34 P-11. Colomb, Naval Warfare. Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated (2nd edn, London, 
1895); A. Gat, 7he Development ofMilitary Thought: 7he Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1992), pp. 207-11. 35 j. S. Corbett, Some Principles ofMaritime Strategy, ed. E. J. Grove (Great Britain, reprint, 1988), pp. 15-30; 
J. T. Sumida, Inventing Grand'Strategy and Teaching Command. ý The Classic Works ofAlfred Thayer Mahan 
Reconsidered (Washington D. C. and London, 1997), p. 45. 36 Corbett, Some Principles ofMaritime Strategy, pp. 15-87,280-304. The first citation relates to Corbett's 
discussion of the theory of war in which the importance of the interdependence of army and navy within a 
maritime strategy, through to its role in 'unlimited' and 'limited' wars, is emphasised. With reference to the 
latter, pp. 60-71, Corbett argued that combined operations were the standard 'limited' war-making 
methodology. Corbett stated that this methodology might involve the taking of territories - the limited object 
of the war - or alternatively it might mean a development of Clausewitz's notion of 'war by contingent, and 
thus demonstrate that Britain possessed great potentiality in 'limited' interference in an 'unlimited' 
continental war through her amphibious capability. The second citation refers to a more practical outline of 
methods of exercising combined command. See E. J. Grove, 'Introduction', in Corbett, Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy, pp. xxiv-xxix; B. D. Hunt, 'The Strategic Thought of Sir Julian S. Corbett', in J. B. 
Hattendorf & R. S. Jordan (eds), Maritime Strategy andthe Balance of Power (London, 1989), pp. 110-35; 
G. Till, 'Sir Julian Corbett And The British Way In Naval Warfare: Problems of Effectiveness And 
Implementation', in K. Neilson & E. J. Errington (eds), Navies and Global Defence: Theories and Strategies 
(London, 1995), pp. 23-50; and D. M. Schurman, The Education ofa Navy: The Development of British 
Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914 (London, 1965), pp. 147-84; Gat, The Development ofMilitary 
Yhought, pp. 218-25. 
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broadening so as to define amphibious warfare by both objectives and composition of force. " 
However, the contention is that this approach omits elements of the historical experience of 
combined operations during the two wars considered within this study. Specifically, it 
excludes some operations - such as the attack on Toulon in 1707 - because they did not 
involve a self-contained land force launched from the sea; and, despite Professor Harding's 
original emphasis on the composition of the force, the definition does not seem to cover 
operations undertaken by a body of troops whose function was ambiguous in the late 
seventeenth century. "' While the current Royal Marines' oldest battle honour on their 
Colours is the conquest of Gibraltar in 1704, that was undertaken by their third mutation of 
form since the Restoration when a pattern had first emerged of raising regiments for 'sea 
service' in emergency which were then subsequently disbanded. These troops were 
commonly referred to as 'Marine Soldiers', and were mustered and paid as standard infantry 
privates when on shore. Yet, they were quickly to come under the administrative and 
operational direction of the Lord High Admiral and could aspire to be Able Seamen. Indeed, 
a permanent Corps was not established until 1755 and it is only from the late 1730s that 
scholars date the beginning of the resolution of the Marines' ftinctional and doctrinal 
ambiguity. Nonetheless, their earlier equivocal status - as either land soldiers, defacto seamen 
or as a wholly new group of servicemen - means that operations undertaken solely by them in 
conjunction with the navy could be considered as a combined army-navy venture. " 
An alternative way forward might be to keep the dual feature of Professor Harding's 
definition - objectives and composition of force - but consider whether the historical narrative 
of the operations yields additional categories of definition. Indeed, primafacie three 
categories seem of particular significance. When analysing types of warfare, it is appropriate 
to understand in conjunction how the operation reached the point of deployment (or indeed 
failed to reach that point), and its perfortnance and fulfilment of objectives when deployed. 
Thus, the administrative process which produced the combined operation, including especially 
the concerns of the developing early modem bureaucracy, should be addressed. Alone among 
37 Harding, Amphibious Warfare, pp. 1-2. 
38 Anon., A Letter to a Member ofParliament Concerning the Four Regiments Commonly Called Mariners 
(London, 1699); Anon., A Short rindication ofMarine Regiments, in Answer to a Pamphlet Entitleg A Letter 
to a Member ofParliament, Concerning the Four Marine Regiments (London, 1699). 
39 AL, MSS 12 I/XVI: Corbett's Naval Precedents, Marines; AJ. Marini, 'Parliament and the Marine 
Regiments, 1739', MM Ixii (1976), 55-65. 
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the theorists, Callwell. touched upon this to an extent in his final chapter in Military 
Operations and Maritime Preponderance, but unfortunately the focus was in-theatre as 
opposed to prior planning. " Secondly, the manner in which the governments sought to 
regulate the in-theatre relationship between the two services would not only have shaped 
contemporary perceptions of combined operations but also their historical development. It 
would seem probable therefore that the structure of operational command would emerge as 
an important additional category of definition. And lastly, as the form and function of any 
combat situation is largely contingent upon the in-theatre environment, the exigencies of the 
war theatre in which the combined operations were deployed will need to be considered in 
any attempt to arrive at a definition for this type of warfare. 
This study aims therefore to treat not only the first elements of the definition - 
objectives and composition of force - but draw from the narrative other categories with a 
particular focus placed upon the bureaucratic processes, the structure of command, and the 
in-theatre environment. 
IV: The Role of Combined Oi)erations in Grand Strateav. 
The second theme emerges from the diplomatic context of William III's operation and to an 
extent provides an explanation for the chosen period. As has already been noted, it could 
never be argued that combined operations are unique to 1688-1713 but, paradoxically, 
William's army-navy descent on the English coast in 1688 might be explained by events upon 
the European continent which did not embrace amphibious warfare. 
Contemporaries and historians have considered that William's Declaration published 
on 30 September 1688, despite only setting forth his concern for Anglicanism. and English 
political liberties, was a cloak for his own continental aspirations. " This turns on an 
assessment of the wellsprings of Louis XIV's foreign policy since the beginning of his 
personal rule in 1661, which had been directed towards the need for France to gain a secure 
frontier with the states of central Europe. The historical debate centres upon whether 
Louis's ambition derived from a warmongering desire to assert la gloire; or, alternatively, on 
40 Callwell, Military Operations andMaritime Preponderance, pp. 431-44. 
41 Sir James MacKintosh, Ifistory ofthe Revolution in England in 1688 (1834), pp. 692-702; Works ofJohn 
Sheffield; for historians favouring this interpretation see for example G. Holmes, Me Making ofa Great 
Power: Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain; 1660-1722 (London, 1993), pp. 246-7; D. McKay & H. M. 
Scott, The Rise ofthe Great Powers 1648-1815 (New York, 1983), p. 44. 
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whether the vulnerability and defensive concerns of national security dictated the extension of 
France's perceived natural geographical frontiers. "' Professor Hatton has been credited with 
rescuing Louis from the moral opprobrium central to the argument which emphasises the 
pursuit of la gloire as part of a conscious policy. In this respect, French vulnerability to the 
Habsburgs since the Peace of Pyrenees (1659) is cited along with a fluid international states 
system that responded to the type of personal statecraft or kingship inherent to la gloire. "' 
Recent scholarship has aspired to a more balanced interpretation, though not by 
splitting the difference between the two interpretative extremes. Instead, a synthesis has been 
sought by suggesting that one can trace a critical evolution in Louis's foreign policy. It is 
now argued that the policy can be divided into three discrete phases. The first period covering 
1661-1675 was characterised by the pursuit of la gloire; the second phase from 1675-1697 
was dominated by defensive concerns and the final period, 1697-1714, was consumed by the 
hoary question of the Spanish succession. " The merit of this interpretation is its coherence in 
that la gloire and a defensive national security posture are not mutually exclusive. It also 
explains, though not necessarily resolves, the paradox at the heart of the second phase 
whereby defensive ends were sought by aggressive means. The significant point for those 
who attribute William's combined operation to England in 1688 to his continental ambitions 
is that the Dutch Prince's formative experience had been marked by such conflicts as the War 
of Devolution of 1667-1668 and of the Dutch War, 1672-1678/9. During both, France 
sought increased territory principally at the expense of the United Province's security. 
Furthermore, William had also seen that the advent of peace did not mean that Louis was 
territorially satisfied; nor that peace would necessarily result in the alleviation of the insecurity 
felt by those states on the French eastern frontier. The period 1679-1684 heralded the 
implementation of the French monarch's rdunion policy -a policy of territorial aggression 
which Louis sought to justify with reference to the diplomatic vagueness and inconsistencies 
of the treaties of Westphalia (1648) and Nijmegen (1679) underpinned by French military 
"' J. Black, 'Louis XIV's Foreign Policy Reassessed', SCFSx (1998), 199-212; R. M. Hatton, 'Louis XIV: 
Recent Gains in Historical Knowledge', JMHxlv(1973), 279-80; J. A. Lynn, 7he Wars of Louis A7171667- 
1714 (London, 1999), pp. 27-32JI-L Shennan, Louis XIV(London, 1997), pp. 32-3; P. Sahlins, 'Natural 
Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries Since the Seventeenth Century', AHR xcvii (1990), 1423-52. 
41 J. Black, 'Louis XIV's Foreign Policy Reassessed', pp. 199-205; Hatton, 'Louis XIV: Recent Gains', pp. 
279-80. 
44 Lynn, Ae Wars ofLouis XIV 1667-1714, pp. 324 1. 
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power. " Accordingly, Louis is portrayed as aiming for France to be the hegemonic European 
power and William as seeking to thwart that development. William understood however that 
the military and demographic resources of the United Provinces were insufficient to position 
him in the vanguard of the opposition to France. Hence, the French King's invasion of the 
Rhineland and the Palatinate in September 1688 -a product of his failure to secure the 
election of the French candidate to the Archbishopric of Cologne and his frustration that the 
Truce of Ratisbon (1684) had not been made a permanent settlement46 - can be described as 
the opportunity for William to descend on England in order to hitch that country's resources 
to the conflict against France . 
4' This interpretation of the 'Glorious Revolution' is 
strengthened by William's subsequent action, namely, that on acceding jointly to the English 
Crown, William brought England into the defensive coalition against France. The pre- 
existing League of Augsburg formed in 1686 comprising the Empire, Spain and several 
German Princes evolved to become the Grand Alliance with the addition of England, the 
United Provinces and Savoy. This continental alliance founded in the nascent balance of 
power diplomacy as an instrument to regulate state relations and principally to balance French 
power remained the bedrock of policy through to the death of Queen Anne in 1714. Indeed, 
the Grand Alliance was reconstituted in 1701 to deal with the perceived threat posed to 
European peace on the death of the childless Spanish King, Carlos 11. Then a culmination of 
events saw Louis break the Second Partition Treaty (1700), aggressively promote and defend 
French interests throughout the Spanish Empire arguably using his grandson - the new 
Spanish King, Philip V- as cipher, while threatening Bourbon domination of west central 
Europe by issuing Letters Patent which declared that Philip (as Duc d'Anjou) retained his 
right to succeed to the French throne. Louis further inflamed Anglo-French relations by his 
recognition of the late King James's son, the Old Pretender, as James III, thus contravening 
the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Rijswijk (1697) which had settled the last war. 
Meanwhile the Emperor, seeking to reclaim Milan and other areas of northern Italy which he 
45 ibid., pp. 161-71. 
46 This Truce was a twenty year agreement between France and the Emperor, certain German Princes and 
Spain to accept the continued French occupation of Lorraine, her hold on Strasbourg and the reunion lands. 
See Sherman, Louis XIV, p. 37, and Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714, pp. 191-9. 
47 McKay & Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 43-5; Powley, The Naval Side of King William's War, 
pp. 17-20; or most famously due to her concentration on this argument, L. Pinkham, William III and the 
Respectahle Revolution: The Role Played by the William of Orange in the Revolution of 1688 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1954). 
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considered Imperial territory, had increased the tension by sending in an army of occupation 
even before the Grand Alliance had been signed. As a check to this, French troops were soon 
acting in proxy for the new Spanish King's army. "' 
The relevance of this brief synopsis of William's motives in 1688 set against the 
current historiography on Louis XIV's foreign policy emerges from a consideration of the 
concept of Grand Strategy. This is a relatively modem analytical focus for scholars and it is 
viewed as multi-layered concept applicable in peace as well as war. In the analysis of war, it 
is used to denote the coherent direction of the instruments of state power and resources, 
including less quantifiable elements such as national morale, towards the immediate military 
objectives but also with a view to the type of peace that is sought. "' Under these precepts, 
the armed force of a state has a dual role: a constituent element of the Grand Strategy but 
also an active means of its implementation. In peacetime, that second role would be reduced 
to one of potentiality and threat. Some have counselled against the use of strategy as a means 
to explain the history of warfare, arguing that it has a reductive effect through seeking such 
an explanation by a 'system of essentials'. 'o Analytically this prematurely links two issues: the 
understanding of one particular strategy and the subsequent derivation of universal principles 
from it. It seems quite correct to be chary of this link for although one sympathises with J. S. 
Corbett's view that these principles should properly be looked upon as a fertilising agent of 
judgement, their pretensions to universality can obscure the shading in ihe historical picture if 
the principles are derived from one age only to be applied crudely to another. This should not 
mean however that contextual strategy is dismissed wholesale as a means of enquiry in the 
history of warfare. It has also been suggested that the method is anachronistic because 
unalloyed strategy was an unknown concept before the nineteenth century. There might be 
some foundation in this charge with reference to the period concerned with here in the sense 
that the protagonists did not use the jargon laden language; but that did not mean that they 
did not face a series of options or make certain decisions - political, economic and military - 
as to how they would prosecute the war. The culmination and interplay of these decisions 
48 Thomson, 'Louis XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', pp. 140-61; Baxter, William 
Iff, pp. 379-401. 
49 P. Kennedy, 'Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Towards a Broader Definition', in P. Kennedy (ed. ), Grand 
Strategies in War andPeace (London, 1991), pp. 1-7; P. Kennedy, 'Grand Strategies and Less-Than-Grand 
Strategies: A Twentieth Century Critique, in L. Freedman, P. Hayes, & R. O'Neill (eds), War, Strategy, and 
International Politics: Essays in Honour ofSir Michael Howard (Oxford, 1992), pp. 227-9. 
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formed Grand Strategy. To assess the choices made as to the direction of the state's armed 
force is to outrme that element of Grand Strategy. And, as has been noted, to do so should 
provide for a greater understanding of a more germane strategic theory associated with it. " 
The question to be posed is that, while recognising William's continental aspirations which 
inaugurated a committed British presence in the European theatre at the head of a coalition 
against France, what form in pursuance of the Grand Strategy did warfare take? 
The older orthodox military and naval histories of this period stick to their own in 
explaining the warfare of Grand Strategy. " The former concentrate on the set piece land 
battles best exemplified by Marlborough's famous four victories over Louis XIV at Bleinheim 
(1704), Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708) and Malplaquet (1709) with the main historical 
debate focused on the tactical minutiae of military manoeuvre and engagement. " The 
navalists seek to demonstrate the period's significance in the establishment of British 
supremacy at sea, usually tacking between the respective merits of the guerre descadre and 
the guerre de course. `More modem works have continued to emphasise the distinctiveness 
of land and naval operations, while recognising that an island power must seek a blend; this 
though was usually meant to signify no more than an attempt to achieve appropriate and 
proportional priorities between the land and sea. " Combined operations as amphibious 
warfare are ah-nost always condemned as a strategical subordinate either directly or by 
implication. 
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There have been some noteworthy exceptions to this trend. "' Generally though, for 
this period, these have focused upon British pretensions to become a Mediterranean power or 
on the extension of overseas possessions. " Such works have provided the student with a 
much clearer understanding of the role of combined operations in Grand Strategy and have 
crucially highlighted the personal commitment to this type of warfare displayed by William III 
and Marlborough as the principal directors of the armed force element of Grand Strategy 
during the two wars considered in this study. A further historical debt is also owed to these 
histories through their raising of the profiles of other naval and army commanders such as 
Admiral Sir George Byng and James Stanhope, who rose to prominence through being 
closely concerned with such operations. Nonetheless, due to the geographical exclusiveness 
of such literature with its focus on the Middle Sea and the Americas, it seems to fall short of 
being a full analysis of the role of combined operations within Grand Strategy. 
Hence, with the first line of enquiry seeking to establish the occurrence and 
distinctiveness by definition of combined operations as amphibious warfare, there will be a 
concomitant illumination of their role in Grand Strategy. This will challenge the focus of the 
orthodox histories and develop with more wide ranging evidence some of the themes of those 
works which proved the exception. From this it will be shown whether the mode of warfare 
which William adopted to invade Britain in order to make good his continental ambitions 
actually came to fulfil a consistent role in Britain's Grand Strategy at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. 
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The two thematic lines of enquiry will be applied to the two wars which form the 
separate chapters of this study. The subdivision therein is dictated by the character of each 
wars' theatres. Perforce, both chapters will contain a colonial theatre sub-section, though 
only the chapter on the Nine Years War will consider Ireland; while the incidence of 
operations in the Mediterranean, including those on the Peninsula, during the Spanish 
Succession War means it will form a sub-section in that chapter. The end of each chapter will 
present some conclusions on the two lines of enquiry based upon the foregoing descriptive 
and analytical narrative. Essentially this will be a historical progress report to show at each 
stage throughout the period 1688-1713 the extent to which a definition of combined 
operations had been arrived at so that its distinctiveness as a form of warfare can be rated; 
and also to demonstrate the scope of such operations within the armed force component of 
Grand Strategy. These strands will be brought together in a final section, which will consider 
the reasons for the success of only some of the operations. The historical detail will allow for 
certain conclusions to be drawn about the perceptions of the form and the deployment of 
combined operations during the period 1688-1713. These will focus upon their strategic 
emergence alongside Britain's post- 168 8 continental commitment and also upon their 
operational articulation by the political and military elite. At a broader level, this analysis of 
some 25 years of operational experience should prompt comment on the existing 
interpretation of warfare. Firstly, the orthodox view of largely static warfare (naval or 
military) punctuated by the set piece battle might seem less relevant as Britain moved to a 
more mobile conception of war. Secondly, where before Britain's development and 
deployment of combined operations as a practice of warfare has been established in the mid- 
to-late eighteenth century, it might now be possible to locate the substantive wellsprings of 
this practice in an earlier period. In turn, this should also push back to the early eighteenth 
century the nascent contemporary comprehension of the type of warfare in early modem 
history which proved germane to Britain's imperial extension. 1688, as a military and naval 
event, combined with British involvement in both the Nine Years War and the War of the 
Spanish Succession can therefore begin to assume a primary role in Britain's emergence as 
the preponderant world power in the eighteenth century. 
29 
Chapter I 
The Nine Years War, 1688-1697. 
Section 1: Combined Operations and the Reconquest of Ireland 
During the Nine Years War, 1688-1697. 
Li Ireland as a Theatre of War. 
In the wake of King James's second (and successful) flight to France on 23 December 1688, 
elections were held for a Convention Parliament that was to determine England's future 
monarch, who would also be the monarch in Ireland by virtue of legislation in Henry VIII's 
time. One contemporary pamphlet outlined why Ireland should rightly be considered as part 
of a wider English dominion and, thus, accept the Convention's resolutions. More 
significantly, the pamphlet also told of the atrocities allegedly then being committed against 
the Protestants in Ireland, and of the significant military commitment which the author 
believed would be required to reclaim the island for whoever was to occupy the English 
throne. ' Well before the formal offer of the crown to the Prince of Orange and Mary in 
England, the fight to obtain Ireland's recognition of the 'Glorious Revolution' had already 
begun. 
Ireland had descended into a state of violent confusion when news of the Revolution 
filtered through. Unlike Scotland which - despite the efforts of the Presbyterians in the south- 
west - initially turned to the constitution in the form of the Convention of the Estates, in 
Ireland the spectre of the 1640s held sway with rumours of invasions and of Protestants and 
Roman Catholics massacring each other. That as a result, a greater number of Protestants 
fled to England through the winter of 1688 was principally due to the continued presence of 
James's Lord Deputy, the Earl of Tyrconnell. A strict Roman Catholic, Tyrconnell had been 
appointed by James in February 1687 to push forward plans to enhance the Crown's authority 
by allowing his co-religionists amongst the 'Old English' to occupy civil and military office. 
Numerous Protestant soldiers, justices, judges and even whole town corporations were turned 
out; and, as preparations were made for a Parliament which looked likely to threaten the 
1 P- Coxe, Aphorisms Relating to the Kingdom of Ireland, Humbly Submitted to the Most Noble Assembly of 
Lords and Commons at the Great Convention at Westminster (London, 1689). 
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Restoration land settlement, those who returned to England spoke of the steady eclipse of 
Protestant Ireland. 
Nonetheless, there is also evidence to suggest that on receiving news of the King's 
flight, Tyrconnell sought calm and initially thought of negotiating with the Prince. This was 
the impression subsequently given in depositions by several Irish Protestants to the enquiry of 
the House of Lords into the miscarriages in Ireland. More immediately, on the Irish Solicitor- 
General, Sir John Temple's recommendation, William concluded that the Lord Deputy would 
prove receptive to an emissary and the cavalry officer convert, Richard Hamilton, was sent to 
demand Tyrconnell's submission? This tactic did not, however, have universal support. 
Danby spoke out against it, arguing instead that a display of preponderant force in the form of 
a squadron would more likely induce Irish quiescence; and, indeed, underlying his point was 
an accurate assessment of the probable reason for Tyrconnell's apparent even-handed 
reaction to the Revolution. " Since September, when James had ordered half the Irish army to 
England to shore up his defences, the Lord Deputy had lacked the necessary troops to secure 
the whole country; and, in the febrile atmosphere attending news of the Revolution, he had 
obviously struggled to contend with both the endemic banditry and the pockets of militant 
Protestant resistance which were emerging as organised 'associations' for the Prince. In the 
short-term, Danby's opposition proved apposite for, once in Ireland, Hamilton treacherously 
never asked for Tyrconnell's sword and instead urged resistance to William. ' 
2 HMC, Ormonde MSS NS, viii. 356: 'A Diary of Events in Ireland from 1685 to 1690% The Life ofJames the 
Second, (ed. ) J. S. Clarke (London, 18 16), ii. 94-8; W. King, The State of the Protestants of1reland Under the 
late King James's Government (3rd edn, London, 1692), pp. I-I 10 provides the most wide-ranging account of 
this sense of Protestant eclipse and, despite the author's unalloyed prejudice, the text affords an insight into 
the likely views of many contemporary Irish Protestants. See also, J. Miller, 'The Earl of Tyroonnell and 
James 11's Irish Policy, 1685-1688', HJxx (1977), 803-23; Sir Charles Petrie, 7he Great Tyrconnell., A 
Chapter in Anglo-Irish Relations (Ireland, 1972), pp. 143-53; P. W. Sergeant, Little Jennings andFighting 
Dick Talbot: A Life ofthe Duke and Duchess of Tyrconnell (London, 1913), ii. 353-72; J. G. Simms, Jacobite 
Ireland 1685-1691 (London, 1969), pp. 19-43; J. C. Beckett, The Making ofModern Ireland 1603-1923 (new 
edn, London, 198 1), pp. 139-141; C. Rose, England in the 1690s (Oxford, 1999), pp. 210-11. 
3 Simms, Jacobite Ireland 1685-1691, pp. 48-52; FIMC, Twelfth Report, House oftords MSS, 1689-1690, pp. 
137-44: Depositions by the following: Mr John Phillips; Sir Robert Colvill; Mr Luke King; Sir Richard 
Rivers; the Archbishop of Dublin. 
4 A. Browning, Thomas Osborne, Earl ofDanby and Duke ofteeds, 1632-1712 (Glasgow, 1944), ii. 159-61: 
'Memorandums att my first coming out of the North to the Prince att St James'. 
5 P. G. Melvin, 'The Irish Army and the Revolution of 1688', IS ix (1969), 288-307 & 'Irish Troop 
Movements and James 11's Army in 1688', IS x (1970), 87-105; RMC, Twellih Report, House of Lords MSS, 
1689-1690, p. 141: Deposition of the Archbishop of Dublin; HMC, Ormonde MSENS, viii. 356-9: 'A Diary 
of Events in Ireland from 1685 to 1690% Simms, Jacobite Ireland 1685-1692, pp. 48-52; H. Murtagh, 'The 
War in Ireland, 1689-169 1', in W. A. Maguire (ed. ), Kings in Conflict: The Revolutionary War in Ireland and 
IrsAftermath, 1689-1750 (Belfast, 1990), p. 65. 
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Positive judgements of Tyrconnell's character have been used to bridge the credibility 
gap between his actions in 1687-8 and his apparent neutrality at the time of the Revolution, 6 
but these largely founder upon the clear indications given in the first months of 1689 that he 
was actually intent upon securing Ireland for James. Large numbers of Catholic troops were 
raised; Protestants were disarmed; a leading Protestant nobleman, Mountjoy, was sent to 
Paris to be arrested under false pretences; officers from France were received in Ireland to 
assess what help Louis XIV might give; meanwhile the ever increasing army - albeit mainly 
comprised of ragged and raw recruits - tightened Tyrconnell's control across the whole 
country! Informed of Hamilton's treachery and kept abreast of the other developments by 
the Protestant refugees, William concluded in the spring that only a military force could bind 
Ireland to the Crown. On 8 March, Parliament was informed of his intention to dispatch an 
arrny of 20 000 men. The King also resolved to send Richard Hamilton's nephew, James, to 
the Governor of Londonderry, Robert Lundy, with the latter's commission, arms, money, and 
encouragement; while preparations were to begin for the immediate dispatch of two infantry 
regiments as relief for the north. ' William had, however, acted too late, for as he revealed his 
intentions, the exiled King James had already begun his sea crossing from Brest to Ireland 
with a French expeditionary force led by several French Generals. Also embarked aboard the 
squadron was a considerable amount of war supplies, though a detachment of up to 5000 
troops was not to sail until a second convoy left Brest three weeks later. On 12 March, 
James landed at Kinsale and within a fortnight he had reached Dublin for the summoning of a 
Parliament which was designed to provide a sense of constitutional propriety to his 
enterprise! 
6 For example, Simms, Jacobite Ireland 1685-1691, pp. 48-52, is complimentary towards Tyrconnell, 
claiming on p. 50 that he 'played a difficult hand with skill', and on p. 52, that his was essentially a 'tentative 
approach' which would have succeeded if William had engaged the Irish problem before James landed. 
7 HMC, Ormonde MSS NS, viii. 14: Mountjoy to Ormonde, 10 Jan. 1689; HMC, Twelf1h Report, House of 
Lords MSS, 1689-1690, pp. 180-2: Letter from Mr W. Howell to Sir Robert Southwell, 3 Mar. 1689; Letter 
from Edward Boyle, Bishop of Cloyne to Henry [Compton], Bishop of London, 4 Mar. 1689; The Journal of 
John Stevens, ed. R. H. Murray (Oxford, 1912), pp. 60-1,60 n. 1; King, The State of the Protestants, pp. 119, 
123-3 1; N6gociations de M. Le Comte DAvaux en Irelande 1689-1690, ed. J. Hogan (Dublin, 1934), p. 6: 
'Mdmoire du Roy pour servir d'instruction au Sieur de Maumont, Mardchal de camp, 16 fivrier 1689' [NS]. 
8 W. Cobbett, Parliamentary History ofEngland (London, 1809), v. 163-4; HMC, Tweyllh Report, House of 
Lords MSS, 1689-1690, pp. 161-2: 'The humble Representation of several of the Nobility and Gentry of the 
Province of Munster', read on 20 Feb. 1689; G. Walker, A True Account ofthe Siege ofLondon-Derry 
(London, 1689), in P. Dwyer, (ed. ), The Siege ofLondondeny, in 1689 (Republished 1893 edn, London, 
1971), p. 14; PRO, ADM, 1/5247, p. 13: Minute at Whitehall, 27 Feb. 1689. 
9Anon, A Full and True Account of1he Landing and Reception of the Late King James at Kinsale (London, 
1689); Nigociations de M. Le Comte DAvaux, pp. 22-5: d'Avaux i Seignelay, 16 mars 1689 [NS]; d'Avaux 
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It was largely at Louis XIV's behest that James had gone to Ireland. Although 
England had not yet officially declared war, the French King viewed the country as an ideal 
diversionary theatre in which to embroil William away from French military action in Europe. 
His war minister, Louvois, had disagreed but his opposition probably had more to do with his 
personal contest with the minister for the navy, Seignelay, for Louis's preferment: clearly 
Seignelay had more to gain from conflict in a theatre that would necessarily rely upon the 
navy. Even so, Louvois reportedly had little faith in the Jacobites' commitment, of which 
James's initial lethargy as he settled in at St Germain-en-Laye stood as testimony. Early 
expeditionary planning did not assume that James would lead the force in person. 
Nonetheless, the exiled King did appreciate that the local context of the conflict between 
Louis and William held the potential for him to reclaim. the throne by securing Ireland, and 
then using it as a springboard for entering England via Scotland where potent opposition to 
William was also emerging. " To that end, the first task which faced the Jacobites once in 
Dublin was to eliminate those centres of Protestant resistance in the north which - after 
Richard Hamilton's successful sweep through eastern Ulster in March during which he 
defeated Mount-Alexander's Protestant band at the 'break of Dromore' and advanced north 
through Coleraine to fall down into county Tyrone, east of the River Foyle - were 
concentrated in Londonderry and Enniskillen. " The battle for Ireland had clearly beenjoined. 
The current military historiography of the war in Ireland embraces two complications. 
The first - and a theme well outside the scope of this study - has been its entry into the 
modem political lexicon as propaganda for both sides of a religious divide. " The second 
pertains to the many excellent scholarly studies of the conflict. " These tend, understandably, 
au Roy, 23 mars 1689 [NS]; AH, xxi, nos. 42,68, pp. 18-19,29-30: 'Instruction pour M. de Maumont, 16 
f6vrier 1689' [NS]; [Louvois] A Bouridal, 10 mars 1689 [NS]; S. Mulloy, 'The French Navy and the Jacobite 
War in Ireland, 1689-1691', IS xviii (1990-1992), 22-4. 
10 AH xxi, nos. 24,5 1, pp. 10-11,22-3: 'M6moire concernant un projet du Roy d'Angleterre sur VIrlande, 31 
janvier 1689' [NS]; [Louvois] A Maumont, 23 fdvrier 1689 [NS]; Nigociations de M. Le Comte DAvaux, P. 
52,61: d'Avaux A Louvois, 4 awil 1689 [NS]; d'Avaux au Roy, 16 avril 1689 [NS]; Mulloy, 'The French 
Navy and the Jacobite War in Ireland, 1689-1691', pp. 18-23; Simms, Jacobite Ireland 1685-1691, pp. 58- 
62. 
11 HMC, Eighth Report, Talbot de Malahide MSS, pp. 493,496: Tyrconnell to Hamilton, 14,17 Mar., 3 Apr. 
[1689]; The Montgomery Manuscripts: (1606-1706), ed. G. Hill (Belfast, 1869), pp. 279-8 1; HMC, Ormonde 
MSS NS, viii. 3 61-3: 'A Diary of Events in Ireland from 16 85 to 1690'. 
12 R. Cathcart, 'Ireland and King Billy: Usage and Abusage' HT xxxviii (July 1988), 41-5; J. G. Simms, 
'Remembering 1690', SIQR 1xiii (1974), 231-42. 
13 For example, J. Childs 'The Williamite War, 1689-169 1 1, in T. Bartlett & K. Jeffrey (eds), A Military 
History ofireland (Great Britain, 1996), pp. 188-2 10; Simms, Jacobite Ireland, 1685-1691; Beckett, The 
Making ofModern Irelang 1603-1923, pp. 13949; Murtagh, 'The War in Ireland, 1689-1691', pp. 61-91. 
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to concentrate on the three land campaigns with their attendant naval manoeuvres, but this 
can diminish the importance and understanding of alternative forms of warfare, and, 
especially, of the combined operations mounted to relieve Londonderry and to capture the 
Munster ports of Cork and Kinsale. Although the former admittedly does not lack treatment 
(a considerable amount of which suffers from the first complication mentioned above)" it has 
rarely been considered within an amphibious context; while the latter operations can be 
interpreted to shed light on the perceptions and reality of combined operations as an 
instrument of warfare during the Nine Years War. 
LH: The Relief of Londonderrv. Mav-Julv 1689. 
The two regiments first sent out by the King to the north of Ireland were not precisely 
embarked upon an active combined operation. The navy was involved, but merely to provide 
the transports and a small convoy whose captains were subordinate to the regiments' colonels 
- Cunningham and Richards. Moreover, they were restricted to landing at Londonderry and 
helping with its defence only if the city remained in Protestant hands; otherwise they were to 
try entering either Carrickfergus or Strangford. Though again, if access was closed off, a 
landing was not be forced and the troops were to be returned to Liverpool. " In the event, as 
the enemy force had not fastened all the approaches to Londonderry, Cunningham and 
Richards were able to enter the town on 16 April to attend a Council of War called by 
Governor Lundy. This Council determined that due to insufficient resources the town could 
not be held and the regiments would not be required. With Caff ickfergus and Strangford in 
Jacobite hands, Cunningham and Richards returned to England. "' 
The Williamite sources denounce Lundy's conduct as treacherous inasmuch as he had 
recommended to a Council whose membership was ignorant of the conditions within the town 
14 For example, a Williamite perspective can be found in the contemporary accounts by G. Story, A True and 
Impartial History of the Most Material Occurences in the Kingdom of Ireland during the Last Two Years, 
Part I (2nd edn, London, 1693), pp. 4-5 and A Continuation of the Impartial History of the Wars of1reland 
(London, 1693), pp. 4-5 and also in the modern monograph by C. D. Milligan, History ofthe Siege of 
Londonderry (Belfast, 195 1). A contemporary account from the Jacobite perspective can be found in A 
Jacobite Narrative of the War in lrelani4 1688-1691, ed. J. T. Gilbert ( Dublin, 1892), pp. 62-9,75-81,83-5; 
while a more modern version can be read in H. Belloc, James The Second (London, 1934), pp. 23 8-50. 
15 PRO, ADM 3/1, pp. 1,3,6,13,17: Board Minutes, 9,12,14,21,27 Mar. 1689; RMC, Twelfth Report, 
House ofLords MSS, 1689-1690, pp. 170-1: 'Orders and Instructions for Col. John Cunningham, and upon 
his death or absence Col. Solomon Richards or the Officers in Chief with the regiments whereof they are 
Colonels', 12 Mar. 1689. 
16 Walker, A True Account ofthe Siege ofLondon-Derry, pp. 15-16; J. G. Simms, 'Notes: The Garrison of 
Carrickfergus, 1689', IS vi (1963-1964), 118-19. 
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and of the inhabitants' temper, a course of action amounting to surrender. " Certainly as 
Governor and Chair of the Council, and as one possessed of a superior command to the 
newly arrived Colonels, Lundy was powerfully placed to control proceedings. Moreover, he 
had been positively ordered to defend the town which was said to benefit from strong 
fortifications built upon a natural defensive aspect. " Even if the strength and maintenance of 
the walls since the conflict of the 1640s is moot, it is undeniable that Londonderry's position 
on the west bank of the River Foyle, which discharges through Lough Foyle into the open 
sea, was well placed for a sea-based supply line. With posts on the river bank and occupation 
of Culmore Fort situated some four miles down-stream where the river met the Lough, there 
remained a reasonable prospect that the supply route could remain open and to have rejected 
the assistance of troops which might have undertaken these tasks was, militarily, an act of 
folly. Nonetheless, Lundy had to grapple with the other realities of his position that more 
appropriately cast him as a defeatist than a traitor. " High ground rose to the west and east of 
the town, providing ideal sites for the besieging batteries; while the garrison's ability to sally 
forth was obviously prevented by the river to the east, with marshland providing a significant 
obstacle on the west. More importantly, just as the two regiments from England were 
arriving in Lough Foyle, separate Jacobite forces under Hamilton and Rosen had 
rendezvoused at Strabane to force a passage across the River Foyle. On 15 April, this was 
achieved when the Protestant forces raised from Londonderry and the surrounding areas were 
put to flight by Hamilton at Clady and by Rosen at Lif[brd. Back inside the walls that the 
Council had decided were indefensible, Lundy either sought or was offered (depending upon 
the political interest of the source) terms which arguably held out the prospect of safety for 
the town's inhabitants. " By 17 April, the town under Lundy's leadership faced the possibility 
17 Dwyer (ed. ), The Siege ofLondonderry, in 1689, pp. 85-8: A letter from Colonel Walker, giving a Ul 
account of the treachery of the late governor of Londonderry, [n. d. ]; Story, A Continuation of the Impartial 
History of the Wars of Ireland, p. 4; Milligan, History of the Siege of Londonderry, pp. 102-7. 
18 HMC, Tweyth Report, House ofLords MSS, 1689-1690, pp. 162-3,171: 'Instructions to our trusty and 
well-beloved Lieut. Col. Lundy', 21 Feb, 1689; 'Instructions for Robert Lundy Esq. ', 12 Mar. 1689; HMC, 
Ormonde MSS, ii. 318-19: Report by Lord Dartmouth and Thomas Phillips on the fortifications in Ireland 
(Ulster), 24 Mar. 1686; C. D. Milligan, Ae Walls ofDerty. Their Building, Defending, and Preserving, Part I 
(Londonderry, 1948), pp. 79-82. 
19 Simms, Jacobite lrelan, ý 1685-1691, p. 10 1, makes th is judicious judgement of Lundy. 
20 J. Fitzjames, Memoirs ofthe Marshall Duke ofBerwick (London, 1779), i. 44; AH xxi, nos. 186-8, pp. 87- 
90: 'Relation de cequi s'est passd au passage de la Rivi&e de Fin, 29 avril 1689' [NS]; 'Article d'une lettre 
dscrite par le Roy d'Angleterre A Monsieur de Roze, 29 avril 1689' [NS]; Maumont A Louvois, 29 avril 1689 
[NS]; Walker, A True Account of the Siege ofLondon-Derry, pp. 13-16; J. G. Simms, 'The Siege of Derry', 
IS A (1963-1964), 224; Milligan, History ofthe Siege ofLondonderry, pp. 115-16. 
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that there would be no siege and if the Governor's conduct lacked implacable courage then - 
provided the Jacobites could be trusted to honour any agreement - it perhaps represented a 
rare instance of humanity in this conflict. 
INSIT TO SHOW 
yx a POSITION 
al 
Twe boom 
Aý 
M166 
WALF SCALE Of 
RAW "M - JIA. 
A.::. 
qI.. 
pTly.. P Lt 
Aftl 
STPIONG 
eac.. Itl) 
CON SATTIRY 
OUA 
DACHAAD 
LONDOND 
Ge'. 
A, 
It 
Gulf MEW 
Fig. 1: The Siege ol'i, ondonderry. 
Diflýring perceptions of trust were to determine the course of events over the 
following days. While at Omagh with Rosen's detachment, James had decided not to proceed 
onwards to Londonderry; but on his return to Dublin a dispatch from the Duke of Berwick 
reached him which indicated that a personal appearance before the town might indeed bring it 
to surrender quickly. Anxious to force the campaign's pace, James immediately turned back, 
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despite d'Avaux's arguments to the contrary. The exact course of events when he arrived 
again in Londonderry's environs on 18 April remain unclear due to the disagreement of the 
Jacobite sources as to whether James alone decided to proceed with a sizeable force to the 
heights overlooking the town, or whether Rosen was complicit in this advance. " The 
important historical point is that the inhabitants of the town perceived that by this action the 
Jacobites had transgressed a commitment made by their vanguard that no troops would come 
within four miles of the town while terms were being considered. Lundy's approach was thus 
laid threadbare and the Jacobites were viewed as an untrustworthy rabble who could not be 
relied upon to guarantee peace. Consequently, the summons sent by James was rejected as 
shots were exchanged; meanwhile, Lundy was unofficially replaced as Governor by Major 
Baker and the clergyman, George Walker. " The town had resolved to defend itself and the 
siege of Londonderry had effectively begun. 
While James and Rosen returned to Dublin leaving Hamilton and Maurnont in 
command, the Jacobites pulled back to establish headquarters at St Johnstown and then began 
fastening the access points to the town in preparation for the advance of their siege works. 
Notably, Culmore Fort at the mouth of the River Foyle was captured ensuring that the 
Jacobites were well placed to cut off the sca-based supply route which, in the absence of an 
interior relief anny, was the town's main hope for succour. This allowed Hamilton - now in 
sole command as a result of Maumont's death during a skinnish for Pennyburn Mill at the 
rear of Culmore - to dispose his besieging force of 4000 men on either side of the town. The 
majority closed in from St Johnstown and Carrigan heights on the west, while two regiments 
with some mortars were posted on the other side of the river: one in Strong's Orchard 
directly opposite Londonderry and the second in a wooded area to the south. In these early 
stages, the town with some 7000 defenders overcame their immediate topographical 
disadvantages to mount several effective sallies. Indeed, the Jacobites were badly galled 
holding Pennyburn Mill, but more significantly they were denied the important post of 
WindmillHill. The capture of this elevation just 500 yards from Bishop's Gate, which was 
the only one of the town's four gates to be additionally protected by a ravelin, would have 
2'A Life ofJames the Second, pp. 332-3; A Jacobite Narrative, p. 62; Nigociations de M. Le Comte 
D Avaux, pp. 101 -6,109-13: d'Avaux au Roy, 27 avril, 6 mai 1689 [NS]; AHxxi, no. 190, pp. 91-2: Pusignan 
a Louvois, 5 mai 1689 [NS]. 
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provided an ideal location on which to position batteries against the defenders' strong point 
and close in the siege. " Nonetheless, even if General Ramsay had been successful at 
Windmill, it is arguable whether Hamilton could have exploited the opportunity due to his 
lack of heavy siege ordnance. Indeed, such was his dearth of equipment, that it has been 
provocatively questioned whether the action at Londonderry should be labelled a 'siege'; the 
word 'blockade' has been, instead, suggested as more appropriate. " Rosen's 
correspondence, once back at Londonderry in June, leaves little doubt that the Jacobites 
considered their operation hindered by this general lack of war supplies. By default, blockade 
was effectively all the Jacobites could enforce, and their chief engineer at Londonderry, 
Massd, considered it a poor blockade to boot. Undoubtedly, though, the inhabitants of the 
town considered themselves besieged and this was significant in strengthening their resolve. " 
Notwithstanding, throughout May the realisation that only a relief operation sent up the River 
Foyle could prevent Londonderry being secured for James became common ground for 
Jacobites and inhabitants allke. 
London's knowledge of the unfolding events at Londonderry was uneven. As the 
preparations for the dispatch of Cunningham and Richards were reaching completion, the 
King decided to send an additional two regiments - Major-General Kirke's" and Sir John 
Hanmer's - to aid the defence of the town. Although many of the transports for these 
regiments were ready from 10 April, the convoy had still to depart when news came through 
in late April of the impending return of Cunningham and Richards. Initially, this was thought 
to signify that Londonderry was lost and some supply ships which were just about to depart 
were ordered to stay. Shortly thereafter came the accurate report that the troops had been 
sent away while the town remained in loyal Protestant hands. Furious, William focused his 
22 C. O'Kelly, Macariae Excidium, or The Destruction of Cyprus, ed. J. C. O'Callaghan (Dublin, 1850), p. 33; 
Walker, A True Account ofthe Siege ofLondon-Derry, pp. 16-19; Simms, Jacobite lrelan4 1685-1691, pp. 
99-100. 
23 AH xxi, no. 189,, p. 90: Pusignan A Rozc, I mai 1689 [NS]; NJgociations de M. Le Comte DAvaux, p. 117, 
160: d'Avaux A Louvois, 6,18 mai 1689 [NS]; Walker, A True Account of the Siege ofLondon-Derry, pp. 9- 
10; 20-2; Berwick, Memoirs, i. 48-52; A Jacobite Narrative, pp. 63-4. 
24 Simms, 'The Siege of Derry', pp. 221-2,232-3, discusses this point. 
25 AH xxi, nos. 244,254,263, pp. 168,175-7,182-3: Roze au Roy dAngleterre, 6,15 juin 1689; Roze i 
Melfort, 29 juin 1689; Nigociations de M. Le Comte DA vaux en Irlande (1689-1690), Supplementary 
Volume, ed. J. Hogan (Dublin, 195 8), nos. [B] 1, IV, pp. 34-5,3 7-8: Roze i d'Avaux, 18,28 juillet 1689 [NS]; 
Walker, A True Account of the Siege ofLondon-Derry, passim; Story, A Continuation ofthe Impartial 
History, pp. 3-4; S. Mulloy, 'French Engineers with the Jacobite Army in Ireland, 1689-1691', IS xv (1982- 
1983), 223. 
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displeasure into ordering four regiments to be sent to the town and wrote to the garrison 
about his determination to provide for their relief. " 
Within a couple of days, this decision gained a sense of urgency and a specific 
operational context when the King's tactical and strategic position in Ireland suffered a 
reverse. On I May, off Ireland's south-west coast, Admiral Herbert had engaged the French 
squadron commanded by Chfiteaurenauh. " Although the result of the ship battle was 
ambiguous, Chateaurenault had managed to escort the supply vessels with troops and 
provisions aboard safely into Bantry Bay for unloading. In the short term, the Williamite 
resistance in Ireland faced an augmented and better provisioned Jacobite force whose 
strategic presence, more importantly, seemed secured by an open sea-based supply route from 
France. " 
Given these circumstances, it was fortunate that the preparations previously 
completed for the aborted dispatch of Kirke's and Hanmer's regiments required only 
augmentation to make ready the new force for departure. As these two regiments were still 
at Liverpool, they were chosen to be sent, while the other half of the force could be swiftly 
supplied by the two returned regiments. Cunningham and Richards were not however to be 
afforded a second chance at Londonderry and they were relived of their colonelcies, to be 
replaced by William Stuart and Sir George St George. " Colonel Trelawny was put in charge 
of the remaining organisation of this force, including hiring the transports and procuring the 
26 There are many variations in the spelling of both Percy Kirke's forename and surname. I have adopted the 
versions in the DNB (London, 1909), xi. 214. 27 CPSD, 1689-1690, pp. 77,80: Nottingham to Herbert, 25 Apr. 1689; Nottingham to the Officer, or 
Commander-in-Chief, and Magistrates of Londonderry, 28 Apr. 1689; PRO, ADM 3/1, pp. 13,16,22-3,30: 
Board Minutes, 21,26 Mar., 6,16 Apr. 1689; HMC, Twelfth Report, House of Lords MSS, 1689-1690, pp. 
172,174-6: At the Committee [for the Affairs of Ireland], 18 Mar., 5,6,8 Apr. 1689; 'Instructions to Peircy 
Kirke, Esq', 3 Mar. 1689; 'Instructions to Sir John Hanmer', 3 Mar. 1689; HMC, Finch MSS, ii. 201,203-5: 
Nottingham to Herbert, 19,25,30 Apr. 1689. 
28 There are various spellings of Chiteaurenault. I have adopted the one given in the Dictionnaire de 
Blographie Francalse (Paris, 1959), viii. 778. 
29 Memoirs Relating to the Lord Torrington, ed. J. K. Laughton (London, 1889), pp. 37-8; S. Martin-Leake, 
The Life ofSir John Leake, ed. G. Callender (London, 1918), i. 21-2; Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 1666- 
1740, ed. C. R. Markham (London, 1895), pp. 7-8; J. Burchett, A Complete History of the Most Remarkable 
Transactions at Sea (London, 1720), pp. 416-17; C. de la Ronci6re, Histoire de la Marine FranVaise vi. Le 
Cripuscule du Grand Regne LApogge de La Guerre de Course (Paris, 1932), pp. 47-52; P. Le Fevre, 'The 
Battle of Bantry Bay, I May 1689', IS xviii (1990-1992), 1-12; Mulloy, 'The French Navy and the Jacobite 
War in Ireland, 1689-1691', pp. 24-5. 
30 PRO, WO 4/1, p. 133: Schomberg to Trelawny, I May 1689; PRO, WO 515, p. 150: Order to Major- 
General Kirke and Colonel Trelawny, 2 May 1689; SP 44/166, p. 37: Commissions for Sir George St George 
to be Colonel of Colonel Richards Regiment of Foot and for Colonel William Stuart to be Colonel of Colonel 
Cunningham's Regiment of Foot, I May 1689. 
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provisions. This arrangement may have been a consequence of the increasingly fractious 
relationship which had emerged between the General Officer-in-Command, Percy Kirke, and 
the Navy Board's local officers when he had been previously overseeing the intended 
departure of his and Hanmer's regiments. Or, more likely, it reflected the fact no naval 
captain was to hold a senior orjoint command in the crossing to Londonderry. In that 
respect there was little difference between Kirke's Instructions and those which governed the 
early supply of troops. However, on this occasion it was positively prescribed that Kirke was 
to ensure the entry of his troops into the town if it remained in Protestant possession. 31 If 
faced with a loyal town but with its access barred, Kirke was to fight his way in. There had 
been no such implication arising from Cunningham's and Richards's Instructions and this, in 
part, provided the combined operational context as distinct from a straightforward 
transportation procedure. The other contributory factor was the significant naval input when 
Kirke's convoyjoined Captain Rooke's Irish station squadron. Since the engagement at 
Bantry Bay, Rooke had been plying the northern reaches of the Irish sea with orders to give 
countenance to any action to reduce Ireland. His subsequent disposal of his small squadron in 
support of Kirke completed the amphibious operational context for the relief of 
Londonderry. " 
Kirke's squadron of three men-of-war and some 24 auxiliary vessels eventually left 
Hoylake on 30 May, though with only three out of the four regiments aboard. St George's 
men had been billeted separately at Chester and were to have embarked from there, but it 
would seem that some confusion occurred over the number of transport vessels required. 
During the crossing, the wind proved variable and, at one stage, Kirke was forced into 
Ramsey Bay on the Isle of Man. This caused a four day delay but he managed to complete 
the rendezvous with Rooke's squadron at Red Bay off the Antrim coast on 8 June. The 
combined force then sailed on a north-westerly course but again encountered veering winds 
which caused a further four day delay near Rathlin Island, some six leagues from Lough 
Foyle. Kirke, nonetheless, used this time to garner intelligence on the access to Londonderry 
31 SP 44/166, pp. 32-7: 'Instructions for Our Trusty & Welbeloved Piercy Kirk Esq. ', 29 Apr. 1689; 
'Instruction for Our Trusty and Welbeloved Charles Trelawny Esq. ', 29 Apr. 1689; Warrant to Commander of 
Ship --------- 29 Apr. 1689; Warrant to Ships hired by Colonel Trelawny, 29 Apr. 1689; PRO, WO 4/1, pp. 
128-9: Blathwayt to Kirke, 5,6 Apr. 1689; PRO, ADM 1/3558, f 115: the Navy Board to the Admiralty, 15 
Apr. 1689, and enclosure, f 115: Anderton to the Navy Board, 12 Apr. 1689. 
32 RMC, Finch MSS, ii. 209,212,219-20: Rooke to Nottingham, II May, 1,20 June 1689; Anon, The Life 
and Glorious Actions ofthe Right Honourable Sir George Rooke, P (London, 1713), pp. 3-10. 
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by dispatching a yacht up the Lough. It brought back the dispiriting news that the French had 
made attempts to blockade the river, though there was no confmmation about the nature of 
the obstacle. " 
Spurred on by news of the relief expedition, the French had blocked the access up the 
River Foyle by placing a boom across a narrow part of the river just above Brookhall. The 
naval officer, Pointis, had taken responsibility for this task and rather incautiously boasted of 
its strength, though he also indicated that additional security would be provided by the 
construction of a second boom up-river. It has been shown that the first boom sank and that 
only the second - constructed from fir wood instead of the heavier oak - remained in place. 
Even if Pointis's description is unreliable, the second boom, with heavy gun redoubts at each 
end, was a formidable obstacle, particularly as the natural shelter of the Lough would hinder a 
vessel building up any momentum with which to strike it. " This was how it seemed to 
Kirke's Council of War, which met in the period after his ships and the three smallest vessels 
from Rooke's squadron had come to anchor just over a mile below Culmore Fort on 16 June. 
The Council concluded that the river was impassable and resolved to await reinforcements 
before attempting a descent elsewhere on the coast. " This decision was condemned by 
contemporaries and subsequently by historians as a prelude for weeks of inactivity"' but, 
within the context of Kirke's command of a combined operation, the charge is unjustified. 
Shortly after the Council's decision to await reinforcements, Kirke began to consider 
alternatives to the passage up the river which, although they might not immediately relieve 
Londonderry, could put pressure upon the Jacobites. There was also the pressing need to 
exercise his soldiers who had been aboard ship for nearly a month and now faced an indefinite 
period of inaction. The Bonadventure, the Greyhound and the Kingfisher ketch were sent to 
33 Anon, A Particular Journal of Major Gen. Kirk's Voyagefrom Leverpoole, to his Safe Arrival at London- 
Derry (London, 1689); HMC, Finch MSS, ii. 212: Rooke to Nottingham, I June 1689; Martin-Leake, The Life 
ofSir John Leake, i. 25-6; The Life and Glorious Actions of the Right Honourable Sir George Rooke, K!, pp. 
3-5; CSPD, 1689-1690, pp. 219-20: Schomberg to the King, II Aug. 1689; K. Ferguson, 'The Organisation 
of King William's Army in Ireland, 1689-1692', IS xviii (1990-1992), 64 n. 9. 
34 I-1MC, Finch MSS, ii. 231,233: Nottingham to Schomberg, 27 July 1689; Nottingham to the King, 2 Aug. 
1689; CSPD, 1689-1690, pp. 147-5: Pointis to [the King of France? ], 13 June 1689; Walker, A True Account 
ofthe Siege ofLondon-Derry, pp. 26-7. 
35 I-1MC, Finch MSS, ii. 219-20: Rooke to Nottingham, 20 June 1689; Martin-Leake, A Life ofSir John Leake, 
i. 26; Anon, The Life and Glorious Actions of the Right Honourable Sir George Rooke, R, pp. 4-5; Powley, 
The Naval Side ofKing William's War, pp. 226-8, includes the minute of the Council of War held on 19 June. 
36 HMC, Finch MSS, ii. 233: Nottingham to the King, 2 Aug. 1689; Simms, 'The Siege of Derry', pp. 230-1; 
Murtagh, 'The War in Ireland, 1689-1691', p. 69 Milligan, History of the Siege ofLondondeny 1689, pp. 
229-34. 
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reconnoitre Inch Island in Lough Swilly. Located north-westwards from Londonderry, Inch 
Island could provide a bridgehead through county Donegal and allow Kirke to establish a line 
of communication with the other remaining centre of Protestant resistance at Enniskillen and, 
more importantly, to threaten the Jacobite rear. On 28 June the Bonadventure reported back 
and four days later - at a post-dinner Council of War held aboard the Swallow - it was 
resolved that Rooke and Colonel Stuart would lead an operation to capture Inch Island. By 
10 July, Stuart's detachment of some 600 troops had landed at two different points on the 
island and within six days a bridgehead to the mainland had been secured with gun redoubts 
on either side of the passage, supported by the Greyhound and the Kingfisher ketch. This 
success allowed Kirke to bring a majority of the remaining troops up out of Lough Foyle and 
to land them on Inch Island. Although the absence of any opposition, and the fact that it did 
not subsequently give rise to further action, may subsequently have provided grounds for 
dismissing this operation, this was certainly not Rosen's attitude at the time. The French 
General clearly saw the danger for the Jacobites of being caught in a pincer between Kirke 
from the north and the Enniskilleners from the south. "' 
Rosen's fears were grounded in the lack of progress with the siege. On his return to 
Londonderry, he had tried to force the pace onwards and extra equipment was brought up to 
facilitate a heavier bombardment of the town. However, a second attempt to take Windmill 
Hill in the first week of June had been bloodily rebuffed as was the assault led by the Earl of 
Clancarty on 28 June against the bastion at Butcher's Gate. Even Rosen's primitive attempt 
at psychological warfare by driving a number of captured Protestants under the walls failed, 
when the garrison replied in an equally savage manner by manufacturing a gallows on the 
walls accompanied by the threat to kill the prisoners held inside. At these macabre events, 
Hamilton, with whom Rosen had an uneasy relationship, ordered those under the walls to be 
released. Jacobite prospects brightened slightly in July with the tentative beginnings of 
negotiations with the garrison but the inhabitants, although in severely straitened 
circumstances, had been cheered by the arrival of Kirke (even if in Lough Swilly) and 
37 Walker, A True Account ofthe Siege ofLondon-Derry, p. 28: Major General Kirk's Letter to Mr. Walker; 
Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, L 26; Anon, The Life and GloriousA ctions ofSir George Rooke, 
R, pp. 5-6; AHxxi, no. 239, pp. 159-61: Fumeron A [Louvois], I aoOt 1689 [NS]; Simms, Jacobite Ireland 
1685-1691, p. I 10; Powley, The Naval Side ofKing William's War, pp. 233-5. 
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therefore procrastinated. " In effect, by mid-July, the Jacobites hoped that the town would 
capitulate due to starvation before Kirke could make an attempt up-river with the relief 
It would seem that the decisive factor was a letter Kirke received from Londonderry's 
governors Walker and John Michelburne who had replaced Major Baker following his death 
from disease in June. This correspondence reinforced previous pleas emphasising the town's 
dire need which were emotionally focused upon alarming images of dog and cat forming the 
inhabitants' staple diet. More importantly it claimed (falsely) that the Jacobites had removed 
their ordnance from Culmore Fort and that the boom was broken. Encouraged by this news 
Kirke returned to Lough Foyle with three heavily laden merchantmen determined to relieve 
the town. Preparatory to this Kirke asked Rooke to provide naval support for the riverine 
operation. Then patrolling in the Irish sea, Rooke received Kirke's letter on 22 July and 
immediately sailed for Londonderry in the Deptford along with Captain Leake's Dartmouth. " 
An alternative interpretation of these circumstances highlights London's increasing 
impatience with Kirke which led the King to positively order that an attempt be made to 
break the boom. Undoubtedly, William did believe Kirke's assessment of the boom's strength 
to be a guess and he considered it reasonable that his General make at least one attempt up- 
river; but by agreeing in principle to despatch reinforcements if the boom remained intact, he 
demonstrated some sympathy with Kirke's alternative amphibious strategy. More 
significantly, E. B. Powley has shown that the order from London did not reach Kirke until 
after he had decided to return to Lough Foyle. 40 
In earlier correspondence about the difficulties he foresaw in getting through to 
Londonderry, Kirke had stressed the fact that the strategically placed Culmore Fort was held 
38 HMC, Eighth Report, Talbot de Malahide MSS, p. 494-5: Melfort to Hamilton, 7 June, 4 July 1689; King, 
The State of the Protestants, pp. 196-8; A Jacobite Narrative, pp. 79-80; A Life ofJames the Second, pp. 365- 
6; Walker, A True Account of the Siege ofLondon-Derry, pp. 25-6,29-34; Milligan, History ofthe Siege of 
Londonderry 1689, pp. 203-11. 
39 Powley, The Naval Side ofKing TVilliam's War, pp. 238-40 includes a copy of the letter of 19 July to Kirke 
from Michelburne and Walker; Walker, A True Account of the Siege ofLondon-Derry, pp. 8 8-92: Walker to 
'Sir' [Kirke? ], 26 June 1689; Morney, Limes, and Gbrastanes to 'Sir' [Kirke? ], 26 June 1689; Walker, Baker, 
Michelburne, Fortescue, Morrison, Strong, and Davys to 'Sir' [Kirke? ], n. d.; RMC, Finch MSS, ii. 233-4: 
Rooke to Nottingham, 2 Aug. 1689; Anon, 7he Life and Glorious Actions of the Right Honourable Sir 
George Rooke, K, pp. 6-7. 
"0 Macaulay, The History ofEngland, iii. 1519,1519 n. 2; Simms, Jacobite Ireland 1685-1691, p. III claims 
that Kirke's return to Lough Foyle was a product of both Walker's letter and the King's order; Dwyer, The 
Siege ofLondonderry in 1689, pp. 208-9: Schomberg to Kirke, 3 July 1689; CSPD, 1689-1690, p. 199: 
Schomberg to the King, 26 July 1689; Powley, The Naval Side ofKing William's War, pp. 250-2. 
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by the Jacobites. " Although Kirke had been told that the guns had been withdrawn, he could 
not be certain and, therefore, in this attempt up the Foyle, the Dartmouth was to draw the fire 
from the fort and the other gun batteries possibly mounted nearby, while the two 
merchantmen - the Mounyby and the Phamix - along with the Swallow's long-boat, would 
proceed up-river in an attempt to break the boom. On 28 July, Captain Leake ably executed 
this task and the other vessels - taking advantage of a northerly wind - safely passed by. 
However, just as they approached the boom - which they found still intact - the wind dropped 
and only the Mounyoy hit the obstacle with any force. Nonetheless, her momentum was not 
sufficient to take her clean through and she rebounded on to the nearby bank, effectively 
leaving her a sitting target for the Jacobites swarming nearby. With the Mounyoy's Master 
dead, the crew combined the recoil from the discharge of the vessel's guns with a rising tide 
to refloat. Meanwhile, the sailors in Swallow's long-boat had set about the boom with their 
axes and cutlasses, considerably weakening the structure. When the Pheenix made a run 
against the boom, she was able to break clean through and was then shortly followed by the 
other victualling ships; provisions and troops could now be landed at the town's Shipquay 
Gate. 42 
A timely English combined operation had relieved Londonderry and opened the sea- 
based supply route. Despite a desultory attempt to continue their fire from the trenches, 
within a couple of days the French raised the siege and retreated towards Dublin. " It is 
difficult to add to Simms's judgement that this operation had been 'an astonishing feat' in 
dead calm conditions and under such close range fire, though at the time the defenders' 
resolve was equally commended. "' Approximately a month after the relief of Londonderry, 
the London book-seller, Richard Lapthorne, wrote to his Devon correspondent, Richard 
41 HMC, Frankland-Russell-Astley MSS, pp. 72-3: T[homas] F[rankland] to his father Sir William 
[Frankland], 22 June 1689. 
42 HMC, Eleventh Report, Appendbr Part vi, Hamilton MSS, nos. 184,185, pp. 185-6: From Major Gen. 
Kirke announcing the partial relief of Derry, 29 July 1689; Copy of a letter from Capt. Rooke, 2 Aug. 1689; 
Powley, The Naval Side ofKing William's War, pp. 247-50 includes a full transcript of the original 
manuscript version of no. 184 above; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, i. 27-9; T. Witherow, Derry 
and Enniskillen in the Year 1689: The Story ofSome Famous Battle-Fields in Ulster (3 edn, Belfast, 18 85), 
pp. 200-8; Walker, A True Account ofthe Siege ofLondon-Derry 1689, pp. 37-9. 
" Nigociations de M. Le Comte DAvaux, pp. 373-5: d'Avaux A Louvois, 10 aofit 1689 [NS]; AH xxi, no. 
242, pp. 164-6: Fumeron i [Louvois], 13 aofit 1689 [NS]. 
44 Simms, Jacohile Ireland 1685-1691, p. I 11; BL, Egerton 3380, p. 1: Shrewsbury to Walker and 
Michelburne, 16 Aug. 1689. 
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Coffin, that Ireland had received a 'death wound in order to its reduction'. "' In many 
respects, this was quite correct. In conjunction with the notable successes over the Jacobites 
around Enniskillen, and in particular the defeat of Mountcashel at Newton-Butler, the north 
had been secured for William. He could now land his army of 20 000 men to effect the 
conquest of the whole isle; while the prospect that the Irish and the Scots might combine their 
resistance at this moment seemed unlikely, especially since the death at Killiekrankie of the 
Scottish Jacobite, Viscount Dundee. Nonetheless, the wound would fester for a further two 
years before proving fatal, and during that time a second combined operation undertaken 
against south Ireland was, militarily, to prove as significant as the one recently completed in 
the north at Londonderry. 
I. iii: The Capture of Cork and Kinsale, September-October 1690. 
The progress of the war in Ireland since securing the north of the country in the summer of 
1689 had not been an unqualified success for William. He had appointed Marshall 
Schomberg, to command his army in the country but, after landing with the troops at Belfast 
in June 1689, Schomberg only advanced as far as Dundalk. There he encamped for the 
winter but the site was so ill-chosen that great numbers of the troops died of sickness. "" 
Frustrated, William crossed to Ireland for the following years campaign and at the beginning 
of July 1690, defeated James at the battle of the Boyne. " Undoubtedly this battle caused 
James to flee his former kingdoms again and allowed William to capture Dublin; however, the 
Jacobites were not yet a spent force and they still held towns and territory in the west and 
south of the country. After the Boyne, a Jacobite rendezvous had been effected at Limerick 
where the leadership resolved to defend the line of the River Shannon. William did flirt with 
possible peace initiatives, but it quickly became clear that their political cost in England would 
be too great; and military necessity then drove him forward to besiege Limerick. It was in 
front of this town's walls that Willliam's 1690 campaign in Ireland ground to a halt. The 
progress of the siege through August was slow, hampered not only by poor weather but also 
by the ambush of his siege train at Ballyneety by the mercurial Irish Cavalry officer, Patrick 
" The Portledge Papers, p. 6 1: Lapthorne to Coffin, 24 Aug. 16 89. 
46 Sir John Dalrymple, Memoirs Of Great Britain andIreland(2 edn, London, 1773), ii. 29-31,40-3,45-8, 
51-7: Schomberg to King William, 20 Sept., 6,8,12 Oct., 4 Nov., 26,27 Dec. 1689; J. Childs, 'A Patriot for 
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Schomberg at Dundalk, 1689', IS x (1971-1972), 14-25. 
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Sarsfield. Although an assault was launched in late August, over 2000 troops were lost 
without the walls being breached and it was then clear that the siege would have to be 
raised. " 
Contributing to William's difficulties in Ireland throughout the summer was England's 
unsettled state since Tourville's naval victory over Torrington at the battle of Beachy Head. 
From the end of June, the French unquestionably had command of the channel and there were 
grave fears in England that Louis would exploit this circumstance to mount an invasion. 
Queen Mary and the Council left in executive control of the country by William during his 
absence urgently requested that he return home and bring with him regiments to bolster 
England's defences. The King agreed to transfer up to a total of ten regiments from Ireland 
and Flanders but he did not himself return immediately; and, when in late July he did make to 
leave Ireland, his desire to direct the siege of Limerick caused him to change his mind at the 
last moment. In the event, aside from a brief landing at Teignmouth during which the town 
was burnt, the French missed the opportunity to exploit their sea command but there still 
remained much unease in London. "" It was therefore unsurprising that when the commander 
of the troops in England, the Earl of Marlborough, proposed an expedition to capture the 
southern Irish ports of Cork and Kinsale, he met a frosty reaction. 
Marlborough's concern with Ireland had been motivated by his perception that 
William's efforts were spluttering to a standstill in front of Limerick and his appreciation of 
the strategic benefit that might accrue from capturing the principal ports of entry for French 
supply. By requesting some 5000 troops which he would lead in an assault against these 
ports with the navy providing support, Marlborough recognised amphibious warfare's 
potential to reinvigorate stalemated military circumstances -a quality of his generalship which 
was to be more fully developed when he commanded the Grand Alliance's armies during the 
War of the Spanish Succession. Support was only forthcoming, however, from Secretary 
Nottingham and Admiral Russell, and the Executive Council resolved to reject his proposal 
47 RMC, Leybourne-Popham MSS, pp. 274-6: 'Autobiography of Dr George Clarke'. 
48 de la Ronci6re, Histoire de la Marine Franqaise, vi. 67-79; Childs, 'The Williamite War, 1689-169 1, pp. 
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Simms, 'The Siege of Limerick 1690', in E. Rynne (ed. ) North Munster Studies: Essays in Commemoration of 
Monsignor Michael Moloney (Limerick, 1967), pp. 3 08-14. 
49 Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain andIreland, ii. 125-31,144-50: the Queen to the King, 2,3,6,22, 
24 July 1690; W. S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times (Sphere edn, London, 1967), i. 274-6; 
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on the grounds of the lateness of the year and the reduction it would cause in England's home 
defence. The Queen, though with no great personal liking for Marlborough, did acknowledge 
that the Council had not been unanimous and sent the plan to William for his decision. 
Despite opposition from his fellow Dutch generals, the King promptly wrote home his 
approval. " 
William's crucial support of Marlborough's project should not have surprised the 
Council. For the King, the capture of the two Munster ports held the potential to redress the 
tactical failures of the 1690 campaign as it got bogged down besieging Limerick. William, 
like Marlborough, recognised the strategic benefits that could also be gained from closing the 
Jacobites' principal supply route from France and winning for the Williamite cause two well 
developed ports on the southern Irish coast. " William had previously championed a similar 
operation to capture Kinsale in late 1689. Then, intelligence returns indicating that Kinsale 
was poorly defended by only one regiment accelerated preparations that were already in hand 
for an attack upon the port. Rear-Admiral Lord Berkeley and Colonel Trelawny were to have 
commanded a force of about half the size that Marlborough would subsequently lead. Only 
the onset of stormy weather at the end of November when the squadron was ready to sail 
caused the operation to be abandoned. " Marlborough's proposals in August 1690 were 
therefore (perhaps deliberately) pushing at an open door in terms of King William's 
commitment to both the objectives of the operation and its character. 
Within ten days of William sending his approval, Marlborough received warrants to 
embark aboard the main fleet at Portsmouth eight regiments of foot and 2000 marine soldiers. 
This reflected the fact that his Instructions effectively put him in charge of both the land and 
sea elements of the force. Command of the fleet was then under a triple commission of 
Killigrew, Ashby and Haddock; these Admirals were not ordered to obey Marlborough 
50 Churchill, Marlborough, i. 277-8; G. S. Cox, 'Marlborough in Ireland-Last Sieges of Cork and Kinsale', AC 
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directly, but they were to assist him in attacking Cork and Kinsale. The main Instructions 
were addressed to Marlborough and the responsibility for directing the attack rested with 
him. The simplicity of the Instructions had probably facilitated their swift formulation which 
was also the case with the preparation for departure. The Admiralty lost no time in 
assembling the fleet at Spithead, while also attending to the procurement of provisions and 
the additional requirements of having soldiers aboard ship such as bedding. Although Danby, 
as part of his constant critique on the operation, complained that the troops had not been 
embarked by 29 September, on the following day the task was completed. Thereafter the 
only thing preventing the departure were the contrary winds that kept the fleet at anchor off 
Portsmouth for three weeks. Finally on 17 September the expeditionary force weighed. " 
Demonstrating the concern for his men which in later years would cause him to be 
affectionately nicknamed 'Corporal John"', Marlborough wrote to Nottingham of his hopes 
that the voyage would be short as many of his troops were suffering sickness from having 
been embarked at anchor for three weeks. " Fortunately, it only took four days for the fleet to 
arrive on 21 September off Crosshaven near the inlet to Cork Harbour. Both Crosshaven and 
the Passage West had been mooted as potential landing sites, but the latter's location 
opposite Great Island in Cork Harbour meant a shorter march of only some seven miles in 
order for the troops to come up to the town of Cork and this factor probably caused it to be 
favoured by Marlborough. However, the numerous passageways of the Lee as it discharged 
into the estuary made entry into Cork Harbour an intricate task, and the fleet's arrival not 
only coincided with the end of a flood tide, but also the dropping of the wind. In these 
conditions, the pilots refused to guide the vessels into the harbour and the expeditionary force 
had to ride at anchor for the rest of the day. 56 
53 PRO, SP 44/166, pp. 149-50: Warrant to John, Earl of Marlborough, 25 Aug. 1690; RMC Finch MSS, ii. 
430,433,457: the Queen to the Admirals, 26 Aug. 1690; Marlborough to Nottingham, 27,28 Aug. 1690; 
Instruction to John, Earl of Marlborough, Lieut. -Gen., 14 Sept. 1690; Warrant to Our Commissioners for 
Executing the Office of Our fligh Admiral of England, 25 Aug. 1690; PRO, ADM 3/4, unpaginated: Board 
Minutes, 6,22,26 Aug., 6 Sept. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/6, pp. 269: the Admiralty to the Admirals, 22 Aug. 
1690; PRO, ADM 2/170, p. 365: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 27 Aug. 1690; Browning, Thomas 
Osborne, ii. 188-9: Carmarthen to [the King], 29 Aug. 1690. 
54 D. Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander (3 edn, Kent 1989), p. xiii. 
55 RMC, Finch MSS, ii. 460: Marlborough to Nottingham, 17 Sept. 1690. 
56 RMC, Finch MSS, ii. 465-6: the Admirals to Nottingham, 26 Sept. 1690; PRO, ADM 51/4213, Part i, 
unpaginated, Hampton Court, 20-3 Sept. 1690; PRO, ADM 51/4201, Part i, unpaginated, Grafton, 20-3 Sept. 
1690; BL, Add MSS 29878, p. 28 [This pagination runs in descending numerical order for the Diary entries 
were made on the reverse of the accounting entries once the notebook had been turned upside-down. ]: W. 
Cramond's Diary, 21-3 Sept. 1690; A Jacobite Narrative, p. 119; G. J. Wolseley, The Life ofJohn Churchill 
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The weather and tidal conditions on 22 September proved suitable and the fleet began 
to make its way into Cork harbour. The lead ship, the Kent, almost immediately encountered 
opposition on its larboard side from a shore battery in Prince Rupert's Tower. " Reports of 
its strength vary from between six to twenty guns. The fleet managed to silence it swiftly by 
several vessels faing a broadside as they sailed by in line-ahead; meanwhile, a small boat party 
was landed to drive the gunners off, though on reaching the emplacement they found it 
deserted and guns had only to be spiked for the battery to be rendered permanently out of 
commission. By early afternoon the ships had come safely to anchor at Passage West and the 
landing of the soldiers by the ships' boats began in the early hours of the following day and 
was complete by late afternoon. Four days later, once all the stores had been landed, the 
main fleet - as ordered - returned home, leaving a small squadron commanded by the Duke of 
Grafton to work with the expeditionary force. " 
The reinforcements which the King had promised Marlborough from his army in 
Ireland took a circuitous route to Cork. On William's departure for England, a Council of 
War at the Tipperary camp was called by Count Sohns - temporarily in command - to 
consider how best to implement the King's order which, in addition to the emphasis upon 
supporting Marlborough's expedition, also included directions that the Irish territory 
currently held by the Williamite forces should be secured for the winter. Without positive 
confirmation of Marlborough's arrival before Cork, the Council considered that it had 
insufficient troops to send immediately a sizeable detachment to the Earl. In the first instance, 
therefore, Major-General Tettau commanding two Danish battalions was sent in the direction 
of Youghal. but with orders to halt along the line of the River Blackwater, thus providing 
cover for county Waterford where the Danish winter quarters were to be based. Meanwhile, 
Major-General Gravemoer was to lead sixteen cavalry squadrons drawn from the Danish, 
Dutch and Huguenot forces along with five Dragoon troops, eastwards along the Blackwater 
Duke ofMarlborough to the Accession of Queen Anne (London, 1894), ii. 164-5. Exceptionally, Anon, A 
Full and True Relation of the Taking of Cork by the Right Honorable the Earl ofMariborough (London, 
1690) states that fleet entered Cork Harbour a day earlier. 
57 Prince Rupert's Fort has since been renamed Corkbeg. 
5' RMC, Finch MSS, ii. 465-6: the Admirals to Nottingham, 26 Sept. 1690; PRO, ADM 51/4213, Part i, 
unpaginated, Hampton Court, 22-3 Sept. 1690; PRO, ADM 51/4201, Part i, unpaginated, Grafton, 22-3 Sept. 
1690; BL, Add MSS 29878: W. Cramond's Diary, 22-3 Sept. 1690; PRO, ADM 3/4, unpaginated: Board 
Minutes, 18 Sept. 1690; Wolseley, The Life ofJohn Churchill, ii. 187. 
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to Mallow, just twenty miles north-west of Cork. "' Neither detachment contained a 
prominent English soldier and Marlborough's request as he approached the southern Irish 
coast that the English major-generals, Kirke and Lanier, command the reinforcements was 
brushed aside by Ginkel who had now succeeded Sohns as commander. Ginkel's view was 
that detachments of Gravemoer and Tettau previously posted on the Blackwater were to 
proceed to Cork, while more than 3000 horse and foot under the Danish commander, the 
Duke of Wurtemberg, would march from Cdhir to Marlborough's assistance. " 
Cork's garrison of over 4000 men commanded by Colonel MacElligott was thus 
threatened by a pincer as Williamite forces moved in to besiege the town from its heights to 
the north and south. MacElligott also had no obvious sources of relief Jacobite forces had 
recently suffered reverses north and south of Limerick in attacking Birr Castle, county Offaly, 
and in attempting to occupy Kilmallock; while it was also reported that a move into county 
Cork had been repulsed by Gravemoer's cavalry near Mallow. Berwick did however begin to 
advance with a considerable force from Limerick towards Cork but the Marshall only got as 
far as Kilmallock before he generously estimated the enemy force in the region to be too great 
for his 8000 men, and this probably gave rise to Jacobite scepticism about the feasibility of 
holding Cork that was subsequently attributed to Berwick. "' Certainly, the task became even 
more unlikely when MacElligott's out-guards failed to offer any credible resistance to the 
approaching forces. 
On landing at Passage West, Marlborough had sent a vanguard under Colonel Hales 
towards Cat Fort, on a hill rising 90 feet above the town and at a distance of 400 yards from 
the walls. This building was a small outwork to the larger Fort Elizabeth which, at under a 
hundred yards from the city walls, provided the principal defence. The Jacobites dispatched a 
couple of Dragoon troops to oppose Hales, and Cramond fondly recalls having much fun 
'popping from the hedges'. " The Dragoons quickly beat a retreat when Hales brought a 
59 CSPD, 1690-1691, pp. 111-12,118-19: 'M6moire pour mon cousin le Comte deSolmes', 2 Sept. 1690; 
Resolution taken by Count de Solms ... as to what had best be done for the King's service, according to his 
instructions and orders, 12 Sept. 1690; The Danish Force in Ireland 1690-1691, eds K. Danaher & LG. 
Simms (Dublin, 1962), nos. 58,59,60,61, pp. 76-8: Wurtemberg to Harboe, 9,13 Sept, 1690; Wurtemberg to 
Christian V, 12 Sept. 1690; Munchgaar to Harboe, 18 Sept. 1690. 
60 The Danish Force in Ireland 1690-1691, no. 62, pp. 78-90: Wurtemberg to Christian V, 23 Sept. 1690; 
Journal of the Very Rev. RowlandDavies, LLD. Dean ofRoss, ed. R. Caulfield (London, 1856), p. 148. 
61 Journal of the Very Rev. Rowland Davies, pp. 148-9; Berwick, Memoirs, ii. 78; The Life ofJames the 
Second, p. 419. 
62 BL, Add MSS 29878, p. 28: W. Cramond's Diary, 24 Sept. 1690; J. G. Simms, 'Marlborough's Siege of 
Cork, 1690', IS ix (1969-1970), 118. 
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couple of field-pieces to bear upon them, however. Once the rest of Marlborough's force had 
come up, the Jacobites abandoned Cat Fort overnight. Meanwhile, in Cork's northern 
suburbs, Tettau and Gravemoer had similar success intimidating the enemy from their 
outposts around Shandon Castle. Fortunately the castle was spared the fires lit by the 
Jacobites as they fled and it remained intact as a readymmade battery site. The final event on 
24 September which bolstered the Williamite approach to Cork was Marlborough's request 
that Gravemoer send him a party of horse. He had been conscious that his expeditionary 
force lacked a mobile screen and, in particular, security on the south-westerly flank; once 
Gravemoer's horse had crossed the Lee some three miles westwards at the church of Carry 
Kippane, Marlborough could then devote full attention to disposing his siege works. " 
Shandon Castle and Cat Fort to the north and south of the city respectively were the 
obvious sites for the siege batteries and Marlborough quickly approved their construction. 
He recognised though that the bombardment from Cat Fort would be masked by the stoutly 
constructed Elizabeth Fort and thus a third battery was established at Red Abbey, situated to 
the south-east of the city, which would direct its fire wholly against the eastern section of the 
walls. The undulating nature of the ground meant that the labour-intensive task of digging 
trenches for cover was not necessary, leaving time for other batteries to be erected at Mitre 
Inn and at the Friar's Garden near Gallow Green, both within 600 yards of Elizabeth Fort. 
This decisiveness in siege operations was the product of the command discretion afforded 
Marlborough by his Instructions, with his authority galvanising the soldiers and sailors to 
work effectively together in bringing up the materials from Passage West and in constructing 
the batteries. ' The efficiency of combined operational endeavour fostered by the command 
structure was, however, threatened on 26 September when Wurtemberg arrived with his 
troops and claimed precedence in command due to his royal lineage. Naturally Marlborough 
was reluctant to accede to the German's demands - particularly as his reputation was that of 
an indifferent soldier - and a row threatened. But to prevent the siege's progress being 
undermined a compromise was reached whereby command would pass between the two 
generals on alternate days. Marlborough's forbearance and flattery of Wurtemberg in 
choosing his name as the password for the Duke's non-command days has been greatly 
63 BL, Add MSS 29878, p. 28: W. Cramond's Diary, 24 Sept. 1690; Journal of ihe Very Rev. Rowland 
Davies, pp. 148-51; Simms, 'Marlborough's Siege of Cork, 1690', p. 118. 
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commended. "' The somewhat juvenile form of the compromise perhaps undermines its 
credibility as a serious solution but Wurtemberg's recognition of his limitations by repeatedly 
deferring to Marlborough meant that the potential threat to the command structure for the 
combined operation never materialised. 
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The final manoeuvre which captured Cork reinforced the combined army and navy 
foundation of the operation. 66 By 27 September, with another battery of heavy ordnance 
constructed on the river bank by the Red Cow Inn and firing directly on the eastern wall, it 
seemed that the siege guns had caused sufficient damage to force MacElligott to negotiate. 
On requesting that envoys be sent to discuss terms, he allowed Bishop Wetenhall to shepherd 
out over a thousand Protestants. This gesture of goodwill proved however merely a ruse. 
Notwithstanding the opportunity to exploit a difference between Wurtemberg and 
Marlborough over concessions to the garrison (the latter being determined to offer none), 
MacElligott held the envoys until the tide had risen and then rejected negotiations. According 
to the Danish Lieutenant-Colonel, Munchgaar, the arrival of the flood tide postponed a 
planned advance that he and Sir David Collier were to undertake on to islands near the city 
walls. Cramond, instead, refers to a three battalion strong assault from the south that had 
been ordered for daybreak on 28 September but which was countermanded at dawn. Both 
these advances would have lacked the breach in the walls upon which the successful capture 
of a besieged town was invariably contingent. It may well be that the attack which Cramond 
mentions was abandoned for this reason and not because of the confusion attending 
MacElligott's apparent desire to capitulate. Nevertheless, if so, the timing was marginal, for 
a breach was effected during the morning of 28 September in the eastern section of the wall. 
The plan reputedly formed for Munchgaar's aborted advance was now significantly expanded 
to encompass a joint advance on the town from the north and south and, with the Lee to be 
crossed, the attack was perforce timed against the tides. The morning's flood tide was used 
to bring up-river to the north-east of the city the bomb vessel Salamander and a sloop which 
were to provide extra fire support. This was likely to be essential, as the marshland around 
the city walls would make the going heavy for the soldiers. Unbeknownst to the allies, 
however, there was a difference in the tidal range between the Lee's north and south channels 
66 The ensuing account of the capture of Cork is based on the following primary sources and secondary 
authorities: BL, Add MSS 29878, pp. 26-5: W. Cramond's Diary, 27-9 Sept. 1690; The Danish Force in 
Ireland 1690-1691, no. 65, Appendix IV, pp. 834,151-2: Munchgaar to Harboe, 29 Sept. 1690; Transl. of 
Authentische Nachrichten - 'The Capture of Cork, 16901; Journal ofthe Very Rev. RowlandDavies, pp. 15 1- 
6; A Full and True Relation of the Taking of Cork; A Jacobite Narrative, p. 119; W. Griflyth, Fillare 
Hibernicum (London, 1690), p. 27; Cox, 'Marlborough in Ireland', pp. 289-90; Simms, 'Marlborough's 
Siege of Cork', PP. 120- 1; Wolseley, The Life ofJohn Churchill, ii. 187-99; Atkinson, Marlborough and the 
Rise of the British Army, p. 116. The four naval captains (in addition to the Duke of Grafton) directly 
involved in the assault were Cornwall, Leighton, Fairborne and Neville. See Griffyth, Villare Hibernicum, p. 
27. 
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and this caused the start of the operation to mistime inasmuch as Wurtemberg's force was 
able to cross the river with ease well in advance of the English. More importantly, it also 
meant that Marlborough's column led by Lord Colchester with Trelawny's grenadiers in the 
van had to wade through water that was often at chest height. Nonetheless, the grenadiers 
ably fulfilled this specialised forward assault role that had become their central function since 
67 their introduction in 1678. Under heavy fire, they fought a passage through to allow the 
regiments of Marlborough, his brother and Collier, along with detachments from two other 
regiments of the expeditionary force, to join Wurtemberg's troops on the East Marsh. 
Shelter and a chance to re-group was provided by the bank of the counterscarp which was 
also partially covered by a house standing in the lee of the city walls. However, before 
sanctuary could be reached, the Duke of Grafton - while reconnoitring the marsh for a gun 
emplacement site - fell to a bullet in the shoulder. His subsequent death caused him to be 
much praised as a volunteer in the offensive across the river; but he was only one of a number 
in this category which - significantly given the operation's amphibious context - comprised at 
least four naval captains in addition to Grafton. 
Repeating his performance of the previous day, Governor MacElligott indicated a 
desire to surrender within two hours of the assault commencing, only to set his face against 
the prospect when the terms were offered. On this occasion, the two naval vessels in the Lee, 
along with the previously established siege batteries, were maintaining a preponderant fire 
which widened the breach, thus providing the troops in the East Marsh with a healthy chance 
of success in the assault. Consequently, MacElfigott quickly changed his mind and agreed to 
surrender, regardless of the proposed terms. These conditions proved strict: the Elizabeth 
Fort was to be rendered inside the hour followed by the town in the morning, when the 
garrison would be taken prisoner. This latter provision yielded many senior Jacobite 
commanders, including the Earl of Clancarty who was also one of the country's largest land 
owners. Well might d'Albeville's account of Cork's capture imply that the sacrifice in 
attempting to retain it had been too great. "' 
67 C. T. Atkinson, 'Grenadier Companies in the British Anny', JSAHR x (1931), 225. 
68 RMC, FinCh MSS, ii. 470-7: d'Albeville to James 11, [27 Oct. -]6 Nov. 1690. 
54 
The capitulation proceeded without incident and this released Marlborough to pursue 
the operation's second objective: Kinsale. " Situated some seventeen miles due south of 
Cork at the mouth of the River Bandon, Kinsale's harbour was considered the better 
anchorage, although much more poorly defended. The town was not walled, and its 
defensive strength derived solely from two forts: the Old Fort sat on an eminence which 
ballooned out into the riverjust east of the town; while the larger and more heavily gunned 
New (or Charles) Fort had been built recently to modern principles on the other river bank to 
the north. On 29 September, an advance party of nearly 500 horse and dragoons commanded 
by Brigadier Villiers and Colonel Neuenhuse was dispatched. As they reached Kinsale's 
environs, a trumpeter was sent with terms to the septuagenarian Jacobite Governor, Colonel 
Fdward Scott, who answered in defiance and led his garrison and the town's inhabitants to 
occupy the two forts. The Villiers-Neuenhuse detachment then could only occupy the town 
and extinguish the fires begun by the Jacobites. Although summons were sent to the two 
forts, their respective commanders, Scott and O'Sullivan-More, imitated Michelburne at 
Londonderry by unfurling a bloody flag in answer. 
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Villiers believed that with modest reinforcements - up to three foot regiments and 
cannon - the Old Fort would be vulnerable; and although Marlborough sent these from Cork 
immediately on receiving Villiers's request, they failed to arrive any earlier than the main 
expeditionary force which entered the town on 2 October. Both Marlborough and 
Wurtemberg agreed with Villiers's assessment of the Old Fort and this was also underlined by 
some deserters who claimed its garrison to be barely 200 men strong. Accordingly, a plan 
was formed whereby Major-General Tettau would lead a mixed force of grenadiers and 
Fitzpatrick's fusiliers across the river to the promontory on which the Old Fort stood. With 
quite remarkable success in several appropriated river boats, this transfer of 800 men was 
completed noiselessly at low water during the night of 2/3 October. In order to maintain 
surprise, the troops landed to the south of the fort and Tettau then disposed them into two 
groups: one to make a feint attack on the weakest part of the fort, and the other more 
substantial group to assault the stronger bastions. This part of the plan worked well, but the 
garrison was about double the strength anticipated; and Tettau might have struggled if several 
barrels of powder had not exploded, killing many of those inside the fort and causing the rest 
to attempt escape. Frustratingly for Marlborough, this audacious capture of the Old Fort did 
not cause Scott to surrender the New Fort, as had been hoped. 
Preparations to invest the New Fort were pushed forward, though effective progress 
was hampered until II October when the artillery train eventually arrived from Cork. Once 
these cannon began to play constantly upon the walls, a breach was opened and on 15 
October Governor Scott beat a parley. In a reversal of previous attitudes, Marlborough was 
now willing to offer terms which would allow the garrison to march out with the full honours 
of war, where instead Wurtemberg wished them taken prisoner. Marlborough was merely 
being pragmatic: with the weather worsening, and news filtering through of Sarsfield roaming 
the region with a cavalry force, he reasoned that it would be better to secure Kinsale - even if 
this required that the garrison go free - than risk Scott refusing the terms and prolonging the 
siege. Ultimately, Marlborough prevailed over Wurtemberg and the garrison marched out on 
17 October. 
Ireland', pp. 292-3; J. Jordan, 'The Siege of Kinsale, 1690: The Danish Report', AC xv (1954-1955), 58-64; 
Wolseley, The Life ofJohn Churchill, ii. 204-15; Atkinson, Marlborough, pp. 118-19. 
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The capture of both Cork and Kinsale had considerably exacerbated the 'death 
wound' that Lapthorne claimed Jacobite Ireland had received at Londonderry. "' Another land 
campaign in the following year, with victory at Aughrim (12 July) and a successful second 
siege of Limerick in the autumn, would admittedly be required before the Jacobites were 
stilled. But Marlborough's operation to the Munster coast was undoubtedly the necessary 
pivot in the second stage of the Irish war, just as the relief of Londonderry had been in the 
fwst. A significant foothold in the south had been secured which provided William with both 
naval and military strategic benefits. The Jacobites' principal sea-based communication with 
France had been blocked off and, notwithstanding any residual French sea command gained 
from victory at the battle of Beachy Head, future supply convoys would be forced due west 
on to Ireland's Atlantic seaboard and into the ports of Galway and Limerick. Militarily, the 
Jacobites' defence of the line of the Shannon - effectively their strategic touchstone since the 
late summer of 1690 - could now be threatened simultaneously on two fronts from the north 
and south. Even Patrick Sarsfield's irrepressible military energy would find this a debilitating 
challenge. Twice in the Irish theatre, amphibious warfare had precipitated the military 
conditions which propelled the Williamite cause to victory. 
70 See pp. 434. 
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Section 11: Combined Operations and the Colonial Theatre During 
the Nine Years War, 1688-1697. 
111: The Overseas Emnire as a Theatre of War. 
John Evelyn's remark with regard to the Nine Years War that Flanders was where 'the 
greate stress of the quarrell lies" reflected the view that the war was essentially a Grand 
Alliance of European states ranged against the principal European continental power - 
France. ' More significantly, Evelyn's view also accorded with the Whiggish argument that 
William III should be considered a good 'European' because his descent on England in 
November 1688 was wholly motivated by his continental ambitions to join England to the 
European alliance against France. ' 
As has been previously outlined William's conduct immediately following the 
'Glorious Revolution' did little to diminish this interpretation. The resistance in Ireland was 
considered a grave inconvenience which would hinder the deployment of English resources 
on the continent; and William's haste to free up troops and war supplies was omnipresent in 
his attitude to the war in that theatre. His frustration with Schomberg's apparent operational 
tardiness which forced him to delay his European command in order to take personal charge 
of the 1690 campaign in Ireland, whilst also sanctioning periodic peace initiatives, spoke of 
this urgency. William was even moved to reduce the Irish Establishment by three cavalry 
regiments and four infantry battalions before the commencement of what proved to be the 
final campaign in 1691. By then, of course, he had assumed command of the Alliance's 
4 
armies in Holland. 
This European focus has had a dual distorting effect upon the historiography of the 
war. Firstly, it reinforced the existing trends in orthodox histories. These concentrated on 
the elemental aspects of warfare such as the bloody set-piece battle which characteristically 
neglected warfare outside of the European theatre. Even if treated by such works, the extra- 
European conflict was usually either portrayed as of little concern to the monarch in terms of 
1 The Diary ofJohn Evelyn, ed. E. S. de Beer (Oxford, 1955), v. 186. 
2 The Grand Alliance was formed when England, the United Provinces, and Savoyjoined the pre-existing 
League of Augsburg which dated from 1686 and comprised the Empire, Spain, and several German Princes. 
' Macaulay, 7he History ofEngland, iii. 1326-7; Sir Charles Firth, A Commentary on Macaulay's History of 
England (London, 193 8), p. 34 1. 
4 Childs, 'The Williamite war, 1689-169 1', pp. 195-6,209; Simms, 'Williamite Peace Tactics. 1690-1691'. 
pp. 303-23. 
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anny deployment, or it was hijacked by the navalists as an aspect of naval strategy., 
Secondly, as a reaction to the above, the histories of empire which detail the Anglo-French 
conflict in the colonies consider the war a predominately maritime contest best waged by 
Mahan's 'command of the sea' principle. " Ultimately, neither strand of history provides a 
clear understanding of the structure and function of overseas warfare. 
Such an understanding is further removed because both distortions represent two 
differing uncritical assumptions about England's world role. Firstly, that England was a 
minor provincial power, predominately disengaged and insular in attitude towards European 
diplomacy where commercial activity was not impeded. It followed, therefore, that the 
military, naval and diplomatic consequences of the 'Glorious Revolution' were primarily 
European in focus. The second distortion assumes that with respect to her colonial 
settlements, the real interest taken, and the actual control exercised, by England was minimal. 
To question both is not an attempt to deny that William positioned England in the centre of 
the European states system; nor does it imply an unrealistic breadth of imperial control. 
Rather it serves to highlight that England was a global power that was necessarily obliged to 
achieve a level of colonial integration in pursuance of the war and that this is a more precise 
context in which to investigate the nature of warfare. 
Perhaps ironically, on his appointment as Secretary of State in May 1695, a briefing 
paper partly informed Sir William Trumbull of this context. Its synopsis on the history of 
acquisition throughout the seventeenth century demonstrated that England's extra-European 
territory and colonial settlement ranged from the most northerly areas around Hudson Bay 
and the fishing banks of Newfoundland, down through the north eastern coast of mainland 
North America where the principal settlements of New England (comprising the provinces of 
Massachusetts Bay, New Plymouth, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island) along 
with New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland were situated, to the 
most southerly colonies of Virginia and Carolina. In the Caribbean, England's principal 
colony was Jamaica, though the Leeward Islands, Barbados, the Bahamas and the Bermudas 
5 B. P. Lenman, 'Colonial Wars and Imperial Instability, 1688-1793', in P. J. Marshall (ed. ), The Oxford 
History of the British Empire ii. 7he Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998), pp. 151-4. The army-centric view 
with the set piece battle as the main focus is predictably provided by Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 
i. 333-93. Good examples of the navalists' agenda are, N. H. Moses, 'The British Navy in the Caribbean, 
1689-1697', MM 52 (1966), 13-40, and Clowes, 7he Royal Navy, ii. 418-534. 
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were also important English acquisitions! These territories became the foundation of 
Britain's 'Old Empire' which endured till the loss of the thirteen mainland American colonies 
as a result of the American Revolutionary War, 1775-1783. 
While accurate in its bald historical facts, the paper remained a partial exposition of 
the war's context because it failed to address the contemporary issue of colonial integration in 
the war effort. Its analysis of the colonies as part of the English polity categorised them 
under one of two forms of government: the King's Commission or Proprietorial control. ' 
This was too simplistic a picture for it failed to cover the subtleties in the governmental 
structure of individual colonies which evolved against a backdrop of increasing friction 
between the colonists and the English Court and Parliament over the extent and source of 
imperial control! More significantly, the paper also failed to relate England's continuing 
offensive and defensive wartime attempts to extend both her geostrategic reach and safeguard 
her mercantilist economy within these extra-European regions. This omission is all the more 
surprising given that by 1695, four operations combining ships and land forces had already 
been sent overseas in pursuance of these ends and another one was to follow before Trumbull 
resigned the Secretaryship on I December 1697. 
In an attempt to correct the historiographical distortions, this section will, therefore, 
consider a set of five expeditionary operations undertaken during the Nine Years War which 
encompassed the extent of empire from Newfoundland to the islands in the Caribbean Sea. It 
should be recognised that the history of the war in the colonies yields many more examples of 
such operations. On the North American mainland, the future Governor of Massachusetts, Sir 
William Phips, undertook two expeditions in 1690: first against Port Royal, Acadia and then 
the grander attack against Quebec. Moreover, as the war there settled into a predominant 
6 See for example, G. S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Strugglefor North America 
(Canada, 1950); D. E. Leach, Armsfor Empire: A Military History ofthe British Colonies in North America 
1607-1763 (New York, 1973). 
7 BL, Add. MSS 72572, fos. 140-9: 'A Short Account of the English Plantations in America, Brought by Mr 
Povey 2 May 1695'. 
8 ibid. 
9 See for example, M. J. Braddick, 'The English Government, War, Trade, and Settlement, 1625-1688', in N. 
Canny (ed. ), 7he Oxford History ofthe British Empire i. The First Century ofEmpire (Oxford, 1998), pp. 
286-308; I. K. Steele, 'The Anointed, the Appointed, and the Elected: Governance of the British Empire, 
1689-1784', in Marshall (ed. ), The OxfordHisjory ofthe British Empire, ii. 105-27; I. K. Steele, 'The British 
Parliament and the Atlantic Colonies to 1760: New Approaches to Enduring Questions', in P. Lawson (ed. ), 
parliament and the Atlantic Empire (Edinburgh, 1995); M. Watson, 'The British West Indian Legislatures in 
the 17th and 18th Centuries: An Historiographical Introduction', in Lawson (ed. ), Parliament and the 
Atlantic Empire, pp. 89-98. 
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pattern of frontier skirmish, small scale riverine expeditions such as the assaults in 1692 and 
1696 upon the Acadian fort at the confluence of the rivers St John and Naswaack, became 
common. In the Caribbean, Sir Timothy Thornhill, a Barbadian planter, and Captain 
Heweston, at the behest of the Leeward Islands' Governor, Christopher Codrington, 
completed a series of modestly successful raids upon Mariegalante, St Bartholomew and St 
Martin's in late 1689 and the early 1690s; while the Royal African Company operated against 
the French territories on the West African coast throughout 1692-1693. However, this study 
will not consider these examples because although the Imperial Parent often knew what was 
planned, none of these operations were originally dispatched from England. Moreover, the 
men and materials involved were usually provided locally by the colonial authorities, or in the 
case of the vessels used against the West African coast, privately owned by the Royal African 
Company. Only on one occasion - the 1696 expedition against Fort Naswaack - was a Royal 
Naval warship, the Arundell, deployed, but it had not been sent out from England for this 
purpose. 10 The common thread which ties all these expeditions to one side is England's 
wholly passive role in their preparation and execution. The definition of a combined 
operation aimed at here first seeks an exposition of the administrative role undertaken by 
England and, without wishing to concentrate solely upon substantive bureaucratic outcomes 
as manifest in the provision of resources, their total absence renders it both unbalanced and 
10 PRO, CO 5/855, fos. 605-12: 'A Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Expedition to Port Royal'; CSPC, 
1689-1692, nos. 914,1417, pp. 275-6,415: Journal of the proceedings of the late expedition under Sir 
William Phips, knight, to Port Royal, 30 May 1690; Sir William Phips's account of his expeditions against 
Acadia and Quebec, [21 Apr. ] 1692; Two Narratives of the Expedition Against Quehec, A. D. 1690, ed. S. A. 
Green (Cambridge, 1902); T. Savage, An Account ofthe Late Action of the New Englanders (London, 169 1); 
J. Walley, 'Mr Walley's Journal in the Expedition Against Canada in 1692 [sic]', in T. Hutchinson, The 
History of the Colony and Province ofMassachusetts-Bay (2 edn, London, 1760), Appendix no. xxi, pp. 554- 
65; C. Mather, Pietas in Patriam: The Life offfis Excellency Sir William Phips (London, 1697); NYCD, iv. 
193-6: Journal of Major General Winthrop's march from Albany to Wood Creek, n. d.; E. W. Baker & J. G. 
Reid, The New England Knight: Sir William Phips, 1651-1696 (Toronto, 1998), pp. 86-109; T. Church, The 
Entertaining History ofKing Philip's War ( 2nd edn, Boston, 1716), pp. 90-157; PXX de Charlevoix, 
History and General Description ofNew France, transi. & ed. J. G. Shea (London, 1902), iv. 27-8; ibid., v. 
29-33; CSPC, 1696-1697, nos. 257,403, pp. 142,218: Stoughton to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 24 
Sept. 1696; Minutes of General Assembly of Massachusetts, IS Nov. 1696; 'Journal of What has Happened in 
Acadia From Oct. 13th, 1691 to Oct. 25,1692% 'Account of the Siege of Fort Natchouak by the English of 
Boston, and of Their Retreat by Villebon, Oct. 22,1696', in Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Century, 
ed. J. C. Webster (New Brunswick, 1934), pp. 40,89-94; T. Spencer, A True and Faithful Relation of the 
Proceedings of the Forces .. 
In Their E%pedition Against the French in the Carihby Islands in the West-Indies 
(London, 1691), pp. 1-8; CSPC, 1689-1692, nos. 444,779,789,789.1, pp. 146-7,221-2,225-3 1: Codrington 
to Lords of Trade and Plantations, 19 Sept. 1689; Stede to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 3 Mar. 1690; 
Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, I Mar. 1690; Account of the action at St Martin's under 
Captain Hewetson, n. d.; V. T. Harlow, Christopher Codrington, 1668-1710 (London, reprint 1998), pp. 17-19; 
Molyneaux, Conjunct Expeditions, Part I p. 102; Colomb, Naval Warfare, pp. 263-6. 
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unproductive to consider the subsequent relationship of these operations to Grand Strategy 
and the practice of warfare. The five which are to be assessed fulfil this immediate 
administrative precept. Thus, with respect to the historical understanding of English 
combined operations in the Nine Years War, it is hoped that their narration will yield the 
justification with which the history of warfare might look upon them as combined operations, 
and also outline their utility within Grand Strategy. 
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ll. ii: Commodore Lawrence Wril! ht's Expedition to the West Indies, March 1690- 
September 1691. 
Not only were many of the overseas colonies administratively and politically disordered by 
news of the 'Glorious Revolution"', on the outbreak of war the Caribbean territories had to 
face a superior French strength in the region that possessed great potential to strike 
effectively at the islands and to damage trade. These circumstances were underlined by the 
subjects of the westemmost colony, Jamaica, expressing their feelings of vulnerability by 
petitioning the crown for a significant defensive seapower commitment. It was to the east, 
however, where the French made some notable gains through the spring and summer of 1689. 
These included the reduction of the Dutch island of St Eustatius in April, and, two months 
later, the eviction of the English from the shared island of St Kitts after a destabilising 
rebellion by the Irish inhabitants. This rebellion spread throughout the Leewards Islands 
causing Anguilla to be left under an Irish Governor when it fell to the French, and forced the 
premature retirement of the Islands' chief, Sir Nathaniel Johnson, who although a staunch 
Protestant, was considered compromised by his publicly declared commitment to James. " 
The Lords of Trade and Plantations (a committee of the Privy Council first appointed 
in 1675 to manage the expanding empire)" had already foretold of the impending demands of 
war in the Caribbean. Within a fortnight of William's circular in early April informing the 
colonial governors of his intention to declare war on France, the Lords sent to the King 
recommendations on the prosecution of the war overseas. As a result, William ordered 
consultation with the Admiralty on the dispatch of a squadron overseas and this quickly 
produced a list of seven hired vessels (to be fitted as men-of-war) and two fireships that could 
form a squadron for the West Indies along with the navy's fourth rate, Dunkirk. Meanwhile, 
the operational conception was broadened by the recommendation that Sir James Leslie's 
regiment of foot should be embarked. Although by the end of May, four of the hired vessels 
were sufficiently adapted to be sent to Longreach for their guns and victuals and Leslie's 
regiment was ready to be embarked, quite unexpectedly the King ordered the hired vessels to 
11 R. S. Dunn, 'The Glorious Revolution and America', in Canny (ed. ), The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, i. 445-66. 
12 CSpC# 1689-1692, nos. 88,90,143, p. 43: Johnson to ?, 25 Apr. 1689; Journal of the Lords of Trade and 
Plantations, 26 Apr. 1689; Johnson to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 24 May 1689; Sir Alan Burns, 
Ifistory of the British West Indies (2nd edn, London, 1965), p. 375; Harlow, Christopher Codrington, pp. 15- 
17. 
13 W. T. Root, 'The Lords of Trade and Plantations', AHR xxiii (1917-1918), 2041. 
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be discharged and their places taken by Royal Navy ships. " The King must have known that 
this action would delay the departure of his combined force to the Caribbean, not just because 
these ships would have to be prepared anew, but more simply because many of them were 
then part of the fleet under the recently ennobled Arthur Herbert (now Earl of Torrington) 
which had just lately fought the inconclusive engagement against the French off Bantry Bay, 
Ireland. " The Lords of Trade were also concerned that the now delayed squadron would 
meet both huff icanes and a strengthened French presence in the Caribbean. " 
William's decision was, however, not impulsive, and not just because of his Dutch 
stolidness. As already surveyed, a credible Jacobite interest was then emerging in both 
Scotland and Ireland where, significantly, it was sponsored by the French. Although 
Dundee's Scottish rebellion was perhaps more romantic than substantial, the prospect that the 
two centres of resistance might combine to organise their resources kept the crown 
precariously placed upon the heads of William and Mary. Moreover, William had still to turn 
his attention to the war on the continent and make the substantial English commitment 
implicit in his acceptance of the English crown. In practice, the Grand Strategy required to 
contain and combat Louis XIV in the early years of the war was proving to be critically torn 
between the competing demands of domestic, European and overseas theatres. Thus, faced 
also with a impecunious exchequer", William probably accepted Torrington's advice that the 
hired vessels were fit only for coastal cruising and that they should be replaced by the navy's 
fourth-rates, with the consideration that some breathing space within the demands of strategic 
14 CSpC, 1689-1692, nos. 69-70,76-7,79,94,102,106,111,113,125,130,146, pp. 22-3,31-6,39-40,44: 
Circular to the Governors of the Colonies, 15 Apr. 1689; Circular to the same effect, 15 Apr. 1689; 
Shrewsbury to Robinson, 19 Apr. 1689; Shrewsbury to Howard of Effingham, 19 Apr. 1689; Shrewsbury to 
Baltimore, 19 Apr. 1689; Shrewsbury to Johnson, 19 Apr. 1689; Memorandum of Lords of Trade and 
Plantations, 29 Apr. 1689; Order of King in Council, 2 May 1689; Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations, 
4,6 May 1689; Order of King in Council, 6 May 1689; the Lords of Trade and Plantations to the Admiralty, 
16 May 1689; Bowles to Blathwayt, 17 May 1689; Blathwayt to the Admiralty, 25 May 1689; PRO, ADM 
1/5247, pp. 31-4: Naval Minute, 6 June 1689; PRO, ADM 3/1, pp. 53-7,83: Board Minutes, [4], 6,27 May 
1689; PRO, ADM 1/169, pp. 52,55,75-6,93: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 12,25 Apr. 1689; the 
Admiralty to Shrewsbury, 15 Apr. 1689; the Admiralty to Beach, 24 Apr. 1689; the Admiralty to Schomberg, 
4,11 May 1689; PRO, ADM 2/377, pp. 123,126-7,138: Bowles to Blathwayt, 20,28 May 1689; Bowles to 
Torrington, 22 May 1689; Bowles to the Navy Board, 23 May 1689. 
15 R. W. Neeser, 'The British Naval Operations in the West Indies, 1650-1700', USNIP 40 (Nov. -Dec., 1914), 
1613; P. Le Fevre, 'The Battle of Bantry Bay, I May 1689', IS xviii (1990-1992), 1-17. 
16 CSpC, 1689-1692, no. 150, pp. 44-5: the Lords of Trade and Plantations to the King, 29 May 1689. 
17 PRO, ADM 2/169, p. 382: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 25 Oct. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/170, pp. 36,89, 
113,1434,203: the Admiralty to the Lords of Treasury, 9 Jan., 8,20 Feb., 17 Mar., 29 Apr. 1690; J. 
Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William 171,1689-1697. - Its State andDirection (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 256- 
7. 
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policy might be gained. " Whitehall, nonetheless, wished to keep up the appearance of 
momentum and, in early June, the Admiralty sent a list of eight naval vessels, accompanied by 
the rather improbable claim that they would be ready within a fortnight. " The fourteen days 
was to become 225 by the time the expeditionary force left England on 9 March 1690. " 
The delay was a product of both accident and design resulting from the administrative 
insufficiencies and bureaucratic inertia of the Admiralty, 'War Office', and the Lords of 
Trade. It would seem that the Admiralty, despite the views of its head, Torrington, 
continued to promote a number of the hired ships rejected by the King and which had been 
dispatched on convoy duty as part of Rooke's squadron stationed off the Irish coast. In 
August some of these vessels were sent a recall order to Plymouth (via Hoylake to take 
aboard a detachment of the expedition's soldiers) but, after their arrival at the south-west 
port, confusion on the squadron's composition reigned through the autumn as the Admiralty 
then moved to implement the King's discharge order! ' 
Meanwhile, the Navy Board turned its attention to the detailed and time consuming 
task of fitting out a late seventeenth century overseas expedition. The squadron's vessels 
would have to be sheathed, manned, provisioned and have their ordnance weight reduced 
before the army battalion with its separate provisions and artillery train could be embarked. 
Other pressing tasks to be attended to included the preparation of the fireships and the 
auxiliary vessels required to carry surplus stores and provisions. In many of these areas, 
much of the Navy Board's work was duplicated as it began first with those hired ships that 
had returned from the Irish coast only to have to begin again with the Royal Naval vessels 
once they had been appointed by the Admiralty. " Moreover, progress in any one of these 
18 CSPD, 1689-1693, p. 133: Memorandum of the proceedings of the Committee of Trade and Plantations, 3 
June 1689. 
19 PRO, ADM 3/1, pp. 88-90: Board Minutes, 30 May 1689; CSPC, 1689-1692, no. 169, p. 57: List of ships 
presented by the Lords of the Admiralty as to the state of ships destined for the West Indies, 3 June 1689. 
20 PRO, ADM 51/582, Part ii, unpaginated, Mary, 9 Mar. 1690. 
21 PRO, ADM 2/4, pp. 169-72: the Admiralty to Rooke, 27 Aug. 1689; the Admiralty to Tollemache, 27 Aug. 
1689; PRO, ADM 2/169, pp. 251,269,271,301-2,361,369,398-402: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 7, 
27 Aug., 28 Sept., 14,18 Oct., 9,14 Nov. 1689; the Admiralty to Schomberg, 27 Aug. 1689; PRO, ADM 
2/170, p. 3: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 18 Dec. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/378, pp. 242,301,365: Bowles to 
Walton, 5 Sept. 1689; Bowles to Addis, 28 Sept. 1689; Bowles to Blathwayt, 23 Oct. 1689. 
22 PRO, ADM 3/1, pp. 92,102,147-9,153,155,163,182: Board Minutes, 3,10 June, 10,13,16,23 July, 6 
Aug. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/4, p. 277: the Admiralty to Wright, 24 Sept. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/5, p. 107: the 
Admiralty to Wright, 4 Jan. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/169, pp. 212,214,216-17,223,225-6,240-1,251,271-2, 
280,317,335,362,398,401-2,512: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 6,8,13,16 July, 7,27 Aug., 9 Oct., 9, 
14,21 Nov. 1689; the Admiralty to Torrington, 10,29 July 1689; the Admiralty to the Lords of Trade and 
Plantations, 7 Sept., 15 Oct. 1689; the Admiralty to Schomberg, 7 Oct., 14 Nov. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/170, pp. 
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tasks could easily to break down and, on this occasion, the navy's victualling system ground 
temporarily to a halt through a lack of both cash and credit. " An uncomfortably bright spot 
light had already been shone on this service during the debates on the conduct of the naval 
war in Parliament's second session, as a consequence of which a committee of inquiry had 
been established. Although the King attempted to pre-empt the committee's conclusions by 
appointing new victualling commissioners, the sense of despair in the service was well 
represented by his new First Commissioner, the London merchant Thomas Papillon, whose 
reluctant agreement to take on the job was almost immediately followed by his constant 
entreaties to be released from it. Ultimately, before the eight months victuals ordered for both 
the land and sea forces could be supplied, the Treasury had to make a series of tactical fiscal 
interventions to provide a short-term boost to the victualling commissioners' cash flow by 
prioritising their Exchequer payments and by forestalling other government creditors. " As 
the money crisis continued into the winter, the Admiralty was also grappling with the chore of 
finding accommodation and procuring freight for several newly appointed colonial governors 
that were to take passage with the squadron. " 
The organisation of the land force was soon equally mired in confusion. Promptly 
after the King's order to discharge the hired ships, it was decided not to employ Leslie's 
regiment, but without first selecting an alternative. In late June, Lord Roscommon offered his 
3,62,67,82: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 18 Dec. 1689,25,29 Jan., 6 Feb. 1690; PRO, ADM 2/378, 
pp. 28-30,146,220,262,317-18,413,419,528: Bowles to Beach, 6 July 1689; Bowles to Torrington, 6 July 
1689; Bowles to the Navy Board, 7 Aug., 11 Sept., 4 Oct. 1689; Bowles to Blathwayt, 27 Aug. 1689; Bowles 
to the Officers of the Ordnance, 8,9 Nov., 10 Dec. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/379, pp. 54,102,108,135,141,161, 
181,188,189,196,200-1,211,220,270: [Bowles? ] to Jespen, 27 Dec. 1689; Bowles to the Navy Board, 10 
Jan. 1690; Bowles to Wright, II Jan. 1690; Sotherne to the Officers of the Ordnance, 16 Jan. 1689; Sotherne 
to Wright, 18,28,29 Jan., 6,18 Feb. 1690; Sotherne to Beach, 25, [30? ] Jan., 1,4 Feb. 1690; Sotherne to the 
Navy Board, 4 Feb. 1690; PRO, ADM 1/3560, pp. 25,119: the Navy Board to the Admiralty, 3 Jan. 1690; the 
Navy Board to Bowles, II Jan. 1690; PRO, ADM 1/5247, pp. 62-3: Naval Minute, 15 Aug. 1689 [first 
version]; PRO, ADM 1/5249, p. 38: Naval Minute, 15 Aug. 1689 [second version]. 
23 PRO, ADM 2/169, pp. 382,528: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 25 Oct. 1689; the Admiralty to the 
Lords of the Treasury, 4 Dec. 1689; CTB, 1689-1693 Li. 62: Treasury Minute Book, 3 Nov. 1689. 
24 Ux. 282-3; CTB, 1689-1692, pp. 64-5: Treasury Minute Book, 10,14 Nov. 1689; CTP, 1557-1696, pp. 
75,95: Presentment of the Commissioners of Excise, 8 Nov. 1689; Representation of the Commissioners of 
Excise and Hearth Money to the Lords of the Treasury, 24 Jan. 1690; A. F. W. Papillon, Memoirs of Thomas 
Papillon, ofLondon, Merchant (Reading, 1887), pp. 353-74; Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, pp. 
309-16,331. 
25 PRO, ADM 2/4, pp. 420,440-1: the Admiralty to Wright, 7,14 Nov. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/5, pp. 238-9: the 
Admiralty to Wright, 2 Feb. 1690; PRO, ADM 2/169, pp. 280,293,317,362,392,534: the Admiralty to the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations, 7 Sept., 15 Oct. 1689; the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 24 Sept., 7 Oct., 5 
Nov., 13 Dec. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/378, pp. 66,179,220,299,345,493: Bowles to Molesworth, 17 July 1689; 
Bowles to Blathwayt, 14,27 Aug., 17 Oct., 29 Nov. 1689; Bowles to Montague, 28 Sept. 1689; PRO, ADM 
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services as colonel but bizarrely felt he could not speak for his regiment and, on the same day, 
the Lords of Trade noted the appointment of Luttrell's battalion. In less than a month, 
however, Secretaryý-at-War Blathwayt was inquiring of John Shales, Commissary General of 
Provisions, how soon the Duke of Bolton's regiment of foot could be shipped for the West 
Indies. " This was presumably Bolton's newly raised second regiment commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Holt; ` which first had to march to Liverpool, and then be brought 
down by sea to Plymouth. " Once this transfer had been completed (by the hired ships drawn 
from Rooke's squadron on their return to England) Bolton's second regiment was found to 
be under strength. With the majority of the English forces committed to the Irish theatre, a 
possible source of recruits was not obvious. It was, thus, decided to draft around 210 men 
from the six companies of Bolton's other regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Norton that had ironically recently been at Plymouth as part of an abortive descent force for 
Ireland under Trelawny but were now garrisoned at Portsmouth. As their relief from garrison 
duties had to be organised and recruits found to make good that draft, additional time was 
required; and furthermore this detachment was to board from Portsmouth thereby requiring 
the squadron commander to organise two separate embarkations. "' All the while, as has been 
mentioned, the French were making gains in the Caribbean and, given that both the squadron 
and Leslie's regiment had been ready to go in May, the King might well have lamented his 
decision to discharge the hired ships. A breathing space in strategy was meaning strategic 
loss. I 
2/379, pp. 13,105,108,217,235: Bowles to Inchiquin, 16,24 Dec. 1689; Bowles to Blathwayt, II Jan. 1690; 
Bowles to Wright, II Jan. 1689; Sotherne to Tollemache, 6 Feb. 1690; Sotherne to Wright, 8 Feb. 1690. 
26 CSpC, 1689-1692, nos. 201,25 1, pp. 69,83: Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 20 June 1689; 
Blathwayt to Shales, II July 1689. 
271 consider Childs in 'Secondary Operations of the British Army', p. 84, to have wrongly identified this 
force as the 'I" battalion' of Bolton's regiment. 
28 PRO, WO 515, pp. 199,225,243,249,251,254,257: Order to the Duke of Bolton, [June/July 1689? 1,6 
Nov. 1689; Order to Colonel Trelawny, 26 Nov., 2 Dec. 1689; Order to the Earl of Bath, Governor of 
Plymouth, 4 Sept. 1689; Order to the six Companies of the Duke of Bolton's regiment commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Norton, 9 Dec. 1689; Order to the Duke of Bolton's regiment commanded by Lieutenant- 
Colonel Holt, 9,12 Dec. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/4, pp. 169-70,171-2: the Admiralty to Rooke, 27 Aug. 1689; the 
Admiralty to Tollemache, 27 Aug. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/378, pp. 221,242: Bowles to Lee, 27 Aug. 1689; 
Bowles to Walton, 5 Sept. 1689. 
29 PRO, WO 4/1, P. 149,15 1: Blathwayt to the Lieutenant-Govemor of Portsmouth, 28 Jan. 1690; Blathwayt 
to Nott, 18 Feb. 1690; PRO, WO 515, pp. 254,263: Order to the six Companies of the Duke of Bolton's 
regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Norton, 9 Dec. 1689; Order to the Duke of Bolton's regiment 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Norton, 12 Jan. 1690; PRO, ADM, 2/379, p. 156: Sotherne to Blathwayt, 
22 Jan. 1690; PRO, ADM 51/582, Part ii, unpaginated, Mary, 19 Feb., 6 Mar., 1690. 
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The third source of delay proved to be the drafting of the Instructions for the 
expedition. Initially, this was hindered by the indecision over whom to appoint as the 
squadron commander. Nobody was suggested for the post until June when Torrington 
recommended and secured the appointment of his prot6g6, Sir Cloudesley Shovell, whose 
recently conferred knighthood recognised his able performance at Bantry Bay. " As it became 
clear however that the French were still able to succour the Irish rebellion and, more 
importantly, threaten England's sea route to the coast, it was decided that Shovell's talents 
were required in the Irish sea. " The Admiralty next favoured the equally experienced Captain 
Lawrence Wright whose service record, like Shovell's, included a West Indian tour. " 
Nonetheless, far from expediting the squadron's departure, his experience brought 
preconceived ideas to be added to the consultation on the Instructions. 
The Admiralty had requested in July that the Lords of Trade forward draft 
Instructions and their delay till October before even considering possible articles was blamed 
upon the King. To speed up the process, the Admiralty rather improbably intimated that 
Wright was ready to sail, though this failed to persuade the key bureaucratic figure, the 
King's Secretary-at-War, William Blathwayt, who also served the Lords of Trade as their 
secretary. It was the second week of November before he circulated a first draft and then 
there were the Admiralty's various amendments and alterations to be contended. Their 
formulation had been complicated by Wright's persistent lobbying that he be provided with an 
independent command from the colonial governors which would allow him scope to direct 
both the naval squadron and the operations once in the West Indies. Securing the Admiralty 
Commission's subsequent agreement to any alterations was convoluted due to the 
requirement that it comprehend the views of its head, Torrington. His frequent absences 
30 PRO, ADM 3/1, pp. 105-7: Board Minutes, II June 1689; PRO, ADM 2/169, pp. 158-60: Admiralty to 
Torrington, 13 June 1689. The treatment of this stage of Shovell's career in the most recent secondary 
literature is variable. S. Harris, Sir CloudesleyShovell: StuartAdmiral (London, 2001) fails to mention the 
appointment; while J. B. Hattendorf, 'Sir George Rooke and Sir Cloudesley Shovell, c1650-1709 and 1650- 
1707' in P. Lc Fevre & R. Harding (eds), Precursors ofNelson: BrifishUmirals of the Eighteenth Century 
(London, 2000), p. 51 claims that Shovell was temporarily assigned to the West Indian squadron commanded 
by Wright. My evidence indicates that Shovell was in fact appointed to the sole command of this squadron 
and that Wright's appointment followed the decision to employ Shovell off Ireland. 
3' Le Fevre, 'The Battle of Bantry Bay, I May 1689', pp. 1-7; Mulloy, 'The French Navy and the Jacobite War 
in Ireland, 1689-91', pp. 25-6; Harris, Sir Cloudesley Shovell, pp. 108-16; Hattendorf, 'Sir George Rooke and 
Sir Cloudesley Shovell', p. 5 1. 
32 PRO, ADM 3/1, p. 136: Board Minutes, I July 1699; PRO, ADM 2/169, pp. 216-17: the Admiralty to 
Torrington, 10 July 1689; Neeser, 'The British Naval Operations in the West Indies', p. 1613. Shovell had 
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afloat or in port put the secretary, Bowles, into a quandary as to how the Instructions could 
ever possibly be agreed if Torrington did not come up to London. " Accordingly, it was 
December before a final set of Instructions was issued, only for it to be augmented - though 
not substantively changed - through January by the formulation of additional provisions. " 
Bowles's irony was thinly veiled when he subsequently commended the Instructions to 
Wright for having been 'maturely debated'. " 
On reading his Instructions, Wright was doubtless disappointed because his principal 
request for independence from the colonial governors had not been granted. Instead, not only 
had Wright iffunediately on his arrival in the region to consult with the Barbadian Governor 
and Council on the expeditionary force's defensive and offensive dispositions, but also after 
making his way to the Leeward Islands, he was to be subordinate to their governor, 
Christopher Codrington. Although the context for this secondary role was specifically stated 
to be the direction of the land forces, and a Council of War was to be sovereign in all 
operational decisions, Wright's authority over the squadron was also circumscribed. Any sea 
action was only to be undertaken after consultation with the relevant governor and sanctioned 
by the Council of War; while, similarly, approval from both was required before he could 
dispatch individual ships. If either thought the squadron's presence was necessary on a 
particular island station then Wright had to comply. Such provisions will be seen to affect 
future disputes within Whitehall when the Instructions for other overseas operations were 
being drafted. In terms of targeting, the Instruction's gave the colonial interest an added 
command advantage. Wright's only option was the freedom to attack Martinique en route to 
the Leeward Islands, otherwise the Council of War had operational discretion on targeting. "' 
The top loading of this Council by the colonists, including its presidency, and the priority 
which would rightly be afforded to the prevailing regional intelligence, meant that Wright's 
opinions as the newcomer would probably carry much less weight. Wright was though 
actually served twice in the West Indies during his early career: first in 1663 with Sir Christopher Myngs and 
again five years later under Sir John Harman. See Harris, Sir Cloudesley Shovell, pp. 14-16,25-3 1. 
33 CSpC, 1689-1692, nos. 263,519,527,552,584,617, pp. 97,169,171,179,183,188: the Admiralty to the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations, 17 July 1689; Blathwayt to Bowles, 28 Oct., 13,21 Nov. 1689; Bowles to 
Blathwayt, 5 Nov., 3 Dec. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/378, pp. 453-4,510,513-14: Bowles to Torrington, 19 Nov. 
1689; Bowles to Blathwayt, 3,5 Dec. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/378, p. 413: Bowles to Blathwayt, 12 Nov. 1689; 
PRO, ADM 2/379, pp. Bowles to Wright, 21 Oct. 1689. 
34 PRO, ADM 2/5, pp. 77-82: 'Instructions for Capt. Lawrence Wright', 21 Dec. 1689; PRO, ADM 2/5, pp. 
156-7: 'Supplementall Instructions to Capt. Wright for the West Indies', 18 Jan. 1690. 
35 PRO, ADM 2/379, p. 45: Bowles to Wright, 24 Dec. 1689. 
36 PRO, ADM 2/5, pp. 77-82: 'Instructions for Capt. Lawrence Wright', 21 Dec. 1689. 
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allowed to fly a 'distinguishing pendant' which identified him as Commodore and C. -in. C of 
the naval squadron going to the West Indies. " 
Wright's squadron of some thirteen ships with Bolton's regiment aboard and sundry 
auxiliary vessels arrived in the Caribbean in early May 1690. As instructed, Wright had made 
first for Barbados (to deliver the new governor, James Kendall) whence after consultation, he 
was to head for the Leeward Islands. Although the voyage had largely passed without 
incident, it was ominous that sickness was already prevalent when the anchors were dropped 
in Carlisle Bay. Wright downplayed the extent of the contagion, but both Kendall and 
Codrington made clear that it was sufficiently extensive to detain the squadron at Barbados 
for the remainder of May in the hope that the men would recover. Although Codrington 
seemed by this time quite resigned to delay, he failed to hide his bitter disappointment with 
the quality of the expeditionary force when it eventually arrived off Antigua. He was 
particularly dismayed at how short Bolton's regiment was of Establishment strength, and at 
the fewness in number and poor quality of the small arms. He calculated that by combining 
Holt's troops with the maximum number of the Leeward Islands' militia, and the remnants of 
the Barbadian regiment, a landing force of only 2000 men would be produced. In the hope 
that additional troops might be forthcoming from Jamaica or even Barbados, the first Council 
of War held on I June deferred selecting a French target. Instead, a fortnight was to pass 
during which the fleet watered at Montserrat and attempts were made to muster as many 
troops as possible. These included some 200 seamen which Wright agreed to commit to the 
land force, along with four naval captains to be commissioned as their officers, who became 
known as the 'Marine Regiment'. A further review of all available forces held on Nevis on 13 
June produced, according to Codrington, an increase of only 500 men from his original 
calculation, though Sir Timothy Thornhill's secretary estimated an additional 1000. 
A Council convened during this two week interval had determined that an attempt be 
made on St Kitts. Back in August 1689 the French had evicted the English from their half of 
37 PRO, ADM 2/5, p. 223: Warrant empowering Capt. Lawrence Wright to wear a Flag at the Main 
Topmasthead, 6 Feb. 1690. The official rank of Commodore did not appear in the Navy Regulations until 
1806. Imported from Holland in 1689, it was used intermittently to denote a Captain dispatched in command 
of a squadron for overseas service. Wright's rank was Captain but he had been appointed C. -in-C. of the 
Squadron in the West Indies. Throughout the eighteenth century the term Commodore became a means of 
allowing a Post-Captain to be appointed to command a squadron without affecting the seniority lists. See 
Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, pp. 455, Appendix X, 650; Sir R. Massie Blomfield, 'Naval 
Executive Titles. Commadore or Commodore? ', MM iv (1914), 73-7; N. A. M. Rodger, The Wooden Wor/J An 
Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London, 1988), pp. 299-300. 
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this shared island and it was thought that the French had now dug in a strong defensive force. 
The Antelope and the Hampshire spent two days (15-17 June) annoying the enemy along the 
island's coastline, while a plan was composed to surprise the French by landing at Frigate 
Bay, situated to the south. To this end, on 19 June Wright was to lead a decoy squadron of 
five vessels away from the Bay, while the Assistance, the Success and the Guernsey would 
shepherd the ships' boats loaded with some 600 soldiers each as far as possible towards the 
shore. Although Wright was subsequently critical of these vessels weighing late in the day 
due to, he believed, the army's slowness embarking, Codrington was more affected by what 
he saw of the French as he neared the landing point. Some 1000 French troops at arms were 
disposed in deep trenches close to Frigate Bay. Surprise was now a chimera; and as 
Codrington considered it an standard rule of warfare that even with an additional 1000 
bodies, men landing from boats cannot overcome those in trenches to establish a bridgehead, 
the attack was aborted. 
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Reconvening the following day, the Council now sought to formulate a plan which 
reclaimed the element of surprise. It now resolved to attack the French by landing two 
groups of troops: one force of around 500 colonial soldiers commanded by Sir Timothy 
Thornhill would go ashore at Friar Bay, a half-mile to the eastwards of Frigate Bay, ascend 
the near 800 foot interposing hill and drop down on the rear of the western flank of the 
French trenches; and as Thornhill was making this attack, a second force comprised of 
Bolton's regiment and the seamen would land as originally planned. The Council also 
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wagered that the French would believe the English return to Frigate Bay a feint for a principal 
landing to the leeward, and, so, to entrench this possible misapprehension, once the soldiers 
for Frigate Bay had been sent on their way, the squadron having been rejoined by the 
detachment at Friar Bay would set sail to leeward. 
The execution of the plan was a complete success. " Thornhill encountered little 
resistance on landing or during his arduous march over what is still known today as 'Sir 
Timothy's Hill'. Swiftly dealing with the derisory number of French scouts, his colonial force 
was able to descend the western slope and punch a hole through the French trenches which 
had been weakened (as the English surmised) by the withdrawal of men to deal with an 
expected attack to the leeward. This changed the situation visa vis the seaborne assault. 
When the rest of the troops completed a successful landing at Frigate Bay, thus tightening the 
other arm of the English pincer, the French fled from their trenches towards the island's 
principal town, Basseterre. A bridgehead had been established; but if the island was to be 
completely conquered then further co-operation between the army and navy would be 
required. This was, in fact, what occurred over the course of the next month as the centres of 
French resistance upon the island were progressively eliminated. 
Drawing his landed troops up into two lines - one taking the high mountainous route 
and the other the road at sea level - Codrington pursued the enemy towards Basseterre. 
About a mile from Frigate Bay both were engaged in a fire fight as the French had rallied 
during their initial retreat. The line of troops on the lower route met particularly stout 
resistance and the Antiguans, who comprised the majority of this force, lost a 
disproportionate amount of men. The French were eventually beaten back and sufficiently 
disordered to abandon the possibility of establishing the town and fort of Basseterre as a 
centre of defence. As Wright, whose task had been to take the squadron down to the coast 
parallel to the town with a view to bombarding it into submission, approached the roadstead, 
the French struck their colours, fired many of the town's building and fled into the mountains. 
38 The ensuing account of the operation on St Kitts is based on the following primary sources: CSPC, 1689- 
1692, nos. 927,968,977,1004,1034.1,11,1044.111, pp. 278-9,288-9,291-4,313-14,303-5: Codrington to 
the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 4 June 1690; Kendall to Shrewsbury, 26 June 1690, Codrington to the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations, 4 July, 3 Aug. 1690; Wright to Kendall, 24 June, 26 July 1690; Inventory of 
72 
Cilarks rvd 
Old 
r IJAme T-rre r 
Vie 
Fig. 6: Outline Coast ot'St Kitts 
It was not the intention of the French Governor, Guiteau, to remain long in the 
highlands, and with a force of some 300 regular troops and planters he travelled north west to 
Charles (or the English) Fort on Sandy Point to stage his defence of the island. Guiteau's 
abandonment of the other inhabitants engendered a sense ofbetrayal that diluted any 
resistance to Fnglish troops on their march upon the fort, while the fleet sailed round to a 
rendezvous at Pheype's Bay. Overlooking Charles Fort from the east, Brimstone Hill 
provided an excellent vantage point for reconnaissance; and from its heights Codrington 
immediately appreciated that he was t1aced with undertaking a standard siege. Although 
Wright was now some distance off the coast in the Old Road having flailed to make the 
rendezvous due to bad anchorage at Pheype's Bay, word still reached him on 27 June that 
Codrington wished a consultation. A meeting that day between the two men reached 
agreement on the positioning of naval ordnance on the north-east slopes of' Brimstone II ill; 
and, more significantly, demonstrated their harmonious relations in that they had both t'elt able 
to dispense with a Council of War. Within two days Wright had landed the two chase guns 
from the Mag's forecastle, and the sailors then serving with the land force were subsequently 
commended by Codrington for their efforts in bringing this ordnance up the hill on specially 
built sledges. With the hill batteries ready to begin their fire, on I July Wright led seven ofhis 
the arms etc. taken at Charles Fort, St Christophers, PRO, ADM 5 1/582, Parts i-ii, unpaginated, Afaty, 9 
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squadron in a double pass of the fort, throwing from half-range an upper-tier broadside on 
each occasion. This did not, however, seem to quell the enemy's fire from the fort and the 
naval captains concluded that the situation of the well-walled fort on a rock that was almost 
as high as the walls caused it to be immune from a sea-based bombardment. A preponderant 
land battery was considered the only way forward and a further nine twelve pounders were 
landed from the squadron to form a shore level gun emplacement. Previously, on 30 June, 
Codrington had opened his half-moon trenches and, as the parallel lines inched forward, he 
sent parties out to sweep the mountainous environs in an attempt to flush out any enemy 
operating in his rear. Although this tactic culminated in a full island traverse by 800 troops 
headed by Codrington, the enemy's dispersal, allowed the majority of them to evade the 
English military broom. 
Given that his attempt to secure his siege force had largely failed, Codrington required 
that swifter progress be made in forcing the fortress to surrender. There was, nonetheless, 
little cause for anxiety. Over the course of nine days from 2 to 12 July, the heavy ordnance 
began to take its toll as the trenches moved within pistol shot of the fort gates. At each stage 
sailors from the squadron - and not only those initially organised as the 'Marine Regiment' - 
were prominent in moving the siege forwards. On 12 July Guiteau beat a parley, seeking a 
cease-fire of between 48 to 72 hours and Codrington quickly consented, though he 
remorselessly continued the works by extending his front trench to link up with the one the 
enemy had dug outwards for access and mounted more guns. Within 48 hours of the cease- 
fire, Guiteau agreed to a surrender and on 16 July the garrison marched out with only their 
baggage, leaving behind some 29 cannon and over 200 small arms. 
Buoyed by this successful action, Codrington persuaded the Council to dispatch 
Thornhill with a force of 350 men comprised of troops from Thornhill's colonial regiment and 
Bolton's regiment to reclaim St Eustatius for the Dutch. Wright ordered the Guernsey with 
some hired sloops to transport and land Thornhill's force, while the rest of the squadron 
sailed to Pheype's Bay to embark the sailors of the 'Marine Regiment'. Thereafter, the 
squadron was to bear for St Eustatius to support the land force. The landing was unopposed 
and Thornhill's force made good progress through the interior of the island to come up 
against the fort on the south side where a French garrison of 80 men had concentrated their 
Mar. -16 July 1690; Spencer, A True andFaithful Relation of the Proceedings ofthe Forces, pp. 7-11. 
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defences. Allied unity was not advanced, though, by the circumstance that former Dutch 
governor, Captain Schorer, had landed three days earlier from Saba with a meagre force of 60 
soldiers which, Codrington acidly remarked, managed only to round up the island's livestock. 
As at St Kitts, the English had to lay siege to the fort, and the squadron again 
provided the mainstay of the ordnance for the batteries. On this occasion, the fort was more 
susceptible to bombardment from the sea and over the two days - 21 and 22 July - Wright 
sent various ships in close to ensure a reasonably constant fire. The naval commander was 
also instrumental in maintaining a regular supply of stores to the trenches until the French 
surrendered on 25 July. It was an outcome that greatly pleased Wright who, after inspecting 
the fort, wrote of its natural and erected defences as being too great to have been overcome 
by assault. " He would also have been pleased with the successful completion of this second 
combined operation just as the height of the huff icane season was giving notice of a cessation 
in operational activity. Moreover, an increasing sickness amongst the troops was hindering, 
in the short-term at least, any further action. Considering these factors, a Council of War 
decided at the end of July that the remnants of Bolton's and the Barbadian regiments would 
remain at St Kitts while the colonial militia could return home. Wright was to depart for 
Barbados and weather the worst of the season by cruising off that station. 40 
London's orders were that Wright return with the squadron on the depletion of his 
provisions towards the end of the summer. However, both Kendall and Codrington - albeit 
for different reasons - were keen that the squadron continue in the Caribbean. Kendall's 
concerns were defensive, fearing that Wright's departure would coincide with the anticipated 
French squadron's arrival in the region, thus leaving the English colonies vulnerable to attack. 
Codrington, however, had a more aggressive vision, focused upon the wholesale capture of 
the Caribbean sugar trade through deploying the squadron to press home attacks against the 
other French islands and, in particular, Martinique and Guadeloupe. As Kendall was not 
embroiled in the campaign to retake St Kitts, the Barbadian Governor was the first to begin 
lobbying the Court as early as June and his promptness bore fruit when agreement was 
reached that the squadron would remain till the turn of the year, while provision ships would 
39 CSPC, 1689-1692, nos. 1004,1034.1, pp, 303-5,313-14: Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 
3 Aug. 1690; Wright to Kendall, 26 July 1690; PRO, ADM 51/582, Part ii, unpaginated, Mary, 17-26 July 
1690; Spencer, A True andFaithfid Relation of the Proceedings of the Forces, pp. 11-12. 
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be dispatched with supplies and around 400 recruits for Bolton's regiment. Furthen-nore, 
when he was eventually to depart, Wright was to appoint a frigate each to the island stations 
of Barbados, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands, showing an increased English commitment to 
the West Indies. 
These decisions taken in October clearly responded more to Kendall's defensive 
concerns than Codrington's enthusiasm to take steps to expel the French. Indeed, the 
Leeward Islands' Governor was most upset when he received notification in December that 
Wright was only to stay until January, particularly as an operation against Guadeloupe in 
October had been shelved due to the refusal of the militia troops to participate until there was 
a full and fair division of the current stocks of plunder. Nonetheless, the slowness of early 
modem military communications meant that Codrington was then unaware that in November 
the Court had decided that Wright would remain in the West Indies indefimitely. ' 
By the time notification of the squadron's indefinite continuance reached the 
Caribbean, reports had come through that a considerable French squadron had dropped 
anchor at Martinique. Wright was cruising off Barbados when this news reached him and, 
although it proved difficult to clarify the exact number of French ships, with estimates of the 
number of men-of-war varying between fourteen and two, it was clear that the navy's ability 
to participate in a combined operation had been compromised. Regional sea command was 
now threatened, and as a result the squadron would either have to assert its supremacy or 
look two ways when undertaking operations. Without waiting for confirmation of the size of 
the French squadron, Wright's initial reaction was to augment his own force by hiring six 
merchantmen whose provisioning would be at the colonies' expense. The naval captains 
readily agreed with this course of action but - probably due to the cost - the colonial officials 
were more sceptical and, when the number of French ships was reported to be considerably 
less then fourteen, Kendall argued for the discharge of some of the merchantmcn. Although 
40 CSpC, 1689-1692, nos. 1004,1034.1, pp. 303-5,313-14: Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 
3 Aug. 1690; Wright to Kendall, 26 July 1690; PRO, ADM 51/582, Part ii, unpaginated, Mary, 31 July 1690; 
PRO, ADM 2/5, pp. 77-82: 'Instructions for Capt. Lawrence Wright', 21 Dec. 1689. 
41 CSpC, 1689-1692, nos. 968,1158-9,1207,1242,1319, pp. 288-9,338,351-2,369-70,388-9: Kendall to 
Shrewsbury, 26 June 1690; the Lords of Trade and Plantations to Kendall, I Nov 1690; Minutes of the 
Council of Barbados, 3 Nov. 1690; the Lords of Trade and Plantations to Codrington, 24 Nov. 1690; 
Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 16 Dec. 1690,15 Feb. 169 1; PRO, ADM 1/5247, fos. 134- 
5,145: Naval Minute, 18 Sept., 30 Oct. 1690; PRO, ADM 2/6, fos. 393-4,488,494,507-9,513: 'Instructions 
for Capt. Lawrence Wright', I Oct. 1690; the Admiralty to Wright, 17,21 Nov. 1690; the Admiralty to 
Tollemache, 18,20 Nov. 1690, PRO, ADM 2/380, f 531: Sotherne to Wright, 17 Nov. 1690. 
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the naval Council undoubtedly complied with the Instructions by consulting with the 
Barbadian Governor, its rejection of his advice transgressed the spirit of the expedition; and 
this was the first milestone on the road to increasingly fractious relations between Wright and 
the colonial authorities. "' 
In early February, Wright revealed his determination to mount further operations with 
Codrington by sailing for the Leeward Islands without first neutralising the French naval 
threat as Kendall had suggested. " To be fair to Wright, he did ply off Martinique for a 
couple of days on his voyage north to seek clarification on the actual strength of the French 
fleet; and on 16 February he received the lowest estimate of only two French men-of-war 
from the crew of a sloop that the Bristol captured under Martinique's shore. As this hardly 
represented a credible threat to his sea command, Wright did not want to waste time or 
resources blocking up Martinique to entice the French out for an engagement. Nonetheless, 
the Commodore also learned that Ducasse was on his way to the region with a considerably 
larger French squadron. This should, perhaps, have instilled a sense of urgency in the 
forthcoming amphibious operations. 
A Council of War held ashore at St Kitts on 19 February resolved to attack 
Guadeloupe, and that the preparations for this were immediately to proceed apace. Wright's 
log recorded much activity by the squadron moving amongst the Leeward Islands embarking 
soldiers and stores but there was no explanation why a month hence the expeditionary force 
had still to sail for Guadeloupe or why on 20 March the Council changed the target of attack 
to Mariegalante. However, unusually for a Captain's log, Wright provides a fairly 
personalised commentary alongside the factual notes. He described disputes such as that over 
the discharge of the hired ships and punctuated the record with sarcastic remarks on 
Codrington's alleged pretensions to greatness in military command. In doing so, he charted 
the deterioration of his relationship with the Governor and implied that the delay was due to 
Codrington's procrastination. Of course, the Leeward Islands' Council was forthcoming with 
an alternative interpretation which portrayed Wright as a dilettante, who possessed 
42 CSpC' 1689-1692, nos. 1312,1384,1384.1,1384.111, pp. 384,404-7: Minutes of the Council of Barbados, 2 
Feb. 1691; Kendall to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 4 Apr. 1691; Kendall to Wright, n. d.; Wright to 
Kendall, 19 Mar. 1691; PRO, ADM 51/582, Part ii, unpaginated, Mary, 11 Jan. -16 Feb. 1691. 4' The ensuing account of the operations against Mariegalante and Guadeloupe is based on the following 
primary sources: CSPC, 1689-1692, nos. 1382,1557,1617, pp. 402-4,461-6,484-92: Hutcheson to 
Blathwayt, 3 Apr., 3 June 1691; Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 3 July 1691; PRO, ADM 
77 
insufficient resolve to attack the French and who wasted time cruising amongst the islands. 
The evidence is ultimately inconclusive but what is clear is that when the squadron left for 
Mariegalante on 21 March, the relationship between the land and sea forces and, more 
specifically, between Codrington and Wright had deteriorated. 
Notwithstanding, the operation against Mariegalante was a success. On 28 March 
Bolton's regiment plus over 200 sailors were landed under the command of Major Nott and 
marched without opposition to the town where a fort of four guns was found to be deserted. 
The enemy had, in fact, fled to the woods upon the English landing, and Nott's main task 
was, as Hutcheson described it, 'hunting-work'. The Major was, nonetheless, deprived of his 
seamen after Wright took a boat down to shore to assess the extent of Nott's task and 
decided that the squadron might be more profitably employed reconnoitring Guadeloupe. 
When the Commodore returned to Mariegalante on 6 April, Codrington had arrived to send a 
summons to the French Governor, Auger, which he answered the day after Nott captured 
Lieutenant d'Avoux and 30 of his men. This number, added to the 50 already killed out of a 
total of 240, obviously caused Auger to believe that he had not sufficient numbers to defend 
French control of the island; but implicitly it also reflected the insignificance of Mariegalante 
within the region. Ironically, this view was underlined by the English who after sending the 
French prisoners away, brought off all their troops on 13 April having resolved to leave the 
island without a garrison as they set out for the strategically more important island of 
Guadeloupe. 
This resolution had been taken at a Council held on 10 April -a fractious meeting at 
which Codrington had tried to persuade the assembled participants that Martinique should be 
attacked first. He argued that this more southerly French island held the key to the rest of 
their possessions in the West Indies and that, militarily, a logical progression could be made 
from it to Guadeloupe. Since Barbados had agreed only to commit troops to the reduction of 
Martinique, Codrington contended that the landing force could make an initial attack while 
awaiting the arrival of this contingent. This would secure the majority of the island save for 
the fort where it was expected the French Governor would retreat in strength. Once the 
Barbadians had arrived they could invest the enemy stronghold thereby freeing the landing 
force to press north to Guadeloupe which Codrington expected to offer less resistance even 
51/582, Part ii, unpaginated, Mary, I Feb. -4 June 1691; PRO, ADM 1/5253, fos. 268-304: Documents 
relating to Wright's court martial held aboard their Majesties Ship Britannia at St Helens, 20 May 1693. 
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though intelligence reports indicated that defensive preparations were being completed in 
expectation of an attack. It remains unclear why the Council was not persuaded by 
Codrington's plausible arguments, especially since the Governor held the Chair in the 
presence of many other soldiers. While the naval captains may have been resolved for 
Guadeloupe on going into the meeting, the majority verdict against Codrington implies that 
some land men voted against him. Perhaps there were fears that, regardless of the eventual 
support from Barbados, the landing force would incur loss at the initial attack on Martinique 
causing there to be a reduction in the 1100 troops then available for deployment on 
Guadeloupe; or perhaps the Council as a whole simply could not accept Codrington's 
assessment about the comparative degrees of resistance expected at either island. 
When the fleet arrived off Guadeloupe on 19 April and bore down towards the shore 
in front of the main town, Basse-Terre, Wright noted the scale of the French defensive 
disposition: deep trenches faced with armed men and a couple of troops of horse positioned 
above. This was in addition to Fort Maudlin and other gun emplacements, all of which 
managed to badly gall the squadron that afternoon when it got caught in a calm at half-cable 
lengths distance. Some thirty men were lost in this exchange which lasted just over an hour 
before a slight wind blew up to allow the vessels to disengage. This stout French opposition 
caused a rethink of the landing site when the fleet aff ived at the intended spot - Anse La 
Barque Bay - on 21 April only to spy the enemy hastening there too. Codrington proposed 
landing at another bay to the windward, sensibly arguing that the extra two leagues march 
was worth the security of wading ashore from the boats largely unmolested. This point was 
subsequently underscored when, after a successful landing had been effected, considerable 
French breastworks positioned at Anse la Barque were seen for the first time. 
Major Nott and Lord Archibald Hamilton led English troops landed first to relative 
safety on a nearby hill-top; included in this force was the re-formed 'Marine Regiment' of 
around 400 sailors drawn from the squadron. Soon after, the march upon Basse-Terre began 
and it was not without incident. For the English, the major difficulty was the immediate 
topography which compressed the reach of their force and provided the French with many 
robust natural features to use as cover. Indeed, the ascent to the enemy's position some two 
and a-half miles distant on the opposite side of a steep gully was difficult; the path, wide 
enough for only three troops abreast, ran through a thick wood that thinned on the left flank 
as the crest was reached. It took a well executed flanking manoeuvre by Lord Hamilton 
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round the less dense left of this wood before the French were forced from their position. 
Such problems were virtually replicated three miles forward where the French had rallied on a 
hill-top across the Habitants river. Again a wood interposed and the most suitable approach 
could accommodate only two soldiers abreast. Codrington initially aimed to beat a path 
through the woods and he committed around 450 men to this task; but, as they got bogged 
down in a fire-fight, he was forced to seek a passage some distance up-river before the 
French could be forced once more onto the retreat. After sunset on 22 April, Codrington 
with an advanced detachment of 500 men did arrive in the deserted town of La Bayliffthree 
miles from Basse-Terre; but it had not been without cost. 
On the following morning, as the rest of the army came up, Captain Blackiston was 
sent forward to reconnoitre Basse-Terre. Since the landing, the squadron had been redundant 
as it followed the course of the army along the shore, but the land sources imply that its 
idleness caused the fleet to provide an inaccurate report that Blakiston was engaged at the 
Fig. 7: (iuadeloupc. 
80 
town, though Wright's log contains no record of this. Nonetheless, on this pretext, 
Codrington moved quickly to support Captain Blackiston to find that he had in fact entered a 
deserted town and that those French who had stayed were in the town's old fortified castle 
connected within a furlong to a 'cavalier' or fortified raised outpost. Hutchesons's report 
makes clear that the strength of these fortifications derived both from their natural aspects 
and the quality of their construction but on 24 April the Council agreed that siege works 
should be begun. 
Wright organised his squadron to land the requisite amount of ordnance and store for 
the siege batteries, while drafting a proposal that the squadron ply to the windward and bear 
down in line to batter the castle and the 'cavalier'. Codrington and the land officers agreed to 
Wright's plans but despite three attempts, the weather and, in particular, the strength of the 
current prevented any seaborne bombardment. Hence by I May, Wright was back at anchor 
off Bailiff landing additional ordnance and stores as Codrington moved his gun batteries ever 
closer to the forts in expectation of effecting the necessary breach as a preliminary to an 
assault. At that point the principal source of worry was that the French might send 
reinforcements from Martinique and, in an attempt to neutralise this threat by increasing the 
size of their own force, the Council sent Hutcheson to Barbados to negotiate an additional 
supply of men. However, within three days of his departure Hutcheson's task looked 
increasingly irrelevant as word came through to Wright that Ducasse had already arrived at 
Martinique, albeit with only two men-of-war. 
This news did not initially impact upon the English operation and the siege batteries 
continued their near constant bombardment, causing several smaller breaches to open up, and, 
on II May, the razing of the fort's house. Two days later however Wright was informed that 
eleven substantial French sail had been spotted coming from Martinique. He immediately 
concluded that Ducasse was leading a relief expedition and sent to Codrington with an 
account of these circumstances and a request that all the sailors currently on shore be sent 
back aboard. The Commodore's instinct was to leave Guadeloupe and sail towards Ducasse. 
His log does, however, play down such intentions and notes that at the Council of naval 
captains convened the following day it was resolved merely to ask Codrington if the squadron 
should sail, thus leaving the army ashore; and the minute of this Council supports this version 
of events. Codrington, nonetheless, believed that Wright was threatening to withdraw sea- 
based support without which his army faced being cut off. Codrington subsequently wrote of 
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trying to forge a compromise by suggesting to Wright that five of the hired merchantmen 
remain on station while the land force made a final push to capture the forts. According to 
Codrington - Wright makes no mention of this proposal in his log - the Commodore's 
response was intemperate and focused on preserving the squadron at all costs. 
The army was re-embarked during the night of 14 May, thus signalling the end of the 
combined operations undertaken by Wright and Codrington. The squadron set off to engage 
Ducasse but, either through accident or design, the Frenchman managed to outrun Wright. 
Thereafter, on returning to Barbados, the relationships between Wright and the colonial 
authorities progressively worsened throughout the rest of the summer to such an extent that 
Codrington and others sought to engineer Wright's disgrace on his return to England. By the 
time Wright left the Caribbean in the early autumn due to sickness and a recall order, a 
warrant been issued for his arrest. The court martial, which did not occur for another two 
years, acquitted him of all charges relating to his conduct when in the Caribbean. In the 
summer of 1691 this was for the future as the important questions about the failure of 
William's strategy and the combined operations in the Caribbean began to be asked at Court. 
111ii: Captain Ralph Wrenn's Expedition to the West Indies, Januarv-April 1692. 
The short three month duration of this expedition, combined with the fact that Captain Wrenn 
failed to make any offensive troop landings before he succumbed to yellow fever in early 
April, questions its separate inclusion in a study of combined operations. This though can be 
immediately answered by the administrative and strategic reality of an expedition which was 
dispatched in the six months following the ignominious circumstances surrounding the 
indecision over Wright's recall and his subsequent arrest for high treason. " 
Superficial enquiry might lead one to pre-date the operation's origins to a 
memorandum circulated in June 1691 in which the author (subsequently identified as 
Blathwayt) laid out a plan for a strengthened West Indian squadron to make a series of 
44 I1MC, Finch MSS, iii. 168: Nottingham to Sydney, 21 July 1691, states that Wright was to be ordered home 
and yet, PRO, ADM 316, pp. 126-7: Board Minutes, 7 Aug. 169 1, contains fresh orders to Wright regarding 
the provisioning of his squadron in the West Indies. HMC, Finch MSS, iii. 198: Nottingham to the 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, 10 Aug. 1691, indicates that it was not until 10 Aug. that the Admiralty 
were requested to remove Wright and issue a warrant for his arrest. Neeser, 'The British Naval Operations in 
the West Indies, 1650-1700', p. 1624 n. 38, claimed that an order countermanding the recall was received in 
the West Indies. By autumn, in the event of the Admiralty having failed to issue the warrant, the Lords of 
Trade in CSPC, 1689-1692, no. 1775, p. 545: Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 21 Sept. 1691, 
made clear their intention to do so. 
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destructive descents on the French territories in conjunction with the Duke of Bolton's 
Second Regiment of Foot (previously taken out by Wright) and a further two infantry 
battalions. " However, this was little different from what Wright had been dispatched to 
undertake, and Blathwayt's plan came to provide the wellspring and general direction of all 
expeditions sent to the Caribbean during the war. The more immediate origins of Wrenn's 
squadron are to be found in the failure of the last Wright-Codrington attempt against 
Guadeloupe. On that occasion the joint service equilibrium whereby maritime preponderance 
succoured the land campaign had been upset by the arrival of some eleven French sail in a 
neighbouring bay. The basic point that (regional) sea command was essential before any 
other attacks (land or sea) could be sustained had been well made. "' It followed that a 
prerequisite of such command was a preponderant sailing force and the small squadron that 
Captain Arthur commanded after Wright's departure was evidently insufficient. Moreover, it 
was desperately short of provisions, both of victuals and war stores. These circumstances led 
West Indian interests to express their vulnerabilities. The colonial governors wrote home of 
their fears of imminent French territorial attacks and such misgivings were underscored by an 
autumn report that France was preparing to send to the region a squadron of fourteen sail. "' 
Meanwhile, critical mercantile opinion on custom duties; the three quarters native crew 
threshold; and the continuing damage inflicted upon trade, all festered throughout the summer 
and culminated in a series of petitions and bills when Parliament opened in the autumn. " In 
the summer of 169 1, therefore, William's war strategy seemed to lack a coherent imperial 
defence component and, in the Caribbean, England was offensively and defensively impotent. 
These were not circumstances he could afford to ignore; nor did he want to. On 19 August 
169 1, a month before Wright touched Kinsale on his return, the Admiralty summoned Captain 
Sir Francis Wheler" to attend 'haveing occasion to employ him'. " 
45 CSpC, 1689-1692, no. 1560, pp. 467-8: Proposals for destroying the French Plantations in America, 
[June? ] 1691. 
46 W. T. Morgan, 'The British West Indies During King William's War (1689-97)', JMIIii (1930), 390; 
Colomb, Naval Warfare, pp. 255-7. 
47 CSpD, 1690-1691, p. 525: Proceedings upon the petition of the Commissioner for the Leeward and 
Caribees Islands, 19 Sept. 1691. 
48 Morgan, 'The British West Indies', pp. 389-9 1; L. F. Stock, Proceedings and Debates ofthe British 
Parliaments Respecting North America, iL 1689-1692 (Washington D. C., 1927), pp. 46-7,50-9. 
49 Also frequently spelt Wheeler, though I have adopted the spelling given in the Dictionary ofNational 
Biography (London, 1909), xx. 1355. 
50 PRO, ADM 3/6, p. 144: Board Minutes, 19 Aug. 169 1. 
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Wheler was to be asked to command the prospective West Indian squadron and 
throughout the following weeks he and the Board were engaged in negotiations over the 
extent and the nature of this command. Using Captain Wright's Instructions as a model, both 
parties moved to the drafting of a new set. Initially no points of contention arose and, indeed, 
the Admiralty proposed and secured agreement for the appointment from the Queen's 
Cabinet Council. " Moreover, the colonial governors were certainly led to believe that it was 
to be Sir Francis who was soon to arrive with a squadron. " However, just two months after 
negotiations had first begun, the Admiralty signed Instructions for a Captain Ralph Wrenn, 
and not Wheler, to command the West Indian squadron. " 
This alteration was a product of the breakdown in negotiations between Wheler and 
the Admiralty. There had been a failure to reach agreement on the balance of authority 
between the naval commander and the colonial governor, who, in the absence of an appointed 
General Officer, would command the land forces. Wheler's request at the end of August for 
a clearer explanation on this point ran up against Governor Codrington's correspondence on 
the perceived imbalance in command which he considered had bedevilled combined 
operations with Wright. As part of a remedy, he had suggested that the governor should have 
sole authority over the naval squadron and this had recently been piloted by ranking the 
current naval commander in the West Indies subordinate to the Barbadian Governor. "' The 
union of military and naval command in the hands of a colonial official was unlikely to appeal 
to a sailor of Wheler's experience; and, certainly, in the following year, a memorandum he 
drafted on the West Indian squadron explicitly argued that the naval command should be 
totally independent of the colonial governors. " 
The firial Instructions issued to Wrenn indicated that the Admiralty required a more 
submissive junior captain to lead the squadron. The provisions on command expressed in 
Articles Seven to Eleven - albeit subtly drafted - showed Codrington to have succeeded in 
51 PRO, ADM 3/6, p. 161: Board Minutes, 31 Aug. 1691; PRO, ADM 2/171, pp. 399-400: the Admiralty to 
Nottingham, 31 Aug. 169 1; HMC, Finch MSS, iii. 405-6: Minutes of the Committee, or Cabinet Council, 
appointed to advise the Queen during the King's absences from England, 21 Aug. 1691. 
52 CSpCp 1689-1692, no. 1993, pp. 587: Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, II Jan. 1692. 
53 PRO, ADM 3/6, p. 24 1: Board Minutes, 30 Oct. 169 1. 
54 PRO, ADM 3/6, p. 202: Board Minutes, 2 Oct. 169 1; PRO, ADM 2/17 1, pp. 399-400: the Admiralty to 
Nottingham, 31 Aug. 1691; CSPC, 1689-1692, nos. 1617 1688, pp. 490-1,520: Codrington to the Lords of 
Trade and Plantations, 3 July 169 1; the Lords of Trade and Plantations to Kendall, 6 Aug. 169 1. 
55 PRO, SP 42/1, fos. 397-406: 'Proposalls Humbly Offered by Sir Francis Wheeler Upon His Being Thought 
On to Goe Commander of the West India Squadron', 18 July 1692. 
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retaining the colonial influence. Admittedly he was not given sole command of the fleet as he 
had argued for, nor could he ignore the resolutions of a Council of War at which Wrenn and 
his three eldest Captains had standing, but overall, the greater discretion in command went to 
the governor. Similar to Wright's Instructions, Codrington, and the Leeward Islands' 
Council of War, could advise on the proceedings of the squadron at sea; while Wrenn was 
also prohibited from detaching any of his squadron without first informing the Barbadian and 
Leeward Islands' authorities. Moreover, having done so, the naval commander had to ensure 
that such land men were satisfied that the King's service did not positively need the ships to 
remain on the island station. 56 
This wrangling between the colonial and naval interests did not hinder the material 
preparations of the squadron and these indicated that the naval force was to combine with a 
contingent of soldiers and, thus, possess an amphibious capability. That this was to be 
modest was obvious from the size of force to be embarked in asmuch that it did not warrant a 
general commanding officer, nor even a commissioned regimental officer. On its dispatch 
from England, twenty non-commissioned officers provided the higher ranks of military 
command for the 400 soldiers which had been drafted from Bolton's Regiment billeted at 
Portsmouth as recruits for his second infantry battalion previously raised for service in the 
West Indies. " Since 1690 it had been mainly quartered in the Leeward Islands and, due to 
sickness and combat casualties, was now desperately short of establishment strength not to 
mention clothes and provisions. 
The squadron's modest amphibious capability was further underscored by the 
relatively small size of its naval component. As Captain of the Norwich, Wrenn was only to 
take under his command from England two fourth rates - the Diamond and the Mordaunt - 
which were to convoy fourteen merchant ships hired as freight for the soldiers, provisions and 
ordnance. Only on arrival in the Caribbean would the squadron be enlarged through the 
addition of the six warships that Wright had been persuaded to leave on station. " 
Significantly, the Admiralty denied Wrenn the additional authority of flying a Flag at his ship's 
56 PRO, ADM 2/8, pp. 330-4: 'Instructions for Capt. Ralph Wrenn, 29 Oct. 1691. 
57 PRO, ADM 3/6, p. 169: Board Minutes, 4 Sept. 1691; PRO, ADM 2/8, p. 215: the Admiralty to the 
Commissioners for Transportation, 4 Sept. 169 1; PRO, WO 516, p. 23 1: Order to the Duke of Bolton, 31 Oct. 
1691; PRO, WO 25/3138, p. 139: Warrant for the Earl of Ranelagh, 19 Nov. 1691. 
58 PRO, ADM 2/8, pp. 330-4: 'Instructions for Capt. Ralph Wrenn', 29 Oct. 1691; CSPC, 1689-1692, no. 
1617, p. 485: Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 3 July 1691. In the event only five warships 
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topmasthead, which would have conferred upon him unofficial rank of Commodore. "' This 
small number of warships and few soldiers has led Wrenn's force to be described as 
'lamentably inadequate'. " Quantitatively, this was quite correct, especially if one of the 
reasons for the squadron's departure was to reclaim command of the sea. However, such 
condemnation misses the point that Wrenn's expeditionary force was modest by design 
because its combined operational deployment was to be as the junior partner with the colonial 
authorities. The Admiralty may have underestimated the capability required to command the 
Caribbean sea and eject the French from their territories, but with respect to Wrenn's 
squadron, its material resource was commensurate with the objectives and structure of 
command set down in the Instructions. 
Despite its small size, the fitting out of Wrenn's squadron was not spared delay. The 
blame, however, did not entirely lie with the Admiralty. Indeed, as has been seen, the 
negotiations over the Instructions continued throughout September and October as the Navy 
Board worked to bring the squadron together. The delays originated with the merchant ships 
which had been hired to carry the majority of the soldiers (the three warships were only to 
carry 50 soldiers each)" plus the ordnance and victuals. There occurred grave problems in 
getting the relevant freight - in particular the victuals - aboard and for the ships then to slip 
down the River Thames to the Downs before starting for St Helens where the soldiers were 
to be embarked. " More delay could then be expected there for the War Office had been slow 
to issue the correct order for the draught. "' Circumstances were further complicated by the 
fact that in early August preparations had been begun to send out some merchantmen with 
four months victuals and stores for the warships already on station. The fourth rates the 
Diamond and the Norwich were to act as convoy and they had a projected departure date of 
joined Wrenn because the Jersey surrendered to the French after a short action on 18 December 1691. See 
Moses, 'The British Navy in the Caribbean, 1689-1697', pp. 26-7. 
59 PRO, ADM 2/381, p. 397: Sotherne to Wrenn, 7 Nov. 1691; PRO, ADM 2/8, pp. 380-1: Order to Capt. 
Wrenn, 7 Nov. 169 1; PRO, ADM 3/3, pp. 20,35: Board Minutes, 28 Jan., 6 Feb. 1690. 
6" Neeser, 'The British Naval Operations in the West Indies', p. 1615. 
61 PRO, ADM 2/171, pp. 425-6: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 17 Sept. 1691. 
62 PRO, ADM 2/38 1, p. 339: Sotherne to Blathwayt, 12 Oct. 1691. 
63 The initial order - PRO, WO 516, p. 223: Order to Col. John Gibson, 7 Oct. 1691 - was cancelled, but then 
reissued on 24 October - PRO, WO 516, p. 230. This was superseded when it was decided that the total 400 
soldiers were to be solely drafted from Bolton's First Regiment of Foot instead of 100 coming from Viscount 
Castleton's Regiment. See p. 84 n. 57 above for the order and Ranelagh's warrant for payment. 
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15 September. " With both these warships appointed to the proposed West Indian squadron 
it seems likely that this convoy never departed and, instead, that the Navy Board had to 
integrate its freight with that being sent out in the fourteen merchantmen of Wrenn's 
squadron. To the Admiralty's credit they recognised the potential for delay and stressed to 
the Navy Board the need for its strict oversight. " It was, nonetheless, to little avail. In early 
October, the Admiralty Secretary, Sotherne, demanded to know of the victuallers why the 
loading of the merchant vessels was in a state of 'backwardness'. " Wrenn was to provide 
regular lists of those vessels that appeared at the Downs, though his first return of mid- 
October which mentioned only Henry Stupple's England Frigate, contradicted the Downs's 
commander's list that also cited the Edward & Elizabeth. Confusion and, doubtless, delay 
resulted. Certainly no time was gained and, by the end of the month, there were more than a 
few merchant vessels who had still not passed down the Thames. With the mass of soldiers 
still to be embarked, it was 2 December before Wrenn received his orders to sail. " 
The fate of Wrenn, his squadron and the prospective combined operations with the 
colonial authorities in the Caribbean can in outline be understood from the Court's 
consideration of his widow's petition for relief The Admiralty had referred her pleadings 
upwards because its rules prohibited relief to the dependants of those not slain in an actual sea 
fight and it considered that Wrenn, who had died from the sickness prevalent in the West 
Indies, was due some form of recognition. The Admiralty's supporting report highlighted 
Wrenn's many years as a naval commander and also his actions in defending his convoy when 
it was attacked on 22 February 1692 by a much larger French force commanded by Comte de 
Blenac, as Wrenn made his way from Barbados to Antigua. "' 
That this was the only incident related from Wrenn's last period of service was highly 
significant for it explains the failure of the combined operations directed by Article Seven of 
Wrenn's Instructions. As demonstrated by Wright's experiences, regional sea superiority was 
a significant requirement for the execution of combined operations. On his arrival at 
Barbados during the second week of January 1692, both Wrenn and Governor Kendall were 
64 PRO, ADM 316, pp. 120,136,147: Board Minutes, 3,14,21 Aug. 1691; PRO, ADM 2/171, pp. 362-3: the 
Admiralty to the Navy Board, 4 Aug. 169 1. 
65 PRO, ADM 2/171, p. 446: the Admiralty to the Navy Board, 30 Sept. 1691. 
66 PRO, ADM 2/38 1, p. 322: Sotheme to the Commissioners for Victualling, 9 Oct. 169 1. 
67 PRO, ADM 2/38 1, pp. 3549 383,450: Sotherne to Wrenn, 17,20 Oct., 2 Dec. 169 1; Sotherne to Blathwayt, 
30 Oct. 1691. 
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hopeful of gaining this sea command for intelligence had indicated that the eighteen-strong 
French squadron was divided between a station off Barbados and an anchorage at Martinique. 
Wrenn, having augmented his own squadron with some merchantmen, sailed on 30 January 
with the objective of engaging the French ships off Barbados. The French, however, checked 
his efforts by sailing north and effecting a concentration of their force, leaving Wrenn little 
option but to return to Carlisle Bay. " 
In the following weeks, despite the lurking presence of the French fleet, the Barbadian 
Council was keen that Wrenn should not default on providing security for the merchants 
operating between the islands, nor on the delivery of the recruits, provisions and ordnance for 
Bolton's regiment quartered on the Leeward Islands. Therefore, on 18 February, having 
taken full advantage of the enhanced authority afforded them by Wrenn's Instruction, the 
island's Council of War dispatched the Captain to convoy the merchantmen bound for 
Antigua and Jamaica. Although the Council had enjoined that Wrenn steer clear of the 
French squadron until the merchants were safe and he had been joined by three warships from 
the Leeward Islands, this took no account of Blenac actively seeking an engagement. This 
was what occurred on the morning of 22 February as Wrenn passed by La Ddsirade near 
Guadeloupe. The French took advantage of a favourable gale to forrn a line of sixteen sail 
and attack Wrenn, who was thus forced to fight a defensive action for four hours until noon 
when the convoy was in the clear. Thereafter, despite the preponderant French force, Wrenn 
managed to bring his squadron of seven sail back to Barbados on 25 February without loss. 
The lack of battle damage could not, however, hide the strategic consequences that Wrenn 
had not only failed to gain command of the sea but had been chased from it. Moreover, 
tactically, it was obvious that the small size of his squadron would prohibit further actions of 
either a naval or amphibious character. This was confirmed by the landing of the recruits - 
increasingly ravaged by sickness - at Barbados. " 
Wrenn's death soon after returning to Barbados meant that he was not given the 
opportunity to seek a resolution of his squadron's strategic and tactical problems. Nor 
indeed, did his successor, Captain Butler, whose leadership was confined to implementing the 
61 PRO, ADM 2/10, p. 306: 'Report on a Reference of Council upon the Petition of the Widdow of Captain 
Wrenn for Relief, IS July 1693; PRO, ADM 1/4080, f. 155: Court Minute, 28 July 1692. 
69 CSpC, 1689-1692, nos. 2024,2025, p. 59 1: Minutes of the Council of War at Barbados, 23,25 Jan. 1692; 
Colomb, Naval Warfare, p. 258. 
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Admiralty's order to return in the spring after disposing certain warships for the guard and 
service of the islands. At the same time, Governor Kendall wrote home of the relative 
weakness of the French force in the region which was such that he believed the English were 
better placed to harin it than might have been thought. This implied that Wrenn's later 
conduct, his death and then Butler's concentration on returning home were all missed 
opportunities. " Such criticism did not adversely impact Mrs Wrenn's case and she was 
awarded a pension of f. 100 per annurn7'; but more importantly for the war policy it 
encouraged the organisation of a third expeditionary operation to the West Indies. 
H. iv: Rear Admiral Sir Francis Wheler's Expedition to the West Indies and North 
America, January-September 1693. 
Although the first six months of 1692 brought European naval success through Admiral 
Russell's triumph at the battle of La Hogue and then planning for an combined operation 
upon the northern French coast, Secretaries Blathwayt and Nottingham devoted much of the 
second half of the year organising a third combined army and naval force for the Caribbean. 
The English Court was optimistic as it considered there to be a 'fair prospect"' of inflicting 
some damage upon the French in the region, while Nottingham even reckoned the advantage 
to be gained 'so great and so probable'. ' These views both rcflected Kendall's assessment of 
inherent French weakness in the Caribbean, and coincided with the colonial Governors-) 
continual solicitation for a further despatch of warships and troops to bolster regional 
security. " But perhaps most importantly, no-one involved in formulating war policy could 
ignore the need to make good the patchy success of the Wright-Codrington ventures in 1691 
and the lack of progress by Wrenn. This was especially true for politicians like Nottingham 
who were sceptical of William's continental campaigning and instead favoured a more 
exclusively maritime strategy. This strategic conception had been pithily articulated by Sir 
Thomas Clarges during the debate on supply for 1692, through his claim that the natural way 
70 CSpC, 1689-1692, no. 2110, pp. 607-9: Kendall to the Lords of Trade, 4 Mar. 1692; Colomb, Naval 
Warfare, pp. 258-9; de la Ronci6re, Histoire de la Marine Franqaise, vi. 246. 
71 CSpC, 1689-1692, no. 2189, p. 627: Extract from a letter of Governor Kendall to Blathwayt, 20 Apr. 1692. 
72 PRO, ADM 1/4080, f 155: Court Minute, 28 July 1692. 
73 The Conduct of the Earl offollingham, ed. W. A. Aiken (New Haven, 1941), p. 113. 
74 NMM, SOU/14, unf: Nottingham to Blathwayt, 12 Aug. 1692. 
75 CSpC) 1689-1692, nos. 1993,2110,2189, pp. 585-8,607-9,627: Codrington to the Lords of Trade and 
Plantations, II Jan. 1692; Kendall to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 4 Mar. 1692; extract from a letter of 
Governor Kendall to Blathwayt, 20 Apr. 1692. 
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for an island was to wage war by sea, and that if America could be reclaimed and sea 
superiority maintained, then the French could overrun continental Europe without impunity 
for England. " 
The operational continuities with 1690-1691 are, however, initially difficult to detect 
due to misleading accounts of the expedition's vague provenance. " It is necessary to work 
many months back from the flurry of preparatory activity in the autumn of 1692 to March 
when the Admiralty decided to send a squadron to the West Indies under Captain George 
Meese. This proposal admittedly fell into abeyance and Meese was soon employed in the 
Channel. " Notwithstanding, by the beginning of April, Secretary Nottingham indicated that 
Blathwayt had already grasped the initiative with respect to the West Indies when he 
encouraged the Secretary-at-War to press on with the project he had fon-ned for the region. 
Governor Kendall's claims in early March that the Barbadians, were eagerly awaiting Wheler's 
arrival could conceivably be used to push the date of origin back even further. " However, it 
seems likely that these expectations were continuing hopes founded upon the preparations for 
a squadron in the second half of 1691 that Wheler was initially designated to command - the 
truncated version of which Wrenn commanded - and not early knowledge of a new design. 
Despite further references between the two Secretaries throughout the spring, progress 
proved slow as overseas endeavour remained strategically subordinate to the quest for 
military and naval success in Europe. " 
Progress on land remained elusive, with William bogged down in a 'war-as-process" 
in Flanders. Command of the sea had been secured at La Hogue in the early summer, 
however; and Blathwayt was hopeftil of gaining the King's attention for his colonial project. 
76 A. Grey, Debates ofthe House of Commons, From the Year 1667 to the Years 1694 (London, 1763), x. 177. 
77 Particularly confusing in this respect is Moses, 'The British Navy in the Caribbean, 1689-1697', p. 27 who 
strongly implied that the decision to send out a squadron under Wheler was not taken till late summer. 
Others, for example, Morgan, 'The British West Indies', p. 391; Childs, 'Secondary Operations of the British 
Army', p. 86; and S. S. Webb, 'William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer: Muddling Through to Empire, 1689- 
1717', W&MQ xxvi (1969), 38 1, all rightly dated the expedition's origins to early 1692. However, only 
Neeser, 'The British Naval Operations in the West Indies', p. 1615 specifically mentioned the proposed 
squadron under Meese as a precursor to Wheler's. 
78 PRO, ADM 3/6, p. 446: Board Minutes, 16 Mar. 1692; PRO, ADM 3/7, unpaginated: Board Minutes, 22 
July 1692; PRO, ADM 7/692, p. 30: Order to Captain Mees[e], 13 June 1692. 
79 CSpC, 1689-1692, no. 2110, pp. 607-8: Kendall to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 4 Mar. 1692. 
80 BL, Add. MSS 37991, fos: 28-9: Nottingham to Blathwayt, I Apr. 1692; HMC, Finch MSS, iv, nos. 129, 
357,513, pp. 73,188,276-7: Blathwayt to [Nottingham], [14-]24 Apr. 1692; Nottingham to Blathwayt, 27 
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In this he was aided by the diminishing prospect that a combined operation would be 
executed against the Normandy coast. " By the end of June, not only did William agree to the 
dispatch of a squadron of eleven sail with one regiment, and 300 recruits for Bolton's 
battalion already quartered on Barbados, to the Caribbean by I August but he also allocated 
an additional infantry regiment; ordered all infantry Captains to increase their companies by 
between five and ten men; and appointed Captain Sir Francis Wheler C. -in-C. " 
The operation was clearly Blathwayt's progeny and his 1691 proposals once again 
provided the outfine. " Still, the extent of the Secretary-at-War's originality in design and 
control should not be exaggerated. The detail in the appointment of the land and sea 
commanders, including the drafting of the Instructions, and the material preparations 
provided many opportunities for Whitehall and others to exert influence. It was thus that the 
King's appointment of Sir Francis WheIer as C. -in. -C. was highly significant. As mentioned, 
Wheler had, in 1691, been mooted to command a West Indian squadron with troops aboard, 
and both the King and Blathwayt would have known of his stalled negotiations with the 
Admiralty regarding this appointment. " Yet remarkably neither initially stipulated the 
parameters of his commission, nor those of the Instructions save only that Wheler was to 
have a 'superior' command at sea and land. " This provided Wheler and the Admiralty with 
an opportunity to influence both by continuing their discussions left off in October 169 1. 
By late July 1692, Wheler had been invited to London for a conference on the 
expedition. The agenda was to be two papers that Sir Francis had earlier submitted to 
Whitehall which considered separately the sea and land commands. " Three Articles in each 
document dealt with the command structure and indicated that Wheler favoured a unitary and 
81 This is Lynn's paradigmatic expression for warfare during the time of Louis XIV. Its characteristics 
include indecision, slow and interminable operations which combined placed primacy on attrition, and an aim 
to make war feed itself See Lynn, The Wars ofLouisXIV, pp. 367-76. 
82 Childs, 'Secondary Operations of the British Army', p. 87; Lynn, The Wars oftoulsXIV, pp. 223-7; HMC, 
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91 
autocratic form. " In the first paper, Article Two expressed the nub by stipulating that the sea 
command be totally independent of the colonial governors. Article Thirteen underscored this 
with the practical condition that the naval commodore have the freedom to deploy his 
squadron without reference to another authority in theatre. The third noteworthy Article (the 
Fifth) aimed at bolstering the naval commander's role by nominally commissioning him a 
Lieutenant-Colonel (or second-in-command) if he should go ashore with the troops. " 
Significantly, Wheler's paper did not mention a Council of War as an arbiter of command 
decisions. The whole thrust was that the number of decision-takers should be kept to a 
minimum. 
The second paper, focusing on the land command, continued in a similar manner. 
Although the proposal that the naval commander be nominally commissioned a Lieutenant- 
Colonel when on shore clearly represented an attempt to interpose him within the army's 
hierarchy, it was not a prelude to reducing the senior soldier's authority and an argument for 
an increase in the scope of the Colonel's command was made. While it was accepted that the 
island forces would have a pre-existing command structure based upon the Governor, Articles 
One and Four made it clear that the land commander sent from England should have full 
authority over the colonial militia and territorially raised regiments. Furthermore, Article 
Three aimed at undermining this recognition of a pre-existing colonial command structure by 
proposing that all the islands' forces should combine to form one brigade under a single 
general officer. " The underlying logic that this would serve to break down the islands' 
regimental loyalties and habits of command, leaving just one individual for the commander of 
the land forces to treat with, was another example of Wheler's desire to concentrate 
command. 
Whitehall's response can be inferred from certain scribbled marginal comments. Of 
the six Articles considered, Articles Two and Five of the first paper received a scribbled 
Touching the Land Forces that are to Goe to the West Indys', 18 July 1692; Wheler to Albemarle, 30 July 
1692; BL, Add MSS 37991, fos. 132-3: Nottingham to Blathwayt, 26 July 1692. 
88 The use of the word autocratic here owes much to the definition of personality traits given in N. Dixon, On 
the Psychology ofMilitary Incompetence (Pimlico edn, London, 1994), p. 287. Dixon considers that the 
autocrat would seek to exercise close control when the circumstances required it and it seems that Wheler 
aimed to structure the command to allow himself such autocratic discretion. 
89 PRO, SP 42/1, fos. 397-406: Articles Two, Five and Thirteen of 'Proposalls Humbly Offered by Sir Francis 
Wheeler Upon His Being Thought On to Goe Commander', 18 July 1692. 
90 PRO, SP 42/1, fos. 407-10: Articles One, Three and Four of 'Proposalls Humbley Offered by Sir Francis 
Wheeler, Touching the Land Forces', IS July 1692. 
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'agreed' as did Article Four of the second paper. The margins of Articles One and Three of 
the latter document and Article Thirteen of the former remained blank. " This pattern could 
suggest that Whitehall agreed that the Service commanders be mainly responsible for 
operational direction, but that there was also a willingness to recognise the essential 
component role of the colonial governors. Certainly, Nottingham reflected gubernatorial 
interests when he argued that Wheler should not be a supreme commander and that, outside 
the theatre of combat, the governors should remain in charge of their island's troops. This 
was a theme that the Secretary returned to after Blathwayt had floated the idea of a military 
appointment superior to the governors and the Committee of Council wished it represented 
that they did not approve of a general army officer's commission which placed the colonial 
officials in a subordinate position. " 
Eventually, the King and Blathwayt settled upon a command structure quite different 
from that implied by Wheler's appointment as C. -in-C. Firstly, Wheler's command was to be 
divided with Colonel John Foulkes, whose career had included the command of Monmouth's 
White Regiment at Sedgemoor (1685), and who was to be C. -in-C-. of all the land forces, 
including the colonial troops, when on board ship and in action; and, secondly, in line with the 
previous two expeditions, a Council of War was detailed as the sovereign command 
authority. This transfer of individual authority to a Council was underlined by its composition 
which included all land and sea officers; the governors; and even the colonial militia officers 
when in combat or discussing island defence. " It has been argued that the resolution of the 
expedition's command structure was a ruinous fudge by Blathwayt acting as an imperial 
centralist, whereby a military commander had been interposed within the previously volatile 
relationship between the squadron commander and the colonial governors. "' Not only does 
the progress of the expedition bear this argument out, it is also underscored by the 
prescriptive nature of the Admiral's Instructions. Although the final version of Wheler's 
Instructions were very general in their objectives, combining standard naval duties such as 
securing island trade with a weak amphibious provision to annoy the French by land or sea as 
91 PRO, SP 42/1, fos. 397-406,407-10: marginal comments at Articles Two and Five and the blank margin of 
Article Thirteen of 'Proposalls Humbley Offered by Sir Francis Wheler Upon His Being Thought On To Goe 
Commander', 18 July 1692; marginal comments at Article Four and the blank margins of Articles One and 
Three of 'Proposalls Humbley Offered by Sir Francis Wheeler, Touching the Land Forces', 18 July 1692. 
92 BL, Add. MSS 3799 1, fos. 131-2,141-3: Nottingham to Blathwayt, 26 July, 12 Aug. 1692. 
93 BL, Add. MSS 37991, fos. 140-1: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 4 Aug. 1692. 
94 Webb, 'William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer: Muddling Through', pp. 386-7. 
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opportunity arose, the King issued him with a set of detailed Additional Instructions. These 
picked up on draft proposals that had been made in September which directed Wheler to 
destroy Martinique by 'frequent descents' and crucially outlined a second phase. It was 
stipulated that Wheler's squadron plus Foulkes's and Goodwyn's regiments must leave the 
Caribbean by the end of May and proceed to North America to combine with the New 
England provinces in an amphibious attempt to seize Canada. Thereafter, before returning to 
England at the end of September he was specifically directed to Newfoundland to destroy the 
French settlements and fisheries there. 95 Both targets were prevailing, though not 
predominant, strategic concerns of the Court since the failure of Sir William Phips's attempt 
to conquer Canada in 1690 and Commodore Holman's ineffective bombardment and raiding 
in 1692 of the southern Newfoundland coast. 
The nine-month interval before Wheler weighed anchor with his squadron of one 
warship and II frigates, sundry support vessels and some 1500 soldiers reflected not only the 
length of negotiations to resolve the expedition's command structure but also the preparation 
of the ships and the organisation of the land force for embarkation. Aside from procuring 
some 50 tons of freight for the household goods of Jamaica's new Lieutenant-Governor, Sir 
William Beeston, who was to go out with the squadron, no specific issue seemed to hinder 
the Navy Board's preparations. It was just that the extent of their duties from ensuring that 
the ships were sheathed and provisioned for eight months, to the appointment of the 
squadrons' standing naval officers, caused the bureaucratic wheel to grind slowly. Moreover, 
they were reliant on the speedy dispatch of orders by others such as Admiral Russell who had 
been requested to send in four ships that had been with his fleet. Delays seemed inevitable, 
and when these occurred they set back other tasks which had been completed on schedule. 
This was particularly true of certain victuals which quickly went bad and had to be replaced if 
stowed for too long before departure. ' 
The assembly of the two regiments and the recruits for Bolton's second battalion 
proved difficult, particularly in the final few weeks before the squadron's departure. Again 
95 PRO, ADM 2/10, pp. 322-7: 'Instructions to Sir Francis Wheler Knt', 25 Nov. 1692; HMC, Finch MSS, iv, 
no. 982, pp. 5 10-11: the King to Wheler: Further Additional Instructions, 27 Nov. 1692; CSPC, 1689-1692, 
no. 2504, p. 712: Instruction to Sir Francis Wheler, Kt Comm an der-in-Chief of the Naval Force in the West 
Indies, 20 Sept. 1692. 
96 PRO, ADM 2/172 pp. 316,350,356,361,389-90,390,392,413,418,423,431: the Admiralty to the Navy 
Board, 23 July, II Aug., 3,5,14,21,24 Sept. 1692; the Admiralty to Nottingham, 17 Aug., 3 Sept. 1692; the 
Admiralty to Russell, 20 Aug. 1692. 
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the structure of command was at the centre of the contested issues. The first problem 
concerned the vacant colonelcy of Hale's Regiment of Foot as the eponymous colonel had 
not been reappointed after suffering the King's disfavour and reputedly that of the other 
officers in his regiment. Godfrey Lloyd was hopeful of being appointed but Nottingham 
managed to cause much rancour by manocuvring Robert Goodwyn into the post with Lloyd 
being barely consoled with the command of Bolton's second battalion in the West Indies. 
Resentment deepened when Nottingham's judgement was called into question by Goodwyn's 
unwillingness to go on the expedition, though Lloyd's efforts to get Blathwayt to intervene 
proved fruitless. " More significantly, this lack of enthusiasm to serve in the Caribbean was 
also displayed by Foulkes who, even after being appointed C. -in-C. of the land forces, aimed 
to command his regiment in Flanders instead. When his request was turned down, he then 
began grumbling about his lack of authority as C. -in-C. These circumstances were made 
worse by the intervention of the Lieutenant-Govemor of Portsmouth, Colonel John Gibson, 
who had been requested by Blathwayt: to help with the troops' regulation and organisation as 
they assembled on the Isle of Wight and around Portsmouth. This he did, but the Governor's 
conduct was motivated by a desire to replace Foulkes. The King eventually stalled Gibson's 
malignant efforts but not before he had undermined Foulkes and caused him to believe that 
there was a whispering campaign against him at Court. " 
Possibly the most damaging aspect of Gibson's intriguing was its basis in truth. He 
accurately represented the poor condition of Foulkes's regiment which required both recruits 
and a stop placed upon deserters at its quarters on the Isle of Wight. This was reportedly in 
contrast to Goodwyn's regiment which was praised as were also the recruits for Lloyd's new 
command. To be fair to Foulkes, he fully recognised the problems with his regiment but 
hardly endeared himself to his men by requesting that a detachment of Dragoons be sent from 
Portsmouth to keep discipline. This ran contrary to English military tradition. 
Unsurprisingly, Gibson had little trouble representing Foulkes's idea as improper, further 
undermining the C. -in-C. 's authority, though Wheler had echoed Foulkes's suggestion. 
Through to December, Foulkes continued to struggle to bring his regiment up to near 
97 NMM, SOU/14, unt: Nottingham to 'Sir' [Blathwayt], 3,12,15 Aug. 1692; [Blathwayt] to Nottingham, I 
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Sept. 1692. 
98 BL, Add. MSS 9727, fos. 74-5,88-9.105-6: Gibson to Blathwayt, 3,8,18 Dec. 1692. 
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establishment strength, and also to keep the officers with their men, as many found the 
attraction of London with the possibility of gaining an exemption from the expedition too 
tempting. Four days before Christmas, Foulkes and Wheler completed the embarkation of 
soldiers, though the Colonel was still seeking deserters. Contrary winds then prevented the 
squadron from weighing until the latter half of the first week in January 1693. " 
The squadron arrived off Barbados at the end of February 1693 after a largely 
uneventful voyage. "' Following a prudent enquiry into the health of the island, Wheler 
dropped anchor in Carlisle Bay and disembarked the troops. The Barbados Assembly had 
already passed an act to provide the soldiers with free quarters and colonial enthusiasm for 
Wheler's arrival was also evident in the efforts of Governors Kendall and Codrington to 
maintain the integrity of around 1000 victualled militia which they had each previously been 
directed to raise. Despite an outbreak of sickness, Kendall had managed to retain some 800 
troops and had organised them into two regiments commanded by Colonels Butler and 
Salter. "' Codrington encountered difficulties after the arrival of the squadron, when the 
Antiguan contingent proved reluctant to serve under an alternative commander to their 
Governor. Codrington was forced to join the expedition as a volunteer commander without 
Wheler or Foulkes being informed. "' This was an ominous development for the operational 
command inasmuch as in a Council of War with upwards of 26 members, there was liable to 
be many opinions, and Codrington with his equivocal status was likely to prove 
contentious. "' 
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The Additional Instructions's direction that the squadron leave the Caribbean for the 
eastern American seaboard by the end of May put time at a premium, and the first Council of 
War to consider how best to descend upon Martinique was held on 2 March. The logistical 
task ofjoining the two groups' land forces at Barbados and the Leeward Islands was perforce 
the first issue to be resolved. The Council's minute implied that there was an early suggestion 
for the squadron to sail to Antigua, collect Codrington's force and then proceed to 
Martinique. This would certainly have been advantageous in terms of integrating the two 
bodies of troops while also reducing the vulnerability of two convoys sailing independently 
but drawing on the same escort force. However, Wheler represented the difficulties involved 
in beating leeward to Antigua and raised grave concerns about sickness setting in the longer 
the troops were at sea. Therefore, the Council resolved that Codrington's force would be 
met leeward of Martinique at the Cul de Sac Marin, one and half miles from the island's 
shore. The Chester and the Mermaid were sent to convoy the Leeward Islands' troops and a 
sloop was to reconnoitre Martinique's coast. "' 
Altemative suggestions cast these proceedings and the point of rendezvous in an odd 
fight. Kendall's contribution had emphasised that, while the French inhabitants were 
supposed to be few in number, they were busily fbrtifýýing all potential landing sites. By 
proceeding to Martinique in two different convoys, the English were risking one group 
arriving before the other, thus, advertising the expedition's approach and stalling any 
momentum that might have been built up for an immediate descent. Instead, time would be 
lost in full view of the enemy as the Council convened for deliberations on the choice of a 
landing site. Codrington had written to propose Mariegalante as an alternative rendezvous, 
but this was rejected by the Council on 16 March on the grounds that the fleet would struggle 
to weather Dominica and that the water was poor at Mariegalante. Yet, when the initial 
decision had been taken to meet at the Cul de Sac Marin there had been no discussion about 
the need to water, nor indeed would it have been possible there. "' 
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The main squadron under Wheler sailed from Barbados on 30 March and arrived at 
the rendezvous on I April, a full three days before Codrington's convoy even left the 
Leeward Islands. To their credit Wheler and Foulkes did not prove idle for, accompanied by 
Codrington's son, Christopher - on temporary release from his Fellowship at All Souls, 
Oxford - they took a sloop to reconnoitre possible landing sites and by nightfall on 2 April, 
Foulkes had securely disembarked all the troops. This initial landing presaged a series of 
raids over three days in which Foulkes, Lloyd, Wheler and Lieutenant-Colonel Lillingston all 
commanded parties attacking French plantations and sugar works, forcing the inhabitants to 
flee into the woods. The only English loss was a party of around seven soldiers and their boat 
crew who had been commanded ashore by a Lieutenant without orders and had blundered 
into a French ambuscade. " These raids were, at best, an irrelevance, for the operation could 
make no progress against the main centres of French defence - Forts Royal and St Pierre - 
without the extra men from the Leeward Islands; and in reality they probably bolstered French 
intelligence. 
On 9 April, Codrington arrived at the Cul de Sac Marin with the Leeward Islands' 
troops and a detachment of about 600 soldiers from Lloyd's regiment. However, three days 
passed before a Council of War was held aboard Wheler's flagship to determine how the 
operation should proceed and then the substantive question was deferred until the fleet had 
gone about to view Fort Royal. Two days later, the Council decided to adjourn again until 
the other island fort had been reconnoitred. In the event a full week from Codrington's 
arrival was to pass before the operation gained any direction with the resolution on 15 April 
to attack Fort St Pierre. Both the natural aspect and design of Fort Royal had caused it to be 
considered a 'difficult work"" by a majority in the Council, though it is noteworthy that of 
the six dissenting voices five were officers from the colonies. Perhaps they possessed local 
insight that Fort St Pierre would prove as tricky. "' 
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Commander in Chief of all Their Majesties ships and vessels in the West Indies, [hereafter 'Wheler's 
Journal'] 30 Mar. -6 Apr. 1693; CSPC, 1693-1696, no. 334, p. 99: Kendall to Nottingham, 9 May 1693. 107 HMC, PortlandMSS, iii. 525: Council of War Minutes, 15 Apr. 1693. 
108 HMC, Portland MSS, iii. 518-19,525: 'Wheler's Journal', 9-15 Apr. 1693; Council of War Minutes, 15 
Apr. 1693; CSPC, 1693-1696, nos. 276,334,336, pp. 86,99,100-1: Minutes of the Council of War, 15 Apr. 
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On 17 April, through an adroit, though admittedly opportunistic, use of calms and 
sudden gales, Wheler managed to create a diversionary impression that the disembarkation 
was to be the southern end of the bay in front of St Pierre, thus allowing a safe landing of an 
initial 1000 troops commanded by Colonel Holt on the basin's north-west side. The rest of 
the soldiers swiftly followed without any loss of life. Holt's advance troops, whose 
momentum had carried them some distance inland, quickly found themselves on the retreat as 
they came up against large enemy parties marching down from the town. It required timely 
succour by Foulkes, commanding a large second tranche of landed soldiers, to stall this 
reverse and cause the opposing forces to take up posts on each side of a large gully. A brisk 
fire fight continued throughout the afternoon and when the Antiguans' outflanking 
manoeuvre along the seashore ended bloodily, Foulkes realised that he would require naval 
assistance in order to force the enemy position. It was determined, therefore, that on the 
following day several frigates would lie close in by the shore so that Foulkes could attack the 
enemy across the gully under the cover of the naval ordnance. However, dawn on 18 April 
revealed that enemy had retired towards the town and fort, thus rendering the joint naval and 
military attack unnecessary. "' 
'09 HMC, Portland MSS, iii. 519-2 1: 'Wheler's Journal', 17-18 Apr. 1693. 
99 
Reconnaissance from a hill top quickly established that the enemy had given up a 
strong defensive position on one side of a gully for an even stronger position, entrenched 
inside the town's fort. It was, though, well within cannon shot and two of the train's field 
pieces were landed and dragged up the hill to begin playing upon the enemy. Meanwhile 
Foulkes organised his troops for the following day when he was to lead a party of 400 men 
followed by an additional 600 against the enemy's less fortified rear. However, on 20 April, 
this force was worsted en route and forced to beat a retreat, the potential effects of which 
were only ameliorated - according to Wheler - by Foulkes's leadership. Meanwhile, the 
French took advantage of the weakened English front to sally forth, killing and wounding 
several of the English out-guards. Despite a four-fold increase in the strength of his battery, 
Foulkes requested that the naval officers attend a Council of War ashore. At this he proposed 
withdrawal on the grounds that there was no prospect of his increasingly weak troops 
dislodging the enemy from the town and fort. A heated debate ensued and the Council was 
adjourned till the following morning when its members were to submit in writing their opinion 
on the question whether the army should besiege St Pierre or draw off. Wheler claimed that 
written opinions were needed partly for reasons of secrecy and partly so that the King and 
nation could be fully informed of events. "' This latter reason anticipated a political stonn 
back home on the proceedings of the expedition, and Wheler, having already expressed his 
opposition to withdrawal, clearly viewed a written record as a necessary from of political and 
professional insurance. "' 
By a majority, the Council, which reconvened on the morning of 21 April, agreed to 
withdraw from Martinique and then consider future action. "' Well might Kendall write 
subsequently that the Barbadians were put into a 'great consternation' by this sequence of 
events. "' Ostensibly it appeared that the English had decided to walk away from a forward 
position of strength which at least merited the opening of trenches for a standard siege 
operation. Moreover, with the French concentrated in St Pierre, Foulkes would not have had 
to contend with the distraction of a relief army. The appreciation of these circumstances 
produced three basic positions within the Council. At the extremes were the traditional 
110 HMC, PortlandMSS, iii. 521-2,526: 'Wheler's Journal' 18-20 Apr. 1693; Council of War Minutes, 20 
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thoroughgoing attack and full-scale retreat options; whilst the pivot was represented by an 
argument to attack and destroy as much as possible around St Pierre before beating a retreat. 
Only Lieutenant-Colonel Colt and Wheler advocated a full-scale siege. Colt believed that a 
significant advance had already been achieved, thus ameliorating any risks. Wheler 
considered that the conjunction of field guns and mortars with the bombardment by the fleet 
should prove sufficient. Neither had any hope of attracting support for their position because 
the middle option reflected similar arguments, and ultimately reached the same answer as 
those who wished to leave immediately. Selecting Colonel Goodwyn and Major Abrahall as 
examples of these options, it is recorded that they both pointed to the 800 men lost since the 
landing and the large contingent of Irish troops who were considered untrustworthy when 
near their co-religionists as dictating retreat. The only difference between these two soldiers 
was that Goodwyn wanted an immediate departure, whereas Abrahall saw merit in causing as 
much devastation as possible before re-embarkation. "' This made clear that the division 
between those demanding instant retreat and those wishing to conduct alternative attacks in 
the environs was, at root, only a question of timing. Hence, twenty-four were in favour of 
withdrawal and only two in favour of continuing the operation, giving rise to the dismay of 
the Barbadians. 
The re-embarkation had taken place in the early hours of 22 April and, thus, the 
soldiers were somewhat haphazardly billeted, causing the squadron to head first for Dominica 
in order to reorganise the troops and to take on water. It was 25 April before the Council 
convened to consider what further action might be taken and, specifically, whether 
Guadeloupe should be attacked. With positive orders to repair to North America by the end 
of May, Wheler was keenly aware that the prospects of any combined operational success in 
the Caribbean were diminishing daily and he argued vigorously for an immediate attack. Both 
Foulkes and Codrington were as aggressive as Wheler, but the land men considered it 
necessary for the troops and vessels to remain for at least six weeks to carry off the French 
inhabitants and bring on new settlers. "' These circumstances both revealed the limitation of 
seapower ashore and the dissociation between the services's requirements when operational 
co-operation is telescoped by time. Although the Foulkes-Codrington contingent was 
113 CSpC' 1693-1696, no. 334, p. 99: Kendall to Nottingham, 9 May 1693. 
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realistic, the warships could not afford the sea time in the Caribbean. Any continuance would 
eventually have required a transgression of the King's orders. The Council thus resolved 
against attacking Guadeloupe and formally signalled the end of all operations in the Caribbean 
under the aegis of Wheler's squadron by ordering that the island troops be returned. ' ` 
This cessation in operations was more naturally confirned by an increasing sickness 
within the squadron and the English regiments. Apparently caught from the merchant ships in 
Barbados and made worse by the spring rains at Martinique, the distemper reached such a 
peak in May that Wheler was reported to have lost half his sailors and most of his officers. "' 
This was no exaggeration. Of the twelve naval captains who had sailed from England, up to 
seven had died, whilst the lower decks had been decimated by the loss of around 700 men. "' 
Such a high number of deaths amongst the seamen undermined the squadron's sailing 
effectiveness; and, although the marine soldiers along with some regular troops could, and 
frequently did, stand in for the able-seamen, they were usually poor replacements. The 
circumstances for Wheler's voyage to America were, therefore, not propitious, and the 
prospects seemed to worsen en route when Foulkes died of the sickness that had, in Wheler's 
opinion, already 'severely smarted"" the two regiments aboard. 
These vicissitudes were, however, largely irrelevant for unbeknownst to Wheler as he 
prepared to depart the Caribbean on 18 May, the second phase of his expedition to join the 
New England provinces in an combined army-navy attack upon Canada and then against the 
French settlements on the southern Newfoundland coast had already been undermined by the 
delay and miscarriage of the orders directing the colonial preparation. Letters to the 
Governors of Massachusetts and New York explaining Wheler's Additional Instructions had 
been drafted as early as February 1693. However, they seemed to have been delayed by a 
comedy of errors, in which the civil messenger objected to his schedule; Nottingham objected 
to the Whiggism of the military messenger; the Virginian fleet remained wind bound; and the 
Admiralty disdained to appoint a warship as courier. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the denouement 
was that when the packet boat with the orders aboard actually managed to leave England, it 
116 11MC, Portland MSS, iii. 526-7: Council of War Minutes, 25 Apr. 1693. 
117 CSPC, 1693-1696, no. 347, pp. 103-4: Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 15 May 1693; 
Webb, 'William BlathwaA Imperial Fixer: Muddling Through', p. 392. 
118CSPC, 1693-6, no. 339, p. 101: A list of Commissioned and Warrant Officers and seamen in the West 
Indian Squadron who have died since leaving England, [May] 1693; RMC, PordandMSS, iii. 516: Wheler to 
4 June 1693. 
119 RMC, PortlandMSS, iii. 516: Wheler to 4 June 1693. 
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was captured by the French. Consequently, when Wheler arrived at Boston in June the 
Massachusetts Governor, Sir William Phips, claimed ignorance of the projected enterprise 
and, indeed, he subsequently alleged that Blathwayt's letter on the topic only arrived at the 
end of July. "' 
The New York Council's consideration of the cost of naval stores with its resolution 
of May to inforin Wheler of the scarcity of flour and biscuit, and Governor Fletcher's remark 
on the widespread surprise at the failure to attack Canada, might suggest that Phips was being 
economical in acknowledging what he knew of the proposed operation even given the delay 
in his official orders. "' However, due to his experience as commander of a combined 
operation against Quebec in 1690, and his subsequent lobbying of the Court for the resources 
to make a second attempt, Phips was the most influential colonial voice on such matters 
especially as Quebec was again the target which, if successfully taken, would presage an 
riverine assault on Montreal. "' The Massachusetts Governor was, thus, able to halt the 
operation against Canada when he informed Wheler that the provinces would have required at 
least four months prior notification to raise some 2000 troops which would have been 
necessary to join a similar number sent out from England - 4000 men being, in Phips's 
opinion, the minimum number required to mount a credible assault. Moreover, in response to 
Wheler's urging that an operation be undertaken even if not against Quebec, the Governor 
argued that the time of year was too advanced to make any descents, and that there was no 
viable alternative target to Quebec below the ile d'Orleans in the St Lawrence River. The 
only suggestion Phips made was that Wheler might attack some French merchantmen which 
were known to be harbouring at Plaisance, (or Placentia), the principal French settlement on 
Newfoundland. "' 
The Additional Instructions already directed Sir Francis to this jointly occupied island 
off the North American coast on the conclusion of the operation against Canada. In the event 
120 CSpC, 1693-1696, nos. 48,116,445,545,578, pp. 13,31,124,156-7,165-6: the King to Phips, 2 Feb. 
1693; the King to Fletcher, 23 Feb. 1693; Whcler to Phips, 8 July 1693; Phips to Nottingham, II Sept. 1693; 
Phips to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, II Sept. 1693; NMM, SOU/14, unt: Nottingham to Blathwayt, 
7,28 Apr. 1693; Blathwayt to Nottingham, 12/23 June 1693; BL, Add MSS 37992, fos. 4-5: Blathwayt to 
Nottingham, 14 Apr. 1693; Webb, 'William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer: Muddling Through', p. 392. 
121 CSPC, 1693-1696, no. 348, p. 104: Minutes of the Council of New York, 15 May 1693; NYCD, iv. 36: 
Fletcher to Secretary of State, 15 Aug. 1693. 
122 HMC, Finch MSS, iv, no. 982, pp. 5 10-11: the King to Wheler: Further Additional Instructions, 27 Nov. 
1692. 
123 CSpC, 1693-1696, nos. 441,453, pp. 124,128-9: Whelcr to Phips, 8 July 1693; Phips to Wheler, 12 July 
1693. 
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of the latter's abandonment, Wheler began early preparations for a descent on Newfoundland. 
However, once again it was Phips who undermined the viability of the operation by his 
unwillingness to make any material contribution. Hiding behind the Charter's provisions 
which prohibited the dispatch of militia without the consent of the colony's recently dismissed 
Assembly, Phips denied Wheler the 400 troops he had requested as reinforcements for the 
remaining 650 from Foulkes's and Goodwyn's regimentS. 124 Without these men, Wheler's 
sickly squadron was to find the French at Placentia with their two new forts and forty guns 
too strong to combat. On arrival off the island, a Council of War rejected the proposals for a 
landing under the cover of the ships' guns, and Wheler's only success before setting course 
for England on 22 September was the destruction of the fishing station on the small he de St 
Pierre which lay to the south-west. 12' This was a product of co-operation between the 
squadron's frigates and a small party of soldiers commanded by Major Rabisner, and it 
represented the sole combined operational success of the expedition's second phase. 
The remnants of Wheler's squadron reached Spithead by mid-October and was put 
into quarantine. "" It had contributed little to what was in any case a bleak year for the allies 
during which both the maritime and continental strategies had suffered reverses with the 
capture of the Smyrna convoy and the military defeats at Ncerwinden (19 July) and Marsaglia 
(25 September). "' That the commanders of the expedition suffered no professional censure 
can be explained by the reasons subsequently given by Codrington for the failure at 
Martinique. Firstly, the timing was poor; the squadron arrived just before the start of the 
rains in May, making sickness inevitable while hampering land operations, and the positive 
orders to leave by the end of May left only two months for what was, in Codrington's 
judgement, a four month operation. Secondly, the constant delay through the autumn and 
winter of 1692 had allowed the French time to fortify. Thirdly, the number of troops was 
insufficient; Codrington considered an additional two regiments necessary. "' Significantly, all 
124 HMC, FinchMSS, iv, no. 982, pp. 510-11: the King to Wheler: Further Additional Instructions, 27 Nov. 
1692; CSPC, 1693-1696, nos. 441,475, pp. 124,133: Wheler to Phips, 8 July 1693; Phips to Wheler, 27 July 
1693. 
125 HMC, Portland MSS, iii. 544-5: ---- to Sir Edward Harley, 17 Oct. 1693; Burchett, A Complete History 
ofihe Most Remarkable Transactions, p. 479. 
126 PRO, ADM 2/12, p. 424: Order to Sir Francis Wheler, 9 Sept. 1693; PRO, ADM 3/9, unpaginated: Board 
Minutes, II Sept. 1693. 
127 Childs, 'Secondary Operation of the British Army', p. 90; Webb, 'William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer: 
Muddling Through', p. 393. 
128 CSpC, 1693-1696, no. 336, pp. 100-1: Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 10 May 1693. 
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three could equally account for the squadron's inertia when it reached North America. Each 
of the three criticisms could be attributed to the expedition's initial design and preparation 
and, in particular, the restrictions placed upon the commanders. At the watershed Council 
held after the withdrawal from Martinique, the Additional Instructions's tight time sequencing 
and the lack of discretion in command for individual commanders meant that Wheler's only 
option was to leave the Caribbean despite the senior commanders agreeing in principal that a 
combined operation could, and should, be mounted against Guadeloupe. Similarly, if an 
administrative opera bouffe had not been played out over the dispatch of the orders to New 
England, or indeed (assuming Phips knew more of the operation than he admitted), if 
Wheler's command had been sufficiently robust to pressurise Phips into providing the 
recruits, then the planned operations against Canada and Newfoundland could have gone 
ahead. The Court's optimism for regional superiority based on imperial aggrandisement 
remained unfulfilled because the amphibious means fixed upon had been poorly designed and 
prepared. 
H. v: Commodore Robert Wilmot's and Colonel Luke Lillingston's Expedition to 
Hispaniola, Januarv-Sel2tember 1695. 
The genesis of this operation was both retaliatory and defensive in form as the focus of the 
war in the Caribbean shifted westwards. In the summer of 1693, the Governor of Martinique 
had proposed the capture of Jamaica in order to alleviate what he considered was the 
vulnerability of the French dispersed among too many islands. Jamaica was also viewed as a 
suitable place to absorb some 2000 French whose plantations had been ruined by previous 
English raids or invasions. "' Although the Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica, Sir William 
Beeston, was not aware of the French Governor's proposal, he knew that French privateering 
raids from French Hispaniola against the island had increased significantly. At the end of May 
1694, the merchant sailor, Captain Elliot, on his escape from French custody had warned 
Beeston of an imminent French invasion as the Governor of Hispaniola, Ducasse, had 
gathered a force of twenty ships and 3000 men. The devastation wrought by the French in 
the six weeks following their dual landings at Cow Bay and at the eastern Morant Bay on 17 
June 1694 was, perhaps, not surprising given the island's vulnerability after a massive 
129 CSpC, 1693-1696, no. 433, p. 123: Abstract of a Memorial from the Governor of Martinique to Monsieur 
de Chamlay, [June? ] 1693. 
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earthquake in June 1692, the damage from which Beeston had only started to make good 
following his return to Jamaica in 1693. "' Nonetheless, the economic consequences and 
humiliation of having fifty sugar-works destroyed and some 1300 slaves stolen, plus 
Beeston's warning during the period of French occupation that all would be lost if a relief 
force was not sent, forced Jamaica's defence and the issue of a retaliatory action up the 
Court's war agenda. 131 
Of course, the war in the West Indies had not been ignored since Wheler's departure 
in May 1693. The colonial governors had constantly requested extra warships and troops to 
attack, and defend, against the French regional presence. London only managed temporarily 
to shelve all requests by claiming that any future force would have to await Wheler's return 
from America. It was however eight months before four warships were dispatched in June 
1694 as convoy for the merchants headed for Barbados. Further pleas from the Leeward 
Islands' Commissioners, considered in November, caused a fifth rate to be appointed but by 
July of the following year it was still at Plymouth. "' Consequently, some historians have 
traced the origins of the Wilmot-Lillingston operation to these requests, when in fact it was 
not until the French attack upon Jamaica in the late summer of 1694 that the idea of sending 
another expeditionary force - as opposed to warships transporting recruits - to the region was 
seriously canvassed. "' 
The Lords of Trade's initial response to Beeston's early correspondence on the 
French invasion was to recommend the dispatch of enough soldiers and ships to relieve the 
island and mount punitive strikes against the French. This latter proposal was specifically 
aimed at protecting English trade and preventing the French mounting a similar operation 
130 CSpC, 1693-1696, nos. 211,212,1236,1236.1, pp. 62-3,325-33: Petition of merchants and planters 
concerned with Jamaica to the King, 23 Mar. 1693; Considerations offered as to the state of Jamaica, [23 
Mar. ] 1693; Beeston to Shrewsbury, 18 Aug. 1694; Sir William Beeston, 'Narrative of the French Invasion', 
in G. W. Bridges, The Annals ofJamaica (London, 1828), i. 312-22; de la Roncifte, Histoire de la Alarine 
Franqaise, vi. 250-1; L. Gregg, 'The Port Royal Earthquake', HT 1 (2000), 28-34. 
131 CSpC, 1693-1696, nos. 1109,1121,1194,1228, pp. 299-300,305,318-19,324: Beeston to Trcnchard, 23 
June 1694; Beeston to Trenchard, 2 July 1694; Beeston to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 7 Aug. 1694; 
Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations, 16 Aug. 1694; Bridges, Annals ofJamaica, i. 323. 
132 CSpC, 1693-1696, nos. 437,494.1., 539,627,870,1564.1,1679, pp. 123-4,140,155,183-4,247,410, 
432: Codrington to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 3 July 1693; Memorial of the Commissioners for the 
Leeward Islands to the Queen, n. d.; Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations, 7 Sept. 1693; Codrington to 
the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 17 Oct. 1693; Order of the King in Council, 8 Feb. 1694; Memorial of the 
Commissioners for the Leeward Islands to the King, n. d.; Bridgeman to Blathwayt, 13 Feb. 1695; Moses, 
The British Navy and The Caribbean, 1689-1697', pp. 30-1. 
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elsewhere in the Caribbean. "" Although the French withdrawal from Jamaica on 18 July 
rendered its immediate relief unnecessary, London did not know of this until October and, 
besides, the whole project gained currency in Whitehall as result of the King's personal 
intervention. Blathwayt represented William's awareness of the strategic importance of 
Jamaica as the centre for the Spanish trade and as a bulwark against French occupation of 
neighbouring islands. Indeed, William's principal fear was that the loss of Jamaica would 
trigger a regional domino effect, resulting in the French capturing the Spanish half of 
Hispaniola and Cuba, and providing them with footholds in the coastal towns from Trinidad 
to St Augustine (on the east coast of Florida). As he had done for the Wheler-Foulkes 
expedition, the King augmented the expeditionary land force by directing that two 
establishment strength battalions be sent; while he also attended to the diplomatic context 
through his envoy at Madrid, Alexander Stanhope, whose orders were to gain the Spanish 
Court's material help in driving the French from Hispaniola. "' 
It was perhaps fortunate that delay in late seventeenth century diplomacy matched that 
of English administration. Immediately upon receipt of his instructions in October (OS), 
Stanhope had sent a memorial to the Secretario del Despacho Universal, Don Alonso 
Camcro, outlining the purpose of the operation and London's request that orders be sent by 
Carlos 11 to his colonial governors directing their assistance. Despite following this up with 
constant calls upon Spanish Ministers, Stanhope was told that colonial affairs could not be 
ordered until the Council of the Indies's President, the Duke of Montalto, recovered from 
illness and, thus, it was towards the end of November (OS) before a positive response was 
forthcoming. Even then, Stanhope was left lamenting the Spanish Court's reluctance to 
ensure that their governors received the orders by bearing the cost of sending out copies by 
various routes. Such circumstances might suggest that the Spaniards were unenthusiastic 
about the projected enterprise, yet Mancera wrote of its centrality to the Alliance's 'common 
cause'; and experience consoled Stanhope that the delay was the product of Spain's 
133 Childs, 'Secondary Operations of the British Army', p. 9 1, posits a clear connection between the earlier 
colonial requests and the Wilmot-Lillingtson expedition. Morgan, 'The British West Indies, 1689-1697', pp. 
399-401, is more oblique but no less confiising by initially implying the link only to step back from it later. 
134 PRO, ADM 7/693, pp. 10-11: 'Att the Committee of Plantations att the Councill Chamber Whitehall', 16, 
20 Aug. 1694; CSPC, 1693-1696, no. 1189, p. 317: the Lords of Trade and Planatations to Beeston, 3 Aug. 
1694. 
135 CSpC, 1693-1696, nos, 1195,1277, pp. 319,341-2: Beeston to Trenchard, 7 Aug. 1694 [Endorsed: 'R. 29 
Oct. 1694]; Blathwayt to Trenchard, 2 Sept. 1694; HMC, Buccleuch Montague MSS, ii. 1 120-1: Blathwayt to 
[Shrewsbury], [23 Aug. -]2 Sept. 1694; PRO, SP 94/73, f. 3 10: Stanhope to 'My Lord', 3 Oct. 1694. 
107 
consistently phlegmatic approach to affairs of state. "' Although frustrating, lethargy did not 
prevented Spain's commitment and this was finally offered in December. 
A report on the forwardness of the expedition's arrangements received by the King in 
December did represent a delay from what had been the expected departure of October, its 
conclusion that only orders for embarkation were outstanding obscured the omnipresent 
confusion amongst the organising bodies during the previous three months. "' The 
considerable correspondence on the preparations"' suggests that the disorganisation was not 
a product of bureaucratic inertia but, instead, arose from the urgency with which the 
Departments would set to work preparing an aspect of the expedition without its Parameters 
being clearly decided upon. The organisation of the land force was particularly afflicted in 
this respect both in terms of its size and the appointed regiments. Such were the problems 
that there occurred a fundamental change in the prescription of the force laid down by 
William in September. 
Northcote's and Farrington's regiments were initially selected by the King, but the 
latter was reluctant to go and Shrewsbury thought that Northcote would be so to. 
Meanwhile, other officers offered themselves and their regiments, including Luke Lillingston 
whose regiment along with Northcote's was eventually chosen. This was Shrewsbury's 
preferred choice, supported by the Transport Commissioners who favoured the administrative 
advantages in terms of the supply of transports, victualling and a pre-embarkation muster 
offered by both these two regiments being in the environs of Plymouth. '" Notwithstanding 
this decision, which on paper would have totalled around 1380 officers and men"', various 
estimates of the force were invoked. On 3 September, the Transport Commissioners were 
charged with finding transportation for 2000 men but within three days, this was reduced by 
136 PRO, SP 94/73, fos. 310-12,314-16: Stanhope to 'My Lord', 3,17 Oct., 21 Nov. 1694, and enclosure, 
Mancera. to Stanhope, I Dec. 1694 [NS]; Spain Under Charles the Second, Or, Extractsfrom the 
Correspondence of The Hon. Alexander Stanhope, British Minister at Madrid 1690-1699, ed. Lord Mahon 
(2nd edn, London, 1844), p. 62: Stanhope to Halifax, 31 May 1694. 
137 CSPC, 1693-1696, nos. 1279,1572, pp. 342,413: Minute of the Lords of Trade and Plantations; 
Memorandum of the state of the preparations for Jamaica, laid before the King in Council, 2 Dec. 1694. 
138 Neeser, 'The British Naval Operation in the West Indies', p. 1624 n. 49. 
"9 RMC, Buccleuch Montague MSS, ii. L 121,126-7,13 1: Blathwayt to [Shrewsbury], [23 Aug. -]2 Sept., 10- 
20 Sept. 1694; Shrewsbury to Blathwayt, 31 Aug., 4 Sept. 1694; CSPC, 1693-1696, no. 1332, pp. 357-8: the 
Commissioners for Transport to Povey, 22 Sept. 1694. 
140 The paper figure for an infantry battalion during William's reign was reckoned to be 650 men and 42 
commissioned officers but Blathwayt's working assumption was said to be lower at 600 men, excluding 
commissioned officers. See, 'Lord Cutts's Letters, 1695', ed. J. Childs Camden Miscellany XXX, Camden 4th 
Series 39 (London, 1990), p. 381 n. 3. 
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300. Meanwhile, the Victualling Commissioners were working to a figure provided by the 
Committee of Council which was a hundred less again and, by December, a third figure of 
1400 was settled upon much to the Transportation Commissioners' chagrin as they had just 
provided for 1841 men. Moreover, ironically, prior to the King's decision, estimates had also 
been prepared for the most economical regimental organisation of a maximum of 1200 
soldiers. Matters were complicated further when it was proposed to send with the 
expeditionary force an Independent Company for service in Jamaica, and also a newly raised 
regiment for Barbados. It was not until the second week of December that the correct total 
of 1200 men - implicit in the King's decision in September for two battalions - was first 
adopted wholesale by all those preparing the expeditionary force. "' 
This initial confusion over regiments and the overall size of the force presaged a 
significant change in their organisation. Throughout the autumn both Lillingston and 
Northcote had presented memorials on the state of their regiments which noted principally 
their arrears of pay and shortage of men. "' This likely contributed to the decision taken 
before Christmas 1694 to send instead a detachment of 1200 men. ` At the beginning of 
January, Brigadier Lord Cutts was sent on an regimental inspection tour starting at Plymouth 
and working east to Portsmouth, during which he was to form this detachment by breaking 
Lillingston's regiment and retaining its core of 600 men, while simultaneously adding to this 
141 CSpC, 1693-1696, nos. 1245,1262-4,1280-1,1283,1295,1299,1302,1349,1393,1405,1526,1557, 
1574,1598, pp. 335,338-9,342-6,364,374,376,404,409,414,417-18: Povey to Clerk, 21 Aug. 1694; 
Estimate of the annual charge, 28 Aug. 1694; Similar Estimate, 28 Aug. 1694; Memorandum as to the above 
Estimates, 28 Aug. 1694; Povey to the Commissioners for Transportation, the Victuallers of the Navy, 
Secretary at War, 3 Sept. 1694; the Victuallers of the Navy to Lords of Trade and Plantations; Order of the 
Queen in Council, 8 Sept. 1694; Extract from a letter from the Navy Board forwarding the following extract 
from the Victualling Commissioners, 10 Sept. 1694; Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 26 Sept. 
1694; Povey to Guy, 9 Oct. 1694; Povcy to Bridgeman, 10 Oct. 1694; the Agents for Barbados to the Lords of 
Trade and Plantations, 26 Nov. 1694; Minute of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 26 Nov. 1694; Memorial 
of the Commissioners for Transportation to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 3 Dec. 1694; Journal of the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations, 14 Dec. 1694. 
142 CSpC, 1693-1696, nos. 1360,1381,1439,1453,1471, pp. 366,370,384,387,391: Memorial of Colonel 
Lillingston to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 28 Sept., 8 Oct. 1694; Povey to Guy, 20 Oct. 1694; Journal 
of Lords of Trade and Plantations, 24 Oct. 1694; Memorial of Colonel William Northcott to the Privy 
Council, [I Nov. ] 1694; CTP, 155617-1696, pp. 357,390,398,412: Representation of Col. Luke Lillingston 
to the King, [About 4 Apr. ] 1694; Memorial of Col. Lillingston to the Lords of the Treasury, [About Sept. ], 
[About 31 Oct. ] 1694; Representation of Col. Luke Lillingston, [1694]. 
"I CSPC, 1693-1696, no. 1598, pp. 417-18: Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations refers to 1200 men 
being sent, while CTP, 155617-1696, p. 410: Letter from Mr. William Blathwayt, to Henry Guy, Esq., 
secretary to the Treasury, 21 Dec. 1694, states that only Lillingston's regiment was to go. These documents 
combined with other evidence which indicates that the detachment of 1200 men was to be listed as a new 
regiment for Lillingston allows the decision to drop Lillingston's late regiment and Northcote's regiment to 
be dated to before Christmas. 
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number 200 strong drafts from each of Northcote's, Faffington's and Colt's regiments. 
Although above Establishment strength this detachment was to be listed as one regiment, and 
Cutts was to supervise its embarkation on board twelve transports for the voyage to the 
Caribbean. The process was not without incident, for despite noting the quality of the new 
regiment - attributed to the rump of Lillingston's former battalion - Cutts had to quell 
mutinous troops aboard four ships through negotiation and drawing a temporary guard of 100 
men from Plymouth Garrison. "' 
As with the organisation of Wrenn's expedition, the naval squadron suffered delay due 
to problems securing the auxiliary vessels. Time was lost haggling over the cost of freight 
and then the question of demurrage arose. The delay only lengthened when the Admiralty 
proved dilatory both in providing a convoy to bring these vessels from the Downs to 
Plymouth and in securing their crews' protections from the press. Consequently, it was 21 
December before the transports headed west along the Channel. "' To cap everything as time 
pressed, when the main squadron weighed from Spithcad on 15 January to link up with the 
transports at Plymouth, the weather drove them beyond to Falmouth. The Commodore, 
Captain Robert Wilmot, then had to travel overland to notify Cutts and organise a 
conjunction of the squadron and the transports for 22 January by which time the troops 
would have been embarked for a week. "' 
144 'Lord Cutts's Letters, 1695', nos. 1-5, pp. 381-5: Cutts to Blathwayt, 13,15,18,20 Jan. 1695; L. 
Lillingston, Reflections on Mr Burchett's Memoirs Or, Remarks on His Account of Captain Wilmot's 
Fxpedition to the West Indies (London, 1704), p. 22-3, CSPD, 1695, pp. 305-6: Newsletter addressed: "For 
the Right Honourable the Earl of Derwentwater, Newcastle-upon-Tyne", 19 Jan. 1695. 
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ships to Lords of Trade and Plantations, 4 Dec. 1694; CTP, 155617-1696, pp. 410: Letter from Mr. William 
Blathwayt, to Henry Guy, Esq., secretary to the Treasury, 21 Dec. 1694. 
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Wilmot probably made the journey to Plymouth instead of sending a messenger 
because of his additional responsibilities as C. -in-C. Lillingston had been hopeful for this 
appointment and, moreover, had effectively claimed it from September. Nonetheless, when 
the Lords of Trade asked the King to decide between the military or naval commander for the 
appointment, Lillingston's recent experience of an amphibious campaign on Martinique in 
1693 was ignored, and the Beachy Head veteran was Preferred. For Wilmot, this was the 
pinnacle of a professional recovery begun three years previously following his acquittal by the 
Devonshire assizes for killing Marine Ensign Roydon in a duel at Torbay, despite his 
undoubted guilt. The appointment, though, was hazardous. Notwithstanding the trenchant 
support by the then commanding Admirals who claimed that Wilmot had been unreasonably 
provoked, the action had surely betrayed a temperament ill-suited to the stress of provocation 
that was likely to be encountered on an expedition to the Caribbean. "" This point is 
underscored by the King, who took the unusual step of granting Wilmot and Liflingston a 
joint audience to impress the need for harmonious conduct. To facilitate this he provided 
instructions for the division of spoils which revealed his hope that his senior army and naval 
officers should, when necessary, think of themselves as the equivalent rank in the other 
service. The King's principal purpose was to point out where clashes between commanders 
had damaged previous expeditions and, then, to exhort Wilmot and Lillingston to 'a mutual 
exact concurrence of kindness'. "' 
This reliance on personality to produce success might be viewed as a compensation 
for the lack of clarity of the Instructions. Although these confirmed the expedition's principal 
objectives as attacking French Hispaniola, a Council of War - again the sovereign command 
authority - could first determine on alternatives. The sealed Instructions given to Wilmot 
prior to departure clumsily attempted to accommodate gubernatorial interests while 
maintaining any operational momentum built up before the squadron touched an English 
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colony. Its Articles were more similar to Wrenn's than Wheler's. The colonial governor was 
to be President of the Councils which met on the island, and his militia officers had 
membership when local defence was on the agenda; more significantly, the Governor and the 
Island Council had the right of veto on the dispatch of warships from the squadron. 
Furthermore, Lillingston's and Beeston's separate Instructions emphasised the latter's 
superiority in command. However, in terms of the Hispaniolan objectives, none of these 
provisions need be adhered to because the squadron was directed in the first instance to the 
Spanish half of the island. If, at the principal Spanish settlement of St Domingo, the 
Governor was ready to proceed against the French, then the squadron need not go to Jamaica 
till the operation was complete. "' Beeston was unaware of this provision and, thus, that his 
influence could be limited to objectives decided upon later. "' Whitehall had diffused the 
sources of unitary conu-nand but in doing so, a smokescreen had been drawn over the extent 
of colonial influence. 
It is ironic that the expedition in which the King personally intervened to prevent 
disorder amongst his senior commanders produced inter-service bitterness of such a 
magnitude that the operation's weaknesses must be whofly attributed to it. This division was 
reflected in contemporary accounts and histories which sided with either Wilmot or 
Lillingston, leaving Beeston largely an irrelevance. The Admiralty Secretary, Josiah Burchett, 
put the naval case plainly in his history, which ignored almost completely the contribution of 
the land commander and was also peppered with waspish comments on the soldiers' 
contribution to the expedition. "' Pubfished in 1703, this text provoked Lillingston to reply in 
which he accused Burchett of being 'indifferently qualified' as a historian and for uncritically 
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accepting 'a most scandalous false account'. "' Burchett continued the controversy by 
responding in detail to Lillingston within the year, and this text, though ignored in G. F. 
James's assessment of Burchett's historiography"', contained in full many of the primary 
documents drawn on for his previous publication. "' Other contemporary accounts are works 
of thinly veiled bias: Commissary Murrey's Journal is unabashed in its support of Wilmot, 
while there is a sense that the Captain of the Ruby sought to twist the usually neutral 
Captain's Log. "' Lillingston, though, did attract some supporters, notably the army scholar, 
J. W. Fortescue, whose preface to the CSPC, 1693-1696, incautiously adopts the Colonel's 
perspective, quoting extensively from his pamphlet and heavily censoring Wilmot's conduct. 
This excess of self-justification provokes sympathy with Beeston's lament that the complaints 
from all sides were 'beyond my power to reconcile'; "" but, however biased these sources, 
they do provide the expedition's narrative and, in disagreeing so vehemently, show the King 
to have been unwise to rely on personal restraint to produce success. 
The clash of characters was immediately evident on the outward voyage. En route 
first to Madeira"', Lillingston believed that Wilmot opened their sealed Instructions before 
the stipulated 400 latitude, and then expressed his dissatisfaction with their contents. There 
also occurred a dispute over the admission of Captain-Lieutenant Warner to the Council of 
War during which Lillingston considered Wilmot to show insufficient deference to an army 
custom and to have done so in a manner contrary to the spirit of accommodation invoked by 
William. After anchoring at Madeira on 12 February, their relationship encountered further 
strains. Wilmot allegedly proposed to Lillingston that they ignore their Instructions and seek 
opportunities for personal wealth, a theme Lillingston believed he had previously hinted at 
during the voyage. Then, when a storm blew up dispersing the fleet over two days (15-17 
February), Lillingston and other regimental officers were nearly stranded on the island. The 
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Colonel, however, did not consider nature as the sole reason for his prolonged stay on the 
beach and accused Wilmot of complicity in preventing his rescue. Murrey, though, recorded 
that the Commodore had sent his boat for the land commander and, moreover, the Ruby's log 
and other Captains' journals confirm both the violence of the storm and the necessity for 
Wilmot to weigh almost immediately in order to preserve the squadron. With reference to 
Lillingston's allegations during the first part of the voyage, Burchett undermines their 
credibility by stressing their origins in situations where only the Colonel and the Commodore 
were present. "' Whoever was to blame, the important point is that before the squadron 
reached Spanish Hispaniola, the two commanders were squabbling furiously, the Commodore 
was reported as wishing to ignore his Instructions; and the fleet had been dispersed. 
Notwithstanding further disputes as to whether Wilmot had issued clear rendezvous 
instructions in event of dispersal, and as to his advertisement of the squadron's presence, 
reassembly occurred at St Kitts by 25 March. Three days later, despite an ominous increase 
in sickness amongst the crews and soldiers, the squadron weighed for Spanish Hispaniola 
bound first for its eastern island of Saona where the Swan, which had previously been sent to 
make contact with the Governor at St Domingo, was to be met. Along with Colonel 
Beckford who had been sent from Jamaica by Beeston in the Hampshire, the Swan's Captain 
gave word that the Spanish were ready to proceed with the operation if Wilmot came first to 
St Domingo. In order to shield the transports from the arduous beat to windward, Wilmot 
sent them north to Samana Bay convoyed by the Reserve, the Ruby, the Winchester and the 
Firebrand fireship, while the rest including the Hampshire went to the Governor, Don 
Ignatio Peris Caro. "' 
Wilmot believed the English to be initially well received at St Domingo with the 
Spanish showing considerable enthusiasm for the projected venture. However, as the days 
passed, in what Murrey euphemistically termed 'many conferences and papers"60, in an 
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attempt to agree the parameters of the Anglo-Spanish co-operation, Wilmot lost patience 
with what he regarded as Spanish procrastination. Not surprisingly, Lillingston argued that 
the negotiations took up to twelve days because Wilmot first tried to dominate the Spaniards 
and then refused to respect their wish to treat only with the land commander. The agreement 
eventually arrived at was wide ranging, including articles to regulate conduct in conquered 
French plantations. More importantly, it determined upon the windward most French 
settlement, Cap Franqois, as the first target and a disposition of force comprising between 
1500 to 1700 Spanish marching overland, while the English sailed around to Manchaneel Bay 
where a rendezvous would occur. Even though the English squadron left St Domingo on 15 
April to link up with the vessels at SamanA Bay, it was 4 May before the fleet - save for three 
frigates and a bomb vessel which had been sent to blockade the French ships at Cap Franýois 
- anchored off Monte Christo near Manchaneel Bay. Lillingston blamed the delay on the 
Commodore wasting time at Samand but this proved irrelevant as the Spaniards had also been 
held up and their General, who had specifically pressed on ahead, only arrived two days 
later. "' 
Fig 9: Hispaniola. 
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With Wilmot unwell, Lillingston and the Spanish officer agreed that Bayaha would be 
the specific point of rendezvous for the troops. On 9 May the squadron anchored in the 
Manchaneel Bay having been joined by the promised three warships of Spain's Barlovento 
Fleet which Murrey considered barely mediocre. Over the following three days the Colonel 
made frequent trips ashore in expectation of meeting the Spanish; and, when on 12 May this 
was fulfilled, it was agreed at a Council that his brother, the Regimental Major, would land 
with some 150 English troops (including 50 Grenadiers) and 100 Spanish from the 
Barlovento to join the overland march. The remaining fit men of Lillingston's regiment were 
landed with him at the Bay of Potansees, some three to five leagues from Cap Frangois where 
the squadron proceeded to lie byjust out of gunshot of the French fort. Lillingston 
subsequently grumbled that his detachment might have been spared the march by the ships' 
boats rowing one and a-half leagues further. It had been planned that once the soldiers 
marched up to the south-cast side of the town, the squadron would broadside the fort while a 
detachment of landed seamen were to attack its rear. This, however, did not account for the 
French unexpectedly abandoning and blowing up the fort on 19 May as the sailors scoured 
the coast for a suitable landing site and the army, still some distance off, struggled across 
country. 
All participants agreed that the sailors were the first into the town, but their conduct 
there became a source of competing assertions. The Commodore considered his men to have 
gallantly defused the booby-trapped houses until all the troops arrived by 21 May when he 
reported that the Colonel pulled down the Jack Flag to replace it with Spain's colours; 
Lillingston believed the sailors' entry to have been premature and their time spent in taking 
off all the spoil; Beckford wrote of soldiers assaulting sailors in their quest for loot; while 
Murrey accused the Spaniards of the plunder. The first combined operation against 
Hispaniola had ended successfully though its methods had exacerbated pre-existing tensions, 
leaving the army-navy force divided and squabbling. Ironically, by retreat, the French had 
damaged the English more than if they than if they had stood and fought. "" 
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The French had pulled back westerly towards Port de Paix which perforce had to be 
attacked next. Communication between Lillingston and Wilmot was now only through 
intermediaries and agreement on the disposition of force for this second phase proved 
contentious. Wilmot believed that the army and navy would be arranged as before and he 
was confounded when Lillingston failed to re-cmbark the English troops and instead took 
them to join the Spanish camp for the overland march. Lillingston's version was that he 
informed Wilmot of his intentions -a point corroborated by Murrey who acted as messenger - 
and condemned the Commodore for failing to leave behind some transports for care of the 
increasingly numerous sick soldiers. Whatever the motivation, the decision for all the troops 
to march to Port de Paix was ill-informed. Distances were miscalculated and the arduous 
nature of the terrain caused the army to take sixteen days where four had been estimated. 
Moreover, tempestuous weather added to the diminishing morale and health of the land force. 
The delayed arrival of the troops at Port de Paix gave rise to recriminations over the 
squadron's actions in the interim. Having left Cap Frangois on 31 May, the squadron 
anchored some five leagues eastwards of Port de Paix on 6 June, and the Commodore sent 
raiding parties ashore to burn all French plantations up to the Port and also, according to 
Wilmot, establish a line of communication with Lillingston. Murrcy and Beckford implicitly 
commended this action as a necessary preparatory step to flush out the French inhabitants. 
Lillingston, although not condemnatory, cast doubt on the resoluteness of Wilmot's raids, and 
argued, in particular, that the flight of the French from the principal and well defended 
plantation four leagues from the Port, was due to the threat that the soldiers were about to 
cut it off. "' 
By 15 June both land and sea forces were before Port de Paix and a summons was 
sent. Its immediate rejection meant that batteries had to be constructed in the hope of 
effecting a breach in what, all agreed, was a stoutly built and naturally defended fort. 
July] 1695; PRO, ADM 51/4322, Part vi, unpaginated, Ruby, 6-21 May 1695; Burchett, Mr Burchell's 
Justification of Ilis Naval Memoirs, pp. 43-6. 
163 Lillingston, Reflections on Mr Burchell's Memoirs, pp. 56-68; Burchett, Memoirs of Transaction at Sea, 
pp. 317-20; Burchett, Mr Burcheit's Justification offfis Naval Memoirs, pp. 47-52; CSPC, 1693-1696, nos. 
1946,1973,1980.1,1983, pp. 536-7,544-5,548-9,554-5: Narrative of Colonel Peter Beckford; Copies of a 
series of letters on the Hispaniola expedition from Charles Whittell, 24 July 1695; Wilmot to the Admiralty, 
26 July 1695; 'Murreys' Journal', [31 July] 1695; PRO, ADM 51/4322, Part vi, unpaginated, Ruby, 22 May - 
15 June 1695; Burchett, Mr Burchett's Justification offfis Naval Memoirs, pp. 122-48: 'Relating to the 
Proceedings at Port de Paix: Capt. Butler of the Winchester; Capt Soul of the Firebrand Firesh ip; Capt Moses 
of the aperiment; Lt Hickman, Third of the Dunkirk-, Lt Jarman, Second of the Dunkirk; Lt Stiles of the 
Swan; Lt Farquaharson of the Reserve; Lt Turner of the Ruby. 
117 
However, disputes followed over the location of the Council of War and Wilmot was said to 
have withdrawn his participation from those held ashore unless Lillingston was willing to 
accept his repeated offer to focus on accumulating personal wealth. Lillingston believed his 
rejection of this offer contributed to Wilmot delaying the landing of the necessary ordnance 
and, eventually after ten days, putting ashore at a most incommodious site the wrong quantity 
and type. This allegation gained credence from the numerous letters that Lillingston wrote to 
Murrey on the topic. Burchett argued that the soldiers had proved dilatory in erecting those 
guns initially landed and that for this reason and others - principally the sailors' reluctance to 
serve under Lillingston ashore - Wilmot sailed by Port de Paix and from 23 June landed a 
detachment of up to 700 sailors with ordnance to erect batteries at differing levels on the hill 
overlooking the fort from the west. Perhaps predictably, Lillingston derided both the position 
and engineering of the navy's batteries; and both services promoted the relative efficacy of 
their continual fire. Certainly the cumulative effect had an impact for, at the beginning of 
July, news was brought to Wilmot that the enemy intended to abandon the fort. On the night 
of 3-4 July the French attempted a breakout: a party of around 500 headed towards Wilmot's 
forces and he sent forward 150 men to meet them. A sharp fire-fight then occurred, resulting 
in many casualties. Eventually the English seemed to gain the upper hand and the enemy fled 
into the woods, where the majority were rounded up later by the Spanish. Prior to this 
Lillingston's battery had managed to effect a breach and he was preparing to launch an 
assault. On hearing the exchanges to the west he sent his Major with some men to investigate 
and the subsequent report led Lillingston to conclude that his soldiers' cfforts had in fact 
forced the French out and that the sailors had been lucky that the French wished only to break 
though and beat a path to the woods. This view was predicated upon the assumption that the 
garrison sallied westwards upon a reckoning that Wilmot's force would offer the least 
resistance. As at Cap Franýois, the individual services tried to claim the success of this 
combined operation on Hispaniola as their own. '" 
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Petit Goavc and Lcogane now remained as potential targets; the former had been 
cited in the original Instructions and both had been agreed upon with the Spaniards at St 
Domingo. However, the pattern of destructive inter-service relationships continued with 
similar disputes on the taking off of spoil at Port de Paix and on the viability of future 
operations on Hispaniola. The Spanish General, Don Juan del Barranio, and Wilmot had a 
heated exchange over the provision of naval help to destroy the Port de Paix fort and over the 
Spaniards' agreement to continue south to Petit Goave, which Wilmot held out as a 
prerequisite condition for providing more assistance. The Spanish were not forthcoming and, 
although the fort was ultimately razed, Wilmot considered the Spanish attitude, combined 
with Lillingston's refusal to commit the English troops due to their increasing sickness, to 
signal the suspension of operations. "' Interestingly, Stanhope makes no mention of this 
dispute in his official correspondence through to 1696, despite Barranio's intention to brief 
66 Madrid. Alternatively, the Spanish Court may have deliberately omitted to mention ft., 
Nonetheless, the soldiers' refusal to continue was certainly the most important factor in 
causing the projected attacks against Petit Goave and Leogane to be set aside. 
The squadron left Hispaniola for Jamaica on 17 July, and arrived within the week. 
Within two months the suspension of operations became a cancellation as Wilmot sailed for 
England. With the two main actions against French Hispaniola having been already 
undertaken, Beeston was in a poor position to generate further operations; and, as he tried to 
make sense of the inter-service squabbling, he became drawn into it. There were other 
contributory factors such as the sickness which was now affecting the warship Captains and 
had already considerably diminished the effectiveness of Lillingston's regiment. Indeed, an 
abstract of its Establishment after the squadron's departure, put it at over 1000 men under- 
strength. Moreover, Jamaica did not have the resources to make good the expeditionary 
force's deficiencies which were thrown into sharp focus by the news that Ducasse had dug-in 
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at Leogane with some 2000 men. Nonetheless, Beeston implied that it was the ongoing 
personal disputes which ensured that the expeditionary force could not be galvanised to 
further action, and in early September, with the season too far advanced for the squadron to 
go to Newfoundland as was stipulated by the Instructions, Wilmot prepared to leave for 
England. On 3 September the remnants of the squadron sailed from Jamaica. Three frigates, 
fewer than had been ordered, were left behind: two as a permanent guard and one to convoy 
the merchants at a later date. Lillingston's regiment was left in the Caribbean but the Colonel 
and some other officers took passage home. "' 
For the religious amongst those soldiers left on Jamaica, Wilmot's subsequent death 
during the return voyage was likely considered a providential judgement on both the success 
and failure of the expedition. "' For the sailors, it robbed the navy of an immediate advocate 
for its role in the expedition. The excursions to Cap Franqois and Port de Paix had barely 
reaped any tactical advantage, still less fulfilled any geostrategic objective; but in evicting the 
French albeit temporarily from northern Hispaniola, the Wilmot-Lillingston expedition had 
succoured Jamaican defence and avenged the French operation of June 1694. These were 
primarily the reasons for which it was dispatched and, alone amongst the combined 
operations sent to the Caribbean during the war, it had fulfilled them. Due to the ceaseless 
inter-service conflict, the claim that this achievement was the product of genuine combined 
operational endeavour as opposed to individual service effort remains unproven. 
JIM: Commodore John Norris's and Colonel John Gisbon's Expedition to 
Newfoundland, April-October 1697. 
In the imperial context of the late seventeenth century, Newfoundland was regarded as a 
territory whose possession did not necessarily require substantial military or fiscal 
commitment. " Lying off the North American coast bounded by the Atlantic reaches to the 
north-east and the south, with the Gulf of St Lawrence and the Straits of Belle Isle to the 
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west, the early history of England's involvement with this island bears testimony to the above 
point. Although discovered by the Englishman Cabot in the late fifteenth century, 
Newfoundland did not immediately become a principal area of official settlement for England 
and this dovetailed with the initial European interest which has been characterised as 
'commercial and non-political"", whereby fishing the huge cod banks remained largely a 
private venture. Even when this became untenable as the competition over the fisheries gave 
rise to territorial disputes, English colonisation on the island remained small scale with the 
total resident population only increasing by thirteen per cent over eighteen years from 1680.1"1 
Paradoxically, the inhabitants had been consistent in their enthusiasm for an official 
settlement but had, in turn, been firmly opposed by the influential West Country mercantile 
interest who feared that it would lead to the loss of their fishing monopoly. Historically, the 
Government had heeded the merchants' views and, while accepting a minimum level of 
settlement, no effort was made to commit human or material resource for the island's 
defence. Heavy fortifications and large garrisons were considered unnecessary on the basis 
that the command of the Atlantic from the Channel, combined with the annual summer 
warship convoy, and the severe winters would provide sufficient protection. "' In marked 
contrast, the French had officially settled over 200 miles of territory along Newfoundland's 
southern shore since the founding of Placentia in 1665. Moreover, Louis XIV had begun 
fortifying these settlements in the late 1680s, thus making clear his wish that France was to 
have a strong base from which to contest the overall territorial control of the island. "' 
In 1689, England's Declaration of War recognised Louis's attitude by specifically 
mentioning French depredations upon Newfoundland. "" Furthermore, it quickly became clear 
that England's indifference to the island's defence was not a sufficiently robust attitude for 
wartime. In May, the King had accepted the Lords of Trade's recommendations on the 
169 G. S. Graham, 'Britain's Defence of Newfoundland: A Survey, From the Discovery to the Present Day', 
CHR 23 (1944), 260. 
170 ibid., pp. 260. 
171 J. Hatton & M. Harvey, NewfoundlanJ 7he Oldest British Colony, Its History, Its Present Condition, and 
Its Prospect in the Future (London, 1883), pp. 428-9. 
172 Graham, 'Britain's Defence of Newfoundland', pp. 264-7; J. MacGregor, Historical and Descriptive 
Sketches ofthe Maritime Colonies of British America (reprint of 1828 edn, Wakefield, 1968), pp. 217-19; 
Hatton & Harvey, Newfoundland, pp. 37-8. 
173 HarveyA Short History offew/bundland, pp. 62-3; Hatton & Harvey, Newfoundlang pp. 38-9; Graham, 
'Britain's Defence of Newfoundland', pp. 267-8. 
174 A General Collection of Treatys ... Relating to 
Peace and War (2nd edn, London, 1732), i. 281-2: 'King 
William and Queen Mary's Declaration of War Against France, May 7,1689'. 
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conduct of the war in the colonies which included the harassment of French settlements on 
Newfoundland and the fortification of the principal English settlement at St John's. "' 
However, it was 1692 before the Ministry made attempts to give their approach teeth through 
Commodore William's bombardment of Placentia and coastal incendiary raids, and in the 
following year (as has been narrated above) directing Wheler to attack the island after his 
operations against Canada. Nonetheless, both fell short of expectations and their failure 
further emboldened the French who then developed an aggressive policy to strike at the 
English placements on the island. 
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In August 1694, an attack by two French men-of-war on Ferryland was only checked 
by the ell'orts ol'William I lolman, commander of the sole English warship on station, who, in 
"' (SP(', 1689-1692, no. 94, p. 32: Journ aI of the Lords of Trade and P Ian tat ions. 26 Apr. 1689: 
573-4: Order in Council on the State of the Plantations, &c, 2 May 1689. 
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conjunction with the inhabitants, erected some fortifications and gun emplacements. 116 French 
assaults commenced again in early 1696 when Admiral Nesmond anchored his ships in the 
harbour in order to attack St John's. '" The attempt was foiled, but the French redoubled 
their efforts in the autumn when d'Iberville and the French Governor of Placentia, Brouillan, 
commenced a series of amphibious raids on the island. Between September 1696 and April 
1697, d'Iberville and Brouillan effectively captured the whole of Newfoundland for France, 
though the settlement at Bonavista and the Island of Carbonear held out. The ultimate 
ignominy was served by the capture and destruction of St John's, thus making a mockery of 
England's defence policy for the island. "" 
It required only the first wide-ranging raid by Brouillan between September and 
October 1696 which encompassed Ferryland and the Bay of Bulls before the West Country 
merchants were petitioning the King for retaliatory action. Inertia would mean the collapse of 
their fishing trade and the forfeiture of an excellent training ground for seamen, and the early 
representations from the Bideford and Barnstaple merchants were soon followed by others at 
the turn of the year, particularly after the attack on St John's in November 1696 became 
common knowledge. The merchants requested an appropriate number of ships and land 
forces in order to reclaim the areas of Newfoundland lost to the French; strengthened 
convoys, and an increased number of capital ships on station would then support this action. 
Ironically, some merchants were now even clamouring for the defensive fortifications that 
they had hitherto opposed because they had considered it a military adjunct of an official 
government settlement; there was even a willingness to countenance a permanent garrison of 
up to three companies of soldiers. "' This mercantile pressure was of great importance in 
176 CSpC, 1693-1696, no. 2059, pp. 592-3: Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 18 Sept. 1695; 
CSPC, 1696-1697, no. 417, pp. 222-3: Memorial of the case of William Holman, commander of the galley 
William and Mary, 23 Nov. 1696. 
177 There seems some confusion as to when this attack took place. Childs, 'Secondary Operations of the 
fi g British Army', p. 95, dates it as occurring in 1694 as do Hatton & Harvey, New oundlan p. 39. The latter 
may, however, be a printing error for they also write that the attack took place four years after 1692. Both 
Harvey, A Short History ofNewfoundland, p. 63, and A. F. Williams, Father Baudoin's War. DIberville's 
Campaigns in Acadia and Newfound7and 1696,1697, (Newfoundland, 1987), p. 28, date it 1696. Ifone 
accepts that a printing error has occurred in Hatton's & Harvey's text then the consensus would seem to fall 
upon 1696. 
178 Although from a French perspective, the most detailed account of these raids is to bee found in Williams, 
Father Baudoin's War. 
179 CSPC, 1696-1697, nos. 392.1,393.1,450,450.1,479,479.1,583,594.1,608.1,635,692, pp. 211,233-4, 
244,303-4,309,314,331,353-4: Petition of the Merchants of Bideford to the King; Petition of the 
Merchants, Traders and Seamen of the Corporation of Barnstaple to the King, 12 Nov. 1696; The Mayor of 
Weymouth to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 2 Dec. 1696; The Mayor of Poole to the Council of Trade 
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convincing the Court that an operation was required and yet oddly it has been overlooked in 
recent scholarship. "' The petitioners were certainly pushing at an open door likely unlocked 
by Sir Robert Robinson's advice in 1695 which had recommended a more aggressive policy 
against the French on Newfoundland. Moreover, the deported inhabitants of the island 
underscored mercantile representations by also petitioning the Court for a land and sea 
expedition to reclaim their settlements. "' Despite this momentum, it was not immediately 
clear that the Court would agree to an operation that had Newfoundland as its sole 
destination, and the deliberations initially got caught up in the ongoing preparations for the 
despatch of a squadron to the West Indies. The strategic and tactical functions reflected by 
that command's composition was initially to form the yardstick by which a viable independent 
expedition to Newfoundland was to be decided. 
A West Indian squadron had been proposed in late 1696 in response to intelligence 
that despite Chfiteaurenauk's squadron being beaten back by bad weather, the French still 
intended to send a considerable force to the Caribbean. "' From November through to the 
spring of 1697 intelligence returns reported that the French were now fitting out a fleet at 
Brest under Pointis. This was thought to be designed for the Caribbean with soldiers aboard 
to attack the Spanish King's possessions there, and attempt the capture of the returning 
Spanish Flota. To deal with these threats, and the fear that Jamaica might be attacked, the 
dispatch of a West Indian squadron became an imperative. '" Concurrently, an idea was 
floated in Whitehall to draft an Additional Instruction for this squadron, directing it to repair 
and Plantations; the Council of Trade and Plantations to the King, 13 Jan. 1697; Copy of a petition from the 
Corporation and merchants of Exeter to the King, 16 Jan. 1697; Petition of the Mayor, Corporation, and 
Merchants of Poole to the King; Petition of the Bailiffi, Capital Burgesses and Merchants to Newfoundland in 
the Borough of Bridport, to the King, 27 Jan. 1697; John Cary of Bristol to the Council of Trade and 
Plantations, 8 Feb. 1697; PRO, ADM 1/4084, fos. 687-8: the Lords of Trade and Plantations to 'Sir' 
[Burchett? ), 23 Nov. 1696. 
1110 D. Aldridge, 'Sir John Norris 1660? - 1749', in Le Fevre & Harding (eds), Precursors offelson, p. 132. 
'81 CSPC, 1696-1697, nos. 427,586, pp. 226,305-7: Petition of John Clappe and others, on behalf of the 
inhabitants of Ferryland, in Newfoundland, now residing at Barnstaple in Devon, to the King, 27 Nov. 1696; 
Copy of the several documents relating to the devastation of the English settlements in Newfoundland, [14 
Jan. ] 1697. 
182 PRO, SP 42/5, fos. 175-6: 'Proposalls for Sending a Squadron to the West Indies', n. d. [Late 1696 or early 
16971. 
181 PRO, ADM 1/4084, fos. 433,435-42,445-51,893-4: Trumbull to Admiralty, 10,11 Nov. 1696,29 Jan. 
1697 and enclosures, untitled; untitled; extract of the Journal of the Council of Trade, n. d.; extract of Sir 
William Beeston's letter, 19 June 1696; extract of another, 4,5 July 1696; PRO, ADM 1/4084, fos 1245, 
1247. Shrewsbury to the Admiralty, 28 Mar. 1697, and enclosure, untitled; PRO, ADM 1/4085, fos 443,451- 
5. Vernon to Bridgeman, 17 June 1697, and enclosure, 'Instructions to be Observd by Our Trusty and 
Welbeloved John Nevill Esq. ' 
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to Newfoundland on its voyage home. The details as to its actions when off the island were 
to follow at a later date. "" The previous mercantile and inhabitants' insistence that both a 
land and sea force would be required to regain the settlements on Newfoundland makes it 
reasonable to suggest that this squadron would have had to have had some troops aboard. 
The intended West Indian squadron was to be formed from two separate groups of warships. 
One detachment of five warships and two fireships commanded in the Mediterranean by Vice 
Admiral John Neville had been ordered in December 1696 to proceed into the Caribbean. 
Neville's orders were strictly naval in character: to locate both Pointis and the Spanish Flota 
with the intent to destroy the former and secure the latter. No extant evidence suggests that 
he had any troops on board other than the likely draft of marine soldiers and, unless these 
troops were to be relied upon, Neville thus required land reinforcements to undertake any 
combined land and sea operations. "' Initially this seemed possible for the other group of 
ships forming the squadron had been delayed in leaving England and could therefore have had 
troops embarked aboard. However, as the sheer extent of this delay became clear, it most 
likely caused the idea to be shelved. Undoubtedly it weighed heavily with the Court that the 
Board of Trade and the Admiralty had traded allegations as to whom was responsible for 
failing to communicate this squadron's design and purpose while the French raids continued 
unabated. Despite an attempt to hasten the squadron's preparations, William quickly rejected 
the idea of an Additional Instruction and, instead, chose to send to Newfoundland a self- 
contained squadron with land forces aboard. In order to inject a sense of urgency into the 
preparations, William informed all the petitioners of his decision by 30 January. "' 
The King's determination made an impression upon the various boards, departments 
and officials who were to put the operation together as they demonstrated an early awareness 
into the necessity of their interdependence. The Board of Trade acted as a bureaucratic pivot, 
liaising effectively with the Admiralty, Secretary of State Trumbull, and the Ordnance Board. 
From the outset the net for help was cast wide in an attempt by Whitehall to spread the 
134 PRO, ADM 1/4084, fos. 893-4,995-6: Trumbull to the Admiralty, 29 Jan. 1697, and enclosure, the 
Council of Trade to Trumbull, 28 Jan. 1697. 
lss PRO, ADM 1/4085, fos 443,451-5: Vernon to Bridgeman, 17 June 1697, and enclosure, 'Instructions to 
be Observ'd by Our Trusty and Welbeloved John Nevill Esq. '; NUL, PwA 972, unf : The naval journal of 
Vice-Admiral John Neville, Dec. 1696-July 1697. 
lg6 PRO, ADM 1/4084, fos. 853-6,893-4,995-6: Trumbull to the Admiralty, 16,29 Jan. 1697, and enclosure, 
the Council of Trade to Trumbull, 28 Jan. 1697; NUL, PwA 974, unf: Neville to Portland, 29 Apr. 1697; 
CSPC, 1696-1697, no. 648, p. 337: Popple to the Mayors of Bristol, Exeter, Bideford, Barnstaple, Plymouth, 
Weymouth, Dartmouth, Poole and Fowey, 30 Jan. 1697. 
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administrative burden. As sundry merchants were asked to estimate for the sea and land 
provisions, the North American provinces were requested to send men and equipment, 
though it remains unclear whether the colonies responded to this appeal. "' Throughout, the 
bureaucratic oil was the redoubtable Blathwayt. His letters make clear William's personal 
commitment, evidenced by his attention to the operation's administrative minutiae. A notable 
example was the King's recognition of the vulnerability of the soldiers' health when aboard 
ship. He directed that the surgeons should care for both seamen and soldiers and, to prevent 
this order miscarrying due to friction between the Admiralty and War Office over funding, 
William shrewdly determined that on the return of the ships each surgeon be reimbursed two 
shillings and six-pence per soldier from the army contingencies. Blathwayt's correspondence 
also crucially kept the pressure upon the Admiralty with repeated requests for the King to be 
provided with reports on the forwardness of the preparations. "' 
The culmination of all this bureaucratic activity was a detailed memorandum on 
progress sent by Blathwayt: on 29 March to the Admiralty which demonstrated that, overall, 
the arrangements were at a relatively advanced stage. "' Within three weeks, on 17 April, a 
squadron of eleven ships"O commanded by Commodore John Norris"', with between 700 and 
137 CSPC 
0 1696-1697, nos. 647,685,686,852, pp. 
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Journals of M. Richards, 1696-7,1700 - Norris and Richards record that on 27 June, Captain Littleton in the 
Portland aff ived with the Fortune fireship, the Unity transport vessel and the Oxenden and the Katherine 
storeships, while two further storeships, the Union and the Benjamin, had failed on that occasion to get about 
Cape Francis. This second fireship was different to the one cited in Norris's Instructions and the disposition 
listofthe23Mar. Norris's journal -PRO, ADM 51/592, Part vii, unpaginated, Monck: 'Noff is's Journal'- 
notes the aff ival with convoys of the Bonadventure (a hired man-of-war from Lisbon) and the Crown over the 
two days, 11-12 July. Another estimation of eight frigates, two fireships, two bomb vessels and some 
storeships was given in Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, p. 27. The frequent citation of other 
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900 troops from Colonel John Gibson's infantry battalion"' and 60 Ordnance Office 
personnel"" captained by Michael Richards (youngest brother of the notable family trio of 
gunners and military engineers)"" aboard, left Spithead. A preparatory time of less than three 
months meant that the despatch of this expedition had been less beset by delay than the others 
sent overseas throughout the war. 
. Nonetheless, the administrative speed belied a lack of smoothness in respect of three 
issues. The least important glitch concerned Richards's appointment as the expedition's Chief 
Engineer and Principal Ordnance Officer. His Journal related the farcical story of how he 
came to this command. Despite initially requesting the appointment, a bout of illness at the 
end of February when the list of appointed ordnance personnel was published, and then the 
uncertainty as to whether Colonel Romer was to attend as the engineer with Gibson 
commanding the train, caused much muddle. Ultimately, without an official letter of 
appointment or Instructions from the Ordnance Board, Richards embarked onboard the 
flagship Monck at Portsmouth on 17 April with only the wishes of the Master-General of the 
Ordnance and a 'gentleman's understanding' with Gibson to explain his presence. "' 
A second administrative ruffle was the debate as to whether the squadron was to 
proceed as one or as two detachments with different sailing times. Initially the officials - 
particularly the victuallers - favoured the latter option for it would allow the minimum of 
provisions to be sent with the fwst sailing, thus providing more time to procure all the 
larger estimates by historians is possibly a product of a lack of awareness about the debate as to whether the 
squadron would depart as one unit or as two and the subsequent circumstances of its departure. 
19' See Chapter 1, Section ll. ii, p. 69 n. 37. 
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- PRO, ADM 51/592, Part vii, unpaginated, Monck: 'Norris's Journal', 14 Apr. 1697 - records his receipt of a 
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193 PRO, ADM 1/4084, f 1269: Blathwayt to the Admiralty, 29 Mar. 1697. 
194 For biographical and military service details on Jacob, John and Michael Richards see H. T. Dickinson, 
67be Richards Brothers: Exponents of the Military Arts of Vauban', JSAHR x1vi (1968), 76-86, and F. J. 
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necessary foodstuffs. However, this ran contrary to the King's wishes that the squadron sail 
as a whole. At the end of March, the Board of Trade intervened on the victualler's behalf by 
pointing out that they had been working under the assumption that the squadron would be 
divided and that further orders would be required if the ships were to be provisioned to sail as 
a whole. The Board's warning had no effect. Within the following fortnight, the Transport 
Commissioners had informed Blathwayt that the transports, having suffered delays in 
victualling, could only sail immediately without the whole quantities. "' The administrative 
process had seemed to frustrate monarchical design; but ultimately it was not to prevail. All 
the ships save one left on 17 April, the remaining vessel, the Portland, followed later with five 
storeships, thus acting more as a convoy than forming a second detachment. 
The third difficulty faced by the officials concerned the drafting of Norris's 
Instructions. Encompassing not only the strategic purpose of the operation but also the 
balance of command between the land and sea officers, it was by far the most important issue 
addressed. Blathwayt sent a draft of the Instructions plus some 'Heads' for discussion to the 
Admiralty on 15 March. In terms of implementing the strategic intent to recover 
Newfoundland, the amphibious quality of the expedition suggested by the King's decision of 
30 January was diluted. Instead of a single combined operation directed to take and hold one 
sector of Newfoundland from whence full control might be achieved through envelopment, 
vaguely targeted assaults against various parts of the island were now promoted. The 
potentially advantageous tactical position conferred upon a single landing by the maritime 
command securing the flanks and the line of retreat had been sacrificed in favour of sporadic 
landings determined upon by the land commander and approved by a Council of War. "' 
Admittedly, the Instructions did specifically direct Norris to Placentia and the French 
strongholds along the southern coast but the suggested course of action was bound by the a 
number of caveats including the requirement that it would not prejudice service elsewhere. 
The combined service assaults were now one of a plethora of tasks for the squadron such that 
when the final set of Instructions was issued on II April, Noff is's responsibilities ranged from 
1" PRO, ADM 1/4084, fos. 1269,1271-4,1413-16: Blathwayt to the Admiralty, 29 Mar., 13 Apr. 1697, and 
enclosure, 'The Dispatch of the Preparations for the Expedition to Newfoundland Consists as Followeth; 
PRO, ADM 1/4084, f 1305: Trumbull to the Admiralty, 31 Mar. 1697, and enclosure, f. 1307: Council of 
Trade to Trumbull, 29 Mar. 1697. 
1" PRO, ADM 1/4084, fos 1168,1269,1275-82, unf. Blathwayt to Secretaries of the Admiralty, 15,29 Mar. 
1697, and enclosures, 'Instructions for Noff is'; 'Heads of Instructions for Captain John Norris; 'Heads of 
Instructions for Captain John Norris'. 
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the immediate necessity of securing the coastal waters to the despatch of convoys to various 
Mediterranean ports. While some of the tasks were a standard feature for any squadron 
stationed at Newfoundland, the majority were thoroughgoing naval activities that evidently 
required no input from the army. "' 
The Instruction's prescriptions on command did though fully recognise that this was 
to be combined army and naval venture. The standard exhortation that the success of the 
expedition depended upon constant good relations between the Service commanders was 
shored up by an attempt to provide both greater clarity on their specific responsibilities and 
enhanced authority in these areas. The commander of the land forces was detailed as 
responsible for proposing when, and where, his battalion was to land for an assault; while he 
also had full command of any detachment of seamen put ashore as assistance. However, in 
deference to the expertise of the senior naval officer, that detachment could only be 
authorised if the Commodore considered it consistent with the sea-going demands of the 
squadron. And, as has already been noted, Norris was in sole command of naval activities 
such as the provision of convoys to the Mediterranean. ""' Interestingly, in this form, these 
provisions were not in the original draught though the enhanced discretion for the land 
commander had formed one of the separate 'Heads of Instructions'. "' In so far as the above 
emphasised that this was a combined venture in a negative manner by delineating 
responsibilities peculiar to each Service, their conjunction was positively reinforced by a 
combined Council of War being the sovereign authority of command. In the usual manner, 
the presidency of the Council would depend on whether it convened ashore or afloat, though 
notably when ashore, Gibson was not bound to invite the naval officers unless he specifically 
wanted their advice. "' This latter provision might be thought to provide a functional 
advantage for Gibson but such an interpretation overlooks the potentially superior structural 
advantage afforded to Norris by the presidency of the combined Council being determined by 
the location of its assembly. This made it more likely that Gibson would have to seek 
sanction for his proposals on the landings under a naval Presidency. These circumstances 
might have been thought to credit Norris with supreme command. However, as the events of 
HMC, House ofLords MSSNS, iii. 327-30: Instructions for Capt. John Norris, II Apr. 1697. 
JIMC, House ofLords MSS NS, iii. 327-30: instructions for Capt. John Norris, II Apr. 1697. 
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for Norr is'; 'Heads of instructions for Captain John Norr is'. 
20' 1 IMC, House ofLords MSS NS, iii. 327-30: Instructions for Capt. John Norris, II Apr. 1697. 
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the expedition were to show the Instructions conferred neither a structural nor a functional 
advantage to either service but instead confirmed their essential association in command. 
It was 29 March before the squadron cleared Lands End, having spent twelve days 
since leaving Spithead working down the Channel collecting such merchantmen as required 
convoy to Newfoundland. However, once out in the Atlantic good progress was made with 
only the last part of the sailing bedevilled by a fog of such thickness that the ships had to use 
all their guns, bells and drums to ward against collision. " By 7 June, Newfoundland was in 
sight and Norris called a combined Council of land and sea officers to determine proceedings. 
Colonel Gibson claimed that he argued for a landing of 150 men to attack Kitty Vitty, a place 
near St John's, while the rest of the troops would be transported in light vessels for an assault 
upon the harbour. The Council ignored this by resolving to gain intelligence on the current 
state of affairs at St John's and, in particular, where it would be possible to effect a landing in 
the face of French opposition. Thus, Captains Cleasby (naval) and Petit (ordnance) were sent 
out in two ship's boats only to return quickly with the news that contrary to expectations, the 
French had quitted St John's some time ago. There remained a few English inhabitants along 
with some merchantmen who, having been separated from the convoy in the recent fog, had 
groped their way through to St John's harbour. By late afternoon, Norris's squadron had 
joined them. "' 
The French departure from St John's was a surprise which rendered void the expected 
fight for reoccupation and ameliorated the need to immediately place it in a defensive posture; 
but also there was now an opportunity to undertake the combined assaults against French 
settlements elsewhere. However, within two days of their arrival, the English decided to land 
all the troops at St John's with the necessary provisions left in the Suffolk hag-boat so that 
they could begin surveying the ground for the erection of the batteries and buildings. This 
would also allow Noff is to take the squadron to sea for twelve days, though the two bomb 
vessels were left behind as harbour defence. These proceedings were not entirely without 
sense for, if a garrison was to be established, then it would require accommodation and St 
John's was also poorly fortified. Moreover, with the provisions stowed on board the men-of 
I ibid., p. 28. 
201 CSpC$ 1697-1698, no. 75, p. 39: Colonel John Gibsone's [sic] Narrative of the Expedition to 
Newfoundland [hereafter 'Gibson's Narrative'], 29 Nov. 1697; PRO, ADM 51/592, Part vii, unpaginated, 
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war having been kept to a minimum, Norris was keen to secure the supply ships coming from 
England and a convoy expected from the Mediterranean. ""' This early decision to divide the 
immediate activities of the army and navy was to prove crucial for the future viability of the 
combined assaults. In fact, they never came to be discussed as a series of events on the land 
and at sea entrenched this initial disposition of force as the only one capable of providing both 
for its own security and that of St John's. 
The first stage in this process occurred when Norris cut short his cruise after only 
three days as a result of inteRigence he gained from the crew of the captured French 
merchantman. The captains agreed at Council that the prisoners' evidence strongly suggested 
that a French squadron of three 70 to 80-gun men-of-war and several 50s were headed for 
Placentia; while letters intercepted aboard from Rochelle referred to a squadron of eleven 
men-of-war bound for Newfoundland that were to link up with others from Brest. This 
information should not have been surprising for it was entirely consistent with the reports sent 
from Europe prior to the expeditionary force's departure on 17 April. "' Notwithstanding, the 
Council resolved that the fleet should return immediately to defend St John's. "' On 22 June, 
a combined Council agreed with the Captains' analysis, believing that St John's could only be 
protected by the fleet until the necessary fortification materials arrived in the supply ships 
from England. Meanwhile, to strengthen the fleet's position in the harbour, improvisation 
with some spare topmasts and fascines caused a boom to be placed across the harbour 
mouth. "' 
The French squadron had not appeared by 27 June when Captain Littleton arrived 
with the storeships, thus allowing Norris to set out cruising again. "' Ominously, the arrival 
of the foodstuffs did not seem to alleviate the general shortage. Gibson emphasised the plight 
of the soldiers, blaming Norris for refusing to send to New England for a further supply and 
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prohibiting the land forces from taking the merchantmens' goods until 2 August. The 
Colonel also drew attention to the prodigious consumption by the Masters of the storeships in 
serving out a full allowance to their crews. " There was, doubtless, some truth in these 
points; but combined they provided a lop-sided picture of the range of the shortage, and gave 
credence to the rather cursory argument that the shortage was a product of divided 
command. "' The accounts provided by Norris and Richards make clear that the deprivation 
was common to soldier and sailor, with both on half-allowance of bread and short-allowance 
of all other provisions save for oatmeal and flour; and that the three principal officers worked 
together to procure all the available bread whether it be with the island's inhabitants or hidden 
in the storeships. "' Rather than conflict between the services causing the scarcity, it seems 
probable that errors had occurred in the victualling as it was completed against an uncertain 
backdrop as to whether the squadron was to proceed as one or two groups of ships. 
This prospective shortage of provisions did not prevent the Council from allocating 21 
sea days for the squadron's second cruise which was to conclude with an assessment of the 
former English ports to the south of St John's. But again, Norris steered the squadron back 
to St John's in little over a third of that time as a result of confirmation from two captured 
prizes that the arrival of a French squadron was indeed imminent. The Masters of both the 
Union and the Bellicuer, claimed to have sailed from Rochelle on 5 May under the convoy of 
Nesmond's squadron of eleven men-of-war which had set course for Newfoundland. They 
believed that Placentia was the place of rendezvous in the event of separation and from there 
it was thought that Nesmond would target Boston. The English naval captains were too 
fearful of the French squadron's reputed strength to risk Nesmond being solely interested in 
the New England town by remaining at sea and thus leave St John's without defence. "' 
Naval perception of French strength in the region was further enhanced by the 
assessments of over a hundred English prisoners who were returned from Placentia in early 
July. Norris was particularly alarmed by the testimony of one Richard Wakeling, Master of 
the Speedwell ketch. He provided a dispiriting account of the extent of the French 
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fortification and ordnance at Placentia, including their 36 gun Fort Placens with a further six 
guns, and two mortars positioned on the hill-top and banks overlooking the settlement. in 
terms of human resources, Wakeling estimated that there were near 2000 soldiers, sailors and 
inhabitants. Finally, the Master reported observing a considerable amount of recent French 
naval activity at Placentia which included around 30 merchantmen in the harbour and four 
French men-of-war cruising between Newfoundland and Hudson Bay. "' The cumulative 
effect of this intelligence about current and potential French regional strength, worked against 
the launching of any combined assaults. The initial decision taken on arrival regarding the 
disposition of the force which had indirectly prioritised the defence of St John's and its 
environs was increasingly confirmed by events as the most prudent option. 
This trend was reinforced by Colonel Gibson, who, although possessing the authority 
for proposing the assaults, seemed not in the least interested in their potentiality. Richards 
provided a vivid account of the Colonel immersing himself in the building work, much to the 
Chief Engineer's chagrin for he considered Gibson to be transgressing upon his area of 
responsibility. The fortification of St John's was actually the only occasion throughout the 
whole expedition when Gibson suggested that the sea and land forces should work together. 
On 14 July, Norris and his captains considered Gibson's request for 400 seamen to fetch the 
palisades and they agreed to a daily provision of 100 men contingent upon restrictions on 
Gibson's command over them. Although the Colonel's ultimate shore authority was 
rccognised, the captains wanted to ensure that naval officers would be the sailors' immediate 
commanders on shore, and further that they be given duties near the harbour mouth. "" 
Gibson rejected the offer outright, and approached Richards to complain of the difficulties 
between the land and sea forces. Interestingly, acquitting Norris of responsibility for the state 
of relations, Gibson blamed 'turbulent spirits' amongst the Captains and asked if Richards 
could mediate. "' Although clearly not sympathetic to Gibson, Richards waited upon Norris 
who had in the interim received a conciliatory letter from the Colonel. An agreement was 
reached for the immediate provision of 100 sailors to palisade and for a further 60 to be 
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employed in breaking up old ships and harbour rock. "" The tension between the land and sea 
forces over the employment of seamen ashore had been resolved but only temporarily. 
Meanwhile, combined operational action seemed increasingly unlikely as there was no 
change in the intelligence assessments regarding French strength. In the evening of the 23 
July, Pointis, having outrun Neville north of Cuba, stood some five French warship into 
Conception Bay. A Council of War held in the afternoon of 24 July confirmed a decision 
taken by the same Council in the morning for the expeditionary force to remain in St John's 
harbour for the common security of the island's settlements, the squadron, and the troops. It 
also decided to embark the soldiers, and call for all neighbouring inhabitants to man the 
incomplete gun batteries along with the naval ordnance that had been set ashore. "' This was 
based upon the flawed premise that the five ships spotted were part of a much larger fleet 
under Nesmond which intelligence returns before leaving England, and naval reconnaissance 
since, had indicated was headed for Newfoundland. "' In fact, Nesmond did not arrive for 
another month and, as a result of the Council's decision, Pointis's squadron with its valuable 
cargo was ultimately able to make a second escape. "" In the Chair at the afternoon Council 
on 24 July, Norris argued that the fleet should leave the harbour and attempt to engage the 
French vessels at Conception Bay. "' However the mutual dependence of the combined army- 
navy action - as framed by the Instructions - was demonstrated by Norris's inability to 
persuade a third of the navy officers who joined the soldiers to vote against egress. These 
captains even rejected the Commodore's persuasive argument that if the French warships in 
Conception Bay were in communication with any others within five leagues, then they would 
have already been spotted from Cape Francis or Baccalieu. In other words, as this was not 
the case, the expected larger French fleet under Nesmond was likely to be too far away to be 
of immediate assistance to those at anchor in Conception Bay and, thus, the opportunity to 
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engage them should be grasped. " Captain Martin of the Blast bomb vessel subsequently 
claimed that all the sea officers had wished to engage Pointis; but laying aside his incorrect 
arithmetic, Martin missed the material point. " This was that despite his presidency of the 
Council, Norris could not overcome the combined dynamic of sailors and soldiers who had 
decided that they did not want the fleet to leave the harbour. 
Even as it became clear over the course of the following days that it was only 
Pointis's squadron in the bay, the Council held firm to its view when it re-convened to 
consider the matter on 25 and 27 July. "' On the latter occasion Norris had had hopes that the 
pre-existing resolution would be amended because he claimed that prior to the Council 
Gibson had indicated a wholesale change in his opinion. That no alteration occurred, Norris 
credited to Gibson's behaviour in Council. The Commodore recorded that, although Gibson 
voted for the fleet's egress, he wished it minuted that he considered this action contrary to the 
benefit of the whole service. "' Neither Gibson nor Richards referred to the former's change 
of vote. Gibson stressed his constant opposition to the departure of the fleet on the basis of 
what be considered was the continuing uncertainty as to whether Nesmond remained 
unsighted off the coast. Certainly, it does seem odd that Gibson would show his hand for a 
proposal which he expressively stated was contrary to the King's service. " Yet, Gibson 
undermined the veracity of his own record by claiming to remember that only three sea 
captains voted with the Commodore for the fleet's departure on 24 July when the extant 
minutes of the Council showed seven supporting Norris. "" However, regardless as to which 
record was correct, Gibson was lending his qualified support to what was primarily a naval 
task - securing the coastal waters. The question of a combined action upon Newfoundland 
had still to be raised and Gibson continued to show no inclination to do so when, at the end 
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of the month, he requested that the Council agree to the troops being landed at St John's 
again to continue their works ashore. " 
Norris's own view on the egress of the fleet in such circumstances altered nearly one 
month hence when, on 18 August, Nesmond with a squadron of fifteen warships did in fact 
appear off St John's harbour. This time Norris gave no thought to seeking an engagement 
and, instead, drew his squadron up line-astern in a half-moon with the broadside of each 
covering the boom that lay across the harbour mouth. He also sent an express north to 
inform the inhabited coastal areas of the enemy's appearance. Meanwhile, with no tine to 
embark, Gibson disposed his troops to man the still partially completed South and North 
batteries, while Richards ensured that each emplacement and the soldiers had sufficient 
ammunition. "' Norr is and Gibson recorded that Nesmond spent a day plying up and down 
outside the harbour, though they disagreed on how many of the squadron subsequently stood 
into the harbour mouth. Gibson believed that the French commander despatched only a 50 
and a bomb vessel which were chased away with a bomb thrown from either the Comet or 
Blast . 
22' Norris considered that the whole squadron stood in about noon, though a cross 
wind forced the vessels to head off and be brought to. Furthermore, he cited the weather as 
proving the undoing of the French when it thickened throughout the afternoon and into the 
following day with a south-easterly gale veering to the east and north-east, thus, forcing the 
squadron to stand out to sea. 230 Gibson argued, however, that it was the strong defensive 
posture provided by the conjunction of the land and sea forces in the harbour area which had 
forestalled the French and he was later supported by the Lords Justices who minuted their 
intent to discount the news that Nesmond had forced the harbour due to the conjunction of 
numerous soldiers and vessels within its haven. Of course, their Lordships had no 
meteorological information. 231 
The English suffered a further fright on 23 August when twelve sail were spotted 
some seven leagues out. Again, the fleet remained in the harbour and assumed a similar 
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defensive posture. Though, on this occasion, Norris noted that his disposition attracted the 
criticism of Gibson who believed that the squadron's fire might prejudice his soldiers at the 
batteries. Not surprisingly, Norris considered his squadron well ordered to defend the 
harbour with the ships' guns clear of the batteries as a result of the broadsides being brought 
up with stream cables at the vessels' stems along with other springs ahead and astern. The 
Commodore, thus, refused to alter the line and dismissed Gibson's intervention as typically 
impolite behaviour. This scare lasted for 24 hours after which the ships could no longer be 
sighted; and then both commanders returned to the building works with a detachment of 
sailors put ashore again to help the completion of the new fort's covered way. "' 
The first three months at Newfoundland show Norris and Gibson to be merely 
reacting to events driven by the intelligence provision which emphasised French strength. 
Certainly, neither had mentioned the possibility of undertaking the combined assaults against 
Placentia and the surrounding areas. Indeed, their initial decision not to work as a combined 
unit but concentrate on individual service responsibilities - fortification and naval cruises - had 
become entrenched. This trend continued through the first few weeks of September as 
relations between all officers became increasingly fractious. Norr is and Gibson revisited their 
quarrel over the command of the seamen ashore; Richards and Gibson involved themselves in 
demarcation disputes; and a Council which convened to decide where the French prisoners 
should be returned occasioned a grubby dispute between Colonel Gibson and Lieutenant- 
Colonel Dove during which Gibson effectively challenged the younger man to a duel. ", 
Meanwhile, as the winter season approached, there was a constant awareness that the 
provisions were further dwindling; and Norris, not knowing that a peace treaty had been 
signed four days previously, called a Council on 17 September to settle affairs for sailing 
home. 
The squadron did not actually leave Newfoundland until 8 October. "' The 
intervening weeks had been taken up with Gibson settling the extent of garrison that was to 
be left and completing as much of the fortification work as possible. The importance of 
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ensuring the defence of the areas of English settlement was confirmed by Gibson's initial 
desire to remain himself in command of the whole regiment as garrison. Even when a lack of 
provisions combined with the Council's refusal to leave the Suffolk hag-boat as lodging for 
the regiment in the absence of a completed barracks reputedly forced Gibson to alter his 
plans, over a quarter of the troops brought out were still to be left under the command of the 
Regimental Major, Thomas Handysde. With ten subordinate officers including three 
company Captains, and an artillery train of 36 personal commanded by Captain Petit, it was 
not an insignificant force for the defence of a relatively small sector of the island. "' Although 
the provision of a garrison had been ordered, the fact that this inherently defensive task was 
to be undertaken solely by the army, thus representing another enterprise successfully 
completed by an individual service, stood as final testimony to the lack of combined 
operational endeavour throughout the course of the expedition. Indeed, it would be easy to 
characterise the operation as one whereby the navy simply acted as a taxi to an army garrison 
and providing return travel for the remainder of the troops. 
The ink on the peace treaty concluded at Rijswijk had been dry for nearly two months 
when the returning squadron came to anchor in the Downs on 3 November. " Under the 
terms of the Treaty, the colonial status of Newfoundland was to revert to the pre-war 
circumstances: essentially a shared island with distinctive areas of French and English 
settlement. "' Thus, even if Norris and Gibson had attempted any combined action against the 
French and expelled them from Newfoundland the peace would have overturned such 
success. However, this prospect did not have to be contemplated because the English 
practice of warfare during this expedition had been wholly moulded by events. It was not on 
this occasion, as some have concluded I", that the army and navy were despatched without 
any operational or administrative principles with respect to the war in the colonies; rather it 
was that both failed to adhere to those provided when in-theatre. The early decision that the 
army and the navy were essentially to remain at St John's was allowed to be entrenched by 
intelligence reports of a considerable French presence on the island and the appearance at 
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different times off the eastern Newfoundland coast of two French squadrons. Fortification 
and the immediate defence of St John's, including its environs, then quickly became the 
objective of the whole operation. 
Ultimately these proceedings had a reductive effect upon subsequent Government 
policy towards Newfoundland. Despite the subsequent furore over Captain Charles 
Desborow's petition against the verdict of a court martial that 'broke' him whilst serving with 
Norris's squadron at Newfoundland, which occasioned the politically motivated suspension of 
Norris for allegedly having been more concerned with protecting prizes than pursuing 
Pointis, 239the Ministry was most concerned with the extent and efficacy of St John's defences 
in the immediate years following the squadron's return. At the end of January 1700, Michael 
Richards was called to a meeting at the Board of Ordnance to provide an account of the 
fortifications at St John's which resulted in him being sent out there again in April as Chief 
Engineer. He was to help the much reduced garrison of one Independent Company effect 
improvements to the nine gun South and five gun North batteries; strengthen the ordnance at 
Fort William and the One Clock Stage; and begin building anew. 2" Although admittedly at 
peace with France, this policy betrayed a return to the Government's limited ambition for 
Newfoundland as a source of cod and a training ground for seamen albeit one that was to be 
better defended. Certainly there was no discussion or planning as to how England might hold 
the whole island as a strategic gateway to the 'New World'. Such was the legacy of a failed 
wartime combined operation that had in its planning and preparation sought conquest. 
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Section III: Combined Operations and the European Theatre During 
the Nine Years War, 1688-1697. 
TIM: Combined Operations as 'Descents' in Eur"e. 
In 1691 Edward Littleton's pamphlet recommended that King William undertake a 'descent' 
(simply a seabome landing of men on enemy territory) upon the French coast. It concluded 
with the claim that the responsibility of a skilful general was 'not to dance after the Enemy, 
but to make the Enemy dance after Him", and it followed that to undertake a combined army 
and navy operation to land soldiers on the French coast would cause Louis XIV to begin the 
jig. Littleton's metaphor neatly encapsulated the principal strategic motive of descents in 
early modem warfare: the establishment of a second front in the enemy's territory, which 
would force him to draw off resources from the main theatre of operations. It also hinted at 
more immediate tactical objectives such as the destruction of a harbour, which might be 
completed as part of the wider strategic venture or form the sole object of the operation, but 
which would equally prompt an enemy response. Overall, despite the author's rather naive 
enthusiasm, the pamphlet outlined a positive case for this type of combined army and navy 
operation upon the French coasts. ' 
Although Littleton was not alone amongst his contemporaries in making the military 
case for descents, ' modem commentators have remained largely sceptical of the arguments. 
The foremost military authority of the late seventeenth century, Professor John Childs, rejects 
the strategic and military worth of combined operations undertaken as descents upon the 
French coast during the Nine Years War. " He condemns them as 'political operations of war, 
which were 'poorly conceived and ill prepared'. ' On both counts, Professor Childs has much 
evidence to draw upon. The political dialectic between the Whigs, who favoured a 
continental army-centric strategy, and the Tories, whose interest was for a more exclusively 
maritime or 'blue-water' strategy that promoted the navy in command of the sea while 
protecting and expanding overseas trade, did largely foster the European descents during the 
war. By combining army and navy resources to meet specific tactical or strategic objectives, 
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they were considered structurally and functionally suited to fulfil certain aspects of both Whig 
and Tory strategies. At a more basic Political level, Danby wrote of the propagandistic 
benefits of effecting a landing directly on enemy territory. " On the second charge of poor' 
planning and preparation, a history of failure can be found in the abandoned attempts against 
the Normandy coast and Brest in 1692 and 1693 respectively, in the bloody repulse at Brest 
in 1694; and in the lack of action by Russell's Mediterranean fleet which had soldiers 
embarked aboard during 1695. ' Nonetheless, Professor Childs's condemnation of descents 
does in the first instance require a rather improbable rejection of the - admittedly now banal - 
Clausewitzian consensus about warfare being sui generis a pofitical instrument. " And, more 
importantly, it assumes that London considered the descents to form a separate and coherent 
strategy. Clearly within such a context the operational failures were truly lamentable; but, 
considered from a different standpoint, the extent and nature of these miscarriages becomes 
explicable. 
An alternative approach would be to consider these combined operations as just one 
element of the Court's war policy: a product not purely of political compromise but as a 
combined army and naval means to implement the separate mil-itary and naval strategies. This 
context admits an element of credibility in the argument that descents might help alter the 
military balance in the land theatre, though not sufficiently to comprise a single war-winning 
strategy. It also implies that William appreciated this point with a greater degree of 
enthusiasm than is usually accorded to him, and that along with senior courtiers and 
commanders, he sought to organise a series of descents as one aspect of his continental 
strategy. Equally, with reference to the wider naval strategy, this interpretative framework 
adopts descents as just one agency for its implementation. Although command of the Narrow 
Seas had been achieved at La Hogue (1692), the French navy had not been destroyed and the 
two principal squadrons operating out of Brest/Rochefort in the north and Toulon in the 
south could still combine to form a considerable battlefleet. There was much to recommend 
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politics which, they argue, would have been an automatic assumption for contemporaries. 
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destroying these vessels as they lay in port to guarantee sea command; and, aside from 
seaborne bombardment, a combined army and navy descent offered a means to do so. This 
approach was only underlined when, from 1694, the French naval strategy evolved to 
promote guerre de course above guerre descadre ' and the coastal ports now served as 
havens for the privateers preying on English trade and the naval warships that afforded them 
escort. In attempting either to prevent the conjunction of the French squadrons or to combat 
the French guerre de course, the descents planned against the northern French coasts might 
also be considered to have fulfilled a dual function by facilitating William's ambition to 
establish England as the principal Mediterranean seapower. As part of this ambition, descents 
were considered as an instrument for destroying shipping in the southern as well as the 
northern ports. More importantly, when in 1695 after the main fleet had wintered in the 
Mediterranean for the first time, descents were perceived as a means of intervening in the war 
on the Iberian peninsula, and, in particular, at Catalonia, where the Duc de Noailles's army 
had made significant gains against the Spanish and was threatening the region's principal 
town - Barcelona. " 
This section will therefore consider the historical evolution of the alternative context 
in which to assess the descents undertaken by England in Europe during the Nine Years War. 
Necessarily such an approach will require an explication of the planning and preparation - 
even if operations were abandoned - which should throw some light upon their administrative 
control and, thus, help establish the credentials of descents as amphibious warfare. The 
corollary of this bureaucratic focus will be an indication of the level of political support for, 
and perception about, these combined operations. If, as conjectured above, it is possible to 
describe descents as handmaidens of the separate continental and maritime strategies and not 
as an independent war-winning strategy, then Childs's interpretation of such operations 
would seem to be open to question. 
111ji: The Planned Descents on the Northern French Coastline, 1691-1693. 
Symcox, The Crisis ofFrench Sea Power 1688-1697, pp. 3-4,6-8,169-77. 
'* Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, ii. 420-65; Gradish, 'The Establishment of British Seapower in the 
Mediterranean', pp. 1-9; Ehrman, 'William III and the Emergence of a Mediterranean Naval Policy', pp. 268- 
92; Childs, 'Secondary Operations of the British Army', pp. 74-80. 
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The claim that the planned descents of the early 1690s resulted only from the King providing 
'greluctant lip service to the idea"' sits oddly beside William's expressed interest in such 
projects even before Ireland was conquered. In February 1691, the Allied Conference held at 
The Hague, discussed proposals for a descent into France; and, although William was then 
sceptical about the plan's practicalities, within four months he ordered that preparations be 
begun. This change of mind was partly because Secretary Nottingham kept the proposal on 
the executive Council's agenda, despite Sydney's representations of the King's initial 
reluctance; but, more importantly, Ginkel's successful start to the 1691 Irish campaign at 
Galway and Aughrim, raised the prospect that troops might soon be spared for service 
elsewhere. Rather than ship them immediately to Flanders, the King was willing to deploy 
them in a descent. 
Despite William's order and Nottingham's claim that the Council was working on the 
project, no detailed planning was undertaken and only Danby in consultation with Leinster 
and other French Huguenots put forward any firm proposals. Their ideas for descents on the 
River Gironde or on the Non-nandy coast accorded with the arguments that Littleton put 
forward in his pamphlet regarding the military benefits which could accrue from such an 
attack; but, as the summer lengthened, preparations had still not begun. By August, Sydney's 
representations that the King was lukewarm about the idea due to the lateness of the season 
and his desire for a naval action, were gaining credit. William's reputed coolness was 
probably a consequence of the military momentum in Ireland stalling once again in front of 
Limerick's walls, ensuring that there would be no earlier release of soldiers from that theatre; 
and, as the siege dragged through to the autumn, it was indeed becoming too late in the 
season. All residual hope that the project might be advanced was extinguished in early 
October when Nottingham told Ginkel to expect that on the conclusion of the peace treaty in 
Ireland many of the soldiers would be transferred to Flanders. " 
Nonetheless, in early spring of the following year, the idea of a descent on the 
northern French coast was firmly back on the war policy agenda. A memorandum sent by 
11 Childs, The British Army of William III, p. 217. 
12 HMC, Finch MSS, iii. 17-18,98-9,128-9,140-1,165,182-4,188,191,202-3,28l, 397,402: Nottingham 
to the Urd President [Carmarthen], 17 Feb. 1691; Nottingham to Portland, 5 June 1691; Nottingham to 
Sydney, 26 June, 31 July 1691; Sydney to Nottingham, 6,20 July, 3 Aug. 1691; Nottingham to Ginkel, 28 
July, 6 Oct. 1691; Nottingham to Russell, 29 July 1691; Russell to [Nottingham], II Aug. 1691; Minutes of 
the Committee, or Cabinet Council, appointed to advise the Queen during the King's absences from England, 
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Nottingham to Blathwayt on 3 March, noted that a descent would take place towards the end 
of May and that some 20 English and Dutch infantry battalions along with a couple of English 
regiments of horse and one of Dragoons would comprise the land force. Along with other 
details on the transportation arrangements for the collection of these troops and the artillery 
train, the memorandum revealed that the King had spoken only to the prospective 
commanders - Admiral Russell, the Duke of Leinster and the Earl of Galway - about the plan. 
The fact that the King had kept other senior courtiers in the dark probably contributed to the 
proposal's lack of political support when it was presented to the Cabinet Council advising 
Queen Mary following William's departure to the European continent for the 1692 campaign. 
Indeed, Godolphin, and a coterie of like-minded colleagues, managed to hold up the 
preparations until the King provided further evidence of his intentions in the matter. 
However, even when this was received, the operation's organisation continued to suffer delay 
when in mid-April the Council's attention was diverted to preparing the nation's defence 
against an imminent French invasion on behalf of the exiled King James. 13 
The death of Louis XIV's War Minister, Louvois, in 1691 had removed from 
Versailles the principal bulwark against French policy focusing upon a Jacobite restoration, 
and, consequently, the French King was persuaded to sponsor another attempt by James to 
reclaim his kingdoms. In early 1692, the French Channel and Mediterranean fleets - save for 
a 35-strong squadron which was to winter in the Mediterranean - had been combined in the 
Channel under the Comte de Tourville, while a sizeable expeditionary force was collected 
along the Normandy coast. However, its organisation proved slow and it was not complete 
when London became aware, through captured papers, of the French plans. To preserve the 
preparations completed to date, Tourville was positively ordered to engage the Anglo-Dutch 
fleet commanded by Russell that had been dispatched from England to intercept. Under the 
gaze of King James standing on the cliffs above, the two fleets clashed off Cape La Hogue on 
19 May and, after five days of fighting, Russell had not only defeated Tourville but had also 
23 June, 28 July 1691; HMC, Finch MSS, iv, p. x; Browning, Thomas Osborne, ii. 202-6: Carmarthen to [the 
King], IS July, 28 Aug. 169 1. 
13 IfMC, Finch MSS, iv, no. 32, p. 18-19: Memorial for Mr. Blathw[ayt], 3 Mar. 1692; NMM, SOU/I 3, unf 
Nottingham to Blathwayt, 19,21 Apr., 6,17,24 May 1692; [Blathwayt] to'My Lord' [Nottingham], 9,19,22 
May 1692 [NS]; IL Horwitz, Revolution Poliliks: The Career ofDaniel Finch Second Earl offollingham, 
1647-1730 (Cambridge, 1968), p. 130. 
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destroyed much of the inftastructure for the invasion force. 14 John Ehrman implies that the 
idea of a descent on the Normandy coast arose from the subsequent deliberations as to how 
best the victory at La Hogue might be followed up. 15 However, as has been shown, the idea 
in general had been current ah-nost since the start of the war and, more specifically, a proposal 
had already been agreed upon for 1692. Undoubtedly, though, Russell's victory provided an 
impetus to the preparations begun by Nottingham in late March. 
Prior to the invasion emergency, it was Admiral Russell who had in fact proposed a 
specific target for the descent - St Malo. Admittedly, his selection was based on the 
assumption that it would force the French to a sea engagement but, immediately following La 
Hogue, he remained convinced that a landing should still be effected around that area of the 
Normandy coast, believing that it would most effectively capitalise upon the current French 
vulnerability. Significantly, however, he implied that for this opportunity to be grasped the 
descent force would have to be ready forthwith. 16 As Russell was returning to Spithead, the 
Cabinet Council resolved to dispatch three of its members - Portland, Rochester and Sydney 
- along with Galway, to meet with the Admiral and Leinster at Portsmouth so that a specific 
target might be determined upon. From the - albeit limited - extant evidence of the meeting, 
it would seem that no resolution on the projected descent's objective was arrived at and that, 
instead, it was agreed that the fleet should reconnoitre the coast to determine the current 
disposition of the remaining French naval forces. Francis Bickley rightly concludes that this 
decision reflected the land force's current lack of readiness. 17 Leinster's efforts in this respect 
had been frustrated by the delays in bringing troops from Ireland and by the measures effected 
to combat the invasion threat; while a general lack of funding had also undermined his 
organisation. Further problems threatened in June moreover when the Duke faced a recall 
demand by William for those horse regiments initially detailed to be transported to Flanders 
but which had remained behind to form Part of the descent force. It was only as a result of 
14 Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, pp. 393-7; Harding, Seapower andNaval Warfare 1650-1830, 
pp. 154-5; Churchill, Marlborough, i. 338-41. 
Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, pp. 399-400. 
HMC, FinchMSS, iv, nos. 255,287,349,361, pp. 1334,152-3,183-4,189-90: Russell toNottingham, 9, 
13,25,27 May 1692. 
17 IIMC, Finch MSS, iv, nos. 350,357,367, pp. xxxi, 185,188,193-4: Nottingham to Russell, 26 May 1692, 
Nottingham to Blathwayt, 27 May 1692; Council of Flag Officers, 30 May 1692; Ehrman, The Navy in the 
Irar of William III, pp. 399-400. 
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Nottingham's entreaties that this was averted. 18 There was no doubt however that William 
was becoming annoyed at the inertia of an operation that he had initially outlined in March 
and, through Blathwayt, he demanded a more specific explanation as to what was currently 
proposed 'than by the Generall words of a Descent'19 
Although there seemed to be an - albeit unexpressed - consensus that St Malo would 
be the target, Nottingham could barely reply to the King in any accurate detail. Moreover, by 
July, Russell began to set his whole face against the enterprise. Following the meeting with 
the three members of the Cabinet Council at the end of May, the Admiral had undertaken a 
fiirther reconnaissance voyage and had concluded that the coastline was too dangerous for 
the larger rates and that, in general, St Malo was not a practicable target as the season 
progressed. Given the time and political currency he had expended in trying to bring the plan 
to fruition, Nottingham was concerned with Russell's increasing intransigence. He therefore 
sought to regain the Admiral's support for the venture but, at this important juncture, the 
Secretary's correspondence did not prove sufficiently tactful. By suggesting that Russell 
would not want to leave himself open to the charge that he had failed to do everything 
possible to make the descent plan work, it seemed to the Admiral that Nottingham was not 
only criticising his actions to date but also probably preparing the political ground for him to 
be blamed for any subsequent failure. Accelerated by their political differences - Nottingham 
was a High Church Tory and Russell a Whig - relations between the two men quickly 
deteriorated to the detriment of the descent plan. With little contribution from Leinster, the 
debate as to whether the descent was to proceed and, if so, what its target should be 
continued throughout July without resolution. 20 
Towards the end of the month, Leinster completed the embarkation of the troops and 
the transports weighed to fall in with the fleet as it sailed up the Channel from Torbay. With 
both component parts of the descent force now together, and with the Queen having 
specifically recommended to Russell that the operation should be deployed to bum St Maio in 
addition to considering the possibility of an attack on Brest given that intelligence had just 
indicated that a number of French vessels had proceeded to that port, Nottingham might have 
Is Horwitz, Revolution Polifiks, p. 13 1; IIMC, Finch MSS, iv, nos. 433, pp. 228-9: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 
13/23 June 1692; NMM, SOU/13, unf.: Nottingham to 'Sir' [Blathwayt], 22 June 1692; [Blathwayt] to 'My 
Lord' [Nottingham], 2 June, 7 July 1692 [NS]. 
'9 NMM, SOU/I 3, unE: [Blathwayt] to 'My Lord' [Nottingham], 7 July 1692 [NS]. 
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anticipated action. However, on 28 July, ajoint service Council of War aboard the Bredah 
concluded that it was not practicable to attack St Maio and, further, that it was too late in the 
year to make any attempt against Brest or Rochefort, which had also been previously 
canvassed as a target. Russell's influence over this decision was evident from the long letter 
he wrote to Nottingham following the Council in which he justified its resolutions in some 
detail. Moreover, doubtless guided by the Admiral, the Council was not minded to after its 
decision when Russell received the Queen's recommendation regarding the burning of St 
Maio. Strictly, the Council had not disobeyed the Queen inasmuch as she had not issued a 
direct order, but its resolutions were clearly clear contrary to her wishes and, perhaps as an 
attempt to soften its attitude, the Council agreed that the fleet would put in at St Helens 
where it could be kept together, ready to consider any commands from the Queen. In an 
attempt to resolve this deadlock between the wishes of the Court and the Ministry on one 
side, and those of the descent commanders on the other, Nottingham and the available 
members of the Cabinet Council - Carmarthen, Devonshire, Dorset, Rochester, Sidney and 
Comwaillis - travelled to Portsmouth at the beginning of August to meet with Russell and the 
other senior commanders. Nonetheless, at their meeting with the Council of War, the 
politicians were not able to Prevail with the servicemen to undertake an attack against St 
Maio or indeed anywhere else on the Normandy or Brittany coasts. 21 As Nottingham 
laconically reported to Portland, the Cabinet Council members returned to London having 
6t 22 succeeded in nothing that we designed . The projected descent against the Normandy 
coast, which had been current since early March, was now finally abandoned, though it was 
to comprise a celebrated Parliamentary contest between the Whigs and the Tories (the 
supporters of Russell and Nottingham, respectively) when the session opened in November. 23 
However, for the immediate future, attention was focused upon an alternative joint army-navy 
operation that the King had proposed just before the Normandy descent was given up. 
20 HMC, Finch MSS, iv, nos. 505,550, pp. xxxv, 270-1,299: Russell to Nottingham, 30 June 1692; 
Nottingham to Russell, 7 July 1692; Horwitz, Revolution Poliliks, pp. 131-2. 
21 HMC, Finch MSS, iv, nos. 622,635-7,639,643,649,655,664-5, pp. xxxv-xxxvi, 334,340-1,343-5,348- 
51,354,358-9: Meese to [Nottingham], 22,26 July 1692; Nottingham to Blathwayt, 26 July, I Aug. 1692; 
Nottingham to Russell, 26 July, I Aug. 1692; The Queen to Russell, 26 July 1692; Leinster to Nottingham, 28 
July 1692, and enclosure, (i) Resolution at a council of war; Russell to Nottingham, 29,30 July 1692, and 
enclosure, (i) Resolution at a council of war, 30 July 1692; NMM, SOU/14, unf.: Nottingham to Blathwayt, 1, 
3 Aug. 1692 
22 HMC, Finch MSS, iv, no. 682, p. 369: Nottingham to Portland, 5 Aug. 1692. 
23 See pp. 150-1 below. 
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William's target was one of France's principal harbours for privateers and the most 
northerly point of the frontier with the Spanish Netherlands - Dunkirk; but on this occasion 
the operation was not to be a seaborne descent, but rather two separate though co-ordinated 
attacks from the land and sea. The intended troops (save for some 200 Dragoons and the 
regiments of Foulkes and Hales, the latter two being designed for an overseas expedition to 
the West Indies) were currently part of the descent force with the fleet at St Helens. William 
planned to land them at Ostend or Nieuport whence they would march overland with 
reinforcements to attack the town of Dunkirk. Meanwhile, the fleet which had transported 
them would undertake a seaborne bombardment against its port. " 
Given the vacillation over the planned descents for the northern French coast the 
Dunkirk operation has perhaps with some justification been labelled as 'face-saving'. ', 
William did not however know for certain when he designed the operation that the descents 
against St Malo or Brest had been aborted, and, in fact, he made the Dunkirk assault 
conditional upon a final decision being taken to abandon operations. Although Blathwayt 
privately infortned Nottingham that the King anticipated their abandonment, that is not an 
argument that the Dunkirk project possessed no merit as a combined army and navy assault 
outside the context of operational failure elsewhere. " 
William had previously targeted Dunkirk in January as a first strike for the 1692 
campaign and it was probably only the fact that the French got wind of the design which 
caused it to be shelved. " Now, later in the year, William was returning to the project and 
hoped to make effective use of the military and naval resources brought together for the 
proposed northern coast descents. His commitment to the success of the venture - as 
opposed to just being seen to being doing something with the gathered forces - is illustrated 
21 HMC, Finch MSS, iv, nos. 646,680, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii, 345-6,368: The King to Nottingham, [28 JulyJ7 
Aug. 1691 and enclosure (i) Instructions to Col. Henry Withers, Adjutant General of Foot; The Queen to 
Leinster, 5 Aug. 1692; BL, Add. MSS 37991, fos. 135,146-7,1624: Nottingham to Blathwayt, 3 Aug. 1692; 
Blathwayt to Nottingham, 8,29 Aug. 1692. 
25 1 IMC, Finch MSS, iv, pp. xxxvii. 
26 See p. 147 n. 24 and HMC, Finch MSS, iv, no. 689, pp. 373-4: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 8 Aug. 1692 and 
enclosure (i) 'Memorandum: for the Earl of Nottingham'. 
27 NUL, PwA 1432, unf: 'A Project made in the Year 1692 to blow up the Forts and Castle of Dunkirk and 
ruine that Harbour'; BL, Add. MSS 61337, fos. 19-3 1: 'Memoire touchant le Siege de D% Fait au mois de 
janvier, 1692% Childs, The Nine Years War and the British Army 1688-1697, pp. 178,2 10 n. 1; Wolseley, 
The Life ofJohn Churchill, ii. 265-6; Churchill, Marlborough, i. 333-4,333 n. 8. Childs obliquely, and 
Wolseley directly, suggest that Marlborough was responsible for betraying the Dunkirk project to the French. 
Churchill, however, derides Wolseley's evidence for this charge but in the process makes the claim that the 
plan was not formulated until August -a view contrary to the manuscript source. 
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by the blanket of secrecy which he threw over details of the operation. Although William's 
adjutant - Colonel Withers who carried the details about the project to Nottingham - had 
Instructions which allowed for the service commanders to be briefed in full, it would seem 
that in the first instance this did not occur. Leinster did not know the exact target until he 
was landed at Ostend; and London - aside from select senior ministers - assumed that with the 
abandonment of the proposed descents, the troops were being transported to the Flanders 
theatre, albeit in the direction of Dunkirk. 28 
The early organisation of this enterprise contributed to the belief that William was 
only transferring troops. Based on the Instructions Withers had delivered to Nottingham, the 
Queen ordered Russell to detach a squadron of some eight men of war from his fleet at St 
Helens to convoy the transport ships with Leinster's troops on board and the auxiliary store 
vessels containing the large descent train to the Downs or Margaret Road where further 
orders were to be sent. Russell appointed Shovell to command this detachment, which 
included Dutch vessels; and, since only the Dragoons and the two regiments bound for the 
West Indies had to be disembarked, the squadron proceeded quickly up the Channel. Once at 
the Downs, the Instructions which Shovell and Leinster received from the King proved only a 
little more specific by informing them that the troops and war stores were to be landed at 
Ostend or Nieuport by 22 or 23 August. A separate Memorandum attached to the order 
anticipated a visit to the squadron by Withers to infort'n the two commanders of the King's 
orders but it remains unclearjust how much he revealed. At the Downs, sickness spread 
amongst the soldiers and in a tersely worded letter to Nottingham regarding the management 
of this problem, Leinster condemned the fact that he was still ignorant about how his troops 
were to be deployed. " 
The outbreak of disease proved not to be as serious as Leinster had represented and, 
although some men were put ashore, it did not hinder the squadron's passage across the 
Channel. The troops were in fact landed at Ostend in advance of the prescribed dates. It was 
2$ BL, Add. MSS 37991, fos. 1614: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 25 Aug. 1692; NUL, PwA 100 1 fos. 1-2: 
Carmarthen to Portland, 5 Aug. 1692; The Portledge Papers, pp. 144-5: Lapthorne to Coffin, 6,13,18,20 
Aug. 1692. 
29 HMC, FinchMSS, iv, nos. 679-80,690,704,726,741, pp. 368,374,380,393-4,401: The Queen to 
Russell, 5 Aug. 1692; The Queen to Leinster, 5 Aug. 1692; Shovell to Nottingham, 8 Aug. 1692; Blathwayt to 
Nottingham, 14/24 Aug. 1692 and enclosure (i) [The King] to the Commander of the squadron attending the 
transport ships and Memorandum; Leinster to Nottingham, 10,17 Aug. 1691; PRO, ADM 7/692, p. 53: 
Order to Sir Cloudesely Shovell, 6 Aug. 1692; BL, Add. MSS 37991, fos. 141-3: Nottingham to Blathwayt, 12 
Aug. 1692. 
149 
then that orders to march towards Dunkirk with the reinforcements of engineers were sent to 
Leinster, while Portland also visited him at Ostend to provide further explanation. " it is 
difficult to know exactly when Shovell was informed of the details that he was to lead his 
squadron against Dunkirk's port as one element of a combined attack on that town. As bomb 
vessels were initially ordered as part of his convoy along with pilots for the Flanders coast, 
and he was instructed to meet with Meester's 'Machine Vessels' if possible, " Shovell might 
have guessed more about the operation than Leinster. Or perhaps Withers was more candid 
with Shovell, though given Leinster's seniority and reputed closeness to the King that seems 
unlikely. Shovell probably received more detailed instructions at the same time as Lcinster 
given that he then wrote briefly to Nottingham about the squadron's disposal for the attack 
upon which Blathwayt later expanded. This correspondence revealed that the Dutch Admiral 
Evertsen would lead a detachment of smaller vessels inshore to bombard the harbour and 
explode some of Meester's 'Machines', while Shovell would remain outside with the larger 
ships to combat any sea based opposition or relief" 
In the event, neither commander acted upon his orders. A week after Portland's 
meeting with Leinster at Ostend, the troops were only encamped just eastwards at Veume 
whence Leinster marched south easterly to Dixmonde, instead of pressing forward due west 
to attack Dunkirk. Shovell for his part struggled offshore with poor weather which prevented 
his well boats from tracking the army as it marched. This was a necessary task to ensure a 
co-ordinated assault but which anyhow would have become impossible when Leinster turned 
his troops towards the interior. " Blathwayt's insouciance in reporting home Leinster's 
actions by claiming that he was preparing winter quarters to the allies' advantage perhaps 
reflected his hitherto low expectations of the enterprise, but it obscures the reasons why 
Dunkirk was no longer the immediate target. Furthermore, the Secretary-at-War failed to 
30 HMC, Finch MSS, iv, nos. 742,767,788, pp. xxxvii, 402,411,421-2: Atkinson to Nottingham, 17 Aug. 
1692; Shovell to Nottingham, 22 Aug. 1692; Portland to [Nottingham], 26 Aug. [1692]; BL, Add. MSS 
3799 1, f0s. 1614: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 25,29 Aug. 1692. 
"'Machine vessels' were small ships containing explosive 'machines' (which Ehrman, The Navy in the War 
of William III, p. 573, compares to modern depth charges) with a firing device which could be set to explode 
once the vessel had been towed inshore and ideally placed alongside the intended target. Meester was a Dutch 
artillery officer at the forefront of the vessel's development during the 1690s, though his Machines were utter 
&ilures in all respects. For a history of the 'Machine Vessel' both before and after Meester's versions see 
E. W. IL Fyers, 'The Story of Machine Vessels'MMA (1925), 50-90. 
32 f IMC, Finch MSS, iv, no. 785, p. 420: Shovell to Nottingham, 26 Aug. 1692; BL, Add. MSS 3799 1, f0s. 
1624: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 29 Aug. 1692. 
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elaborate when the orders for the embarkation of Leinster's troops were issued in mid- 
September having contended that the occupation of Veume and Dixrnonde was all that the 
General could achieve. Portland and Cambon, after visiting Leinster at Ostend, had reported 
difficulties with the proposed attack, though no specific details were offered. Thus, aside 
from the increasing lateness of the season and the bad weather hampering the co-ordination of 
the naval and military attacks, there is little else to suggest why the assault on Dunkirk was 
dropped. "' Bickley's positive conclusion that unlike the earlier planned descents, the venture 
against Dunkirk had at least been begun, misrepresents the nature of the planned combined 
operation. " As previously noted, it was not to be a seabome descent but a co-ordinated 
attack from the land and sea; thus, although the landing of the troops at Ostend was a 
necessary prerequisite for the attack, it did not mark its beginning. That event was forestalled 
by Shovell's squadron being beaten off the coast and more importantly, by Leinster marching 
to Dixmonde. The combined operation against Dunkirk had been abandoned just like the 
other descents against the northern French coast. 
It might be reckoned a measure of William's commitment to descents as part of his 
war policy that despite the experiences of the previous year his speech at the opening of the 
parliamentary session in November 1692, indicated his intent to mount a larger descent as 
part of the forthcoming campaign. "' Although Parliament first began picking over the traces 
of the previous summer's failed attempts which developed to become a celebrated contest in 
apportioning blame between the Tory and Whig supporters of Nottingham and Russell, " 
preparations for another descent were begun at the turn of the year. Neither Russell nor 
Nottingham emerged with much credit from the Parliamentary deliberations but it was the 
Admiral whom the King decided to replace for the forthcoming campaign by refusing to 
accede to Russell's threat to resign if he had to receive orders from Nottingham. In Russell's 
33 BL, Add. MSS 37991, fos. 159-60,165-6: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 1,8 Sept. 1692; HMC, Finch MSS, iv, 
no. 839, p. 448: Shovell to Nottingham, 7 Sept. 1692. 
34 BL, Add. MSS 37991, fos. 159-60,164-6: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 1,5,8 Sept. 1692; HMC, FinchUSS, 
iv, nos. 847,855, pp. 453-4,457-8: Blathwayt to Nottingham, 12,15 Sept. 1692. 
35 HMC, Finch MSS, iv, p. xxxviii. 
36 Cobbctt, Parliamentary Ifistory of England, V. 707. 
31 The Commons debates on the descents and the naval campaign of 1692 can be followed in Grcy, Debates of 
the liouse of Commons, x. 243-8,252,263-79,291-6 and in 7he Parliamentary Diary ofNarcissus Luttrell, 
1691-1693, ed. H. Horwitz (Oxford, 1972), pp. 218-19,220-4,239-41,271-7,294-6,310,329-33. The 
papers submitted during these debates can be found in CJ x. 714-23,749-5 9. H. Horwitz, Parliament, Policy 
and Politics in the Reign of William III (Manchester, 1977), pp. 104-22, 
is a detailed secondary account of the 
Parliamentary proceedings. 
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place, a triple commission of Killigrew, Delavall, and Shovell was appointed to command the 
fleet in a similar manner to Killigrew, Ashby, and Haddock in 1690. To the relief of Russell's 
defenders, however, Nottingham did suffer a reverse in March when the King completed 
some ministerial changes to the Whigs' advantage in an attempt to build a majority in 
Parliament. Two such changes were to move Nottingham to the Southern Department, and 
to appoint the implacable Whig, Sir John Trenchard, to the second secretaryship of state 
which had lain vacant since Shrewsbury's departure. Although it had been Nottingham's 
suggestion that the post be filled to ease his administrative burdens, Trenchard would 
certainly not have been his preferred choice. " 
In addition to his new appointment as Secretary for the Northern Department, 
Trenchard assumed responsibility for naval affairs and consequently for the co-ordination of 
the preparations for the descent. Deliberations by the Admiralty and Cabinet Council before 
and after the King's departure for the continent resolved upon Brest as the target for 1693. 
Specifically, the aim was to destroy the French fleet commanded by Tourville which had 
congregated in the port after La Hogue, and thus to prevent its conjunction with d'Estrdes's 
squadron based at Toulon. The exact disposition for the attack was to be left to a Council of 
War called by the Admirals for on this occasion no general officer was appointed to command 
the five regiments which were ordered to comprise the land force. " Not all ministers 
supported the project and those at the Treasury in particular complained about what they 
calculated to be the disproportionate costs to the prospective benefits of the enterprise. " 
Despite these doubts, Blathwayt represented that William was sufficiently relaxed about the 
estimated f. 55 000 cost of the expedition to apportion a further E22 000; while the secretary 
also reported that the King believed 'something considerable' could be undertaken at Brest. 41 
The destruction of the enemy fleet in the port was contingent upon the descent being 
undertaken early in the season before the French put to sea. Preparations were pushed 
forward at Portsmouth, and the regiments were quickly moved to camps in Sussex and 
around Winchester in Hampshire where supplies were more plentiful and convenient than the 
38 Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, pp. 409-13; Horwitz, Revolution Politicks, pp. 135-41; 
Horwitz, Parliament, Policy and Politics, pp. 109,114-1 S. 
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alternative camp at Hounslow Heath. Moreover, it was also thought that the congregation of 
the troops at those places was sufficiently close to Portsmouth to alarm the French with the 
prospect of an imminent embarkation if they spied the soldiers' movements. Only the 
confusion over the amount of bedding to be provided by the Admiralty for the soldiers on 
board the fleet and a debate which arose over the authority of naval Captains to discipline the 
troops when on board caused delay. These matters were however in the process of being 
clarified when the order was issued at the beginning of May for the Admirals to embark the 
soldiers. "' 
It has been claimed that no embarkation took place and, indeed, that the descent upon 
Brest was dropped as the Admirals were ordered in late May to provide additional escort to 
the outgoing Smyrna convoy - the Levant fleet of merchantmen which Vice-Admiral Rooke 
in command of a squadron of fifteen warships had been ordered to escort in January 1691"1 
Delays had prevented its departure and on hearing in May that Tourville had left Brest to join 
d'Estr6es to attempt an ambush of the convoy, William thought it prudent that Rooke leave 
immediately. The Cabinet Council however appreciated that a quick departure was unlikely 
and suggested instead that the main fleet should also accompany the convoy. "' This did not 
mean that the descent had been abandoned, though. Blathwayt had previously confided to 
Nottingham the King's desire that any measures taken for the Mediterranean trade should not 
hinder the project of the descent and when members of the Cabinet Council went to consult 
with the Admirals about the naval campaign, the assault upon Brest was still part of the 
agenda. Upon the orders to accompany Rooke being sent to the Admirals, two regiments 
were embarked and they were to be followed by a further two with the fifth (for an unknown 
reason) left ashore. Moreover, these orders only required the Admirals to accompany Rooke 
as far as they thought appropriate. This left them with both the discretion and opportunity to 
undertake the attack on Brest, although the intelligence that Tourville had left the harbour 
negated the original objective. " This intelligence was however unconfirmed (Tourville did 
42 NMM, SOU/14, unf: [Blathwayt] to Nottingham, 27 Apr. 1693; PRO, ADM 3/8, unpaginated. Board 
Minutes, 9,10,22,25 May 1693; PRO, ADM 7/694, pp. 41,53-5,67-8,72-4,77-80,82,92-4: Order to the 
Admirals, 4,10 May 1693; the Admiralty to the Admirals, 10,23,24,30 May 1693; the Admirals to'Rt 
Honble', 18,22,24 May 1693. 
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not leave Brest until the end of May)" and on their departure with the Smyrna convoy, the 
expectation was that the Admirals would seek an opportunity to assault Brest. 
That opportunity did nonetheless fail to present itself throughout the summer. After 
initially deciding that the main fleet would accompany Rooke's squadron thirty leagues past 
Ushant, the Admirals decided to continue on for a fiirther twenty. This reflected their lack of 
intelligence on the movements of the French fleet and much of the early part of the summer 
was spent trying to guess where Tourville and d'Estrdes might be. To begin with, the 
Admirals believed that the Toulon squadron had put into Brest, though it was not until Rooke 
had departed that the earlier reconnaissance of Brest harbour was followed up. This 
confirmed that it was empty and the Admirals then turned their attentions to a fruitless search 
for Tourville in the immediate vicinity. In the event, Tourville had sailed south to join 
d'Estrdes to effect the ambush of the Smyrna convoy which they achieved in Lagos Bayjust 
round from Cape Vincent on 17 June. " 
Although it was towards the end of August when the Council of War officially 
abandoned the descent on Brest due to the lateness of the season, in reality it was the earlier 
confirmation that its harbour was empty which had sounded the death knell of the descent. 
Unable then to prevent the joining of the French squadrons, the descent was rendered 
functionally irrelevant as an aspect of the naval strategy. This was confirmed when the 
additional provisions prepared for the assault were apportioned to alternative services soon 
after the June reconnaissance; while at the beginning of July, the field officers were set ashore 
and the artillery train and the auxiliary transports vessels were discharged. "' As London had 
become increasingly concerned for the security of Rooke's squadron, the main fleet was 
ordered to set out to his aid. Lack of provisions and poor weather however prevented the 
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fleet from sailing before word came through of the ambush. Thereafter, it continued cruising 
in the Soundings until the Admirals' requests that the ships be laid up for the winter were 
granted at the beginning of September. Within a month the Admirals were given leave to 
come up to London to face the gathering political storm on the destruction of the Smyrna 
convoy. For the third year in succession, a descent had been prepared as a significant part of 
the King's war strategy only for it to be abandoned as other circumstances demanded more 
immediate attention. This type of combined operation would nonetheless be back on the war 
agenda in the following year; and it would then actually go ahead. 
ITUH: The Descent on Brest, 8 June 1694. and the Subseguent Proposals for 
Descents on the Northern French Coastline. 
Two years on from the publication of his 1691 pamphlet proposing a descent on the French 
coast, Littleton wrote a sequel. "' In this he criticised the descent projects undertaken over the 
past two years for being either raids, or grandiose invasion ventures aimed to capture an 
enemy stronghold. The first he considered morally reprehensible and the second false 
economy in terms of men and resources. Littleton's ideal descent would instead aspire to 
scize a weak point on the enemy coast, fortify it and then maintain a small garrison. This 
would cost England little and, with the majority of troops re-embarked to attend to other 
descents, several footholds could be created along the enemy coast, thereby critically 
stretching their resources. In terms of purpose, the emphasis was on the strategic priority of 
establishing a second front upon enemy territory rather than on capturing an enemy town or 
port for immediate tactical reasons. It is unclear whether Littleton would have approved of 
William's determination to assault Brest in 1694 in order to prevent the French squadron 
based there from leaving for the Mediterranean and joining with the Toulon squadron to raise 
the prospect that the combined fleet might wreck the havoc on English trade it had the 
previous year. At one level this descent would be the tactical capture of Brest to destroy the 
harbour and the ships anchored within. At another level, it would be the implementation of 
William's developing ambitions that England be the principal power in the Mediterranean. As 
this would establish intervention on another front (albeit one projected from the sea), the 
descent's strategic credentials must also be recognised. 
49E. Littleton, The Descent Upon France Considered; In a Letter to a Member oftarliament (London, 
1693). 
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As a follow-on from the failures in 1693, a decision in principle to attack Brest in 
1694 was taken during the winter of 1693-4 and not, as Professor Childs contends, in the 
spring of 1694. A rendezvous was &ed for the fleet at the Downs at the beginning of March; 
however it was mid-April before this was completed, and by then events in the Mediterranean 
during the early months of the year had forced a rethink of the plan. " At the end of 
November 1693, Rear-Admiral Wheler, recently returned from his fruitless expedition to the 
West Indies and North America, had been sent to the Straits with a squadron to convoy trade 
and provide succour to the Spanish along their Mediterranean coastline. In February 
Wheler's squadron was caught in a violent storm as it made its way through to the Middle 
Sea and the Rear-Admiral went down with his ship along with five other vessels. Although 
the remainder of the squadron made it into Gibraltar Bay, England was now without any 
effective naval presence in the Mediterranean either to pressurise the French in that theatre or 
- and more importantly in the City's opinion - to provide protection for trade. " It now 
seemed imperative that the French fleets should not combine and the Instructions issued on 
24 April to the re-appointed Admiral of the Fleet and newly appointed head of the Admiralty 
commissioners, Edward Russell, anticipated that he might have to chase the French Brest 
fleet south to prevent such a juncture if it had quit Brest before an assault could be mounted. " 
The political fall-out in the autumn from the Smyrna convoy ddbdcle had claimed 
Nottingham as its principal victim and abused the two obviously Tory admirals of the joint 
command - Delavall and Killegrew - more than Shovell, thus marking another milestone on 
William's political journey away from mixed-ministries to his mid-decade reliance upon the 
Whigs. Russell, therefore, largely owed his appointments not just to the failures of the joint 
commanding Admirals but to the increasing political ascendancy of the Whigs with whom he 
was identified. " It was certainly not due to his commitment to descents about which he had 
been unenthusiastic in 1692; and now, on receiving his Instructions of 24 April, he began to 
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question their feasibility in correspondence with the Duke of Shrewsbury, who in March had 
returned to the Ministry as Secretary for the Northern Department. "' 
Russell's principal criticism that chasing the French fleet southwards could not be 
undertaken in conjunction with a descent on Brest was based on a misinterpretation of his 
orders. As part of William's strategy, the priority of the Instructions of 24 April was to stop 
the Brest fleet from entering the Mediterranean to combine with the Toulon fleet: the assault 
on Brest harbour and the chase were merely possible options to that end, depending upon the 
current intelligence of the enemy's whereabouts. " Russell's error was understandable, for the 
idea that both options would be pursued was driven by the administrative preparations of the 
descent which, having suffered an early delay, continued independently of the refinement of 
the Instructions upon fresh intelligence altering the operational context. 
Although late and with many of the seamen unpaid, Russell's fleet had managed to 
assemble at Spithead by the end of April. There was however still no sign of the auxiliary 
store ships, the artillery train, nor indeed of the ten infantry battalions which were to comprise 
the land force for the descent. "' The senior English general, Thomas Tollemache, " had been 
appointed to command these troops in mid-April, but it was the beginning of May before they 
had encamped at Portsdown Hill above Portsmouth. Nearly a fortnight later on II May, 
Tollemache announced that they were ready to embark but by then Russell had taken those 
ships in the fleet which had been paid upon a reconnaissance mission, and this confirmed the 
departure of the French fleet under the command of Chfiteaurenault from Brest harbour - 
presumably bound for the Mediterranean. Russell was furious that the descent force had been 
delayed, for Brest was then seen to be weakly defended by only the town's militia and a 
couple of regular infantry companies. The Master-General of the Ordnance - Lord Sydney 
-" Private and Original Correspondence of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury [hereafter Shrewsbury 
Correspondence], ed. W. Coxe (London, 1821), p. 192: Russell to Shrewsbury, 3 May 1694. 
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was the main target of his ire, being labelled by the Admiral a 'driveller'. " Again, with the 
preparations for the descent force continuing in his absence, Russell had assumed that the 
descent on Brest had an additional objective to preventing the French fleet's departure. 
Shrewsbury's correspondence with the Admiral showed that he shared this assumption, 
although significantly, before Russell's return from his reconnaissance, the Secretary went 
beyond the April Instructions to outline a possible scenario which envisaged both an attack on 
Brest and the fleet sailing south. The suggestion was that if the French fleet had left the 
harbour, then Russell would lead a squadron to the Mediterranean in pursuit, but that the 
detachment which would have to be left behind to guard the Narrow Seas could undertake 
the descent. Upon hearing that Brest harbour was empty the King's reaction was almost 
exactly along these lines. "' The descent was now being uncoupled from the policy of 
preventing a conjunction of the two French squadrons. It stood independently as an assault 
to destroy Brest harbour and any ship contained within. Admittedly, the possible strategic 
benefits which might accrue both in the Channel and the Mediterranean from knocking out 
France's principal northern port were not explained, leaving the operation vulnerable to the 
charge that it was purposeless. " 
To an extent, the administrative organisation of the descent force had already 
prepared the ground for a refinement of the orders contingent upon the new independence of 
the operation. During May, as Trenchard laboured to expedite the preparations, a warrant for 
the embarkation of the troops aboard the ships left by Russell at Spithead under Shovell's 
command directed Tollemache to consult with the Admiral on how best the force might be 
used for 'annoying the enemy'. " No mention was made of the descent's previous purpose as 
one option for preventing the egress of the French fleet, though equally it was not specifically 
stated that Brest was to be targeted regardless. That clarification only came some weeks 
after Russell had concluded his reconnaissance when, on 29 May, Lord Berkeley, who was to 
command the Channel squadron that was now to be detached from Russell's main fleet, was 
given a squadron list along with a set of Instructions: these clearly directed Berkeley 
53 NMM, SOU/2, fos. 211-14: Trenchard to Blathwayt, II May 1694; PRO, SP 44/167, p. 212: Order to 
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undertake the descent upon Brest, though a Council of War was to decide the actual plan of 
attack " 
On 31 May, after Russell had brought his ships up from Torbay (where he had put in 
after his reconnaissance mission) to Spithead and the two squadrons had weighed to sail 
down the Channel, a Council was convened aboard Russell's flagship the Brilannia. 
Probably because the only access to Brest and its harbour was through a tight channel called 
the Goulet, the Council decided against a direct attack and instead resolved to land the troops 
at Camaret Bay on the shore line of the Roscanvel Peninsula. This was the southern of two 
bays (Bertheaume Bay being the other to the north on the shore of the Plateau du Uon) 
which flanked the entrance to the Goulet, and, if the peninsula could be secured. then 
batteries might be established not only to bombard Brest but also to provide cover fire for the 
fleet as it proceeded up the Goulet to conduct its own bombardment of the harbour. "' 
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Fig 11: The Descent on Brest. 
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In formulating this plan the Council was not wholly ignorant about the potential 
opposition which might be encountered. Intelligence had come through that Louis XIV had 
dispatched his celebrated engineer, Vauban, to Brest and that he was busily improving its 
defences and those on the attendant coastline; while there had also been reports of significant 
numbers of French foot and horse being transferred to the region. Childs points to a series of 
'Letters from Brest' mentioned in the London Gazette of 4 June which mention specifically 
trenches and extensive batteries, and upwards of 9000 troops in the area; he questions why - 
given that Tollemache was in receipt of at least one of these letters before sailing - the 
operation was not called off? Only recklessness or a sense of confidence that the force was 
sufficient to combat the French can provide the answer. 64 
The two squadrons had sailed together for just less than a week when, on 5 June, they 
parted upon their respective missions. " Once Berkeley had brought his Anglo-Dutch fleet of 
some 29 warships, fireships, bomb and machine vessels safely round the ile d'Ouessant, he 
called a Council of War. This upheld the principal resolutions of 31 May regarding the 
landing site at Camaret Bay and the subsequent progress of the fleet through the Goulet, but 
it considerably refined the landing disposition. The Monck and the Dutch frigate, the 
Damiaten, were to engage Vauban's recently built redoubt at the bay as the troops landed; a 
naval Lieutenant was to command each landing boat; and Major-General Lord Cutts secured 
agreement that not only should 600 grenadiers land as a vanguard but that 50 of them should 
initially be put ashore to assess the strength of the enemy entrenchments. Lastly, the Council 
expressed its intent to land that evening or at least for the squadron to stand as far into the 
bay as circumstances would allow. 
64 PRO, SP 44/205, pp. 131-2: Trenchard to Russell, 24 May 1694, and enclosure 'Extract of a letter from Mr 
Wolscly', 16126 May 1694; CSPD, 1694-1695, p. 155: Trenchard to Russell, 28 May 1694, and enclosure 
'Extract of a letter from Paris', 28 May 1694 [NS]; CSPD, 1695, p. 258: Newsletter addressed to the Earl of 
Derwentwater, at Newcastle-on-Tyne, 24 May 1694; Tollemache Family Archives 716, unf.: 'An Account of 
the Proceedings of the Brest Expedition in Vindication of the Aspertions Thrown Upon His Excellencie 
Lieutenant-General Tolmach'; Childs, The British Army of William III, p. 228; London Gazette, No. 2983, 
11-14 June 1694. 
65 The ensuing account of the descent upon Brest is based on the following primary sources and secondary 
authorities: Carmarthen, A Journal ofthe Brest FExpedition, pp. 9-34; BL, Add MSS 61264, fos. 9-12: 'Report 
of Descent on Brest'; Tollemache, 77re Tollemaches, pp. 78-80: 'Volunteer with Lt. -Gen. Talmach in the 
Expedition to Brest, Given this 15th June 1694% Tollemache Family Archives 716 unf.: 'An Account of the 
Proceedings of the Brest Expedition'; 'The Attempt on Brestý 1694', in The Naval Miscellany, ii. ed. Sir John 
Knox Laughton (London, 1910), pp. 202-5; HMC, PortlandMSS, viii. 41-2: 'Engagement in Camarett Bay'; 
NMM, SOU13, fos. 35-7: 'My Lords Cutts His Account of the Attempt at Brest', 9 June 1694; PRO, SP 42/3, 
fos. 522-5: Berkeley to Trenchard, 9 June 1694; A. le Moyne de ]a Borderie, Ifistoire de Bretagne (Rennes, 
1972), v. 565-7; G. Gustave-Toudouze, Monsieur de Vauban (Paris, 1954), pp. 103-40. 
160 
Several auxiliary vessels and even some ships had fallen too far astern for any 
progress to be made on the night of 6n June and it was the following afternoon before the 
fleet anchored in the water between Camaret and Bertheaume bays. On coming to this 
anchorage, a shortening of the wind had forced the fleet upon a double tack, thus exposing it 
to fire from the batteries posted at both bays as well as those situated at the Point des Minoux 
and the Point des Filletes on the north and south sides of the Goulet. Fortunately, none of 
this ordnance struck home. Curiously though, Tollemache ignored the extent of this fire 
when, on returning from a reconnaissance of Camaret Bay, he reported that there were 
neither batteries nor trenches nearby and that with only Camaret fort presenting an obstacle, 
he predicted that the landing would take place without any opposition. Either on a separate 
survey mission or accompanying Tollemache (the sources are not clear on this point) the 
Marquess of Carmarthen and Cutts came to a different conclusion about the extent of the 
French defensive preparations. Returning to the flagship, they argued vigorously to Berkeley 
that additional ships be sent in with the two already designated to bombard the fort at 
Camaret Bay, so that fire might be directed against any enemy troops, which they believed 
would mount considerable opposition to the landing. In accordance with his Instructions, 
Berkeley referred these matters to the Council which was to assemble in the early hours of the 
following morning. 
Thick fog at first light on 8 June kept the signal for the Council unposted for some 
four hours, and when the cloud lessened, allowing the Council to meet, it also revealed 
several squadrons of enemy horse on the hills rising behind Camaret Bay. " Clearly the 
reconnaissance of Carmarthen and Cutts had been more keenly observed than Tollemache's 
efforts. More importantly, it underscored their argument for an increase in the naval 
detachment which would act as cover for the landing. Accordingly the Council resolved that 
an additional six vessels would follow the Monck and the Damiaten into the bay; and, upon 
offering, Carmarthen was given the task of positioning these latter two vessels first and then 
returning to lead in the remaining six. Meanwhile, the soldiers had been embarking in the 
landing boats in the previously agreed descent order by which Venner's regiment would 
follow the grenadiers on to the beach with the other battalions then descending in reinforcing 
sequential waves. 
66 The sources range from five to fourteen squadrons of enemy horse. 
161 
In the event, as the landing boats began to follow Carmarthen's detachment into the 
bay this order was lost - an inexcusable circumstance given that there was a naval commander 
in each boat and that the cahn weather should have made it easier to manoeuvre these small 
oared crafts. Conversely, the tranquil weather conditions made Carmarthen's task much 
harder. In the calm both the Monck and the Damiaten had to be towed into position which 
was not only a laborious and fmely balanced manoeuvre but it also caused a gap to open up 
between them and the other ships, now numbering only five as the Greenwich had failed to 
join the detachment. The two warships were exposed to a considerable bombardment from 
the west side of Camaret Bay and the Point des Filletes before they could either bring their 
broadside guns to bear or the other vessels arrived in support. Moreover, Carmarthen 
quickly appreciated that he faced a greater number of batteries - three emplacements with a 
total of fourteen guns around Camaret Church with another redoubt of up to six guns behind 
the fort - than even his reconnaissance had predicted, and that to combat this he would have 
to alter the naval detachment's position in the bay. Forced to visit each ship individually to 
communicate the new positions, critical time was lost as this inshore detachment failed to 
achieve any superiority over the shore defences still less establish an effective fire support for 
the beach landing. 
The extent of the enemy preparations to oppose the assault also demoralised the 
landing party as it approached the shore line. Tollemache's aide, Captain Green, understated 
matters when on spying three batteries to the right and two to left of the beach, in addition to 
its three trenches containing troops and another battery, and the 150 musketeers positioned to 
provide flanking fire, he noted that the men were 'not very forward to land'. " It was not, 
however, just the men who appeared to waver as small arms and ordnance fire began to rain 
down amongst the boats. Belying the sobriquet 'Salamander' which he was subsequently to 
gain for stolidity under fire, Cutts failed to organise the 50 pre-vanguard grenadiers. 
Consequently Tollemache was forced to cry out to the Brigadier to effect the landing and in 
so doing questioned Cutts's commitment to his orders, although in fairness to Cutts, he had 
previously argued that the operation should be abandoned if the 50 grenadiers found the 
enemy entrenchments heavily defended by regular troops -a fact which was clearly apparent 
without any troop landings. Nonetheless, Cutts's views had not been officially adopted by the 
" Tollemache, The Tollemaches, p. 79: 'Volunteer with Lt. -Gen. Tahnach in the Expedition to Brest, Given 
this 15th June 1694'. 
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Council of War and crucially his vacillation in command forced Tollemache to land 
precipitously with only five other officers" and nine grenadiers. "" 
Leading up from the beach, about thirty ydrds from the shore, were some rocks which 
provided cover for Tollemache and his colleagues while they awaited more troops. Although 
remaining in his boat, Cutts had now began to organise the grenadiers and a party of 150 
were landed. Tollemache along with the other officers moved from the cover of the rocks to 
lead this group up the beach; but, lacking numbers and without adequate covering fire from 
the vessels in the bay, this party was badly galled by the French batteries. La Motte and many 
of the grenadiers were killed, while Tollemache was shot in the thigh (a wound he was 
subsequently to die from when it became gangrenous back in England) and he struggled back 
to the shelter of the rocks again with Green and Montargier. " A further 200 grenadiers next 
made it on to the shore and Tollemache, despite his wound, again went to rally them for an 
attack up the beach. Carmarthen's naval detachment was still making no impact upon the 
French batteries whose fire along with some French marines, killed many English troops and 
forced the rest to retreat to the boats. For a third time, Tollemache was back under the rocks 
with his two colleagues. Just then Green spied a considerable party of French horse making 
its way down to the beach and, fearing a rout, he was able to persuade a reluctant Tollemache 
that the descent could not succeed. Further ignominy was still to attend the General before 
he could leave the bay, however. The ebb tide at landing had stranded many of the boats on 
the beach and, with desertions amongst the crews, refloating was proving difficult. After 
lifting Tollemache into a boat, Green faced this problem and had to bribe the crew of 
63 The officers were Colonel de la Motte, Lieutenant-Colonel de Montargier, Captain Green and an Ensign 
accompanying the grenadiers. 
69 The reader should be warned about the narrative of the descent in Ment Clark, Goodwin Wharton (Great 
Britain, 1984), pp. 289-93, which could be considered misleading on several counts. Not only does Clark 
seemingly misunderstand the nature and function of the grenadiers by claiming on p. 291 that their standard 
operational form was 'neat rows' which undertook 'text-book attacks' (see above p. 53 for a different 
interpretation), he claims that Tollcmache aborted the planned grenadier vanguard on nearing the shore, and 
instead chose to land the regular infantry under his leadership. There is no mention of the General's 
exchange of words with Cutts to encourage him to land the grenadiers; rather Clark writes on p. 292 that 
Cutts was ordered to go to the rear of the boats to organise the reinforcements. Another questionable claim by 
Clark is the statement that it was Carmarthen who - after returning from his reconnaissance - committed the 
additional warships to his detachment, when quite clearly only the Council of War had the authority to take 
(as it did) that decision. 
" Childs, The British Army of William III, p. 234 states that Tollemache received his wound on making his 
final retreat from the rocks to the shore. I have instead preferred to follow the Captain Green's account - 
Tollemache, ne Tollemaches, p. 79: 'Volunteer with Lt. -Gen. Talmach in the Expedition to Brest, Given this 
15th June 1694' - which clearly states that the General was shot in the thigh when he went to lead the 150 
grenadiers which had landed. 
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Berkeley's long-boat to help get the General safely off the shore. The spirit of combined 
army and navy operational endeavour here was somewhat defective. 
As Tollcmachc's boat reached the relative safety of the flagship whence he was 
quickly transferred with a surgeon to the Dreadhought, the Earl of Macclesfield and 
Carmarthen were left to withdraw the remaining land and naval forces. Theirs was an 
unenviable task. Macclesfield, although not on the beach, had to bring off the remaining 
grenadiers as the French party of horse bore down and also turn around the other landing 
craft still burdened with their troops. Carmarthen meanwhile had to put about his detachment 
of ships whose rigging and masts had been badly damaged during their engagement with the 
fort and shore batteries. Given the progress of the descent to that point, it was perhaps 
remarkable that only the Dutch vessel, the Wesep, and four landing boats (from which 
approximately 50 grenadiers were taken prisoner) had to be abandoned; but, combined with 
the 1091 seamen and troops killed, wounded and missing, " it represented an additional 
failure which had to be addressed by the Council when it convened that afternoon on board 
the Dreadnought. 
The Council quickly fixed upon the extent of the French defences as the principal 
cause of the descent's failure but when Tollemache suggested that a small squadron be sent to 
bombard Brest, the Council demurred on the basis that it required a prevailing westerly and 
easterly wind respectively to get in and out of Brest, thus raising the prospect of a 
considerable delay while waiting for the appropriate wind. Perhaps more revealing however 
were Berkeley's fears about the quantity and capability of French ordnance at the town, 
which he subsequently confided to Trenchard. " Accordingly, as the fleet upon the Council's 
direction returned to Spithead to land the soldiers and await further orders, the importance of 
Vauban's preparations at and around Brest in scuppering the descent was reinforced in 
English minds. Yet with respect to the execution of the combined operation, this perception 
71 PRO, SP 42/3, fos. 518-19: 'An account of the soldiers and seamen that are killed, wounded, or otherwise 
missing since late action in Camarett Bay. & what ships they were on board'; 'An account what officers and 
soldiers are killed, wounded or missing that were on board the Dutch men of war'; 'An account what seamen 
were killed and wounded belonging to the Dutch ships'. There are a variety of claims made in both the 
primary and secondary sources as to how many men were killed, wounded or missing at Brest. Instead of 
trying to split the difference between them all, I have opted for the official tally which certainly seems well 
informed in terms of basic information. I recognise however that the authorities in England might equally 
have been pursuing an agenda in the presentation of these figures, and that accordingly they might have been 
massaged downwards. 
72 PRO, SP 42/3, fos. 522-5: Berkeley to Trenchard, 9 June 1694. 
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about the role of the French defences can be shown to be largely a tactical and strategic red 
herring. 
Firstly, unwarranted attention is often paid to this issue because of the allegation that 
it was the Earl of Marlborough who had betrayed the project to Louis XIV. Childs rightly 
warns against concentrating upon an issue which Marlborough's biographers have exhausted. 
In short, it would seem (assuming the letter is not a forgery) that Marlborough did write to 
Louis about the descent but that his letter was not the first which the French King had 
received on the English plans. Effective operational secrecy was rarely achieved in early 
modem warfare and, as Childs again appositely remarks, Louis's intelligence provision would 
have had to have been exceptionally inadequate for him not to have known even as early as 
April (which he did) what the English planned. It is also significant that following the 
bombardment of St Malo in November 1693, Louis had directed Vauban to make a swift 
inspection of the defences on the Cotentin peninsula and the Brittany coast. So, when on 
receiving intelligence of the projected Brest attack and ordering Vauban in early May (NS) to 
attend specially to the fortifications at Brest and the defences of Camaret and Bertheaurne 
bays, improvements at these places had already been on the French King's agenda. "' 
Stripped, therefore, of the allure of scandal, the defences should be properly placed within the 
context of the operation. 
This does not mean that the importance of the batteries and the fortifications in the 
repulse of the English can be denied. As has been seen, they were undoubtedly the immediate 
cause of failure. The commanders knew that Vauban had been fortifying the area, and his 
reputation pointed to a conclusion that the defences being put in place were probably 
considerable. Moreover, it was an assessment of the strength of the French position which 
led to the naval detachment designed for the bay being augmented. " The descent was 
launched in the knowledge that it would be opposed and probably vigorously so. However, 
there was also a reasonable hope that this opposition could be overcome. Given that context, 
the tactical reasons for failure must therefore be looked for elsewhere. The King was of the 
"Childs, The British Army of william III, pp. 224-7,238 n. 19; B. Pujo, Vauban (Paris, 1991), p. 191; A. 
Blanchard, Vauban ( [Paris], 1996), p. Y. le Gallo, Histoire de Brest (Toulouse, 1976), p. 130. 
74 PRO, SP 44/205, pp. 131-2: Trenchard to Russell, 24 May 1694, and enclosure 'Extract of a letter from Mr 
Wolsely', 16126 May 1694; Tollemache Family Archives, 716, unf : 'An Account of the Proceedings of the 
Brest Expedition in Vindication of the Aspertions Thrown Upon US Excellencie Lieutenant-General 
Tolmach'; Carmarthen, A Journal of the Brest Expedition, pp. 14-17. 
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opinion that Tollemache's 'too ardent zeal"' had caused him to act rashly, thereby implying 
that his military judgement was suspect. Macclesfield also made this point, but rather more 
brutally, when he wrote to Portland after Tollemache's death that the 'King has lost a subject 
but not a General'. ' It was Shrewsbury who - though probably inadvertently - provided a 
credible answer. With few details then to hand, his relation to the King of the events at Brest 
noted the recollections of an unnamed participant that boats had run into each other and that 
too many craft had large draughts which were inappropriate for descending upon an ebb 
tide. " The loss of order by the boats -a naval responsibility inasmuch as a ship's Lieutenant 
was in command of each - as they followed Carmarthen's detachment into the bay was critical 
for it meant that the anticipated strike-force momentum built-in by the sequential landing 
disposition could not be realised. Moreover, as some boats struggled with the ebb tide and 
Cutts's irresolution about landing the grenadiers took hold, a confusion arose which 
prevented Tollemache reordering the nearby boats to effect a landing of a good number of 
troops, albeit not in the form of sequential waves. Tollemache's military judgement was too 
severely circumscribed by the conditions and by Cutts's actions to be at fault; zeal was all he 
could offer as a substitute. That could not however remedy the woeful inadequate strike- 
force of five officers and nine grenadiers which were first on to the beach nor could the 
additional 350 grenadiers which subsequently landed. The tactical deficiency of the descent 
was simply the failure to submit the French opposition to the maximum potential of the 
English plan. 
Strategically, the failure at Brest has been attributed - though probably unintentionally 
given that the context of the passage was tactics - to the inflexibility of the operational 
Instructions which are considered to have afforded Tollemache or the other senior 
commanders no discretion in target selection. " It follows that as they were unable to favour 
an alternative point of attack, which might have seemed to offer better prospects of success 
when in-theatre, failure was largely predetermined - especially given the extent of the French 
defences at Brest. In a confused manner, this was an issue which subsequently greatly 
exercised those involved. After the repulse, the afternoon Council on 8 June asked 
Tollemache if he had the authority to mount an attack elsewhere. The General claimed then 
75 Shrewsbury Correspondence, p. 46: William Iff to Shrewsbury, I July 1694 [NS]. 
76 NUL, PwA 469, unf.: Macclesfield to Portland, 16 July 1694. 
" Shrewsbury Correspondence, pp. 41-4: Shrewsbury to William 111,15 June 1694. 
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that he did not and maintained this view until his death on 22 June. However, Secretary 
Trenchard was equally adamant in his subsequent correspondence that the orders did not 
restrict Tollemache to land only at Brest and that the Council of War possessed the sovereign 
authority to alter any aspect of the operation. Certainly, when delayed with the fleet at 
Spithead, and in receipt of intelligence regarding Vauban's work at Brest, Tollemache wrote 
to the Court of his desire to land elsewhere; and his Proponents later claimed that as no reply 
was offered the General assumed that the attack on Brest must proceed regardless. It cannot 
be established whether the Court did reply but before the fleet left England, Trenchard 
reported Tollemache's request to Blathwayt, though he misinterpreted it to mean that 
Tollemache wanted to undertake an additional attack which Trenchard dismissed on the 
grounds of insufficient resources. The Secretary did stress to Blathwayt, however, that the 
operational orders did not fix the assault at a particular place: the Council of War was to 
advise on that. These points Trenchard returned to in correspondence with Blathwayt after 
reading the minutes of the Council of the afternoon of 8 June. " The final Instructions issued 
on 29 May hold the answers. In this document Brest is clearly stated as the first strike target 
and Trenchard was being disingenuous to claim that no particular place had been settled 
upon, though only insofar as he meant a wholly different target. The Instructions only 
allowed the Council full discretion to determine the landing site and the tactical deployment 
of the force at Brest. Tollemache, on the other hand, was guilty of ambiguity. His claim that 
he had no power to order an attack elsewhere was only strictly correct in that he could not 
personally sanction such a move. The Instructions expressively stipulated that after the land 
forces had completed whatever was possible at Brest, then a Council of War was to consider 
what might be undertaken elsewhere. " By prioritising the targets, the Instructions lacked the 
strategic vision which might have allowed for an alternative place on the Brittany coast to be 
attacked in pursuance of the same objectives inasmuch as if a foothold could have been 
secured on enemy territory then a body of troops might have been dispatched to attack Brest 
from the interior. Tollemache's failure at Brest was not tactical but strategic: he was too 
willing to accept the limitations of the Instructions. 
78 Childs, The British Army of William 117, p. 235. 
" NMM, SOU/3, fos. 25,67-8: 'At a Council of War' 8 June 1694; Trenchard to Blathwayt, 15 June 1694; 
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In the aftermath of the failure at Brest the King - albeit indirectly - threw his support 
behind further descents on the northern French coast by confirming that he would not 
immediately recall the soldiers to Flanders and was content for them to be otherwise 
employed. This caused the Queen to order Berkeley to hold a Council of War of land and sea 
officers to consider what might now be undertaken against the French coast. With Brest no 
longer a viable target, the Council, which assembled on 15 June at St Helens, seemed bereft 
of ideas. It rather vaguely resolved that the squadron would sail to the northern French coast 
with the soldiers and the bomb vessels to 'give the enemy as much trouble' as the weather 
conditions would allow. This proved insufficiently detailed for the Queen who, through 
Secretary Trenchard, ordered the fleet to the Isle of Wight to land the soldiers until the 
Council decided both upon a particular target and the number of troops that would be 
deployed. In his defence of the Council's deliberations, Berkeley drew upon the military case 
for descents as expressed by Littleton's first pamphlet. The Admiral claimed that the 
Council's vague resolution to remain ready in sight of the French coast was a ploy to keep the 
enemy guessing as to where a landing might take place thereby forcing them to stretch their 
resources to cover all possible options. Berkeley also claimed the more practical motivation 
that, in light of recent events, it was prudent to keep operational details secret. A further 
Council held on 18 June was only a little more specific in it resolutions, suggesting Calais, 
Dieppe, and Havre de Grace as possible targets. For this, four regiments were considered 
sufficient but it was significant that greater emphasis was placed on their help to man the fleet 
and the bomb vessels rather than as an assault force. The Council was now promoting 
bombardment as a form of engagement upon the enemy coast and in conjunction with the 
increasing impasse between the Council and the Queen, descents were being undermined as a 
part of the war policy. " 
Obviously keen that some attack be made against the French coast, the Cabinet 
Council attempted to push events forward by accepting the Council of War's prerogative 
over targeting. The Lords were, however, of the opinion that the full ten battalions should be 
embarked if the Council of War's objective remained to keep the enemy resources stretched; 
this they believed would leave weak points on the coast where the English troops might be 
go NMM, SOU/2, fos. 272-4: 'Orders to the Rt. Hon. John, Lord Berkeley, 29 May 1694. 
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profitably landed. Consequently, once the King had again confirmed that he did not require 
the troops in Flanders, Berkeley was ordered to embark the ten battalions with Macclesfield 
as their commander. "' The Admiral and the Council of War were however now settled upon 
the bombardment of French coastal towns rather than troops landings. In early July, the 
Channel squadron set about bombarding Dieppe and Havre de Grace, reducing the former to 
ashes and leaving about two-thirds of the latter ablaze. In Berkeley's account of these actions 
there is no indication that the soldiers were deployed in a combined action, other than as help 
in manning the fleet and the bomb vessels. Just before sailing from Dieppe, Berkeley did send 
the Elizabeth and a brigantine with Colonel Venner in command of 200 troops to make an 
assault upon Treport, but this detachment soon returned having failed to effect a landing. In 
truth, the Admiral considered the ten regiments a burden - especially since two of his 
squadron had been withdrawn to escort the victualling ships bound for the Mediterranean. 
He warned that the overcrowding would cause the spread of sickness and returned to his 
claim that four regiments would be sufficient to make good the lack of seamen manning the 
squadron. " 
The bombardment of Dieppe and Havre de Grace had taken its toll upon the bomb 
vessels and the ship-borne mortars, and Berkeley's squadron was back on the English coast at 
the end of July for a refit. Permission was then given for him to disembark some of the 
soldiers if he wished, but he was to come to London for discussions on how best the 
squadron might be employed for the remainder of the campaign season. At these it was 
decided to target Dunkirk and for the rest of the summer attempts were made by the Channel 
squadron first under Berkeley and then, when the first and second rates had been laid up at 
the end of August, under Shovell, to destroy Dunkirk harbour through bombardment or the 
explosion of fireships and machine vessels. In mid-September, Shovell also brought the 
$1 PRO, SP 44/205, pp. 138,140: Trenchard to Berkeley, 13,16 June 1694; PRO, SP 42/3, fos. 540-3,552-5, 
564-5,566-9,588-91: Berkeley to Trenchard, 13,17,18 June 1694; Council of War Minutes, 15,18 June 
1694; Cutts to Anon., 21 June 1694. 
S2 PRO, SP 42/3, fos. 152-3: Committee of Council Minutes, 21 June 1694; NMM, SOU/3, fos. 107.14: 
Trenchard to Blathwayt, 22,26 June 1694; PRO, SP 44/205, p. 145: Warrants to John, Lord Berkeley, and 
Charles, Earl of Macclesfield, 23 June 1694. 
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Trenchard, 4,13 July 1694, and enclosures, 'Copy of a Latter from the Rt. Hon. the Lord Berkeley', 3 July 
1694, 'At a Council of War', 3 July 1694, 'Extract of a Letter from My Lord Berkeley', 9 July 1694; 'At a 
Council of War', 14 July 1694. 
169 
squadron in front of Calais to bombard it. " At least four regiments from the original ten were 
aboard the squadron during these attempts" but at no point was a landing attempted nor is 
there evidence to suggest the troops' active participation in the bombardments. In the event, 
these proved largely unsuccessful, though not sufficiently so to diminish the increasing 
support of them as the instrument of warfare best directed against the French coastline. "' A 
combination of the failure at Brest and their subsequent frustration by the commanding 
Admiral and the Council of War had caused the descents to be dropped as the preferred form 
of coastal attack. Although in the summer of 1696, a couple of small scale descents - in 
reality these were little more than raids - were undertaken by Berkeley and Captain Messe at 
Belle ile, the islands of Houat and Hoddic, and Rhd Island, it would appear that neither 
infantry nor marines soldiers were involved, and that the brief landings which did take place 
were conducted by the seamen. By mid-decade, bombardment was the staple form of assault 
upon France's northern coasts and the only combined army and navy operations being 
deployed in the European theatre were in the Mediterranean through the agency of Russell's 
fleet. 97 
THAV: Combined Operations and Admiral Russell's Mediterranean Fleet, 1695. 
Two months on from leaving Berkeley 37 miles south of Rams head, Admiral Russell led his 
fleet of 63 warships through the Gibraltar Straits and into the Mediterranean. July had been 
spent refitting and revictualling at Cddiz and, seeking the combined French fleet, Russell was 
bound for the waters off Barcelona where Tourville had taken station to succour Noailles's 
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army as it advanced on this principal Catalan town. " For the 1694 campaign, Louis XIV had 
committed large resources to the war in Spain in the hope that Noailles, who had first led a 
French army into Spain four years previously, could make considerable gains in Catalonia and 
force the Spanish to a separate peace. The French King's calculation was that this would 
damage the unity of the Grand Alliance and perhaps cause the other members to seek 
individual peace with the French. On 7 May, Noailles's army decamped from Le Boulou and 
assisted by Tourville's Toulon squadron made good progress. The Fluvia and Ter rivers were 
crossed by the end of May and at the latter the Spanish army, commanded by Catalonia's 
viceroy the Duke of Escalona, was defeated. A month later Palam6s and Gerona fell to the 
French who, shadowed by their now combined fleet, pressed on towards Barcelona; a siege in 
early autumn seemed probable. However, news of Russell's approach caused Tourville to 
scurry back to Toulon, believing his fleet to be outnumbered by the Anglo-Dutch force. The 
balance was more even than the French Admiral thought but his actions based on this 
perception had effectively allowed Russell to complete his mission of chasing the French from 
the Mediterranean sea; while it also meant that Noailles was without the necessary fleet 
support to besiege Barcelona. " 
Running short of provisions and with only a few weeks left in which the larger rated 
vessels could remain at sea, Russell's expectation was that he would shortly head for 
England. The King, wishing to consolidate this newly gained strategic position in the 
Mediterranean, had other ideas, however. At the end of July, William let it be known to the 
Cabinet Council that he wanted Russell to continue as long as possible in the Mediterranean 
and on his departure to leave a substantial squadron to winter in those parts. William's actual 
desire was for the whole fleet to winter in the Mediterranean but, as political cover, he 
wanted the initiative on this to come from his ministers. However, when the Cabinet Council 
vacillated over interpreting the King's intentions and then issued Russell with Instructions 
which allowed him the option of returning home depending upon what stage in his return 
journey he had received these orders, the King decide to issue his own Instructions on 7 
August. These were unequivocal: Russell was to use Cddiz as a base and winter with the 
38 An Exact Journal ofthe Victorious Expedition ofthe Confederate fleet, the Last Year, Under the 
Command ofthe Right Honourable Admiral Russell (London, 1695), pp. 1-4; PRO, SP 42/3, f0s. 602-5,714. 
17: Russcll to Trcnchard, 1,28 July 1694; Memoirs Relating to the Lord Torrington, p. 67. 
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whole fleet in the Mediterranean; only the passage of the French fleet through the Straits 
would admit Russell's departure. The prospect of wintering in the Mediterranean had 
apparently been raised with Russell earlier in the summer and on that occasion he had argued 
strongly against it on strategic and practical grounds. His immediate reaction on receiving his 
Instructions was no different. It was largely due to Shrewsbury's soothing correspondence 
that Russell accepted the King's orders without first embarrassing himself or causing his 
command to be vulnerable by raising objections. " William now had the strategic presence in 
the Mediterranean which he had long aimed for and the 1695 campaign season offered the 
prospect of converting this into territorial gains upon the French Mediterranean coastline or 
tangible diplomatic currency by helping the Spaniards to force Noailles back across the 
Pyrenees. 
Aside from the marine soldiers aboard, Russell's fleet had no additional troops to use 
either as a strike force on the French coast or to offer as support to the Spanish army. These 
circumstances had in 1694 caused him reject the Spanish Viceroy's proposal to augment his 
army for attacks against French positions. " Accordingly, it was decided in December to 
boost Russell's capability by dispatching to Cddiz four regiments - about 3000 men in total. 
The emphasis of command was indeed upon the Admiral for, although Brigadier Stewart was 
appointed commanding officer of the regiments, he was to defer to Russell about their 
deployment and Russell was separately commissioned as Captain-General. The decision had 
been taken before the turn of the calendar year to ensure that the troops arrived in the 
Mediterranean early in the campaign season but transport arrangements quickly ran into many 
problems. A portion of the troops were to go aboard the victualling convoy and bomb 
vessels set to leave in the spring but for the remainder ships would have to be hired. The 
initial hope that these vessels would be ready to come down the River Thames to the Downs 
as soon as the ice melted at the end of January quickly proved forlorn as the owners proved 
89 An Exact Journal ofthe Victorious Expedition, pp. 4-7; C. Sevin de Quincy, Histoire Militaire du Regne de 
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punctilious in getting protection for their crews in advance of concluding the Charter Party 
negotiations. Even then the transport ships proved slow in getting to the Downs whence they 
were still to sail along the coast to Spithead for the troop embarkation. In late March, 
William got Blathwayt to float a proposal that ships at Portsmouth be hired instead. When 
Lord Cutts, whom the King had appointed to inspect and embark the soldiers, wrote that 
there was a shortage of 800 berths upon his arrival at Portsmouth, Blathwayt: might well have 
wished that he had pushed the proposal further. It was notjust the organisation of the 
transports which gave rise to delay for problems emerged during the embarkation process. 
Many of the companies remained unpaid due to their officers' peculation and it was the 
stifling of an order about pay by an officer which allegedly led to the mutiny of four 
companies of Brigadier Stewart's regiment at Salisbury as they marched to Southampton, 
where they were to board. Cutts's intelligent management of these problems ensured they did 
not proliferate and cause even greater delay, thus allowing him to complete the embarkation 
towards the end of March. Shortly thereafter, the convoy was reported to be in mid-channel, 
off St Catherine's point and bolstered by a fair gale from the east and north. Within 
approximately three weeks the troops were with Russell. " 
A descent on Toulon or at Marseilles - similar in form to that undertaken at Brest - 
was considered the optimum use of these troops by the Ministry and the Instructions sent to 
Russell in May actually prioritised these targets and not order their abandonment as Childs 
contends. To bolster the attack, a link-up with some soldiers provided by the Duke of Savoy, 
Victor Amadeus II, which would march upon the target from the interior was also mooted 
and the English envoy in Turin, Lord Galway, was attempting to co-ordinate matters. Russell, 
however, first attended to the subordinate part of his Instructions which required that he put 
troops into Barcelona to prevent its capture by the French who were considered likely to 
make it a priority again in the forthcoming campaign. Then he took the fleet to the 
hes 
d'Hy&es whence he was able to reconnoitre Toulon; while Rear-Admiral Neville was sent 
with four Colonels to assess Marseilles. Both missions reported on the extensive French 
92 Shrewsbury Correspondence, p. 78,222-4: Shrewsbury to William 111,23 Dec. 1694,2 Jan. 1695; Russell 
to Shrewsbury, 10 Feb. 1695; PRO, WO 5/7, unE: Blathwayt to Bridgeman, 9,16,19 Jan, 6 Feb. 1695; 
Blathwayt to the Commissioners of Transportation, 16 Jan. 21,22 Feb., 7,8 Mar. 1695; Blathwayt to Cutts, 
17 Mar. 1695; PRO, SP 44/168, p. 104: 'Instructions for Our Trusty and Welbeloved Brigadier-General 
William Stewart Commanding Our Land Forces Going for Cadiz', 12 Mar. 1695; Childs, 'Lord Cutts's 
Letters, 1695', nos. 12-14,17-20, pp. 394-6,398-404: Cutts to Blathwayt, 16,19,21,22,24 Mar. 1695; 
Rivett to Cutts, 19 Mar. 1695; Blathwayt to Cuffs 21 Mar. 1695. 
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defensive preparations, particularly at Toulon where the French fleet lay, apparently showing 
no signs of putting out. In the interval, Victor Amadeus, having set in train the negotiation 
which would lead to a separate peace with France and Savoy's departure from the Grand 
Alliance, failed to respond to Galway. Russell then returned to the Catalan coast to find that 
the troops were not required in Barcelona as the war in Spain had taken a different course 
from the previous year. "' 
The opportunity for Russell to intervene in the Spanish theatre was a product of the 
altered military realities in Catalonia where the energy of the new Viceroy and army 
commander, the Marquis de Gastaflaga, caused the Spaniards to take the initiative. In the 
spring, he moved to capture Ostalric and Castelfollit de la Roca and, although on that 
occasion French relief got through, by the end of July the new French commander, the Duc 
de Vend6me, abandoned the former town upon Gastaflaga's second approach. The French 
had retired to Gerona and consequently the Viceroy was keen to capture Palam6s next; but 
with only an army of 12 000 (many of whom were sick) and, more importantly, lacking the 
heavy ordnance which would be necessary to conduct a successful siege, he sought Russell's 
help. "' At the beginning of August, after having withdrawn the troops from Barcelona, the 
two commanders held a meeting at Blanes, about a half days march from the Spanish camp, 
and it was agreed that Russell would provide combined military and naval help. 95 
Initially Gastaflaga. had rather vaguely proposed that Russell land the troops he had 
aboard at Blanes whence they would march with the Spanish army to Palam6s. The Admiral, 
concerned that this held out the prospect of several days marching and presumably keen to 
firm up the details of the operation, instead informed the Viceroy that he would land up to 
4000 soldiers at a bay near Palam6s if the siege looked likely to go ahead. Russell also 
Shrewsbury Correspondence, pp. 228-34,237-8: Shrewsbury to Russell, 7 May, 2 July 1695; Russell to 
Shrewsbury, 2,11 May, 14 June, 21 July, 16/26 1695; HMC, Buccleuch Montague MSS, ii. * 182-3: Privy 
Council Minutes, 4 May, afternoon 4 May 1695; Childs, 'Secondary Operations of the British Army', pp. 77. 
8. 
" Quincy, Histoire Militaire, iii. 77-8 1; Lynn, The Wars oftouis AV, pp. 251-2. 
95 The ensuing account of the operation to retake Palam6s is based upon the following primary sources and 
secondary authorities: NMM, SOU/I 6, fos. 5-12: 'An account of proceedings from the f irst time it was 
desired of me that His Majesty's subjects land in Catalonia', 16 Aug. 1689, (printed by Coxe in Shrewsbury 
Correspondence, pp. 237-42, but with less detail); PRO, SP 94/74, fos 4-6: Stanhope to 'My Lord', 28 Aug. 
1695, and enclosure, 'Extract of a letter from the Duke of Tursis's Secretary to his friend in Madrid of the 27 
Aug. from the Roade at St Feliu'; CFKS, U1590 C9/1/33: 'Father' to James, 4 Aug. 1695 [NS] (Alexander 
Stanhope specifically claims that Russell offered help to Gastaflaga before being asked for it. This is not 
however born out by the other evidence); Quincy, Histoire Militaire, iii. 77-81; Lynn, The Wars ofLouisXIV, 
pp. 251-2; Childs, 'Secondary Operations of the British Army', pp. 78-80. 
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claimed that he then informed Gastafiaga that he could spare the troops for just over a week 
and that their disposition at the siege would have to facilitate embarkation in the event that 
the French navy departed from Toulon. Soon after their meeting, Brigadier Stewart was set 
ashore to consult further on military matters, while Russell took the fleet south down the 
coast in anticipation of the troop landings and to deliver the first phase of naval support. 
On 7 August (NS), two bomb vessels were sent into the Bay of Palam6s to throw 
some shells as a preliminary to the siege. Two days later, upon Brigadier Stewart's word that 
the military circumstances were propitious with the French army camp reportedly at least four 
leagues from Palam6s at La Bisbal d'Emporda, Russell landed 3000 English infantry and 
about 500 Dutch troops under Count Nassau in the early hours of the morning at St Feliu. de 
Gufxols. Linking up with the Spanish army which had encamped at Calonge, the whole force 
marched that day to within two miles of Palam6s. When covering these final miles the next 
day, the Anglo-Dutch van encountered a considerable body of enemy horse as they entered a 
defile and, although they did not attempt to stop the march, it did contradict the report that 
the French were some days march from Palam6s. As the allies settled into their camp just 
outside the town, Vend6me drew up his army to within a mile, posting his horse in the valley 
and foot upon the surrounding hills. The French had effectively checked the initial moves of 
the allied force and when reports came though that Vend8me was expecting over 4000 
reinforcements from Rousillon, it seemed unlikely that the allies would be able even to invest 
Palam6s. 
According to Russell (although it is necessary to keep in mind his contempt for the 
Spanish) the Spanish commanders next panicked and, expecting a battle the following day, 
they transferred all power of command to Stewart. In the event, an engagement did not 
occur. The allies occupied and began fortifying some high ground so that when on 12 
August the French marched forward to inspect their opponent's position, they wheeled north 
and left for the neighbouring town of Palafrugell. Perhaps they felt the allied position too 
strong or were surprised at the size of the Spanish army given that they were probably 
unaware of the arrival of troops from England; but, regardless, twenty-four hours had been 
sufficient to make the siege of Palam6s appear a realistic proposition. 
A similar amount of time was sufficient to bring this operation to an end. Over 12-13 
August (NS), Russell had delivered the second phase of naval support. Bomb vessels and 
ketches with mortars were towed into Palam6s Bay to throw their shells at the town and were 
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exacting considerable damage when a frigate, which had previously been dispatched on an 
intelligence gathering mission along the Provence coast, returned. The Captain had taken 
two Toulon fishermen prisoner and they claimed that the French fleet of sixty warships was 
now lying in Toulon Road, armed and ready to sail. In order to prevent them passing through 
the Straits, Russell wished to go in search of them and once a Council of War had sanctioned 
his resolution, he informed Gastafiaga that he was recafling his troops so he could leave the 
Catalan coast. The Spanish Viceroy protested, not the least because he had just begun to 
press the siege forward by landing heavier ordnance that had been brought down from 
Barcelona, but Russell remained firm to the decision. A debate on the viability of continuing 
with the siege of PalamOs followed, though the sources place different emphasis upon the 
participants. In his correspondence with Shrewsbury, Russell gave himself a central role in 
pressing the futility of the operation; he foresaw the principal difficulty as that - even with the 
troops he had put ashore - the total number would be insufficient to combat the French relief 
army currently at Palafrugell but which could return at any point. Another source emphasised 
instead the discussions which took place between Gastaflaga, his Spanish colleagues and the 
Imperial officer, the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt. During these consultations, Hesse- 
Darmstadt heard what he considered were defeatist, even treacherous, remarks by the Spanish 
commanders to the effect that the English fleet was of no service to Spain and that a separate 
peace treaty would be of greater benefit. He accordingly withdrew the Imperial troops and 
this was thought to have caused the siege to be abandoned. All such discussions probably 
contributed to the demise of the operation but with regard to the combined operation, it is 
Russell's account of his own actions which is of interest. 
Since arriving in the Mediterranean, he had made no secret of his contempt for the 
Spanish in general and their military competence in particular. ' Having agreed to 
Gastaflaga's request, albeit inserting a qualification on how long he could have the troops 
ashore, as soon as intelligence came through which allowed Russell to recall his troops, he did 
so. Yet the urgency which he protested was necessary to prevent the French fleet from 
passing through the Straits did not seem to extend to embarking the troops. They were not 
put aboard until 16 August (NS) and then Russell, upon Gastaflaga's request, agreed to 
support to his army as they marched away from Palam6s all the while passing further 
96 See for example, Shrewshury Correspondence, pp. 216-18,242-5: Russell to Shrewsbury, 31 Dec. 1694,4 
Sept. 1695. 
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derogatory comment upon the Spanish. Such conduct does beg the question whether this 
was another example of Russell's equivocation about combined operations, similar to what he 
had displayed in 1692 and over the descent on Brest in 1694. 
The intelligence about the French fleet's imminent departure proved to have been a 
ruse concocted by Vend6me. When Russell arrived off Toulon the fleet were found to be Still 
in the harbour, though he was unable to determine the extent of their preparations for sea as 
bad weather forced him off station. By then, however, any further combined action on the 
Spanish coast could not be contemplated and, although the French did evacuate from 
Palam6s and Castelfollit de la Roca, they maintained a presence in Catalonia. In October, 
leaving a squadron of ships under Vice Admiral David Mitchell which Sir George Rooke was 
on his way to augment, Russell returned to England He took all the troops - save for a 
couple of companies from Colonel Pusissar's regiment - with him and there were to be no 
further combined operations in the Mediterranean. For the remaining two years of the war, 
England was able to maintain a squadron in the Mediterranean sufficient for the protection of 
trade, but it did not have the military capability to intervene decisively on the French or 
Spanish coasts. Indeed, Barcelona fell to the French in 1697. " The abandonment of descents 
or combined operations as part of the war strategy in the northern European theatre had been 
quickly followed in the southern Mediterranean region. 
9' Quincy, Histoire Militaire, iii. 178; Shrewsbury Correspondence, pp. 242-5: Russell to Shrewsbury, 4 Sept. 
1695; PRO, WO 5/7, unf: Orders to Brigadier Stewart, Colonels Brudenell, Coote and Puissar, 2 Nov. 1695; 
Lynn, The Wars ofLouis. X7V, pp. 251-2; Harding, Seapower andNaval Warfare 1650-1830, p. 162. 
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Section IV: Combined Operations and the Nine Years War, 1688-1697. 
As an adaptation of the traditional interpretation of early modern warfare, Professor Lynn's 
paradigm - 'war-as-process" - is correctly applied to the operational history of the Nine 
Years War. It allows for Professor Black's criticism that the orthodox histories suffered from 
a 'present-mindedness' which failed to recognise that early modem warfare could be viewed 
as decisive'; it also rightly characterises such warfare on land and at sea as largely static. 
When advantage was sought, the intention was usually to out-manoeuvre the enemy rather 
than to force an engagement, and even when battles occurred few immediate in-theatre 
decisions resulted. This inflexible cast of combat might not seem to provide a propitious 
operational context in which to assess altemative forms of warfare such as combined 
operations; but paradoxically its contextual rigidity yields a clear background against which 
the developing features of a quite different instrument of warfare can be illustrated. 
Despite a reasonably high incidence of such operations - nine executed and numerous 
others planned - throughout the war, a clear and unambiguous definition for this type of 
combat does not emerge. At a basic level, the composition of force continued to be a useful 
definitional category but, aside from the participation of land and sea components, there was 
little functional similarity between, for example, the combined expeditions despatched to the 
Caribbean and the 'descents' promoted against the northern French coast. Operational form 
was often contingent upon the purpose and the theatre of the war in which it was to be 
deployed - factors which worked against universality. Moreover, the events of the Nine 
Years War revealed two further categories as inherent to defining early modem combined 
operations. 
Integral to the post-1688 emergence of the 'fiscal-military state" were the 
bureaucratic structures concerned with the direction of warfare. The multi-component form of 
combined operations required these authorities to co-operate or, at least, liaise in preparing 
the force for departure. Throughout the war, the principal organisational relationship 
1 Lynn, The Wars qfLouis XIV, pp. 3 67-76. 
2J. Black, 'Eighteenth Century Warfare Reconsidered', 97Hi (1994), 215-31. 
3 This is a term developed and applied by the historian J. Brewer to best describe the form of the 'British 
State' from the later seventeenth century as a result of Britain's perennial involvement in wars from then 
which necessitated a sharp increase in spending on the armed forces and a rise in taxation and the National 
Debt. The argument follows that this moulded the state's form. J. Brewer, The Sinews OfPower. * War, Afoney 
and the English State 1688-1783 (London, 1989); J. Brewer, 'The Eighteenth-Century British State', in L. 
Stone (ed), An Imperial State at War: Britain 1689-1815 (London, 1994). 
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between the Admiralty, the Secretaries of State, and William Blathwayt (as King William's de 
facto Secretary-at-War) was always tortuous and often broke down. Delays were endemic 
and were usually lengthened for the colonial operations as the Board of Trade and the local 
colonial authorities sought a role. The identifiable problem was the absence of a non-personal 
administrative process, which could be initiated as the standard procedure for preparing a 
combined army-navy operation. However, although the fiscal-military state required further 
development, the authorities could not simply avoid the task and hence their increasing 
awareness - albeit often contingent on personalities - that the organisation of a combined 
operation necessitated a sustained multi-level bureaucratic relationship. By 1697, this 
recognition had arguably ameliorated the length of delays; the colonial expedition dispatched 
in that year was prepared within three months. 
In-theatre command structures was the second category to emerge as important in 
shaping the form of the operation. In the eighteenth century, Thomas More Molyneaux's 
belief that a successful combined operation required the 'uniting of the two heads' to produce 
a unified and purposeful force highlighted the inherent significance of command to 
operational progress. " However, a recent authority on early modem amphibious warfare has 
argued for a shift in analysis away from this relationship and a general reduction of the 
emphasis placed upon the functioning or malfunction of the executive Councils of War of the 
joint services, which became the standard command structure for such operations. Indeed, in 
terms of operational command, Professor Harding considers these Councils as mediating the 
separate and potentially divisive service interests, thus leaving the senior commanding officers 
reasonably content with their tactical control when in theatre. ' This argument rightly 
highlights other factors excluded by Molyneaux which bore upon the success of amphibious 
warfare throughout the eighteenth century; but, with respect to the Nine Years War, it risks 
dismissing the command concerns of contemporaries which were significant in shaping 
perceptions of combined operations. Representations by commanders such as Sir Francis 
Wheler and Christopher Codrington on the scope and form of their individual operational 
command arose from their recognition, or from their anxieties, that they were to be engaged 
in a combined and co-operative venture. Personal or individual service advantage was viewed 
in this context as potentially important. Equally, the drafting of operational Instructions 
" Molyneaux, Conjunct Fxpeditions, Part 11, p. 30. 
5 flarding, 'Sailors and Gentlemen of Parade', pp. 35-55. 
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revealed the Ministries' perceptions regarding the combined service form of the intended 
operation. Their promotion of executive Councils of War was indeed an attempt to mediate 
service interests, though as this was achieved through the dilution of individual service 
authority it is questionable whether the commanders were content. Moreover, the 
prescriptive nature of the Instructions with respect to, for example, objectives or chronology 
also caused resentment amongst commanders. Notwithstanding, by strictly confining the 
issues over which they had to co-operate, it was another means whereby the Ministry made 
manifest the combined form of the operation. From the perspectives of the commanders or 
the Ministry promoting the operation, command structure was viewed as an important 
component in shaping operational design. 
Albeit variously defmed, England's war policy during the Nine Years War did 
encompass combined operations, but equally it cannot be claimed that they revolutionised the 
military policy of the Ministry's Grand Strategy. It is nonetheless important to understand 
that this was never the contemporary aspiration and the condemnation by Professor Childs of 
these operations' supposed Grand Strategic ambition tilted at a historical illusion of his own 
making. " 
Combined operations were motivated by differing strategic and tactical reasons across the 
varying war theatres: expeditions overseas were expected to conquer territory, whereas the 
two operations deployed in Ireland aimed at rejuvenating a stalemated military theatre. The 
experience of the Nine Years War thus suggests that combined operations should be correctly 
looked upon as embedded within the Grand Strategy and, depending upon whether the Whigs 
or the Tories were ascendant in the Ministry, as handmaidens of their favoured continental or 
maritime policies. The Whigs' commitment to William's campaigning on the European 
continent disposed them to the arguments regarding the diversionary capacity in the land 
theatre of descents or raids; whilst the Tories were keen to link the amphibious capability to 
the maritime standard, thus promoting the colonial combined operations as a means to 
enhance trade and English commercial supremacy. This political split on strategy was more 
general than absolute, however. The King, principally advised by Blathwayt, kept a tight rein 
over war policy and emerged as a champion of the combined operation in either a maritime or 
continental context. In 1690, William's support ensured that Marlborough's operation to 
'6 See Chapter 1, Section Ill. i, p. 139. 
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capture Cork and Kinsale proceeded; in the mid- I 690s, a similar level of commitment to the 
descents and raids on the northern French coast allowed these to continue longer than their 
manifest failure admitted; and finally William - albeit often prompted by Blathwayt - 
continued to promote combined expeditionary forces to the colonial theatre, both as a means 
to expel the French and also to assert the establishment of maritime supremacy in those areas. 
The King's objective that England should become the principal Mediterranean seapower also 
embodied maritime ascendancy, and the combined operations deployed as interventions in the 
Iberian theatre or against French shipping in its main northern and southern ports were a 
component part of that policy. It remains to be seen whether a change of monarch and the 
increasingly divisive Party atmosphere would cause combined operations to be more 
consistently applied within the strategic context of the War of the Spanish Succession, or to 
be dropped altogether. 
Combined operations, had a higher profile during the Nine Years War than Lynn's 
6war-as-process' admits. Their identification is nonetheless predicated upon accepting an 
increased number of the categories of definition to include the theatre of war, bureaucratic 
control and command structure. This properly illuminates the developing contemporary 
perception about combined army-navy operations. With respect to Grand Strategy, combined 
operations were embedded within and variously applied across theatres and hence there can 
be no generic or revolutionising strategic claims with respect to their deployment. It thus 
remains to be seen whether the history of the Spanish Succession war can provide greater 
clarity on both the form and strategic function of combined operations as amphibious warfare. 
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Chapter 2 
The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. 
Section 1: Combined Operations and the Mediterranean Theatre During 
the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. 
Li: The Outbreak of War and the Mediterranean as a Theatre of Combat During 
the Spanish Succession War. 
'Laugh at this as much as you please, I was told it to-day by a reverend 
churchman. " 
Thus, the English Envoy to Spain, Alexander Stanhope, concluded a letter home to an official 
in the Secretary of State's office. The topic for hilarity was the continued attempt to cure the 
perennially sickly King of Spain, Carlos 11. On this occasion an exorcist from Germany had 
been employed to produce not only Carlos's good health but also his ability to sire an heir. 
Since acceding to the Spanish throne in 1665, Carlos's demise had been frequently anticipated 
by observers at Madrid, but against seemingly considerable medical odds he had lived. 
However, he had also - despite the ministrations of exorcists and quacks - remained 
impotent. 2 It was this latter issue, rather than Carlos's well-being, which was of greater 
interest to the European capitals. In the absence of an heir, not only would the Spanish 
Habsburg line end with Carlos but there would also be a vacancy on the Spanish throne and 
its substantial empire, which ranged from the New World to the European territories in Italy 
and the Netherlands. 
European interest in the Spanish succession also reflected the fact that there were no 
shortage of claimants to the throne. The principal dynastic candidates were the French 
Bourbons and the Austrian Habsburgs through the marriages of Louis XIV and Emperor 
Leopold I to the daughters of Philip IV of Spain - Maria Thdr6sa and Margaret Th6r6sa 
respectively. There was (and remains) substantial debate about the legitimacy of these 
dynastic claims. For her part, Louis's wife had renounced her rights and those of her 
1 Spain Under Charles the Second, p. 191: Stanhope to Yard, 21 Oct. 1699. 
2 W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon (2 nd edn, London, 1815), i. 45; Spain 
Under Charles the Second, pp. 98-9,102-4,124-6,136-8,179,181-183,194: Stanhope to Vernon, 5 Sept. 
1696; Stanhope to Lexington, 16 Sept. 1696; Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 19 Sept., 14 Nov. 1696; Stanhope to 
Portland, 14 Mar. 1698; Stanhope to Methuen, 29 July 1698; Stanhope to his son, James Stanhope, 14 Mar., 
182 
descendants to the Spanish throne on her marriage but, although Spanish custom embraced 
this act, its legality under Castilian law was doubtfid and besides, Louis believed it invalid due 
to the non-payment of her marriage dowry. On the Habsburg side, Margaret Thdr&sa died 
young having bome Leopold only one child, Maria Antonia. Her son, Joseph Ferdinand, the 
Electoral Prince of Bavaria, had therefore a more direct claim than either of Leopold's sons 
by his second wife, Eleanor of Neuburg; but Maria Antonia had also given a pre-marital 
renunciation - albeit in private with her father and therefore also legally questionable - to the 
Spanish inheritance. 3 Quite simply, the issue was a dynastic and legal quagmire which, in 
early modem Europe, could only be solved by diplomacy or war. 
Bourbon and Austrian Habsburg diplomatic initiatives on the question of the Spanish 
succession had been current even before Carlos came to the throne, and their success was 
usually a yardstick of either dynasty's European predominance. Partition of the Spanish 
Empire had been the focus of this diplomacy and in the final years of the seventeenth century, 
when Carlos's death seemed imminent, it was again the favoured proposal. At Louis XIVIs 
instigation, just after the end of the Nine Years War, the Maritime Powers entered into 
negotiations with him over the future of the Spanish throne and empire. 4 In 1698, the First 
Partition Treaty was concluded which identified Joseph Ferdinand as Carlos's heir with 
territorial compensation from the Spanish Empire for the sons (to whom the claims had been 
transferred) of Louis XIV and Leopold I- the Grand Dauphin and Archduke Charles. As 
Leopold and the Spanish Court both opposed partition they did not accept this treaty, 
however. Indeed, Carlos considered the succession a domestic matter; and, despite his Court 
being divided between supporters of the French and Imperial candidates, he made a will 
which left the whole empire to Joseph Ferdinand. The death of the Electoral Prince in the 
following year however forced the issue to be quickly revisited. This, in turn, produced the 
Second Partition Treaty. Its provisions substituted the Archduke Charles for Joseph 
29 June, 9 July 1698,15,29 July 1699; Stanhope to Jersey, 24 June, 1699; Stanhope to Yard, 4 Nov. 1699. 
' P- Lodge, 'The Spanish Succession', History New Series xii (1927-1928), 333-8; H. Kamen, Philip Vof 
Spain: The King Who Reigned Twice (London, 200 1), pp. 1-2; H. Kamen, The War ofSuccession in Spain 
1700-15 (London, 1969), pp. 1-4; W. Roosen, 'The Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', in J. Black 
(ed. ), 7he Origins of War in Early Modern Europe (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 157-61; Thomson, 'Louis XIV and 
the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', pp. 141-4; Lynn, The Wars ofLouisXIV, pp. 266-8; 
Hattendorf, 'Alliance Encirclement and Attrition', pp. 13-15. 
The progress of these negotiations can be followed in Letters of William III and Louis XIVand of 7heir 
Ministers, ed. P. Grimblot (2 vols, London, 1848). 
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Ferdinand and augmented the territorial compensation to the French Dauphin. The treaty was 
rejected for a second time by Spain and the Emperor, whose interest in the whole inheritance 
was in truth focused upon the Spanish Italian territories. Carlos's response was to draft 
another will which replaced Joseph Ferdinand with Louis's grandson, Philip, duc d'Anjou, 
whom failing Philip's younger brother, the Duc de Berri, though with the codicil that if the 
French failed to accept the will then the whole inheritance would fall to the Austrian 
Archduke. 5 Aside from marking the victory of the French influence at the Spanish Court led 
by Cardinal Portocarrero, the will made it more likely that war rather than diplomacy would 
be required to provide a solution to the Spanish succession. 
The inevitability of war on Carlos's death on I November 1700 has nonetheless 
remained the subject of considerable historical debate. One theory emphasises the structural 
malfunction of the European states system in 1700 whereby it proved unable to mediate 
Louis's unenviable choice between his commitment to the Second Partition Treaty and his 
dynastic ambitions now vested in his grandson as a result of Carlos's Will. 6 Substantive 
proposals are required for diplomacy to work however, and in 1700 there was simply no 
credible (and thus compromise) candidate to those proposed by the Bourbons or the Austrian 
Habsburgs. The European powers were not therefore at Carlos's death afforded any 
meaningful chance to resolve the succession issue. Nonetheless, although Emperor Leopold 
invaded the Spanish Italian territories within a few months of Louis's acceptance of Carlos's 
will, the response of other European states was seemingly peaceful. Poland and Savoy 
quickly recognised d'Anjou as Philip V; while the United Provinces and England came round 
to that position too, albeit with a sense of anxiety. 7 Consideration of another aspect of this 
historical debate is perforce required to provide the bridge from these circumstances to the 
outbreak of general hostilities. 
This focuses upon the responsibility of individual rulers and, in particular, the extent 
to which Louis XIV's actions after accepting the will precipitated the re-formation of the 
5 Lodge, 'The Spanish Succession', pp. 333-8; Kamen, Philip V, pp. 2-4; Kamen, 7he War OfSuccession in 
Spain, pp. 1-4; Roosen, 'The Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', pp. 157-6 1; Thomson, 'Louis 
XIV and the Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', pp. 141-4; Lynn, The Wars OfLouisxIv, pp. 
266-8; Hattendorf, 'Alliance Encirclement and Attrition', pp. 13-15. 
Roosen, 'The Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', pp. 151-71. 
ibid, p. 161. 
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Grand Alliance against France in September 1701.8 The letters patent declaring that dAnjou 
retained his right to accede to the French throne; the French occupation of the baff ier fortress 
in the Spanish Netherlands; the granting of the Spanish assiento to French merchants; and 
finally the recognition of the 'Old Pretender' as James III, have been interpreted as 
particularly inflammatory of English and Dutch opinion and thereby eliciting a proportionate 
response from these states. 9 Equally, it has been argued that each event possessed a benign 
explanation and that they were only considered casus belli because William and the Dutch 
were looking for excuses for a war that they had already determined upon. Louis's conduct 
was therefore blundering rather than intentionally malign. " Such a view however overlooks 
the importance of perception. To Louis's fellow rulers, his actions seemed to mark a return 
to his earlier kingship, which sought territorial aggrandisement and the destabilisation of the 
European states system. " This was why the Earl of Marlborough's Instructions for 
negotiating the second Grand Alliance charged him, amongst other things, to limit French 
power and preserve the European peace. 12 
The Alliance Treaty signed by England, the Dutch Republic and Emperor Leopold on 
7 September 1701, continued in a similar manner by committing the signatories to 'repelling 
the greatness of the common danger' 13 ; and, although the war was not officially declared until 
the early summer of 1702, the continuing preparations and the Franco-Imperial clash of arms 
in Italy allows this document to be considered as an initial statement of the war aims. its 
broad strategic thrust of checking French power meant that, while the succession of d'Anjou 
was deplored as potentially giving rise to a union of the Franco-Spanish crowns, there was no 
requirement that the Confederate Powers 14 take military action to place the Archduke Charles 
on the Spanish throne. That commitment would only be made in eighteenth months time as a 
s Thomson, 'Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', pp. 140-61; Lynn, The Wars ofLouisXIV, pp. 
268-7 1; P. Sonnino, 'The Origins of Louis XIV's Wars', in Black (ed. ), The Origins of War, p. 129; G. M. 
Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne: Blenheim (London, 1965), i. 144-52. 
' Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, i. 144-52; Lynn, The W= ofLouis X7V, pp. 269-70. 
10 Thomson, 'Origins of the War of the Spanish Succession', pp. 140-61. 
" Sonnino, 'The Origins of Louis XIV's Wars, p. 129. 
12 PRO, SP 104/69, f 152-6: 'Instructions for Our Right Trusty and Right Welbeloved Cousin and Counsellor, 
John Earl of Marlborough', 26 June 1701. 
13A General Collection of Trealys, i. 415 : 'The Second Grand Alliance or the Treaty concluded between the 
Emperor, the King of Great Britain, and the States General, September 7,1701. ' 
"' This was the term by which the allied powers fighting France became commonly known. 
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means of bringing Portugal into the Grand Alliance. 15 Paradoxically therefore, despite the 
wellsprings of war being the succession to the country's throne, mainland Spain was not 
immediately a combat theatre. 
That did not mean however that the Peninsula was not a target as Spain was central to 
the military balance of power. If French strength was to be reduced then English strategy, at 
least, looked to extend the war to as many fronts as possible in order to stretch and exhaust 
Louis's resources. 16 Of greater strategic importance was the fact that, unlike the previous 
conflict with Louis, the country which stood as the gateway to the Mediterranean was now 
hostile. This had considerable implications for the development of a Mediterranean strategy 
similar to the one which William III had pioneered for the Grand Alliance in 1694-5 and 
which, in his last years he supposedly vouchsafed to Marlborough. 17 It has been argued that 
the latter's commitment to this Mediterranean ideal demonstrated a military and strategic 
mind resembling 'the whole map of the war'. 18 Yet, the same commentator criticises 
Marlborough's range across this map in downplaying the importance of the Iberian peninsula, 
particularly when compared with the war in Flanders. 19 Such a view is though based on the 
narrow premise that the war in Spain was the principal focus of the conflict in the 
Mediterranean whereas English Grand Strategy actually incorporated this region within the 
broad aspiration of asserting English power from the Straits through to the Levant. As the 
Tory Southern Secretary of State, the Earl of Nottingham, surmised: a Mediterranean 
presence meant that England could secure her trade routes, assist the Imperial interest in 
Italy, and provide a powerful diplomatic lever to encourage states such as Algiers and Savoy 
to break with France. 20 
Consideration of the war policy with respect to the Mediterranean must therefore be 
two-fold. Spain was undoubtedly an important element, particularly given that it passed from 
15 A General Collection of Treatys, i. 356: Article I of 'An Alliance Offensive and Defensive between 
Leopold Emperor of the Romans, Anne Queen of England, and the States General of the United Provinces, on 
the one part, and Peter 11 King of Portugal, on the other part. ' 
16 Hattendorf, 'Alliance Encirclement and Attrition, p. 20; J. B. Hattendorf, Englandin the War of the 
Spanish Succession: A Study ofthe English New and Conduct of GrandStrategy, 1702-1712 (London, 1987), 
pp. xiii-xviii, 267. 
17 E. Gregg, Queen Anne (London, 1984), pp. 126-7; Churchill, Marlborough, ii. 28; Corbett, England in the 
Mediterranean, 1603-1713, ii. 468-9 
"' C. Barnett, Marlborough, (Ware, Hertfordshire, 1999), p. 264. 
19 ibid., p. 157. 
20 NRO, FH MSS 275, pp. 194-6: Nottingham to Marlborough, 27 Oct. 1702. 
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one strategic context to another during the course of the war. The first, from 1702-3, was as 
an enemy territory forming a theatre of the war in which the conflict there was characterised 
by attrition The second, from 1703 to the end of the war, was as the main ob ect of 
acquisition for the Grand Alliance. Although Britain's significant military commitment to 
Spain arrived under the second strategic context, combined military and naval expeditions 
were dispatched to the Iberian peninsula from the first summer of the war and numbered three 
by 1706. Then, over the course of two years the Spanish dependencies - Majorca, Ibiza, 
Sardinia and Minorca - were captured by expeditions which were formed from the allies's 
naval squadrons that plied off the Spanish coast and the military forces that had been 
stationed in the two Spanish coastal footholds - Gibraltar and Barcelona - that the Grand 
Alliance had captured. Meanwhile, combined operations were also being directed further 
eastwards against the southern French coast where the naval port Toulon was a perennial 
target; while they were also the favoured operation when the allies sought to help the 
Camisard rebels in Languedoc or to ease French pressure upon the Duke of Savoy in 
Piedmont when he switched sides to join the Grand Alliance in 1703. Not all of these 
operations were successful and many merely remained as plans but the early and sustained 
commitment of the Ministry to combined operations within the Mediterranean proves 
instructive with respect to their strategic function. A necessary first step however is to 
consider in turn the organisation and progress of the operations and to comprehend how this 
shapes the historical understanding of early modem combined operations. 
Lii: Admiral Sir George Rooke's and the Duke of Ormonde's Expedition to Spain, 
July-November 1702. 
The decision to send an expedition to Spain had, in principle at least, actually been made prior 
to the official declaration of war on 4 May 1702. After the conclusion of the Grand Alliance 
in September 1701, when it seemed unlikely that war would be averted, the Imperial Court 
had pressed for the immediate dispatch of a fleet to the Mediterranean. The Emperor 
believed that the Alliance Treaty recognised his pretensions to the Spanish Italian territories 
and, accordingly, that this fleet should facilitate a descent upon the Neapolitan coast to 
reinvigorate the recent revolt against Spanish rule in Naples. 
21 The centrality of the 
21 PRO, SP 105165, unf.: Vernon to Stanhope, 17 26 Apr. 1702 [NS], and enclosure, Ta proposition du 
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Mediterranean to William's strategic ambitions meant that he too wished the dispatch of a 
fleet there but he questioned it proceeding directly to the Italian coast. Encouraged by the 
Admiralty, William considered it first more important to secure entry and a presence in the 
Mediterranean both diplomatically and logistically by luring Portugal from its French alliance 
and by capturing a Spanish port which might be used as a forward naval base. Admiral 
Rooke had already in January 1702, submitted a plan for a combined land and sea attack upon 
the Portuguese or Spanish coasts. 22 Ironically, the English hand was strengthened by the 
redundant Imperial courtier, Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, who, since arriving in 
London in February 1702, had been engaged in discussions on this topic with the English 
Court, while semi-detached from the Imperial Envoy, Count WratiSlaW. 23 
Only a complex of factors can explain why Hesse-Darmstadt departed for London at 
the beginning of 1702. The conclusion of the Franco-Portuguese alliance the previous 
summer had shelved the plan that he would command some 5000 Habsburg troops in 
Portugal in support of the Archduke's Spanish claims; and, since then, despite being a cousin 
of the Empress Eleanor, he had found his influence at Vienna to be on the wane. To Hesse- 
Darmstadt, England offered a refuge from his enemies and, more appealing, potential 
employment. Hence his letter of recommendation suggested that he be the Imperial 
commissary with any land force on board the English fleet. The fact that his letter was only 
signed by the Vice-Chancellor Kaunitz, and not by the Council of State, suggests that the 
obscure politics of the Imperial Court also underlay his trip. Certainly, his behaviour upon 
arrival in London, when he kept his distance and concealed his intentions from Wratislaw, 
underscored this point; as did, in greater measure, his fon-nal proposal to William for an 
expedition to Spain. 
Hesse-Darmstadt's scheme, which not surprisingly suggested that he serve as the 
imperial Commissary, reflected previous informal discussions he had held with the King, 
during which William requested that the Emperor provide 5000 troops for the venture. Such 
Ministre de L'Empereur pour envoyer la Flotte sur les Costes du Royaume de Naples, fonded sur la neccssitd 
facilitd, et sur l'utilitd de cette Entreprise, 15 avril 1702'; Stepney to Manchester, II Apr. 1702 [NS]; s. 
Spens, George Stepney 1663-1707. ý Diplomat andPoet (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 202-3. 
22 The Journal ofSir George Rooke, Admiral ofthe Fleet 1700-1702, ed. 0. Browning (London, 1897), pp. 
144-5; A. D. Francis, The First Peninsular War 1702-1713 (London, 1975), pp. 21-2,31-2; Trevelyan, 
England Under Queen Anne, i. 138-9,155. 
23 A. D. Francis, 'Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt and the Plans for the Expedition to Spain of 1702', BIIIR 
x1ii (1969), 58-75. 
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talks have also been identified as resolving upon CAdiz as the target, though Hesse- 
Darmstadt's proposal did not name it specifically. 24 Undoubtedly, Marlborough's references 
in his letters home to Godolphin, less than a month after Queen Anne's succession, about the 
'the project of CAdiZ"25 implied that this was a pre-existing Williamite policy; while this 
targeting decision would also have been in line with the positive marginal comments William 
made upon Hesse-Darmstadt's submission. 26 
The King's enthusiasm for the project was probably founded in the opportunity it 
offered for England to capture a forward naval base so that the fleet could enter the 
Mediterranean and act with impunity along the Italian or French coasts. Moreover, around 
the same time, it was decided to send John Methuen back to Lisbon - where he had served in 
the 1690s - with the task of detaching Portugal from its French alliance. 27 William's death at 
the beginning of March did not derail the policy and, although the Emperor ordered 
Wratislaw to redouble his efforts in pressing the necessity of going to Naples, Queen Anne 
remained firm. to her Privy Council conunitment on the evening of William's death that his 
preparations against France would continue. Eventually, the Emperor had simply to accept 
that the Confederate fleet was to mount an attack against the Spanish coast first and that, if 
success and time allowed, the Italian coast would be the next target. 28 
While Queen Anne's accession may not have altered the proposal, it did initiate the 
substantial delay which beset the organisation of the expedition. Part of this could be 
attributed to the uncertainties over the composition of Anne's first ministry and her desire to 
find a military and naval role for her husband, Prince George of Denmark. With decidedly 
modest abilities in both spheres he had to be found titles - Generalisssimo and Lord High 
24 Francis, 'Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt', pp. 59-62; Francis, The First Peninsular War, pp. 31-5; PRO, 
105165, unf: Stepney to Vernon, 22 Apr. 1702 [NS]; 'Memorial presented to his Majesty by the Landgraf of 
Hesse, concerning the Descent on Spain, 12 mars 1702' [NS]. 
25 The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ed. H. L. Snyder (London, 1975), i, no. 53, pp. 53: 
Marlborough to Godolphin, 24 Mar. 1702. 
26 PRO, Sp 106195, unf: marginal comments on, 'Memorial presented to his Majesty by the Landgraf of 
Hesse, concerning the Descent on Spain, 12 mars 1702' [NS]. 
27 A. D. Francis, 'John Methuen and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of 1703', IIJ iii (1960), 103-24; AD. 
Francis, 'Portugal and the Grand Alliance', BIHR xxxviii (1965), 71-93; Francis, The First Peninsular War, 
pp. 35-8. 
23 Cobbett, Parliamentary History ofEngland, vi. 4; PRO, SP 105165, unf: Stepney to Vernon, 8,26 Apr., 9, 
20 May 1702 [NS], and enclosure, 'La proposition du Ministre de L'Empercur pour envoyer la Flotte sur les 
Costes du Royaume de Naples, fondee sur la necessite facilite, et sur Putilite de cette Entreprise, 15/26 avril 
1702'; Stepney to Manchester, II Apr. 1702 [NS]. 
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Admiral - without any real executive power. 29 It was May before Nottingham and Hedges 
were appointed to the two Secretaryships and Prince George's Admiralty Council was in 
place; and, only then, could they begin to pick up the organisation. of what was to be one of 
the largest expeditionary forces dispatched in the early eighteenth century. 
Bringing together the English and Dutch Grand Fleets at Spithead on which twelve 
English infantry regiments, some dragoons, and eight Dutch battalions were to be embarked 
quite simply took considerable time. Thejournals and correspondence of the commanders, 
Admiral Sir George Rooke and the Duke of Ormonde, detail their exhaustive efforts in this 
regard. Aside from the standard responsibilities of their positions, such as the gathering and 
the provisioning of their forces and ensuring that they had adequate accommodation with 
bedding, Rooke and Ormonde were faced with certain larger administrative tasks. 30 In 
particular, five regiments had to be transferred from Ireland; a sizeable descent train organised 
in conjunction with the Ordnance office; and oversight provided for the infantry holding camp 
on the Isle of Wight, which was only one of the two embarkation points (Plymouth being the 
other). These were not primarily army affairs either due to the role of the navy in organising 
transport for the troops and embarkation. 31 Given the potential for delay attendant upon all 
these matters, it is perhaps remarkable that the organisation of the expeditionary force was 
largely complete by the beginning of July. 
The same could not be said for the drafting of the Instructions. This process 
continued on from the Nine Years War in a manner whereby it was usual for several sets to 
be issued along with attendant shorter Additional Instructions. Rooke received his first 
Instructions and secret additional notes from Secretary Hedges on 7 June. Withthejoint 
army-navy Council of War the sovereign command body, the Instructions required that CAdiz 
was to be reduced, though Gibraltar was acceptable as a default target. Moreover, if time 
29 W. A. Speck, The Birth ofBritain: A New Nation 1700-1710 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 35-6 
30 The Journal ofSir George Rooke, pp. 144-63; BL, Add MSS 38159, pp. 2-7: The Duke of Ormonde's 
Journal of the Expedition to Spain in the Year 1702 [hereafter 'Ormonde's Journal']; PRO, SP 42/67: fos. 13- 
15,18,22: Rooke to Nottingham, 29 May, 1,4,13,25 June 1702; PRO, SP 44/168, pp. 398-400: 
'Commission for the Duke of Ormonde to be C-in-C of the Forces to be Employed on Board the Fleet', 12 
Apr. 1702. 
31 PRO, WO 4615, p. 70: 'Your Lordship Most Obedient & Humble Servants' to 'My Lord [Romney? ], 20 Feb. 
1702; PRO, SP 44/206, p. 21-2: 'The Duke of Ormonde's Demands from the Office of the Ordnance for the 
Sea Expedition', n. d.; Vernon to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 26 Mar. 1702; Vernon to the Transport 
Commissioners, 26 Mar. 1702; PRO, SP 105165, unf.: Vernon to Sutton, 12 July 1702; PRO, ADM 2/28, pp. 
76,107-8,15 1: the Admiralty to the Transport Commissioners, 24,31 Mar, 20 Apr. 1702. 
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and the Council allowed, then Vigo, Pontevedra or La Coruila could be attacked on the 
fleet's return. The secret Instructions directed that ships and a garrison be left at Cadiz, if the 
operation proved succesSfUl. 32 Within a week, however, the priorities of these Instructions 
were upset when the Ministry requested that Rooke's Council of War immediately consider 
whether a descent might first be undertaken at La Corufla if the French ships listed in the 
intelligence report from the station commander, Rear-Admiral Munden, were still present. 
The Council agreed but stressed that it was contingent upon confirmation of the French 
presence in the harbour and to facilitate this, Rear-Admiml Fairborne was dispatched with a 
33 
squadron to keep the French bottled-up in the port. Notwithstanding, the Instructions were 
altered for a third time as a result of the poor early July weather which delayed Rooke's 
departure. The Ministry considered the season of year to be too advanced for attempting a 
range of targets; hence it was decided that if Fairbome reported a French squadron at La 
Corufla then the descent was to be made there but, if not, then the fleet could proceed on to 
Cadiz but no further. Gibraltar on the outward and Vigo and Pontevedro on the return 
journeys were all ruled out as possible targets; only La Coruila on the fleet's return was 
viewed admissible if the Council of War agreed. 34 The expeditionary force's Instructions 
were strictly drafted and this was ultimately to have considerable bearing upon the progress 
of the operation. 
Once Rooke made it out of the Channel at the end of July, the weather conditions 
improved considerably and the main fleet quickly made Cape Finisterre to link up with Rear- 
Admiral Fairborne's squadron which, as mentioned, had been sent to La Coruila at the end of 
June to block up the French squadron that Munden had failed to prevent getting into that port 
in the first place. The French had, however, left before Fairborne's arrival and, although the 
Rear-Admiral and Rooke initially missed each other at the latter's station off the Cape, 
Fairborne came up by the end of the first week in August. 35 Within three days of this 
conjunction, the main fleet reached the Portuguese coast and on II August in Lagos Bay, a 
32 PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 3-10: 'Instructions for Our Trusty and Welbeloved Sir George Rooke Knt', 7 June 
1702; 'Additional Instructions for Our Trusty and Welbeloved Sir George Rooke Knt', 7 June 1702. 
" The Journal ofSir George Rooke, pp. 157-60; PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 16-22: Hedges to Rooke, 13,16,18 
June 1702; 'Instructions for Our Trusty and Wclbeloved Sir George Rooke Knt', 16 June 1702. 
34 PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 28-30: Hedges to Rooke, 20 July 1702; 'Instructions for Our Trusty and Welbeloved 
Sir George Rooke Knt', 20 July 1702. 
31 The Journal ofSir George Rooke, pp. 163,164 n. 1,171-3; PRO, ADM 2/28, pp. 226-8,438-9: the 
Admiralty to Munden, 5 May 1702; the Admiralty to Rooke or in his absence Shovell, 24 June 1702. 
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Council of War was convened to consider an agenda dominated by intelligence on CAdiz sent 
by the English Envoy to Portugal, John Methuen. 36 
The defences at Cddiz were reportedly poor, both with respect to the garrison troops 
and the fortifications. The six regiments in the town were said to be a third under strength 
and, although several new works had been erected since Carlos 11's death, the speed with 
which they had been thrown up had impaired their quality. Satisfied that no significant 
measures had been undertaken to defend Cadiz, Methuen concluded that the circumstances 
for an immediate attack were propitious, especially since the town's commandant, Scipio 
Brancaccio, was reputedly disliked by both soldiers and inhabitants. Nonetheless, it seemed 
to the Council that this intelligence merely underscored the expedition's original strategic 
intent to target Cddiz and that its assessment of the doubtful and confused state of affairs in 
the town prevented a decision being taken on the tactical form of the assault. To address this 
concern, a detachment of grenadiers commanded by Colonel Pearce was to be put ashore at 
Rota - some six miles north-west of Cddiz - to gain ftirther intelligence. 
It must be assumed that Methuen had not then sent Ormonde a duplicate of an 
anonymous letter from Tavira, dated 10 August (NS), for it provided considerable detail on 
the disposition of CAdiz's defenceS. 37 The town itself was situated at the extremity of the 
narrow Isla de Ldon peninsula, which snaked out from Spain's south-west coast, and was 
separated from the mainland by the Bay of CAdiz. CAdiz's inner harbour - the Puntales - was 
accessed by a channel - the Canon de Puntales - leading from the outer bay, and which was, 
at its narrowest point, flanked by the forts Puntales and Matagorda, on the Isla de Ldon and 
the mainland respectively. The anonymous correspondent told not only of strong materials 
comprising the chain across the Puntales, but also of the number and the reach of the guns in 
the Puntales and the Matagorda forts and, significantly, of a new work built just up from the 
Puntales Fort, which provided additional fire from its sixteen guns across the inner bay. 
36 The ensuing account of the operation to capture CAdiz is based upon the following primary sources and 
secondary authorities: BL, Add MSS 38159, pp. 2-33: 'Ormonde's Journal'; The Journal ofSir George 
Rooke, pp. 118-262; Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, pp. 47-56; A Full and Impartial Ilistory of 
the &pedition into Spain (London, 1704), pp. 1-172; The Life andAdventures ofMatthew Bishop of 
Deddington in Oxfordshire (London, 1744), pp. 6-11; PRO, ADM 51/4320, Part iv, unpaginated, Royal 
Sovereign, 21 July47 Sept. 1702; BL, Sloane 2496, pp. 42-54: 'Examinations relative to the failure of the 
Expedition against Cadiz 1702'; Spain Under Charles the Second, pp. 206-12: Stanhope to his father (11on. 
A. Stanhope), 29 Aug., 3,4 Sept. 1702 [NSI; Owen, War at Sea Under Queen Anne, pp. 77-8 1; Colomb, 
Naval Warfare, pp. 283-6. 
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Further detail in the letter outlined the strength of the forts dotted along the coastline leading 
to Cddiz. In addition to this correspondent, accounts fi-om fishermen captured by the 
detachment en route to Rota were sent by Pearce; while other news filtered through from 
Portugal and elsewhere along the southern Spanish coast. Thus, although Pearce's sally onto 
the mainland failed to glean anything further, on reconvening two days later, the Council 
considered that it had sufficient information to facilitate detailed planning. 
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Certain topographical circumstances were similar to those which had framed the 
attack on Brest in 1694 inasmuch as that a direct landing upon the principal target from the 
calm of an inner harbour was an unlikely proposition due to the narrow sea access. A day 
after this Council, while waiting for the transport ships to gather, Fairborne did suggest that a 
passage through to the Puntales could be forced but he failed to convince his naval 
colleagues. The other possible direct route was from the Atlantic side of the Ldon peninsula 
and it was rcconnoitred on 13 August by both the Quarter-Master-General and the Chief 
Engineer. Despite their report of three commodious landing bays (one large and two small) 
between the Isla de Santa Pedro (on the backside of the Ldon peninsula) and CAdiz town, and 
notwithstanding Ormonde's support, this approach was vetoed for leaving the naval vessels 
too exposed. The intelligence also made it clear that any direct route would have to contend 
immediately not only with the considerable ordnance located in the strategically sited forts but 
also with some 4000 troops based in the town and 1000 regular horse alongside the militia 
which roamed the nearby coast. Cddiz would probably have to be besieged and the navy had 
doubts about supply, particularly if the ships were forced to lie off the Uon peninsula in 
unsettled weather. As at Brest in 1694, it was considered more appropriate to land troops 
some distance from the intended target and, then to march upon it with the aim of capturing 
enemy defence works en route which would facilitate the entry of the fleet into the inner 
harbour to conduct a destructive close range bombardment. The Council therefore resolved 
to land the troops in the Bay of Bulls, immediately east of Rota, with Fort Santa Catalina (or 
St Katherine's Tower)38and Puerto de Santa Maria on the road to the Uon peninsula the 
initial objectives. 
Ormonde, was principally responsible for the troop landings, having issued the 
instructions governing them and then being present in his barge throughout; meanwhile, the 
most senior naval commander present, Fairborne (Rooke was ill in his flagship with a gout 
38 The 1695 map reproduced in Owen, War at Sea Under Queen Anne, causes confusion on the question of 
fort names. Its Spanish name for St Katherine's Tower is Santa Cattalins and it marks another fort to the 
north-cast of CAdiz town, called Santa Catalina. Although Owen does not obviously represent the capture of 
St Katherine's Tower (Fort Santa Catalina) as part of the march to occupy Puerto de Santa Maria, on p. 78, he 
refers to Fort Santa Catalina as being like Fort Matagorda on the 'northern arm' of the inner harbour, which 
must be the fort labelled Santa Catallins on the map. Other secondary literature such as Colomb's Naval 
Warfare, pp. 2834 and, more importantly, the primary sources listed in n. 36 above generally refer to the fort 
east of Puerto de Santa Maria as Santa Catalina, though 7he Journal ofSir George Rooke, occasionally makes 
reference instead to Fort Santa Catarina. 
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induced fever) could only maintain a supervisory role from the deck of the Swifisure. 
Ormonde's descent Instructions bore a remarkable similarity to Tollemache's intentions at 
Best. Some 1200 grenadiers were to be first ashore with the landing thereafter configured as 
mutually reinforcing waves of regiments in line; the English would take the place of seniority 
on the right leaving the Dutch to the left. Significantly, two important lessons had been learnt 
from the Camaret Bay ddbdcle: the forward landing craft were to be of the shallowest draft; 
and the Instructions indicated that it was the responsibility of the general officers and also the 
individual platoon commanders to ensure an orderly landing. Naval lieutenants were not on 
this occasion - as they had been at Brest - solely in charge of the landing craft. Although 
additional ammunition and war stores were to follow immediately behind the third wave, 
Ormonde also shrewdly ensured that his men were each carrying two days full provisions, 
thereby providing them with the capacity to sustain a period - albeit short - of operational 
independence in the event that the landing was vigorously contested. 
It was late morning on 15 August before the operation commenced. Four third rates 
stood into the bay to guard against the French galleys known to be in the Puntales and also to 
engage Fort Santa Catalina whose guns could rake the landing she. The weather proved the 
main obstacle with the strong winds upsetting several boats and thus causing a number of 
men to drown; only a very few soldiers did not have to swim or wade through shoulder high 
water to reach the shore. The detachment of grenadiers led by Pearce and Lord Donegal 
were first onto the beach and, despite wet ammunition, fought off an equal number of Spanish 
troopers which charged down from the hills. Those horsemen and a small gun emplacement 
(abandoned on the approach of the Dutch) apart, no other opposition was encountered on the 
landing beach and some 6000 troops were successfully ashore by night-fall. Before then, 
however, Ormonde had moved to secure Rota, in his rear, which was a suitable prospect for 
additional troop and artillery train landings. 
A place of little strength upon a declination, Rota was easily threatened by the 
Confederate forces. A summons was sent ahead and, as the army approached, Rota's chief 
magistrate came out to offer Ormonde the town keys. A camp was quickly established along 
with a headquarters in the town castle, while the remaining stores and troops were landed. 
Amongst the latter were a group of sailors who had been asked to volunteer to go ashore as 
'Pioneers' and the account of one 'Pioneer' - Matthew Bishop (then a seaman in the 
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Swiftsure but later a celebrated Malburian soldier)39 suggests that their experiences were not 
dissimilar from those of the Naval Brigades some centuries later. 40 
Ormonde remained at Rota for three days to organise the next phase of the operation. 
In anticipation of the march along the coast to the Isla de Ldon peninsula, a letter was sent to 
the Governor of Puerto de Santa Maria explaining that the Confederates intended to occupy 
the port but pledging that no harm would come to the inhabitants provided that they remained 
quiescent. Ormonde's letter recognised that the operation against CAdiz was indirectly linked 
to the promotion of another claimant to the Spanish throne and the ongoing diplomacy to 
bring Portugal into the Grand Alliance. The necessity of not alienating the inhabitants of the 
targeted territory meant that it was simply not sufficient to complete the operation without 
thought to the impact of the army's actions. On this occasion, some restraint in waging war 
was required which quickly proved to be beyond Ormonde and his fellow officers and, more 
importantly, was unrecognised by the soldiers. 
Once two small ambuscades had been beaten off, the army was able to enter the now 
nearly deserted Puerto de Santa Maria; meanwhile a grenadier vanguard captured Fort Santa 
Catalina. Almost immediately, discipline broke down. Houses were looted and churches 
despoiled; while drunk troops molested the remaining women and nuns. It was notjust the 
army privates who were culpable, however. The naval 'Pioneer', Bishop, contentedly 
recollects drinking wine with a colleague on a roof prior to the army entering the town and in 
his log entry of 23 August, Captain Ley of the Royal Sovereign bluntly notes that both 
seamen and soldiers were plundering Santa Maria. Considerable evidence also points to the 
participation by officers of both services. Certainly, the senior generals, Sir Charles O'Hara 
and Sir Henry Belasis, were later placed under arrest by Ormonde for their alleged role in the 
plunder, while some naval officers were implicated in storing loot in their vessels. These 
actions undoubtedly extinguished any support there might have been in Andalucia for the 
Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne and Ormonde's subsequent declaration against the 
plundering did not appease the inhabitants. Militarily, this meant that CAdiz would have to be 
captured and then defended in a conventional manner, not only against the Franco-Spanish 
troops but also against the town's inhabitants and those of the surrounding area. Without 
39 C. T. Atkinson, 'One of Marlborough's Men: Matthew Bishop of Webb's', JSAIIR xxiii (1945), 157-69. 
1 See, for example, R. Brooks, The LongArm ofthe Empire: Naval Brigadesfrom the Crimea to the Boxer 
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considerable additional resources, the security of a Confederate Cddiz might easily be 
breached from within and hence its worth as a naval base and a secure gateway to the 
Mediterranean was called into question. Even before an attack had been launched, and 
regardless of whether it was to be successful, failure at Cddiz had largely been ensured by the 
expeditionary force's conduct at Santa Maria. 
This last point was not however fully appreciated at the time and, although both 
Rooke and Ormonde subsequently recognised that the events at the port had greatly hardened 
opposition, the desire to push forward was maintained. The Council had previously agreed 
that the naval bombardment of Cddiz depended upon the capture of Fort Santa Catalina, thus 
allowing the naval detachment to stand safely into Cddiz Bay, and also whether or not 
Ormonde decided that the army should reach Puerto Real first. With the first condition 
achieved, Ormonde inexplicably deferred his decision on the march to Puerto Real by calling 
another Council, which convened on 24 August. Perhaps responding to the Duke's 
unexpressed wish, the officers present looked at the next stage in greater detail and resolved 
that if the army could capture Fort Matagorda, then the navy might send a couple of frigates 
though the Canon de Puntales and, if the passage proved clear, additional vessels might 
follow. Aside from enabling the navy to destroy the French ships and galleys tied up in the 
Puntales, it would, more importantly, allow for a close range bombardment of CAdiz to soften 
up its defences against a land assault. The Council recognised though that the essential first 
step - the capture of the Matagorda - was not an easy prospect, particularly with respect to its 
approach. Consequently, Rear-Admirals Fairborne, Wassanaer and Grayden were charged 
with assessing the viability of transporting men from the River Xeres (now River Guadalete)41 
at Puerto de Santa Maria to the neck of land upon which the Matagorda was situated. 
The Admirals submitted two reports which, although admittedly taking account of the 
different conditions at high and low water, gave no clear opinion other than to convey their 
general scepticism about this method of advance. Uncharacteristically, it was a Dutchman, 
Admiral Allemonde, who forestalled the potential deadlock by calling another Council which 
decided to stick with the resolution of 24 August. The coastal advance upon the Matagorda 
Rebellion (London, 1999). 
411 am most grateful to Dr Roy Alexander of Chester College, Professor Adrian Harvey of Liverpool 
University and Dr Roberto Lazaro, Suau of Consejo Superior des Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC) at the 
Estacion Experimental de Zonas Aridas (EEZA), Almeria, for their geographical expertise which helped me 
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was nonetheless rejected in favour of Baron Sparr marching some 2500 troops overland, 
albeit having to cross three rivers in the process. This task though was to be eased by use of 
the ships' boats. By the end of August, Sparr was dug in a half-mile from the Matagorda and, 
although the attack was getting bogged down in marshy ground which was ill-suited for the 
siting of his field-artillery, he confidently sent for the rest of the army to join him. That it 
proved not forthcoming was partially due to the emergence of reservations over this approach 
but also because of a general desire to get some troops on to the Isla de Ldon in quick-time. 
This in turn set in-train a series of Councils of both land and sea officers which led to the 
abandonment of the operation against Cidiz. 
In separate letters, Ormonde and Rooke had represented their doubts about the 
attempt to force the Puntales by taking the Matagorda. Ormonde, writing to Secretary 
Nottingham, was circumspect but seemed to be preparing the ground for the failure by 
emphasising that his preference had always been to land troops on the back-side of the Uon 
peninsula. Rooke meanwhile, making his first effective intervention in the Cddiz operation, 
represented to the General that he would need to clear the channel of blockages. 
Furthermore, that the capture of the Matagorda fort would be insufficient for him to send 
vessels through the Canon de Puntales due to the prohibitive fire which would come from the 
fort opposite the Matagorda. A change of mind on this matter meant that Rooke was now 
supported by his commander in Cidiz Bay, Fairborne, and in a rarely remarked upon display 
of unanimity with Ormonde, Rooke similarly argued that Cidiz could only be taken by a 
considerable landing of troops on the Uon peninsula in conjunction with a sea-based 
bombardment. Accordingly, to expedite the entry of the army on the Isla de Uon, Ormonde 
proposed that the soldiers march away from the coast to Puente de Suazo and cross over the 
bridge there to Uon and, in the event that it was broken or defended, he requested that the 
navy send sufficient boats and materials to the river at Santo Pedro, so that a make-shift 
bridge could be fashioned between there and Suazo. Chairing his first Council of naval 
officers since arriving in the region, Rooke gained their agreement to Ormonde's proposal 
only for it to be thrown into doubt four days later when Brigadier Seymour brought an 
additional caveat to the plan. 
Before attempting to pass over on to Ldon, the Council of Land Officers considered 
conclude that the Xeres is probably now the Guadalete. 
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what to do in the event that the bridging manoeuvre failed and the army was forced to retreat. 
Implicit also in their deliberations was the belief that Sparr was unlikely to succeed, and thus 
the generals sought naval agreement to bring the army and artillery off at the mouth of the 
Xeres. The naval Council baulked at this proposal, arguing instead that the only safe 
embarkation place was the mole at Rota. Two days later, an increasingly discontented naval 
Council reconvened to consider matters further. Rooke had to contend with the mounting 
concern of his Captains at the increasing sickness amongst the junior officers and the 
, 42 crewmen employed ashore in what the Council superciliously called 'slavish services , and 
at the lateness of the season. There was also a move to restate the belief that the capture of 
the Matagorda would not facilitate the entry of the fleet into the Puntales. This naval Council 
of 2 September should not however be interpreted as representative of discordant relations 
between the army and navy, which contemporaries and commentators have assumed to be the 
principal reason for the failure of the operation. " It also passed resolutions that the flag- 
officers in CAdiz Bay reassess their scepticism about the tactical utility of the Matagorda and 
that a bombardment of Cidiz be undertaken at the first opportunity of good weather. Far 
from actually pulling the plug on the operation, the naval officers merely asked aloud if there 
was any real prospect of success at Cddiz and, if so, how quickly it was likely to come about. 
On the same day, a Council of army officers had moved to answer that question. 
Considering a letter that Lord Shannon had brought from Sparr which included the 
engineering officers' opinions, the Council decided that the attack against the fort should be 
recalled and that ajoint Council should convene to assess matters further. It was this 
Council, held on 5 September, which concluded that as the capture of the Matagorda was too 
difficult a task with the resources to hand, and one which would not in any event ease the 
passage of the fleet into the Puntales, then the operation against Cidiz should be abandoned. 
There is no record of rancour at this Council, nor of any such vigorous debates as had 
occurred at the Council of mid-August, which determined the tactical advance on CAdiz. 
Rather, it would seem that both the army and navy, first separately and then in this Council, 
calmly came to the conclusion that the operation could not succeed on the approach taken 
42 The journal of Sir George Rooke, p. 194. 
43 Life ofCaptain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, pp. 54-6, is a contemporary account which considers poor 
inter-service relations the cause of failure at CAdiz. Examples of histories which emphasis the role of army- 
naval discord are, Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, 
i. 273,276 and Coxc, Memoirs of the Kings of 
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and, indeed, that any attack would now require greater resources. Implicitly, this recognised 
that the indirect route to Cddiz was misguided and, as Marlborough later argued, if Cidiz was 
not from the outset a directly attainable target, then an alternative should have been 
considered. 44 More obvious was the impact of the events at Santa Maria in encouraging the 
locals' resistance and help to Governor Villadarias and Commandant Brancaccio to make best 
use of their limited resources, a point which Hesse-Darmstadt's letters to Rooke and 
Ormonde made clear. The problem therefore with Colomb's judgement that the operation 
45 
represented a failure of perseverance is that it overlooks these factors. The inter-service 
discord frequently referred to, and particularly the break-down in relations between Rooke 
and Ormonde, principally arose from the debate about what the expeditionary force was to do 
(if anything) now that Cidiz was not considered a feasible target. 
Marlborough later stepped into this debate by urging to Nottingham that the situation 
on the Spanish coast be retrieved if possible for the 'common cause% 46 This had been 
Ormonde's view, though unlike Marlborough, he was so anxious to undertake something that 
no obstacles were recognised. Rooke however saw complications everywhere, and retreated 
behind the provisions in his Instructions of 20 July which restricted alternative targets to one - 
La Corufla - but, as usual, its viability was contingent upon the agreement of a joint Council. 
According to Rooke'sjournal, Ormonde had proposed proceeding to La Corufla at the 
Council of 5 September but the sea officers declared against it due to the lateness of the 
season and they were supported by the testimony of the Corufla pilots whom Rooke brought 
in for questioning. However, no formal resolution was apparently adopted by the Council 
and meantime Prince Eugene's campaign in Italy and, in particular, the Battle of Luzzara (4 
August) was being interpreted as an encouragement for the Spaniards to welcome the 
Austrian Habsburgs. Emboldened therefore, Ormonde continued to lobby Rooke privately as 
they organised the troop withdrawal from the Andalucian coast. Increasingly frustrated by 
what he considered the General's disregard of the Instructions, Rooke sought the opinion of 
his fellow senior naval officers, once the embarkation was complete on 16 September. 
Spain, i. 224. 
44 The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, no. 139, p. 148: Marlborough to Godolphin, 21 Nov. 
1702. 
45 Colomb, Naval Warfare, p. 285. 
46 The Letters and Dispatches ofJohn Churchill, First Duke ofMarlborough, From 1702-1712, ed. Sir 
George Murray (London, 1845), i. 47: Marlborough to Nottingham, 23 Oct. 1702 [NS]. 
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Ormonde had suggested a variety of targets for another assault including CAdiz again; 
the Galician coastal towns of Pontevedro, Vigo and La Corufla; and Ayamonte, which was 
located westwards from CAdiz Bay at the estuary of the Guadiana river. Rooke placed them 
before his naval Council and, considering each in turn, the officers concluded that Ayamonte 
was the only possibility but even then concerns were raised about the viability of seaborne 
supply in the winter season. On-nonde's earlier disquiet about insufficient resources to 
capture CAdiz was used to reject a second attempt there; while it was felt that the Galician 
coast could not be reached in time before the inclement weather and diminishing provisions 
made an attack impractical. A joint Council was convened the following day to resolve the 
future proceedings of the expeditionary force, when the specific question before it was 
whether it would be reasonable to make a second landing on Spain. Factors such as the 
region's disinclination to the Austrian House and the depleted condition of the Dutch 
provisions - such that they had only one months supply for their troops - weighed heavily in 
the balance, and the Council decided against another landing in Spain. Indeed, it resolved 
that the expeditionary force should head for England. Ormonde, Sparr, and Pallandt refused 
to sign the minute but this did not represent a simple army-navy division for Brigadiers 
Seymour and Hamilton, Major-General O'Hara and the army's second-in-command, Bellasis, 
sided with the eight naval officers present. As with Captain Norris's experience at 
Newfoundland in 1697, it was Ormonde's failure to carry his fellow service officers which 
caused the decision to go against him. 
The fleet stood out into the Mediterranean and, in accordance with the Instructions, 
the dispatch of an expeditionary force to the West Indies was organised. "' Ormonde however 
proved unable to accept the Council's decision and his attitude quite clearly tilted at the 
Council's sovereignty of command enshrined in the Instructions. Seizing upon a letter from 
Methuen, which strongly implied that the Portuguese now offered a blank cheque of help to 
the expeditionary force, Ormonde began to agitate again that the circumstances were 
propitious for a second assault. Rooke had also received a letter from the envoy but his was 
more balanced in tone. While acknowledging that the Portuguese had declared themselves 
free from the French alliance, Methuen reported that their only overture to the Alliance was 
to make available six warship berths in each of the country's ports. Methuen did nonetheless 
" See Chapter 2, Section HAN, pp. 309-28, for the progress of this force. 
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believe that the navy should take up this offer and leave some frigates to winter in the 
Mediterranean -a proposal that had also been included in the Instructions. The Council, 
which convened to consider Methuen's recommendation, had first however to decide upon 
the scope of Portugal's engagement. The officers present proved overwhelmingly sceptical of 
Ormonde's 'blank cheque' letter, believing it to contain 'ambiguous and doubtful 
expressions 948 and again only Sparr and Pallandt supported the General. There was also 
opposition to the substantive issue of leaving some ships in the region and, at a further 
Council held two days later on 24 September, the resolution to return forthwith to England 
was upheld. 
The history of the Rooke-Ormonde expedition to Spain would have remained one of 
failure if they had not come upon a piece of luck on their returnjourney. Off Cape Finisterre 
in thick weather on 6 October, the Pembroke came into the fleet from Lagos with news that a 
substantial French squadron escorting the Spanishflota had put into Vigo. 49 The convoy was 
commanded by Vice-Admiral CMteaurenault whose squadron had originally left Brest in 
September 1701 for a year long tour in the Caribbean where it was to defend the French 
possessions and attack the English colonies. However, a lack of resources and stout English 
island defences caused vacillation in pressing forward these attacks, and, on hearing that a 
lack of provisions and wonn damage had forced C6etlogon's escort squadron to return home 
without the Spanish silver plate, Chiteaurenault considered that Louis's interests would 
instead be best served by his squadron taking up this task. Throughout June theflota was 
gathered at Havana and, in the night of 23 July, the 56 sail convoy departed. Cddiz was the 
usual destination for the plate fleet but the arrival of the allied operation against that town in 
late August meant that an alternative had to be found. As a result of an accurate intelligence 
appraisal of the Anglo-Dutch fleets' dispositions and a disagreement between ChAteaurenault 
and theflota commander, Manuel de Velasco, Vigo was selected as the safest compromise 
option. 50 The communication by Captain Hardy of the Pembroke would not however have 
"s BL, Add MSS 38159, p. 32: 'Ormonde's Journal'. 
`9 PRO, ADM 51/4320, Part iv, un paginated, Royal Sovereign, 6 Oct. 1702; The Journal ofSir George 
Rooke, p. 227. 
'A Full andImpartial History, pp. 152-72: An Account of Monsieur ChAteaurenau Id's Expedition from his 
First Sailing from Brest in September 170 1, to his Putting into the Harbour of Vigo in September 1702; A. 
Baudrillart, Philippe VEI La Cour de France (Paris, 1890), i. 115; H. Kamen, 'The Destruction of the 
Spanish Fleet at Vigo in 1702', BIHR xxxix (1966), 165-6. 
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surprised the English Ministry because two days previously Secretary Nottingham had 
received similar news from Paris. This timely report was the fruit of the Maritime Powers' 
efforts to track theflota since the early summer in the knowledge that its interception would 
be a significant financial set-back for the Franco-Spanish war effort. This priority was 
reflected in the deployment from mid-July of Sir Cloudesley Shovell's squadron on stations 
off the Western Approaches and the Channel looking for Chfiteaurenault. However, by the 
time Nottingham had informed the Admiralty and orders to Rooke and Shovell to consult 
over the destruction of the French fleet had been dispatched, Rooke had already seized the 
initiative in theatre. Within hours of Captain Hardy coming aboard, the Sorlings and the 
Sheerness were dispatched to confirin the news and the fleet stood away for Vigo; meanwhile 
Rooke called a meeting of the Flag Officers for the following day. 51 
This naval Council quickly brushed aside the deadline of I October for attacking 
Galician ports, which it had set on 16 September when considering Ormondc's list of targets 
for a second landing on Spain, and it determined to 'insult them [the French] immediately, 52 
at Vigo. Although the unexpected nature of the opportunity which had arisen was an 
argument for ignoring the cut-off date, the alacrity with which it was disregarded suggests 
that the naval officers had been unnecessarily timid in their earlier deliberations. Indeed, 
Ormonde might with some justification have concluded that the Navy had wrongly frustrated 
the expedition's progress after the embarkation of the troops from Rota. However, delight 
that action was about to occur probably led the General to abandon this argument, albeit 
temporarily. By the early morning of 8 October, Vigo was in sight and, although the Sorlings 
and the Sheerness did not return with confirmation of Pembroke's intelligence until the 
following day, Lieutenants Paddon of the Lenox and Sanders of the St George were sent in 
boats to reconnoitre the French position. " 
They would have found that the eighteen strong French squadron and fifteen sail of 
51 PRO, ADM 1/4088, f, 78: Nottingham to the Admiralty, 4 Oct. 1702; PRO, ADM 2/28, pp. 508-9: the 
Admiralty to Shovell, 17 July 1702; PRO, ADM 2/29, pp. 30-1,92-3,98-9,146-7,150: the Admiralty to 
Shovell, 20 Aug., 11,18 Sept., 5 Oct. 1702; the Admiralty to Rooke, 5 Oct. 1702; PRO, ADM 3/17, 
unpagin ated: Board Minutes, 24,26 Sept., 5 Oct. 1702; The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, no. 
110, pp. 114-15: Godolphin to Marlborough, 13 Sept. 1702. 
52 The Journal ofSir George Rooke, p. 228. 
5' The Journal ofSir George Rooke, p. 228; PRO, ADM 8/7, unpaginated: 'The present disposall of all her 
Ma . esties Ships & Vessells in Sea Pay', I Aug. 1702. U 
203 
the Spanishflota 54 had passed by Vigo, which was situated in the middle of its eponymous 
bay's southern shore, and through to the estuary where a capacious inner harbour opened out 
at the town of Redondela. Just prior to this, between the Randa headland and the northern 
shore, the bay narrowed to a breadth of half a mile, thus forming the Estrecho de Randa 
channel, which was the only access to the harbour. Sheltered also by the surrounding 
Galician mountain range, the French anchorage was naturally a strong defensive position. 
Additional security was provided by a number of artificial land defences, which 
CMteaurenault had augmented since his arrival. A boom, described by Bishop, 'as strong as 
the "Art of Man" could devise 55had been placed across the Estrecho, which was flanked by 
Fort Randa to the south and by Fort Corbeyo on the northern shore, though this was 
essentially little more than a boosted gun emplacement. Aside from increasing the ordnance 
of these forts with naval guns so that Randa held nearly 30 pieces and Corbeyo ten less, 
Chiteaurenault also ordered a number of French marines to garrison the southern fort and to 
act in conjunction with the Spanish troops that roamed the coast from Vigo eastwards. Much 
of this detail and more was known to London due to Methuen's intelligence contacts from 
Vianna in southern Spain; but, of course, such reports took so long to be processed that 
Rooke was forced to rely upon his own reconnaissance provision. Fortunately, Paddon and 
Sanders were able to furnish Rooke with the above intelligence picture, while also informing 
him that much plate had already been disembarked for Lugo. 56 Although the opportunity to 
destroy ChAteaurenault's fleet made this latter point seem immaterial, its pre-eminence in any 
reckoning of the operation's success has subsequently been emphasised. 57 
-" There is considerable disagreement amongst the domestic primary sources consulted on the number of 
French and Spanish ships at anchor in the inner harbour. The numbers cited are taken from Kamen, 'The 
Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet', p. 168, on the basis that his authorities are documents held in the 
Archivo, General de Indias, Seville, and therefore arguably have greater pretensions to accuracy. 
55 The Life andA dventures of Matthew Bishop, p. 11. 
56 PRO, ADM 1/4088, fos. 91-4: 'An Account of the Present Condition of Vigo in a Letter from Mr Lacy an 
English Gentleman Living in Vianna from Vianna', 13 Sept. 1702. Endorsed: '27 Oct. 1702, Nottingham 
transmits an account from Mr Methuen of the present condition of Vigo which he hear from Mr Lacy and 
English Gentleman at Vianna'; More intelligence on Vigo from Methuen, n. d. 
51 Kamen, 'The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet', pp. 165-73. 
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While the naval Council had taken the initial decision to proceed to Vigo with the 
intention ofattacking the French fleet, it was a meeting of1x)th the land and sea officers on 
II October which lbirmulated the assault tactics. Marshal Tallard's aide, I lautclbrt. later 
claimed that the anchorage possessed near 'perfect security"' and it was clear that Rookc's 
ships would not bc- able to penetrate the inner harbour without help from the land. 
Specifically, at least one of the two sources offlanking fire across the F. strccho would have to 
he stilled and, to this end, it was decided to land a detachment ofsoldicrs on the southern 
shore of Vigo Bay with the objective of capturing Randa Iort. The theorist Callwcll has 
written that military success must occasionally act as a prerequisite for the naval opcratloný`, 
but this places a premium upon sequencing the separate service actions. Thus at Vigo, 
officers gave considerable thought to their service formations. Ormondc issued all equivalent 
set of landing instructions to those used at C6diz: a vanguard detachment ol'greiladiers Would 
secure the beachhead for the line regiments to come ashore in sequence, and the soldiers were 
Louis Charles, Marquis de Flautetbrt, The Atemoirs ofihe Afarquis de Hawelort Wonclon, 1763), p. 4 1. 
Callwell, Afililary Operalions andAlarilime Preponderance, pp. 136,146-7. 
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again to be self-sufficient for two days with order to be rigorously enforced at the battalion 
and company level. As for the navy, Rooke appreciated that disarray threatened if the whole 
fleet tried to pass through the Estrecho. Twenty-five of the smaller rates were therefore 
selected as the initial attack squadron which was disposed in seven groups of up to four 
vessels, each with a commanding Admiral and accompanied by ten fireships. Entry to the 
channel was to be in line abreast with the end ships detailed to absorb and quell and any shore 
artillery fire, while the other line vessels would concentrate on breaking through into the inner 
harbour to bombard the enemy thereby allowing the fireships to be dispatched. Vice-Admiral 
Thomas Hopsonn was to command the lead group in the Torbay with the Barfleur on the 
starboard post by the Randa promontory and, with no land assault planned for the northern 
shore, the post on the more vulnerable larboard end of the line was taken by Buckman's 
Association. 60 
The haze which had masked the fleet's arrival in Vigo Bay - though not sufficiently to 
prevent a desultory cannonade from Vigo's town defences - was replaced on the 12 October 
by heavy rain and squanS. 61 The morning was spent landing some 3000 troops in the Punta 
de Alameita and Taberna bay near Teis where no opposition was encountered. 62 The 
Grenadiers commanded by Pearce and Shannon were immediately ordered forward to Fort 
Randa and Ormonde was to follow with the rest of the troops. The march proved as 
uneventful as the landing and it was only upon drawing near the fort that Ormonde spied a 
body of Spanish foot advancing between the fort and the hills to the rear of Redondela. 
Despite reputedly being four times the number of the assault force, they retreated upon the 
approach of the grenadier vanguard after a rather half-hearted attempt to engage in a long- 
range skirmish. Although the fort's garrison of 300 French marines and 50 Spaniards was 
more determined in its opposition, it was not long before they too were overcome. Almost 
60 Anon, A Relation of the Great and Glorious Success ofthe Fleet and Forces ofIfer Majesty and the States 
General at Vigo (London, 1702). 
" The ensuing account of the operation at Vigo is based upon the following primary sources and secondary 
authorities: Anon, A Relation of the Great andGlorious Success ofthe Fleet andForces; The Journal ofSir 
George Rooke, pp. 232-6; Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, pp. 57-9; BL, Sloane MSS 2496, pp. 
42-54: 'Examinations relative to the failure of the Expedition against Cadi4 1702% A Full andImpartial 
Ifistory, pp. 111-25; BL, Add MSS 38159, pp. 33-7: 'Ormonde's Journal'; PRO, ADM 51/4375, Part vii 
unpaginatcd Torbay: 11-13 Oct. 1702; 7he Life andAdventures ofMatthew Bishop, pp. 12-13; de Survilie, 
77je Memoirs ofthe Marquis de Hautefort, pp. 40-5; Owen, War at Sea Under Queen Anne, pp. 83-5. 
" Owen, War at Sea Under Queen Anne, p. 84, claims that some 3000 Spanish militia had to be driven from 
trenches along the shore but none of the primary sources listed in the above reference refer to this. 
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immediately upon coming up to the fort, the grenadiers captured the lower gun platform 
which housed the majority of the ordnance and, as the garrison retreated into the old stone 
tower, Charles's Churchill's regiment arrived in support to secure the western end of the 
fortifications. This frecd the grenadiers - in a typically opportunistic fashion - to rush in and 
overpower the garrison when its commander, the French naval Captain, Sorel, opened the 
tower gate to make a sortie. Randa fort was in Confederate hands and if Hopsonn could 
correctly time his run up to the boom, he would be spared the potentially devastating flanking 
fire from the south. 
Sailing ships are however too reliant upon the wind for their sailors to be more than 
approximate in their timing and, having rather precipitously set off immediately the soldiers 
had landed, a calm descended which forced Hopsonn to drop anchorjust short of the boom 
before Ormonde's grenadiers had even taken the fort's outwork battery. Accordingly, the 
French turned all their ordnance upon the motionless squadron, only to squander the 
opportunity to force its retreat through inaccurate fire. As the shells fell around him, 
Hopsonn's proximity to the boom allowed him to observe the scope of the French defence of 
the inner harbour. It looked much stronger than the previous reconnaissance mission had 
suggested and consequently he thought Rooke should see this too. The Admiral along with 
Fairborne completed the perilous journey to the Torbay and retired to Hopsonn's cabin for 
discussions on how they might act. 
Although the Admirals decided to adhere to the original plan, the weather proved the 
important element inasmuch as a fresh gale shortly sprung up to allow the squadron another 
run at the boom. With the Barfleur and Association disposed against the two forts, Hopsonn 
signalled his division to set both fore and top sails and then he 'steered directly for the 
booMs,. 63 It was at this point that Ormonde began the final assault on Randa Fort, having 
earlier taken its principal battery. The sequencing was only therefore slightly disrupted by an 
early naval move but it did mean that the lead ship, the Torbay, received a considerable 
amount of fire, particularly from the French ships, Le Bourbon and LEsperance, placed just 
inside the harbour. Nonetheless, Torbay's ramming of the boom allowed her to break clean 
through and, although the remainder of her division and that of Vandergoes had to set about 
the obstacle with cutting equipment, it was not long before three divisions of the attacking 
"' Quoted in Owcn, War at Sea Under QueenAnne, p. 84. 
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squadron entered the inner harbour. For the vessels first inside the Puntales, there was still an 
awkward engagement to be fought before the French squadron could be destroyed or 
captured. The harbour's confined sea space increased the destructive potential of the French 
fireships. Indeed, Hopsonn had to abandon the Torbay as it was very nearly destroyed by the 
blazing Le Favori - only its premature explosion allowed crew to return to the English ship 
and extinguish the flames. Within about forty minutes from first breaching the boom, the 
Confederates had silenced Le Bourbon and LEsperance and consolidated their presence both 
in the harbour and on the coast around Randa. In such circumstances, ChAteaurenault was 
quick to conclude that his defence was now untenable and he ordered the French squadron to 
be fired and abandoned. The loss of fifteen ships of the line so early in the war was a 
considerable set-back for the French navy which, even in less troubled times, struggled for 
recognition at Versailles. 
It has been argued that the Confederates could also only really feel pleased at the 
losses suffered by the French marine for fiscally the operation did not prove to be (as hoped) 
a debit upon the Franco-Spanish war finance. The silver taken from theflota was 
insignificant compared to the amount previously landed; and it was revealed that the Maritime 
Powers' trading communities possessed a capital and financial interest in theflota. Anglo- 
Dutch embarrassment over these circumstances was compounded by Philip V's shrewdness in 
using the attack as a pretext to exact additional contributions from foreign traders and raise 
loans, thus further upsetting established trade patterns. 64 These reservations do however 
ignore the psychological impact of the operation. The financial disparities were not widely 
appreciated at the time - indeed, as the merchandise and silver were recovered from the 
prizes, the officers and men anticipated considerable pay bonuses - and the practical 
symbolism of the assault resonated to a greater extent to England's benefit throughout the 
European capitals than this argument admits. Certainly in Lisbon, even if Pedro 11 was not 
immediately persuaded to join the Grand Alliance, the operation helped make the context for 
Methuen's diplomacy, which brought about that accession, much more favourable. Equally, 
the Emperor now seemed more willing to consider temporarily sidelining his Italian ambitions 
64 Kamen, 'The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet', pp. 165-73; Kamen, Philip V, p. 32; Francis, The 
First Peninsular War, p. 54. 
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and sending the Archduke Charles to the peninsula. 65 Stripped of its economic failures, the 
operation might justly be interpreted as contributing to the transition between Spain's 
different strategic war contexts and, in that regard, the judgement that the operation at Vigo 
had no impact upon England's or the Alliance's Grand Strategy seems wide of the mark. 66 
Moreover, even if this transition has not been seen as heralding an alteration in the 
foundations of England's and the Grand Alliance's war strategyý 7, it at least forced a re- 
ordering of the resource priorities over a wider geographical area. 
That development was however several months away. The more immediate strategic 
implications were implicitly considered by Parliament in different but equally suggestive ways. 
Upon their return in November, motions of thanks to Rooke and Ormonde were moved in the 
Commons alongside those to Marlborough. Despite taking important posts in the Maas 
valley and the lower Rhine, Anne's Captain-General had had a torrid campaign on continental 
Europe, having been frequently prevented from engaging the French by the cautious Dutch 
Field Deputies . 
6' The parity of esteem implied by the votes of thanks suggested that the 
political debate over the poles of war strategy - continental or naval - continued in ignorance 
that the Ministry was effectively promoting a blend of both and that the combined 
expeditionary force sent to Spain was not perforce a handmaiden of the navalist case. This 
though was the assumption the Lords made by ordering an enquiry into the failure at Cddiz. 
Doubtless, the Lords had been provoked by Ormonde's friends whose complaints 
about Rooke's conduct at Cddiz were sharpened after relations between the General and 
Admiral broke down again at Vigo: Rooke had refused Ormonde's request to leave behind a 
substantial number of ships to support his troops as they conducted further attacks in the 
Galician interior, thereby forcing Ormonde to embark all the troops on 17 October and to 
relinquish his post on the Spanish mainland. Marlborough did try to wam of the folly of an 
69 
enquiry in that it might rebound to Ormonde's detriment, which to an extent it did. 
However, the sense that the operation was a failure of naval strategy and tactics to penetrate 
65 Trevelyan, England Under QueenAnne, i. 309; Lynn, The Wars ofLouisXIV, p. 277; Francis, 'John 
Methuen and The Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of 1703', p. 117; Francis, e First Peni u ar ar p. 69. 
66 Churchill, Marlborough, ii. 137. 
Th ns I 
67 1 lattendorf, England in the War of the Spanish Succession, p. 267. 
" Cobbet, Parliamentaty History ofEngland, vi. 94; Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, i. 253; C. 
Barnett, Marlborough (London, 1974), pp. 504. 
69 7he Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, no. 139, pp. 147-8: Marlborough to Godolphin, 21 Nov. 
1702; BL, Add MSS 38159, pp. 35-7: 'Ormonde's Journal'. 
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the Mediterranean - an opinion held by the Queen - drove the investigation. Rooke appeared 
before the committee of the House of Lords twice in January 1703, when he was subject to 
detailed questioning on matters that had largely been the concern of the Councils of War 
during the operation. Of the 36 answers to written and oral questions Rooke provided, he 
referred back to the deliberations of the Councils of War in twelve, while eight of these 
twelve responses related to the joint army-navy Councils. In doing so, Rooke demonstrated a 
far surer grasp of the nature of combined operational command than his political peers and 
thus took the sting out of the attack on the navy. It was probably his performance in this 
regard which, despite the best efforts of the former Admiral of the Fleet, Torrington, ensured 
that Rooke escaped without censure when the Committee reported on 17 February. Indeed, 
their resolution that Rooke had 'acted like and brave an worthy commander -)70 with respect to 
his Instructions and Councils of War, recommended him when, in 1704, the Admiralty aimed 
to implement a wide-ranging combined operational agenda against France and Spain in the 
Mediterranean. 71 
UN: Operations Against the Spanish Coast. 1704 and the Capture of Gibraltar. July 
1704-April 1705. 
The Spanish theatre had been quiet during 1703 as the allies awaited the outcome of the 
Methuens' diplomacy to bring Portugal into the Grand Alliance. Joint army-navy ventures 
were limited to projected attacks on the French coasts and aiding the Camisard revolt in 
Languedoc . 
72 Nonetheless, as two of the Methuen treatieS73 - the Quadruple Offensive and 
Defensive Alliance and the Triple Treaty - were agreed in the early summer, a fleet was 
dispatched to the Mediterranean. Its priorities were however trade protection and assisting 
the imperial forces on the Neapolitan and Sicilian coasts. Descents upon Spain were 
suggested but they were explicitly categorised as subsidiary services and it was only for 
watering that 2500 marines were landed at Altea on 3 August. 
74 The Quadruple Treaty had 
70 The Journal ofSir George Rooke, pp. 255-6. 
"' The Journal ofSir George Rooke, pp. 241-52,254-6 (calculations are based upon Rooke's list of questions 
and answers); P. Le Fevre, 'Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, 1648-1716', in Le Fevre & Harding (eds), 
British Admirals, p. 38; Hattendorf, 'Sir George Rooke and Sir Cloudesley Shovell', p. 65. 
' See Section Lvii, pp. 294-5 below. 
73 The third was a Commercial Treaty, which was not signed until December 1703. 
74 PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 81-6: Hedges to Shovell, 10 May 1703, and enclosure, 'Instructions for Our Trusty 
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however completed the transition of Spain's strategic context within the war from simply a 
theatre of combat to a target of acquisition for the Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne, 
the Archduke Charles. " This alteration ensured the Peninsula's centrality within the 
Alliance's war policy for the remainder of the war. 
The strategic commitment to place the Archduke on the Spanish throne meant that the 
most pressing task was to transport him to the Peninsula along with the 12 000 troops - 4000 
from each of England, Austria and the United Provinces - that the Alliance was bound by the 
treaty to augment the Portuguese anny. 76 Charles was proclaimed 'King of Spain' in Vienna 
at the beginning of September; however the Emperor's reluctance to let his son go, and the 
Archduke's adoption of a punctilious monarchical grandeur, greatly slowed his progress to 
the Dutch coast, where he was to embark aboard a Anglo-Dutch fleet for Portugal. 
Meanwhile, the troop provision proved contentious. The Imperial contribution was not 
forthcoming and, although London increased England's contribution by a half again, the 
Dutch only reluctantly agreed to share the cost of supplying the outstanding 2000. Although 
Marlborough indicated a willingness to furnish 6000 troops from the army in Flanders, he 
manoeuvred to limit the amount withdrawn from that theatre and directly opposed 
Nottingham over having to provide the remaining 2000. Perhaps surprisingly - given 
Marlborough's pre-emincnce in the Queen's affections and his political and personal 
friendship with Lord Treasurer Godolphin - the Secretary prevailed. 77 Even with the arrival 
and Welbeloved Sir Cloudesley Shovell Knt', 7 May 1703; Memoirs Relating to the Lord Torrington, pp. 98- 
109; Life ofCaptain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, pp. 70- 1. 
" 
14 General Collection of Treatys, iii. 356: Article I of 'An Alliance Offensive and Defensive between 
Leopold Emperor of the Romans, Anne Queen of England, and the States General of the United Netherlands, 
on the one part, and Peter 11 King of Portugal on the Other', 16 May 1703. Despite the facts that he was 
proclaimed Carlos 111, King of Spain, by the allies and others opposed to Philip V, and that he even entered 
Madrid as King, his 'reign' (unlike Philip's) achieved no legitimacy outside of the war. Therefore, in relating 
events in the Peninsula, I shall continue to refer to him as the Archduke Charles. 
76,4 General Collection of Treatys, iii. 357-8: Article IX of 'An Alliance Offensive and Defensive', 16 May 
1703. 
77 HMC, Frankland-Russell-Astley MSS, pp. 12646: [G. Larnberty] to Cutts, [28 Julyn8 Aug., [4n 15, 
[18/]29, Aug., [28 Aug. /18 Sept., [In 12, [4nI5, [8n19, [15n26 Sept., [29 Sept. n 10 Oct., [2/]13, [16n27 Oct., 
[23 NovA4 Dec. 1703; The Letters and Dispatches ofJohn Churchill, i. 85,117-18,123,142-3,155-6,163- 
4,168,170-1,192,203-4: Marlborough to Nottingham, 13/24 Apr., 14 June, 15 July, 8,23,27 Aug., [5/6? 1 
Oct. 1703 [NS]; Marlborough to Stanhope, 23 June 1703 [NS]; Marlborough to Hill, 30 Aug. 1703 [NS], 
Marlborough to Hedges, 30 Oct. 1703 [NS]; The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, nos. 175,221, 
245-6,255, pp. 182 n. 1,227-8,246-7,254-5: Marlborough to Godolphin, 13 May, 29 July, 23,27 Sept., 19 
Oct. 1703; The Correspondence 1701-1711 ofJohn Churchill, First Duke ofAlarlborough andAnthonie 
11einsius, GrandPensionary ofHolland, ed. B. van't Hoff (The Hague, 195 1), nos. 114,121,130,133,144, 
149, pp. 70-1,74,81-3,91,94: Marlborough to Heinsius, 26 May, 12 June, 16,21 July, 13 Sept., 4 Oct. 1703 
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of the Archduke on the coast, and the embarkation of the troops aboard the transports by 
November, planning continued to be frustrated. Over the two days (26-7 November), the 
west-south-westerly winds of the celebrated Great Storm blew up the Channel and along its 
coasts wreaking devastation on a grand scale. 78 Several of the troop transports off Holland 
were run aground forcing the soldiers ashore and the senior Lieutenant-General on the coast, 
Lord Cutts, was faced with the unenviable logistical task of re-organising the embarkation of 
the troops before large scale desertions occurred. Despite considerable effort, however, not 
all the transports were ready by December when Admiral Rooke's squadron collected the 
Archduke, and the remainder had to follow in the New Year. 79 
The original hope that Charles, along with the troops, would reach Portugal by 
September had been dashed by these delays and, thus, instead of proceeding directly to the 
Peninsula, he was landed at Spithead on Boxing Day whence he travelled to Windsor to be 
received by the Queen. His subsequent journey to the Peninsula aboard Rooke's fleet was 
however attended with considerable delay, partly caused by Rooke's unwillingness to leave 
without the troop transports and partly by bad weather. The fleet did not reach Lisbon 
harbour at the mouth of the River Tagus until the beginning of February. " 
The triumphal reception and ceremonies for the Archduke in Lisbon bored Rooke 
and, after participating in those that he was duty bound to, he left with a squadron of some 
[NSI. 
's A fW I account of the Great Storm on land and at sea can be found in Daniel Defoe's two works, The Storm. 
Or a Collection of the Most Remarkable Casualties and Disasters Which Happend in the Late Dreadful 
Tempest, Both By Sea and Land (London, 1704) and, A Collection ofthe Most Remarkable Casualties and 
Disasters, Which Happend in the Late Dreadful Tempest Both By Sea and Lang On Friday the Twenty-Sixth 
offavember, Seventeen Hundred and 7hree (2 ad edn, London, 1713) - albeit recognising the warning given 
in Martin-Leake, Yhe Life ofSir John Leake, i. 126 n. I with respect to Defoe's inventive methodology in 
compiling his A Journal ofthe Plague Year (London, 1722). Other accounts of the storm can be found in, 
CFKS, UI 590 C9/4 unf : Philip Stanhope to James Stanhope, 29 Nov. 1703; Memoirs Relating to the Lord 
Torrington, pp. 116-18; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, i. 126-9; Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 
1666-1740, pp. 72-3. 
79 JIMC, Frankland-Russell-Astley MSS, pp. 147,151-2,157-9: Cutts to Churchill, [28 NovJ]9 Dec. 1703; 
Cutts to Leigh, or the Officer Commanding RM Forces Ordered for Portugal, [18/]29 Dec. 1703; Cutts to 
Whiteman, [30 Dec. /]10 Jan. 1704; Cutts to Sadler, [30 DecJ]10 Jan 1704; Cutts to Marlborough, [31 
DecJ1 II Jan. 1704; PRO, ADM 51/4317 Part vii, unpaginated, Royal Katherine, 26-27 Dec. 1703. 
*0 PRO, SP 44/208, p. 119: Hedges to Rooke, 20 Jan. 1704; PRO, SP 42/67, fos. 38,404,48,50B: 'A Copy of 
Sir George Rooke's Orders', 26 Jan. 1704; Rooke to Nottingham, 27.28 Jan., 1,14,29 Feb. 1704, and 
enclosure, 'At a Council of Flag Officers', 28 Jan. 1704; 'Draught of Orders to Sir George Rooke, Read & 
Approved', 31 Jan. 1704; PRO, ADM 51/4317 Part vii, unpaginated, Royal Katherine, 26 Feb. 1704; The 
Afarlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, nos. 265-6, pp. 263-4,263 n. 3: Marlborough to Godolphin, 25 
Jan. 1704; Marlborough to the Duchess, 25 Jan. 1704; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, i. 134-5; 
, tfemoirs Relaing to the Lord Torrington, p. 
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eighteen sail for a commerce protection cruise between Capes St Vincent, St Marys and 
Spartell. Sir John Leake, who on 3 March had brought into the Tagus those auxiliary ships 
left behind by Rooke, remained at Lisbon with six men-of-war to organise the trade convoys 
and the landing of stores from the Content. " It was on his return to Lisbon in early April 
after an uneventful cruise when Rooke turned his attentions to the fleet's three sets of 
Instructions issued during March. Although descents against the Spanish coast were 
recommended, none of the Instructions were exclusive to the Peninsula and, indeed, a wide 
range of tasks within, and at either end of, the Mediterranean were given. More pressing 
however were the secret Additional Instructions which ordered the fleet's participation in a 
land and sea attack against Toulon. The Ministry, and Secretary Nottingham in particular, 
considered this operation of great importance. Only the relief of Nice and Villefranche82 
(directed by the open Instructions) had priority. Given that Rooke concealed these 
Additional Instructions even from his Council of fellow Flag officers, which met three times 
following his return, it is understandable that the Portuguese Court failed to appreciate his 
haste to depart for the Mediterranean. 83 
The Portuguese priorities were descents against Spain and the stationing of a 
squadron off the Atlantic coast. An apparent problem with respect to the former was that 
Rooke's fleet had no army soldiers aboard, but when a specific suggestion for a landing of 
troops in Catalonia was made, Rooke claimed that he had been assured 2000 Portuguese 
troops by the Archduke's 'Court'. Neither John Methuen nor King Pedro knew of this 
commitment, and, although the latter was not unwilling to provide the men, he was unable to 
do so in the time Rooke laid down for the fleet's departure. Accordingly a row developed 
which was only compounded by Rooke's intention to take the whole fleet into the 
Mediterranean, thus leaving the Portuguese coast without a defensive squadron. Pedro 
81 PRO, SP 89/18, fos. 85-6: Paul Methuen to'Sir', 12 Mar. 1704; PRO, SP 42/67, f. 5013: Rooke to 
Nottingham, 29 Feb. 1704; BL, Add MSS 5440, lbs. 165-8: 'At a Council of War of Flag Officers, 29 Feb., 5 
Mar. 1704; BL, Add MSS 47970, pp. 25-6: Journal of Admiral Leake [hereafter 'Leake's Journal'], 20 Feb., 3 
Mar. 1704; Martin-Leake, The Life qfSir John Leake, i. 135-8; Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, 
p. 74. 
82 Their Italian names - Nizza and Villafranca - were then current. 
83 PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 121-35: Hedges to Rooke, 14,24,28,29 Mar. 1704, and enclosures, 'Instructions for 
our Right Trusty and Welbeloved Sir George Rooke Knt', 14,24,28 Mar. 1704, 'Additional Instructions for 
Our Right Trusty and Welbeloved Sir George Rooke Knt', 29 Mar. 1704; NRO, I'll 275, pp. 16-17: 
Nottingham to Rooke, 29 Feb. 1704; BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 169-74: 'Att a Councill of War of Flag 
officers', 12,18,25 Apr. 1704; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, i. 142-3. 
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considered this a breach of the Quadruple TreaY84 and it took all Methuen's personal 
currency with the King, and guile in arguing that Portugal's security would be best served if 
French fleet could be destroyed in the Mediterranean, before tempers calmed. 85 Given the 
existence of Rooke's secret Instructions, it could have been that he engendered this row to 
hasten the fleet's departure and to prevent it being locked into plans for descents. 
Nonetheless, by not informing his fellow Flags of the Additional Instructions, Rooke risked 
the Council of War frustrating his intentions, which to an extent it did. The final Council 
before Rooke left Lisbon bound the fleet in the first instance to the relief of Nice and 
Villefranche but also, on the basis of a proposal submitted by the Almirante de Castille, 
committed the Admiral to helping the Archduke's cause on the coast near Barcelona. " 
This pledge was temporarily prioritised during the outward voyage due to the tireless 
lobbying of Prince George Hesse-Darmstadt, who had taken passage with the Anglo-Dutch 
fleet as a military adviser to the Archduke. On 10 May, when seven cruisers previously 
dispatched on a fruitless chase of six French ships that had fallen in with the fleet off Cape 
Palos returned, a Council of War was held in Altea Bay at which Hesse-Darmstadt 
successfully argued that an appearance of the fleet before Barcelona would greatly help the 
Archduke's cause in Spain. Barcelona, and indeed the wider province of Catalonia, had a 
history of opposition to the Castilian-based Spanish crown, and reports had filtered through 
that it favoured the Archduke over Philip V. Hesse-Darmstadt -a former Governor of 
Barcelona in the 1690s - did not therefore wish merely to show the flag and when the current 
governor, Don Francisco de Wasco, refused to admit Hesse-Darmstadt's secretary, 
Zingerling, with the summons to surrender, the German Prince proposed a landing of the 
marine soldiers and two small companies of Spanish deserters aboard the fleet to encourage 
the inhabitants' defiance of Velasco. Initially, the naval Council rejected his proposal on 
consideration that there were insufficient officers to command the forces ashore, and also 
because Rear-Admiral Wishart had recently reported that several French sail had been spotted 
"A Collection of General Treatys, iii. 359: Article XVIT of 'An Alliance Offensive and Defensive'. 16 May 
1703. 
is pRO, Sp 89/1 g, fos. 89-91,100-11,122-3,128-9: John Methuen to Nottingham, 22 Apr., 1,7,8 May 1704 
[NS]; John Methuen to Hedges, 7,14 June 1704 [NS]; BL, Add MSS 5437, E 54: John Methuen to Leake, 23 
Mar. 1704 [NS]; PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 151-3: Hedges to Rooke, 16 May 1704. 
" BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 173-4: 'Att a Councill of War of Flag Officers', 25 Apr. 1704; T. Lediard, The 
Naval Ilistory ofEngland (London, 1735), ii. 783-4 n. i. 
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apparently heading westwards. However, the following day brought news that Barcelona 
was on the brink of declaring for the Archduke and that a naval bombardment in addition to a 
landing would comprise a sufficient display of support to act as a trigger. Pressing his case 
again in the Council, and with the strategic importance of controlling Barcelona with respect 
to the neighbouring provinces of Valencia and Aragon highlighted, Hesse-Dan-nstadt secured 
agreement to land some 1600 English and Dutch marines along with the companies of 
Spanish deserters, while several bomb vessel approached the town. 87 
Covered by the Tiger, the Tartar, the Newport, and two Dutch vessels, Hesse- 
Darmstadt landed with the troops towards the north-east of Barcelona in the late morning of 
19 May; meanwhile the bomb vessels took up position. As the landing's objective was merely 
to precipitate the rebellion, the operational orders restricted the troops from marching beyond 
a secure line of retreat; therefore, they did not advance much upon Barcelona, despite 
attracting some 1000 local volunteers. Hesse-Darmstadt nonetheless immediately sent another 
summons to Velasco, which elicited the same response as before. More alarming however 
was the news that the town council could not deliver the town and that, on being informed of 
the smallness of the land force and its finite time ashore, Velasco had moved against the 
dissent: the revolt against Philip V's rule in Barcelona was stillborn. Hesse-Darmstadt 
quickly sent word to Rooke for the marines to be embarked the following morning but that, 
meantime, the bomb vessels should continue to bombard the town. The numerous shells 
expended in this manner proved a woeful denouement to an operation which had held 
sufficient promise to distract the fleet from the pursuit of its more pressing orders. 89 
The fleet spent the remainder of May and early June aiming to implement these 
Instructions with respect to Nice and Villefranche; while Rooke also at this juncture revealed 
his secret orders for Toulon. Ultimately, neither Savoyard town required relief and the 
s' if. Kuenzel, Das Leben unddasBriefwechsel des Landgrafen Georg von Ilessen-Darmstadt (London, 
1859), no. 42, p. 313: Hesse-Darmstadt to his brother, 7 Apr. 1704 [NS]; BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 175-80: 
'Att a Councill of War of Flag Officers', 10,18,19 May 1704; BL, Add MSS 47970, p. 30: Teake's Journal', 
18-19 May 1704; HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, A. 149-5 1: Hesse-Darmstadt to Rooke, 10, IS May 1704; 
Rooke to Hedges, 8 June 1704; Martin-Leake, 77je Life ofSir John Leake, i. 145-7; Lediard, 77je Naval 
History of England, i i. 78 6-7. 
's BL, Add MSS 47970, p. 30: Teake's Journal', 19-21 May 1704; HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, A. 15 1, 
154-5: Rooke to Hedges, 8 June 1704; Hesse-Darmstadt to Rooke, 20 May 1704; BL, Add MSS 5440, f0s. 
181-2: 'Att a Councill of War', 20 May 1704; Martin-Leake, Yhe Life ofSirjohn Leake, i. 147-8; Kuenzel, 
Das Leben und der Brieswechsel, no. 47, p. 320: Hesse-Darmstadt to Galway, 12 June 1704; PRO, ADM 
51/4317 Part vii, unpaginated, Royal Katherine, 19-21 May 1704; Francis, The First Peninsula Iyar, pp. 106- 
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reluctance of the Duke of Savoy, who was to commit troops overland from Piedmont-Savoy, 
meant that the Toulon operation seemed unlikely to proceed, thus causing Rooke to focus 
upon seeking the French fleet that was reportedly operating in the area. London had been 
aware early in the season of the extensive French naval preparations at Brest and, although it 
was initially thought that a concentration in the Channel was intended, by the time that 
Shovell's squadron sailed to cover the port, the Comte de Toulouse had journeyed south to 
join the Toulon squadron. There had been various reported sightings of French naval vessels 
since the Anglo-Dutch fleet's entry into the Mediterranean, but, when lying off iles d'Hyares 
on 25 May, Rooke received credible information that both French commanders had recently 
been near the mouth of the Straits. 89 Sailing westwards, Rooke spotted Toulouse passing 
Minorca, whereupon he tacked the fleet northward and cleared for battle. A calm prevented 
the allies reaching the French fleet until it was sufficiently close to Toulon for the egress of 
reinforcements to worry the Anglo-Dutch Flags and, consequently, the Council decided to 
put about for Lisbon. Prior to leaving the Mediterranean however, another brief landing on 
10 June was undertaken at Alicante where some 400 marines commanded by Lord Nugent 
temporarily occupied two forts and transported the Governor northwards in an attempt to 
intimate the Bourbon authorities to adopt a softer policy against dissenting local inhabitants. " 
Off Lagos on 16 June, the fleet met Shovell's squadron of 22 warships which had 
followed Toulouse down from Brest to reinforce the Mediterranean fleet. Rooke also then 
received new Instructions from London which significantly altered the fleet's strategical and 
tactical priorities. These recognised that the operations on the Italian and French coasts were 
either no longer required or were not possible and instead directed the fleet to the reduction 
of Spain as 'the main and principall service'. " Accordingly, Rooke was to consult with the 
Archduke and Lisbon as to what might be done. Capturing CAdiz, supporting Catalonia or 
7. 
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any other province inclined to the Archduke, and coastal troop transportation were all 
recommended. In anticipation of Charles and Pedro formally making their intentions known, 
the Council of Flags dispatched an escort squadron for Portugal's Brazilflota in response to 
Methuen's warnings about Portuguese anxieties for its safety, and resolved that the remainder 
of the fleet would take up station in the Straits. 92 Charles and Pedro, meeting at Santarem, 
fixed upon Cddiz as the primary target for bombardment and a landing of marines, with Port 
Mah6n, Minorca, the alternative. Rooke's naval Council considered the Cidiz proposal on 
17 July and, despite the emphasis in the Instructions to act at the Archduke's behest (an 
approach which bore the personal approval of Queen Anne) 93 they rejected it as unworkable 
without army co-operation. The Council's decision was not surprising inasmuch as it had at 
earlier meetings made the provision of some army soldiers a prerequisite for attacks on Cddiz 
or Barcelona. This did not however account for overlooking the second option, Port Mah6n, 
which Zingerling had strongly advocated at Santarem. It was sidelined by Hesse-Darmstadt's 
proposal to capture Gibraltar through a bombardment and a marine landing. This action, 
which had originally been a possibility on the fleet's first passage through the Straits in May, 
was now resolved upon by the Council of War. 94 
Situated at the north-west foot of a three mile long rocky mountain (the Rock) that 
forms a peninsula of southern Andalucia, and which is connected to the mainland by a small 
flat isthmus, Gibraltar had a long history of attention from English seamen and politicians. Of 
the latter, Cromwell had advocated its capture in the mid- I 650s; while its use as a temporary 
naval base between 1680-2 when Admiral Herbert tired of Tangier, may well have been 
within recent memory for many of the sailors of 1704 - Rooke and Shovell had certainly 
served with Herbert during the 1680s. Although one contemporary report compared its 
harbour facilities favourably with Cddiz, it was Gibraltar's strategic position as guardian of 
the Straits accessing the Mediterranean which comprised its worth. Certainly, it was this 
92 PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 147-50: Hedges to Rooke, 9 May 1704 and enclosure, 'Instructions for Our Right 
Trusty and Welbeloved Sir George Rooke Knt', 9 May 1704; HMC, House oftords MSS NS, vi. 160- 1: John 
Methuen to Shovell, 22,23 June 1704 [NS]; BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 189-90: 'Att a Councill of War of Flag 
Officers', 17 June 1704. 
93 The Letters andDiplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne, ed. B. C. Brown (London, 1968), pp. 143-5: Queen 
Anne to 'The King of Spain', 16 May, 4 June 1704. 
" RMC, House ofLords MSS NS, A. 167-8: John Methuen to Rooke, 10 July 1704 [NS], and enclosure, The 
Almirante to John Methuen, n. d.; BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 197-8: 'Att Councill of War of Flag Officers', 17, 
21,28 June, 17 July 1704; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, i. 152-153; Francis, 7he First Peninsula 
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command of the Straits, together with the aim of capturing a bridgehead on the Spanish 
mainland for the Archduke, which was again the principal attraction for the Anglo-Dutch 
Flags. 95 
Early morning fog on 20 July caused an inauspicious start to the Gibraltar operation 
as the Lenox collided with the Prince George. 96 By about II o'clock however, the weather 
had sufficiently improved to allow Rooke to signal the fleet's attack disposition. it had 
previously been agreed that, although the whole fleet would stand into Gibraltar Bay, Rear- 
Admiral Byng would position a squadron of some twenty Anglo-Dutch vessels much closer in 
against the town to conduct the bombardment and cover the marines. One account implies 
that Byng was given this command because of Rooke's pique that the junior Admiral had 
opposed the operation at the Council, though Byng's subsequent conduct did not betray any 
lingering resentment. 97 
Dating from 1627, the town's shore defences were not extensive and the 50 small 
guns along the sea wall had been poorly maintained over the years. Notwithstanding, on the 
squadron's first approach cannon fire damaged the Flagship's mainmast and, as Byng's 
operational orders prohibited firing until a summons had been sent to Governor Don Diego de 
Salinas, he withdrew the squadron out of cannon range. Meanwhile, to the north of the Old 
Mole, Captain Whitaker of the Dorselshire was directing the landing of around 1800 marines 
War, pp. 108-9; G. Hills, Rock of Contention: A History of Gihraltar (London, 1974), pp. 167-9. 
95 BL, Add MSS 10034, fos. 99-100: 'A Letter from the Engineer, Mr Bennet', 6 Dec. 1704; Martin-Leake, 
The Life ofSir John Leake, i. 153-4; T. Venning, Cromwellian Foreign Policy (London, 1996), pp. 119-20; 
Le Fevre, 'Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, 1648-1716', pp. 25-6; BL, Add MSS 28058, f. 3 1: 
'Memorandum Advocating the Occupation by the English of Gibraltar and Havana'; The Tangier Papers of 
Samuel Pepys, ed. E. Chappell (London, 1935), pp. 231-2. 
" The ensuing account of the first phase of the operation to capture Gibraltar is based upon the following 
primary sources and secondary authorities: BL, Add MSS 10034, fos. 5-6,91: 'A Short Account of Gibraltar 
from the time of its being Possessed by the Crown of Great Britain in 1704 to 1745, W. Skinner, Chief 
Engineer of Great Britain'; 'Journal of the Taking of Gibraltar by the Combined Ficet in 1704, and Defence of 
the Garrison by the Prince Hess', 21 July4 Aug. 1704; BL, Egerton 2521, fos. 91-2: Whitaker to 'Sir' [Sir 
Richard Haddock], 29 July 1704; BL, Add MSS 47970, pp. 34-5: 'Leake's Journal', 17-26 July 1704; Add 
MSS 5440, fos. 197-8,201-2: 'Att a Councill of War of Flag Officers', 17,25 July 1704; PRO, ADM 51/4317 
Part vii, unpaginated, Royal Katherine, 17-25 July 1704; PRO, ADM 51153 Part i, unpaginated, Lennox, 17- 
25 July 1704; PRO, ADM 1/2642, unf : Jumper to 'Honorable Sir' [the Admiralty], 22 Mar. 1705, and 
enclosure, 'To His Royall Highness Prince George of Denmark, Lord High Admiral of England &c. The 
Humble Petition of Sir William Jumper Captain of HMS Lennox'; HMC, House ofLordsAISS NS, vi. 164-5: 
Rooke to Hedges, 28 July 1704; Memoirs Relating to the Lord Torrington, pp. 137-46,189-94, Appendix: 
, [Some Extracts from the Journal of the Rev. Thomas Pocock]'; Martin-Leakc, The Life ofSirJohn Leake, i. 
154-6; The Life andAdventures ofMatthew Bishop, p. 19; Hills, Rock of Contention, pp. 169-75; J. A. C. 
Hugill, No Peace Without Spain (London, 1974), pp. 89-99; Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, i. 423-7. 
' Memoirs Relating to the Lord Torrington, p. 137. 
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and 200 Catalaneg under Hesse-Darmstadt near Punta Mala on the isthmus connecting 
Gibraltar to the mainland. Once the marine grenadiers' fire had frightened off a party of up to 
50 Spanish horse, which came down from the town during the landing, Hesse-Darmstadt 
secured the immediate objective of severing Gibraltar's line of communication by taking post 
amongst the mills at the foot of the Rock within musket shot of the Puerto de Tierra (the 
town's landward gate, also known as the Land Port). A summons was then sent to the 
Governor. 
The tensions between Salinas's instinct to hold out and his persuading the City 
Council to do so despite the dilapidated fortifications and, more importantly, the crucial 
shortage of manpower (the garrison had only about 60 regulars and 300 raw militia, 
notwithstanding a previous request for additional troops to the Andalucian Captain-General, 
the Marquis de Villadarias) probably caused the delay in responding to Hesse-Darmstadt. As 
a result, before the garrison's statement of loyalty to Philip V reached the Puerto de Tierra, 
Byng had deftly warped his squadron in overnight so that on 23 July it ranged in-line ahead 
from the Old Mole at the north of the town to the New Mole in the south. This meant that 
when Rooke received word of the summons's rejection, Byng was prepared for the Red Flag 
being raised at the Royal Katherine's foretop, to signal the beginning of the bombardment. 
Until then only a few bombs had been thrown into the town as cover for the squadron and the 
marines but now, and for nearly six hours, Byng unleashed a bombardment upon the town 
that, Bishop observed, made the 'Houses shack'. 99 
98 Hills, Rock ofContention, p. 169-70, n. 26 and Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 90-1 discuss the 
number and composition of troops landed. As Rooke had no regular troops aboard, it is accepted that the 
burden of the force landed was (as the Admiral himself noted) around 1800 English and Dutch marine 
soldiers. However, references by others - and in particular Whitaker - put the number of troops landed at 
2000. Hills and Hugill credibly suggest therefore that the additional troops comprised the companies of 
Spanish deserters originally embarked by Hesse-Darmstadt and some of the local Catalans which joined him 
at his landing at Barcelona in May. 
" The Life andAdventures ofMatthew Bishop, p. 20. 
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Fig. 14 : The Rock of Gibraltar. 
Having led a night raid into the Old Mole to disable a 10-gun French privateer which 
had been firing into the marines' camp, Captain Whitaker had not brought the Dor. vervhire 
into Byng's line and he was thus acting as liaison between Rooke, Byng and the individual 
ships of the attack squadron. The hot calm weather of 23 July caused the gun smoke to lie 
particularly heavily in the air, and by mid-morning it was clear that only a temporary cease- 
fire would allow its dissipation so that the bombardment's progress could be eflýctivcly 
reviewed. Whitaker was carrying this cease-fire order throughout the squadron when, upon 
reaching the English ships at the southern end ofthe line, his attention was drawn by Captain 
Jumper of the Lennox to the silence of the New Mole's battery and the Torre dcl Tucrto 
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Fort' 00, situated just south-east of the Mole. Through the smoke, both Captains perceived 
that an attack by the ships' boats at this sector might well be unopposed. Whitaker took this 
suggestion back to Byng who ordered the squadrons' boats to be armed and manned while 
Whitaker sought Rooke's agreement. This was readily given by the Admiral who released the 
remaining fleets' boats and appointed Whitaker to command the attack. By the time he 
returned to the Lennox, however, the sailors from about a dozen boats had, with little 
opposition, already landed and were entering the fort. 
It remains unclear why Jumper began the attack without a direct order. Some 
commentators have suggested that he and Captain Hicks mistook as a signal the warning shot 
fired by the Ranelagh across the path of the women and children who were fleeing back to 
the town from their shelter in the Europa Point shrine. Another has suggested that Whitaker 
agreed to Jumper beginning the attack before he returned to Byng and Rooke. There seems 
no irrefutable evidence for either suggestion, however, and a more accurate picture would 
probably emphasise a number of factors - the warning cannon shot; poor communication 
between Jumper and Whitaker; and news passing along the line that the commanding Rear- 
Admiral wished the attack - as precipitating the action. Whitaker was not however without a 
crucial leadership role at the New Mole. Either through a seaman's carelessness in carrying a 
lighted match or as a result of an enemy mine, the powder magazine in the Torre del Tuerto 
Fort exploded as the sailors took control, Ming up to 50 and wounding over 100. The 
surviving sailors panicked and feld back to the boats. Whitaker, on coming ashore at Rosia 
Bay, had immediately to rally these men to the task in hand. His swift action sent Captains 
Aston and Roffy along the sea rampart with some 50 men to take the 8-gun southerly bastion 
of the town walls; while another detachment of troops was dispatched to secure Europa 
Point. With operational composure restored, Whitaker and the rest of the sailors followed 
Aston and Roffy. 
As the attackers at the New Mole fastened in upon the town from the south, the fleet 
recommenced their bombardment against the centre; and meanwhile to the north, the marines 
... Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 89-90,93-4 refers to four forts in total near the New Mole: the 
Nuestra Senora de Europa, (New Mole Fort) and three others, one of which is identified as the Torre del 
Tucrto- Hugill's description of their exact location is vague and given that the primary sources, and the other 
secondary histroies, identify only one fort behind the New Mole - the Torre del Tuerto - it may be that flugill 
conflated some smaller gun redoubts with fortifications. This piece concentrates upon the Torre del Tuerto as 
the focus of the attack at the New Mole. 
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had kept up a steady musket fire against the defenders of the Puerto de Tierra. Salinas's 
instinct to hold out was appearing increasingly misguided as the Anglo-Dutch operational 
momentum took hold -a trend underscored by Byng leaving his Flagship to join Whitaker at 
the southern gate on the evening of 23 July. Indeed, the following day, Hesse-Darmstadt and 
Byng sent in summons from their respective positions and, although Salinas requested time to 
consult with the City Councfl, there was little doubt that it would seek a surrender upon 
terms. Hesse-Darmstadt did however suspect Salinas of one final delaying ruse by sending 
negotiators without any proposals, but the threat of imposing an unconditional surrender led 
to the north gate being relinquished as a sign of good faith and the negotiations proceeded 
apace. The subsequent terms were reasonably generous inasmuch as the garrison, with all 
their equipage and colours flying, had three days to depart after the Anglo-Dutch entry and, 
provided an oath was sworn to the Archduke as King, only French subjects would be 
imprisoned. On 25 July, the march of the marine soldiers into Gibraltar town and the signal 
ordering the seamen at the New Mole back to their vessels marked the end of the operation. 
Two historiographical myths quickly arose about this operation at Gibraltar: that the 
Rock was captured for Queen Anne and that, at the moment of surrender, Rooke replaced the 
Austrian Flag with the Union Ensign. 101 To these it is possible to add a third: that it was in 
1704 that Gibraltar could be considered captured for either the Queen or the Austrian House. 
Undoubtedly, the Anglo-Dutch land and sea operation gained control of Gibraltar in late July 
but it is not always recognised that besides a subsequent naval engagement, a combined 
action sustained between the late autumn of 1704 and the spring of 1705 would be required 
before the town could be described as captured. 
The capability of the French fleet to imitate the allies's action at Gibraltar and regain 
the town was immediate and real. Toulouse heard of the allies' success while lying off 
Barcelona with some 50 men-of-war and immediately headed for the Straits. Meanwhile, the 
allied Flags had decided to remain off Gibraltar until Charles issued further orders, though the 
Council ruled out further operations upon Spain's coasts due to the lateness of the season and 
would only support a siege upon CAdiz if the marines at Gibraltar were relieved. A week 
later, just as the fleet completed watering on the Barbary coast, the Centurion with its 
toPgallants fully set and firing warning shots, came in with the news that Toulouse had been 
'01 Hills, Rock of Contention, pp. 475-7, Appendix A: 'Two Myths about the Capture of Gibraltar, 17041. 
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spotted off Fuengirola. Despite Hesse-Darmstadt's protests, Rooke immediately embarked 
about half of the marines from the garrison at Gibraltar and sailed to engage the French. 102 
The only set piece naval battle of the Spanish Succession war took place off Milaga 
on 13 August. 103 Mahan and Colomb judged it indecisive and, although neither side 
dominated after seven hours of fighting, this view does not reflect contemporary or 
subsequent historical opinion. 104 Toulouse's decision - admittedly pressed upon him by his 
senior cofleagues - to disregard the following morning's opportunity to re-engage from the 
windward in favour of returning to Toulon, has been interpreted as both a French and an 
Anglo-Dutch victory. In France, news of the engagement caused Te Deums to be sung; while 
Toulouse's return to Toulon was greeted with bunting and general joy. However, 
Marlborough's casual note, after some initial doubts, that this public rejoicing did not seem to 
be quickly followed up in the French news-sheets or pamphlets raised questions about the 
nature of the purported French victory. 'O' It was narrowly based on the belief that the refusal 
to re-engage from the windward on 14 August was consonant with the epoch's preference for 
a 'victory of etiquette' over the 'decision of a battle'. 106 Since Toulouse had sufficiently 
established the French fleet's reputation during the previous day's fight, the appropriate 
course of action had been to preserve its future capability. Nonetheless, as Admiral 
Torrington found out after Beachy Head, explanations of the 'fleet- in-being' thesis lack 
popular appeal - hence the absence of instructive French literature to accompany the people's 
rejoicing on simply being told that they had won a naval victory. Marlborough's remark 
could also have indicated French recognition that Toulouse's return to port was a strategic 
victory for the allies, with such success subsequently underscored by France's abandonment 
of Grand Fleet actions for the rest of the war. Paradoxically, interpreting MAlaga, as a 
102 MeMoirS Relating 10 the Lord Torrington, pp. 146-9; Martin-Leakc, The Life ofSir John Leake, i. 157; 
HMC, House oftords MSS NS, vi. 172: Rooke to the Lord High Admiral, 27 Aug. 1704. 
103 Contemporary accounts of the battle can be read in HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, A. 172-3: Rooke to the 
Lord High Admiral, 27 Aug. 1704; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, i. 158-67,176-8 1; Afemoirs 
Relating to the Lord Torrington, pp. 150-63. Standard secondary accounts include: L. G. Carr-Laughton, 'The 
Battle of Velez Malaga, 1704', JRUSI 1xviii (1923), 367-90; J. Creswell, BrifishAdmirals of the Eighteenth 
Century: Tactics in Battle (London, 1972), pp. 50-62; Harding, Seapower andNaval Waoýwe 1650-1830, pp. 
171-2; Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713, ii. 530-5. 
104 Mahan, The Influence ofSea Power Upon History, p. 211; Colomb, Naval Warfare, p. 303. 
'05 de la Ronci6re, Histoire de la Marine Frangaise, A. 368; PRO, SP, 87/2, fos. 158-9,169-9: Marlborough 
to 'Sir', 26 Sept. 1704 [NS]; Marlborough to Harley, 3 Oct. 1704 [NS]; The Marlborough-Godolphin 
Correspondence, i, no. 379, p. 372: Marlborough to Godolphin, 15 Sept. 1704. 
"" de la Ronci&e, Histoire de la Marine Frangaise, A. 365. 
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strategic naval victory for the Alliance highlights the distinctive role of combined operations 
within war policy because it did not - contrary to the consensus of naval historians'07_ fUll y 
secure Gibraltar for the allies. The French marine may have begun to concentrate upon the 
guerre de course, but smaller squadrons could still undertake coastal attacks or assist military 
forces ashore. It was against this latter possibility that the allies had to defend Gibraltar by 
mounting an eight month long combined operation. 
Since the garrison's surrender in late July, the Andalucian Captain-General, 
Villadarias, had been preparing to regain Gibraltar by a siege action. His efforts received a 
timely boost in late September when Pointis's squadron of nineteen men-of-war from Toulon 
landed supplies and up to 3000 troops on the isthmus, north of Gibraltar. Astutely, the 
French had taken advantage of the absence of an allied naval presence in the Straits. The fleet 
had departed for home on 24 August and, although there remained a winter squadron under 
Vice-Admiral Leake, the majority of its vessels were undergoing necessary repairs at Lisbon. 
Accordingly, Villadarias moved quickly to reap the full benefit of these circumstances by 
opening his trenches at the beginning of October and slowly moving his besieging force of 
between 7000 and 11000108 men towards the town's northern walls. 
Inside Gibraltar, Hesse-Darmstadt was struggling with a lack of resources and with 
dissent. Prior to Rooke's departure all the marines had been put back ashore, but along with 
the Catalan companies and about 60 naval gunners, the garrison only made, according to the 
Quarter-Master-General, about 2600 men. Its effective disposal moreover was threatened at 
an early stage by friction between the marine Brigadier, Fox, and the Irish-born Imperial 
Major-General, Henry Nugent, whom Hesse-Darmstadt appointed Governor. Despite this 
dispute, which continued until the death of both officers in November, the garrison worked to 
improve Gibraltar's defences in advance of the desperately needed additional materials 
arriving from England. The Round Tower, situated north-east of the northern walls, marked 
the garrison's first line of defence. Guns placed there and at the audaciously constructed 
Willis's battery further north-east again on the Rock's northern face provided an cnfilading 
fire against an enemy approach in that sector. The area was also partially mined, while gun 
107 flarding, SeapowerandNaval Waoýve 1650-1830, p. 171; Carr-Laughton, 'The Battle of VelczMAlaga, 
1704', p. 367-8; Corbett, England in the Mediterranean; 1603-1713, ii. 535. 
108 There is no agreement amongst the sources on an exact figure, but this probably accurately represents the 
operational peaks and trough as forces were brought up in stages and were killed, wounded or withdrawn. 
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emplacements were erected at the Old Mole. Finally, conscious perhaps oftheir success at 
the New Mole, the garrison positioned several 32 pounders to contest an attack there., 0" 
These efforts meant that the Anglo-Dutch position at Gibraltar was not weak. Moreover, in 
addition to the defences being strategically disposed, the provisions left by Rooke would last 
until December and, once refitted, Leake's squadron might establish a sea-borne supply line. 
Hesse-Darmstadt could nonetheless only be aware that if the French established footholds 
north and south (as the allies had in July) then the town could be reduced with minimal enemy 
effort through blockade rather than by siege. 
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After landing reinforcements, however, Pointis decided to put about for Cddiz, thus 
"9 Martin-Leake, The Life qfSir John Leake, i. 181-2; Kuenzel, Oas Leben und der Briesivechsel, no. 3, pp. 
465-6: Hesse-Darmstadt to Galway, 21 Sept. 1704 [NS]; B L, Add MSS 100.34, fos. 5-6,99-101: 'A Short 
Account of Gibraltar', n. d.; 'A Letter from the Engineer Mr Bennet', 6 Dec. 1704. 
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reducing the immediate threat of a combined French attack on Gibraltar. Still the six frigates 
left behind served notice of the French capability and Pointis's Cddiz station suggested that 
the priority might be to strangle Gibraltar's supply route from Lisbon. "O These were the 
circumstances Leake faced when Hesse-Darmstadt requested relief for the garrison, 
particularly powder and provisions. The Admiral had first been informed on 19 September 
that the French were before Gibraltar by his scout, Tiger, but it was only when Hesse- 
Darmstadt and Captain Fotherby corroborated this news that the Council of War convened to 
address the issue. Its meeting on I October considered the squadron too small, and 
possessing too few supplies, for an immediate departure to Gibraltar. Nonetheless, while 
awaiting further details on the enemy dispositions in the area, four vessels designed for 
England as a trade escort were held back and one small rate sped for home to request 
additional men and materials. Fortunately, Hesse-Darmstadt continued to get news to Leake 
and on 13 October, this included the important report that Pointis was thought to be lying 
between the Puntales and CAdiz and, thus, not well placed to trouble Leake's passage to 
Gibraltar. "' 
Upon receipt of this advice, Leake called another Council of War. Three ships 
carrying provisions from England had recently arrived at Lisbon, as had a small Dutch 
squadron of five sail, and Leake recommended a swift departure for Gibraltar. The Council 
agreed to send a 23-strong Anglo-Dutch squadron, but its departure was to be delayed by 
five days in the hope that John Methuen would procure the desperately needed powder, 
which was the only commodity lacking from the six months provisions for Gibraltar now 
stowed aboard the squadron. Fortunately, 200 barrels duly arrived by 24 October and the 
squadron was able to depart the following morning, bound on a operation to combine with 
Gibraltar's military garrison to raise the French siege. 112 
Hesse-Darmstadt's belief that Pointis posed little threat at CAdiz proved prescient and 
the squadron completed an uneventful four day passage to Cape Spartell. In advance of 
110 de la Ronci6re, Histoire de la Marine Franqaise, vi. 368-9; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 128. 
111 BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 33,49-50,215-16: Fotherby to 'Sir' [Leake], 9 Oct. 1704; Hesse-Darmstadt to 
Leake, 24 Oct. 1704 [NS]; 'Att a Councill of Flag Officers', I Oct. 1704; BL, Add MSS 5437, fos. 58-60,75: 
Leake to the Admiralty, 26 Sept., 2 Oct. 1704; Leake to the Secretary of State to His Majesty the King of 
portugal, I Oct. 1704; 'Capt. Fotherby's Acount of the French Ships and Army before Gibraltar', 8 Oct. 1704. 
112 BL, Add MSS 5437, fos. 66-7,70: Leake to John Methuen, 21,22 Oct. 1704; Leake to Hesse-Darnstadt, 21 
Oct. 1704; Leake to the Admiralty, 24 Oct., 3 Nov. 1704; BL, Add MSS 47970, p. 41: Tcake's Journal', 24-5 
Oct. 1704. 
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crossing the Straits to enter Gibraltar Bay, Leake sent ahead all the clean frigates to prevent 
the egress of any enemy vessels; he also - rather unscrupulously - ordered colours be struck 
to increase the surprise. In the event, neither measure was necessary for, although the 
L'Etoile slipped through the frigate screen, she was captured by the Swallow after a short 
chase, while the rest of the enemy vessels in the bay - including two French warships, a frigate 
and a fireship - were either burnt or ran aground upon the squadron's appearance on 30 
October. The immediate French naval threat had, at least, been combated without much 
effort, and Leake could land his supplies and some twenty armed sailors unimpeded. ' 13 
The squadron's arrival had the more important consequence of helping the garrison 
frustrate an imminent three-pronged French attack. ' 14 Towards the end of October, 
Villadarias's siege guns had breached both the Round Tower and St Paul's bastion, which 
guarded the Old Mole, and thus preparations had begun for an assault upon these openings. 
Simultaneously, 3000 men were to be landed at the New Mole, and an attack launched on the 
town from the heights of the Rock to the east or ideally from within the town, if the Spanish 
troops managed to descend unnoticed. Tactically, these attacks aimed at spreading the 
garrison so thinly throughout the town that the entire defence of Gibraltar would implode. 
However, the destruction of the French vessels in the bay meant that they could not supply 
cover for the assault on the breaches; instead an allied naval force might now confine 
Villadarias's force to the trenches. Meanwhile, as the Anglo-Dutch squadron prevented the 
bay being traversed, the rendezvous of the New Mole assault force at the beaches was simply 
abandoned. The appearance of Leake's squadron could not however forestall the attack from 
the east. Colonel Figueroa's force of 500 men had already made their way to the Rock's 
south-eastem slopes some distance beyond Catalan Bay, where the native goat herd, Simon 
Susarte, was to guide their ascent. This vanguard expected a detachment of 1500 troops to 
follow but, having spent the night of 30/3 1 October in St Michael's Cave, they awoke to find 
113 BL, Add MSS 47970, p. 4 1: 'Leake's Journal', 29-31 Oct. 1704; BL, Add MSS 5437, E 69: Leake to John 
Methuen, 3 Nov. 1704; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 199-200; The Life andAdventures of 
Matthew Bishop, p. 25. 
114 The ensuing account of the planning and frustration of the French attack is based upon the following 
primary sources and secondary authorities: BL, Add MSS 5437, 
f. 66: Leake to John Methuen, 3 Nov. 1704; 
BL, Add MSS 5440, fos 57-8: Hesse-Darnstadt to Leake, 12 Nov. 1704 [NS]; BL, Add MSS 47970, p. 4 1: 
'Leake's Journal', 31 Oct. 1704; BL, Add MSS 10034, f 92: 'Journal of the Taking of Gibraltar', 31 Oct. 
1704; The Life andAdventures ofMatthew Bishop, pp. 25-6; Martin-Leake, The Life qfSirJohn Leake, ii. 
200-2; Hills, Rock of Contention, pp. 187-9; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 1334. 
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the summit ridge deserted. G. Hills argues that, in the absence of clear evidence, the larger 
detachment's non-appearance should be understood as Villadarias's fmal attempt to facilitate 
the northern sector attack. Probably aware that a self-imposed oath prohibited Colonel 
Figueroa's force returning until Gibraltar was taken, Villadarias envisaged this vanguard 
entering the town regardless of their number. Once inside, he hoped that they might cause 
sufficient distraction to make an assault upon the breaches tenable. Mindful however, that 
Leake's squadron tipped the balance of force against him to the north, Villadarias retained the 
1500 men to ensure a concentration of troops in the attack. His error was the failure to 
recognise that for Figueroa the 1500 men did not just represent an enhanced capacity; as his 
troops carried only small arms with three rounds of ammunition each, the reinforcement was 
essential fire support for the main attack to get inside the walls. In the event, Figueroa's men 
were simply outnumbered and outgunned by Colonel Borr's 800 strong mixed force of 
sailors, marines and their grenadiers, which was dispatched on 31 October when the 
Spaniards were spotted on the ridge. Bishop colourfully described them as 'swarms of bees 
upon the hill' whose confusion caused them to be easy prey to the garrison, which acted, 'like 
lions in the valley'. ' 15 An assault on the breaches was now impossible. 116 Despite the French 
reverses, however, the siege was not raised, nor did Pointis return to Toulon. The allies's 
control of the Rock remained vulnerable and the combined operation had to be maintained. 
In the period immediately following the failure of Villadarias's attack, Hesse- 
Darmstadt did suggest a counter-attack: the garrison would sally forth against the French 
trenches and a couple of frigates would cannonade the east side of the enemy camp and their 
battery where it lay open to the sea thus softening it up for an attack by the ships' boats. 117 it 
is a misrepresentation to portray Hesse-Darmstadt as enthusiastically - even recklessly - 
urging this action. '" The whole project was to be left to Leake's 'very best consideration 
'"The Life andAdventures ofMatthew Bishop, pp. 25-6. 
116 Hills, Rock of Contention, p. 189 n. 41, claims that the north front attack did in fact begin. Ile cites in 
support 13L, Add MSS 5440, fos. 57-8: Hesse-Darmstadt to Leake, 12 Nov. 1704 [NSI and specifically I lesse- 
Darmstadt's phrase, '... the enemy were attacking us that very night of your entrance in many places at once... 
However, this is a misquotation. Hesse-Darmstadt used the imperfect subjunctive tense 'were to attack' rather 
than the imperfect 'were attacking'. Accordingly, the letter cannot evidence the beginning of an attack in the 
northern sector; indeed, the sense of the letter is that Leake's arrival prevented all imminent attacks. On this 
issue, I am grateful to my Chester College colleague, Mr John Doran, for an enlightening discussion upon 
grammatical form. 
J17 BL, Add MSS 5440, fos 57-8: Hesse-Darmstadt to Leake, 12 Nov. 1704 [NS]. 
"' Hills, Rock of Contention, p. 190; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 134. 
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what may be thought most proper to be executed"'9 and, moreover, with respect to the 
landward sally, Hesse-Darmstadt implied it would be reckless to release the necessary two- 
thirds of his current garrison force. Leake's naval Council promptly rejected the sea-based 
elements of the counter-attack as unsafe for the time of the year and Hesse-Darmstadt lodged 
no official protest. 120 Perhaps the senior commanders were influenced by the broader 
operational reason, that large set-piece land-sea attacks against the French positions had to be 
avoided during the last two months of 1704. The July operation had only gained an insecure, 
and now besieged, foothold within Gibraltar and its translation into a secure bridgehead 
required Hesse-Darmstadt and Leake to prioritise its succour; a combined operation based 
upon attrition was required. Such an operation had not been common in Europe during the 
last decade, however. Most of the combined military-naval ventures had either been single 
strike coastal incursions such as the descents of the 1690s or operations to capture territory in 
which the target had been successfully secured by the initial amphibious action or not at all - 
Cork (1690) and Brest (1694), for example. Lacking experience and specific Instructions to 
guide their actions, Hesse-Darmstadt and Leake had to achieve an combined modus operandi 
themselves. 
Not surprisingly, theirjoint action over this two month period was multifaceted, 
though the fleet undoubtedly bore the heavier burden. The squadron provided a considerable 
quantity of materials, provisions and ordnance, while seamen worked ashore with their 
number peaking at a daily contribution of 600 in early November. About half acted as relief 
guard for the southern posts so that the garrison could set about improving the defences and 
another half helped with these works. Hesse-Darmstadt did offer the sailors payment for 
their labour; while Leake carefully husbanded the naval resources by levying fines on non- 
returned or broken equipment, though many sailors simply side-stepped this penalty by 
stealing from the garrison's stock. Under the expert guidance of the engineer, Colonel 
Bennett, the town's defences were vastly improved and, despite Villadarias's bombardment 
from recently augmented batteries the siege made little headway. 
"' 
119 BL, Add MSS 5440, f 57: Hesse-Darmstadt to Leake, 12 Nov. 1704 [NS]. 
120BL, Add MSS5440, fos. 57-8,217-18: Hesse-Darmstadt to Leake, 12 Nov. 1704 [NS]; 'Att a Councill of 
War of Flag Officers', 2 Nov. 1704. 
12 1 BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 67-8,71-4,78-9,82-3,217-20,225-26,229-32: Hesse-Darmstadt to Leake, 13, 
16,18,22,25 Nov. 1704 [NS]; 'Att a Councill of War of Flag Officers', 2,6,27 Nov., 14,16 Dec. 1704; BL, 
Add MSS 10034, fos. 92-3,100-1: 'Journal of the Taking of Gibraltar', 1-27 Nov. 1704; 'A Letter from the 
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Equally, however, the garrison lacked the manpower to use the improved defences 
for attack, while the increasing sickness daily reduced their number. Upon his return to 
England, Rooke had raised questions about the garrison's strength as part of a general plea 
for resources; while Leake believed it to be the most pressing issue from the outset. 
Crucially, Marlborough - who represented the strategic importance of Gibraltar to the Court - 
proved an ally and, locally, the army commander in Portugal, Lord Galway, was also 
impressed by Gibraltar's needs. News of the latter's support was manifest in the promise, 
conveyed by John Methuen, that Gibraltar would receive a detachment of troops from the 
reinforcements to arrive at Lisbon, including soldiers from the Irish Establishment. 122 
The safe transfer of these soldiers from Lisbon opened a fault-line in the relationship 
between Leake and Hesse-Darmstadt and strained the effectiveness of their combined 
operation to defend Gibraltar. Since early November, the increasingly poor weather had 
made it difficult for the Admiral to keep station safely within Gibraltar Bay. Consequently, 
towards the end of the month, Leake suggested departing for Lisbon with the dual purpose of 
getting replacement ship parts and of securing the expected troop convoy, either on route or 
directly from the Tagus. Given that Pointis was known to be in Cddiz and, according to 
recent intelligence, had been preparing his squadron for departure, the convoy's security 
seemed a pressing matter to Leake. He even raised the prospect of looking into Udiz to 
offer the French Admiral battle. Hesse-Darmstadt had however become frustrated by the 
squadron's variable motion in the bay, which he believed eased the pressure on the enemy by 
allowing the naval bombardment and the ships' boats attacks against enemy camps to be 
inconsistent. Perhaps not surprisingly therefore, he opposed the departure of the squadron, 
believing that it would leave Gibraltar vulnerable to attack. The commanders' respective 
positions turned upon different predictions of Pointis's immediate intentions, and both views 
were based upon narrow service interests. Leake considered that Pointis would engage the 
troop convoy in a naval action, thereby denying the garrison vital reinforcements; while 
Hesse-Darmstadt believed that the French Admiral's intention was to combine with 
Villadarias to mount an attack upon Gibraltar from the landward. Despite there being a 
Engineer Mr Bennet', 6 Dec. 1704; The Life and, 4dventures qfMalthew Bishop, pp. 27-9. 
122 BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 36-7,77: Rooke to Leake, 9 Oct. 1704; John Methuen to Leake. 9 Nov. 1704; BL, 
Add MSS 5437, fos. 69,71: Leake to John Methuen, 3,10 Nov. 1704; The Letters andDispatches ofJohn 
Churchill, i. 526: Marlborough to Hedges, 3 Nov. 1704 [NS]; Kuenzel, Das Leben und der Brieswechsel, no. 
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majority of naval officers at the Council, the garrison officers present - Hesse-Darmstadt, and 
Colonels Purcell and Borr - secured agreement after a lengthy debate that the squadron would 
remain in front of Gibraltar - either in the bay upon an easterly wind or, nearby, if out at sea 
under a westerly. 123 Other than the implication that the naval Flags were more willing to 
compromise, there is no indication why the three soldiers prevailed at this Council. 
Nonetheless, this wholesale neglect of an important naval concern nearly undermined the 
combined operation then being sustained to defend Gibraltar. Indeed, it was largely luck that 
ensured the garrison survived the winter. 
Leake had been correct to think that the troop transports would require additional 
protection against Pointis. The 21-strong convoy left Lisbon on I December withjust a four- 
frigate escort and dispersal was the convoy's only defence when it fell in with Pointis's 
squadron of 22 warships off Cape Spartell on 6 December, having first thought the French 
were Leake's squadron coming to their aid. The Admiral had had news of their departure a 
day previously but, despite immediately resolving to sail to their aid without consulting the 
garrison, the wind proved contrary. 124 Although, paradoxically, this variable weather 
enhanced the effectiveness of dispersal as a defensive tactic, the allies were very fortunate that 
some fifteen transports made it through to Gibraltar, thereby depriving the garrison of some 
20 infantry companies and 200 recruits. 125 The events of the early winter of 1704-5 quickly 
6, p. 468: Hoffmann to Hesse-Darmstadt, II Nov. 1704 [NS]. 
123 BL, Add MSS 47970, pp. 41-3: 'Leake's Journal', 2-27 Nov. 1704; BL, Add MSS 5437, fos. 72,79-8 1, 
89-91: Leake to Vanderdussen, 14 Nov. 1704; Leake to Hesse-Darmstadt, 22 Nov. 1704; Hesse-Darmstadt to 
John Methuen, 26 Nov. 1704; Leake to the Admiralty, 28 Dec. 1704; BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 80-3 225-6: 
Hesse-Darmstadt to Leake, 25 Nov. 1704 [NS]; 'Att a Councill of War of Flag Officers', 27 Nov. 1704; 
Martin-Leakc, 7he Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 214-2 1. 
124 BL, Add MSS 5437, fos 82,89-9 1: Leake to Hesse-Darmstadt, 5 Dec. 1704; Leake to the Admiralty, 28 
Dec. 1704; BL, Add MSS 5440, fos. 227-9: 'Att a Councill of War of Flag Officers', 5 Dec. 1704; BL, Add 
MSS 47970, pp. 44-5: Leake's Journal', 6-14 Dec. 1704; BL, Add MSS 47972A, pp. 9-11: Journal of Captain 
Thomas Kempthorne, 26 Nov. - 19 Dec. 1704; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSirJohn Leake, ii. 223-5. 
125 The exact number of troops and transports actually lost to the French as opposed to simply escaping back 
to Lisbon is uncertain. Hills, Rock of Contention, p. 194 claims that one transport was lost and three 
captured, thus losing 13 companies of Barrymore's regiment, three companies of Donegal's regiment, six 
Dutch companies and 200 recruits. Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 136, claims that only one transport 
was captured by the French with four others returning with Kempthorne's Roebuck to Lisbon, though no total 
of soldiers lost is given. The primary sources do not consistently support either Hills or Hugill. Kuenzel, Das 
Leben und der Brieswechsel, no. 62, p. 532: Hesse-Darmstadt to 'King Charles Ill', 27 Dec. 1704 [NS], notes 
the loss of 7 English and 6 Dutch companies, but it makes no reference to Donegall's men or the recruits. 
13L, Add MSS 5437, fos. 89-91: Leake to the Admiralty 28 Dec. 1704, suggests tentatively that only 400 men 
werelost. Kempthorne'sjournal -BL, Add MSS 47972A, pp. 10-11: Journal of Captain Thomas 
Kempthorne, 28 Nov. - 19 Dec. 1704 - makes no mention of accompanying transports back to Lisbon. The 
point is that the evidence is only conclusive in the positive sense as to how many transports passed through 
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underscored the significance of this incident. The 2000 troops which did arrive safely proved 
essential reinforcements for the garrison as its number continued to fall due to sickness. 
Hesse-Darmstadt's problems were not yet over, however. Leake was forced to remove the 
squadron to Lisbon for refit at the end of December, and the Marshal de Tess6 arrived in 
Spain to succeed the Duke of Berwick with direct orders from Louis XIV to make a personal 
assessment of the siege's progress. Even before Tessd's arrival at Gibraltar, moreover, 
Hesse-Darmstadt had to defend the town against another major assault launched by 
Villadarias, which - probably due to the jealousy and anxiety he felt at the imminent arrival of 
the French General - proved particularly vigorous. 
126 
Bolstered by some 4000 reinforcements brought down by General de Thouy, 
Villadarias launched a two-pronged assault against the breaches in the Round Tower and the 
northern curtain wall on 7 February. Initially, the weight of the enemy force enabled them to 
capture the Tower and penetrate the northerly first line of defence. Quickly negotiating the 
scree slope, this Franco-Spanish force next took the four-gun batteryjust 40 yards from the 
old Moorish citadel, which stood as an outwork to Gibraltar's castle, guarding the north-east 
edgeofthetown. Only the sacrificial actions of Captain Fisher, commanding just over a third 
of a company of Seymour's marines, gained the allies time for reinforcements commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonels Rivett and Moncal to come up from the town and along the covered 
way. Once these deployed, the enemy momentum was halted and, after a bloody combat, 
reversed. Within the hour, Villadarias's men had been forced back down the scree and out of 
the Round Tower. It was the Spaniard's last attempt to recapture Gibraltar as Tessd arrived 
to take command within two days. 127 
The French Marshal was pleasantly surprised at the progress of the siege but, despite 
bringing with him an additional 3000 troops, he remained sceptical about the potential for its 
success and believed this could only come about if the siege was consistently supported from 
the sea. As a result of the representations Tessd made to the French and Spanish Courts, 
Pointis was positively ordered to Gibraltar, where he arrived on 16 February. Bad weather, 
however, frustrated the putting of supplies ashore, and also prevented the co-ordinated land 
the Straits. 
126 Mimoires et Lettres du Marichal de Tessj (Paris, 1806), ii. 136-9; G. M. Trevelyan, England Under 
QýTen Anne: Ramillies and the Union with Scotland (London, 1965), ii. 57-8. 
." Hills, Rock of Contention, pp. 196-7; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 13941; MmoiresetLetlresdu 
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and sea attacks envisaged by Tess6. By the end of February, the worsening weather had 
largely dispersed the French squadron, leaving only five warships in the bay. Meanwhile, 
Leake's squadron had returned to Lisbon on 23 December for a much needed refit; but a lack 
of supplies and the requirement that Leake attend to a variety of outstanding tasks - such as 
the transport to Gibraltar of some 500 Portuguese soldiers collected at Lagos by Paul 
Methuen back in November - caused delay. Nonetheless, with the Garland left to serve 
Gibraltar and some frigates continuing to cruise the Straits, the French naval actions were 
recorded and communication with Hesse-Darmstadt was maintained. Leake was therefore 
well aware of the pressing need to relieve Gibraltar but, with the sanction of his Council, he 
determined to wait for the additional supplies expected with Rear-Admiral Dilkes's squadron 
from Spithead. 
Dilkes's arrival at the Tagus shortly thereafter meant that only contrary winds 
prevented the departure of Leake's squadron prior to 6 March. As before, his intention was 
to rendezvous at Cape Spartell, and then cross over the Straits to surprise the enemy in 
Gibraltar Bay. The strong south-westerly that blew on 10 March disrupted this plan, 
however; but it also forced the five French vessels out of the bay, allowing Leake to spy them 
as he rode two miles off Cape Caberta. A shot fired at the French from the Europa Point led 
the Admiral to conclude that the garrison was secure and he immediately gave chase. Within 
four hours, LArrogant struck to the Newcastle, while the elapse of another four saw 
LArdent and Le Marquis captured by two Dutch ships and Le Magnanime and La Lys 
Vaisseau run ashore. On board Le Magnanime, Pointis had been wounded, though not 
fatal. ly, unlike the French naval challenge at Gibraltar. Tess6 was now denied the sea-borne 
support of his military operations that he had considered a prerequisite for the recapture of 
Gibraltar, and this circumstance increased his scepticism about pursing the siege. Louis was 
also of this opinion, believing that his troops might be more usefully deployed elsewhere on 
the peninsula. Understandably, given that it would mean conceding the loss of part of his 
mainland kingdom, Philip V remained to be convinced. This took less than a month as the 
evidence that allied garrison had an uninterrupted sea-borne supply line and could still, 
despite the ravages of sickness, mount sallies against the besiegers' positions, was balanced 
against the pressing allied threat on Spain's Portuguese borders. On 12 April, on Philip's 
, Xlardchal 
de Tesso. ii. 146-7. 
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orders, Tess6 raised the siege of Gibraltar. 128 
The lifting of the Franco-Spanish siege in April 1705 meant that Gibraltar could be 
effectively considered as captured by the allies. There was certainly a qualitative difference in 
their control of the town from when the marines first took possession on 25 July; and it was 
not simply that their numbers had been boosted by line infantry. For nine months, the land 
garrison maintained a constant operational relationship with Sir John Leake's Mediterranean 
squadron to defend Gibraltar, and more specifically to cause the Franco-Spanish siege to be 
fifted. Twice - in November 1704 and March 1705 - as the garrison resolutely maintained 
their presence in the town against the enemy siege, the navy brought in essential 
reinforcements to help defend against assaults and neutralise the French naval threat. 
Moreover, in the interval, Leake stationed his squadron within Gibraltar Bay and combined 
with Hesse-Darmstadt's forces to pressurise Villadarias's siege works: sailors were sent 
ashore to help the garrison with their defences; bombardments were conducted; feint attacks 
by ships' boats against the enemy camps facilitated garrison sallies. Clearly, there is 
considerable evidence to characterise the capture of Gibraltar as the product of a successful 
combined operation undertaken between the summer and spring of 1704-5. 
It might equally be argued however that the action at Gibraltar cannot be conceived as 
a combined operation in the traditional manner inasmuch as the land force deployed was not 
precisely an army. Despite the presence of some regular soldiers and the Archduke's military 
representatives, the force was comprised mainly of the marine soldiers which had been raised 
for sea service in April 1702. The legislation expressly stated that these men were to serve 
aboard naval ships and they were ultimately placed under the direction of the Lord High 
Admiral; certainly, the War Office had no bureaucratic interest in these men. It is nonetheless 
essential to set the marines' traditional 'army' features against this prevailing Admiralty 
influence in their administrative and command structures. Specifically, the men were 
organised into standard infantry regiments (indeed Edward Fox's and George Villiers's 
marine regiments first raised in 1702 were subsequently translated into the line and continued 
128 Memoires el Leltres du Marichal de Tessi. ii. 147-54,186: Tessd au Prince de Conde, 21 fdvricr, II avril 
1705 [NS]; BL, Add MSS 5437, fos. 89-91,93-4,100-1,105-7,110-13: Leake to the Admiralty, 28 Dec. 
1704,13,27 Jan., 24 Feb., 3,31 Mar. 1705; Leake to John Methuen, 4 Feb. 1705; Leake to Clarke, 7 Feb. 
1705; Leake to Hesse, 28 Mar. 1705; BL, Add MSS 5440, f 77: John Methuen to Leake, 9 Nov. 1704. 
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- albeit under different guises - into today's army) 129 with two grenadier companies. Perhaps 
more significantly, (as Gibraltar demonstrated) the marines undertook many traditional 
soldierly functions, which could allow them to be considered as soldiers rather than sailors 
which operated ashore. Thus, although this operation was not technically an example of co- 
operation between the Royal Navy and the English Army, the marines functional ambiguity 
contributes to the conclusion that there was a sufficiently strong element of co-operation 
between a military land force and the navy to enable it to be included. 
Insofar as this is an appropriate characterisation of a combined operation, it broadens 
its definition. The operational co-operation was between forces on land and at sea with the 
exact composition and specific function of these forces less important. With respect to the 
Grand Strategy, the significance of the combined operation at Gibraltar was two-fold. It was 
integral to England's strategic penetration of the Mediterranean, which was necessarily being 
headed up by the Royal Navy; while it was equally important in furthering the military cause 
of the Archduke on Spanish mainland. This operational pattern which emerged to capture 
Gibraltar was repeated later in 1705 when the allies attempted to take Barcelona, the principal 
city of the symbolic and strategic Spanish province of Catalonia. 
Liv: The Capture of Barcelona, and Other Lesser Spanish Coastal Towns. 1705- 
1706. 
Although the popular slogan - 'No Peace Without Spain' - emerged from a Parliamentary 
address presented to the Queen on 23 December 1707 as part of the Lords's debate on the 
130 
progress of the war in Spain, it did not invoke a new war strategy. Rather, it was a public 
declaration of a policy determined by Portugal's accession to the Grand Alliance and given 
military expression upon the Archduke's arrival in the region in 1704. From then on, the 
conquest of Spain had remained high on the Ministry's strategic agenda, either as an end in 
itself or as part of England's penetration of the Mediterranean. In the latter respect, the 
capture of substantial coastal ports not only provided footholds in Spain for the Archduke but 
129 Fox's and Villiers's marine regiments evolved to form part of the current Light Infantry and Queen's 
Regiments. 
"0 The specific origin of the phrase was the passage in the address: '... That no Peace can be honourable or 
safe, for Your Majesty and Your Allies if Spain, The West Indies or any part of the Spanish Monarchy, be 
suffered to remain under the Power of the House of Bourbon... ' - L1, xviii. 400. The House of Lords spent 
much of the first session of the First Parliament of Great Britain considering the state of the war in the 
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also bases to sustain a permanent naval presence. Even before Gibraltar had been secured, 
Admiral Mitchell was again sent to negotiate with the Dutch about the creation of a Grand 
Fleet with troops aboard, which was to depart for the Mediterranean in the coming campaign 
year. Agreement was reached that the United Provinces would contribute some 20 warships 
and 2400 troops, while England was to provide as half as much again. The English 
Parliament showed its commitment to such a venture by voting funds to raise six new 
regiments for 'sea service'. "' The specific strategic and tactical intent of this fleet and the 
land force remained however undefined until the spring of 1705 when discussions began in 
the Cabinet Council. 
Julian Corbett has argued that the Ministry's ambition for this Grand Fleet did not 
relate to the Spanish mainland but was instead directed towards broadening English influence 
in the Mediterranean. This would require the fleet to maintain a regional sea command and 
protect the trade routes, and a contemporary pamphlet emphasised the capture of Minorca to 
gain use of its superior and strategically shed Port Mah6n harbour. On this occasion, 
however, according to Corbett, Marlborough's advocacy of an attack against the principal 
southern naval base of Toulon formed the focus of deliberations on possible combined 
operations for the Grand Fleet. 132 Corbett's argument implies that both the Ministry and 
Marlborough, in particular, were indifferent towards the conquest of Spain and that it was not 
conceived of as part of a wider Mediterranean theatre. At a strategic and political level, 
however, Marlborough, along with Godolphin, had first given expression to the 'No Peace 
Without Spain' resolve when they sought to undermine French peace overtures in the late 
summer of 1705; while previous operational priorities had demonstrated an appreciation of 
the naval and military logistical advantages that might accrue from captured enemy ports on 
the Spanish coast or nearby island dependencies. 133 More specifically, an attack on Toulon 
might fulfil the diversionary purpose of a descent as articulated by Littleton's 1690s 
Spanish theatre - see LI, xviii. 359,397400 and HMC, Ifouse oftords MSS NS, vii. xxix-xxxv. 
131 PRO, ADM 1/4090, fos. 14-15: Hedges to 'Iffis] R[oyal] H[ighness, Prince George'], 30 Nov. 1704; PRO, 
SP 41/3, f. 38: St John to Hedges, 3 Apr. 1705; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 160-1. 
132 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, ii. 546-8; Anon,, 4n Inquiry into the Causes of Our Naval 
Miscarriages (2 rid edn, London, 1707), pp. iii-v. 
133 The Correspondence 1701-1711 ofJohn Churchill, nos. 256,323,333, pp. 160,202-3,208-9: 
Marlborough to Heinsius, 9 Jan., 5 Sept. 1705 [NS]; Heinsius to Marlborough, 15 ao0t 1705 [NS]; Yhe 
Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, nos. 489,493, pp. 473,478-9: Marlborough to Godolphin, 8 
Aug. 1705; Godolphin to Marlborough, 18 Aug. 1705; Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, ii. 734. 
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pamphlets since it would ease the French military pressure in Spain. "" Thus, when the 
Cabinet Council met to consider three target options in February, the Ministry's ambition and 
Marlborough's preference for Toulon suggested that both possessed a strategic vision with a 
broader tactical bottom than characterised by Corbett. 
The Admiralty rejected an assault against Toulon on the grounds that it was wholly 
contingent on easterly winds. The Board also managed to get the second option - Barcelona 
- overruled on the basis that its defensive fortifications were too strong and that the 
retribution following the allies' previous landing in May 1704 would have had a demoralising 
impact upon its inhabitants. This left Cddiz, which was thought to be poorly defended and 
ready to declare for the Archduke; thus the Admiralty was to prepare a memorandum upon 
targeting it. Any self-congratulation by the Admiralty on its influence over the objectives of a 
joint army-navy operation would have been premature, however. A detailed report of the 
Cabinet Council meeting soon reached the French thereby enabling Philip V to begin 
defensive preparations at Cddiz. When London leamt of this leak, the Ministry was forced 
into a rethink. 135 
This process began at the end of Marchjust after the appointment of Charles 
Mordaunt, P Earl of Peterborough as C. -in-C. of the land forces to be embarked aboard the 
fleet, which was followed in May by his commission to bejoint Admiral with Sir Cloudesley 
Shovell. 136 Although Peterborough would still have to work through a Council of War, this 
dual commission undoubtedly placed him in the senior command position with responsibility 
for both the naval and army components. His appointment attracted considerable surprise 
and subsequent critical comment for not only was Peterborough's military experience limited, 
he possessed an uneven temperament that was thought to be unsuitable for command. Only 
two years previously he had stepped back from both the Governorship of Jamaica and 
command of a expeditionary force to the West Indies, when he considered that preparations 
for the latter were proceeding in a slow and haphazard manner. In March 1705 however, two 
factors were in Peterborough's favour. Firstly, Marlborough did not veto his appointment 
134 See Chapter 1, Section IIIJ, pp. 139,154, for a discussion of Littleton's pamphlets. 
135 Mimoires et Lettres du Marichal de Tessi. ii. 169-74: 'Memoire sur les project des ennemis, et relation 
d'un homme bien informe et bien intentionne quej'entretiens aupres de milord Gallowai, n. d.; Ilugill, No 
peace Without Spain, pp. 149-50. 
13" HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 361: Copy of a warrant from the Queen to Charles, E. Peterborough, 
31 Mar. 1705. 
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despite - as he explained to his wife (who reportedly liked and corresponded with 
Peterborough, albeit infrequently) - not expecting much of the Earl. Secondly, 
Peterborough's aristocratic lineage and political experience embodied the essential position of 
rank for working with Archduke's 'Court'. 137 Indeed, it is surprising, given the subsequent 
emphasis and form of Peterborough's operational Instructions, that the importance of this 
latter criteria has been neglected. 
Throughout April and early May the Cabinet Council, along with both Peterborough 
and invariably Shovell, drafted these Instructions. The perfunctory nature of Harley's 
minutes of these meetings, which recorded the bureaucratic process rather than revealed the 
discussion, meant that it was not until the Instructions were first issued on I May, and then 
added to on 2 and 4 May, before the debate over objectives was glimpsed. Given that 
concerns over the increased defences at Cadiz had caused the rethink, it was noteworthy that 
this port remained a listed target. Along with Barcelona, the Instructions identified Cadiz as a 
town whose capture was essential for the Archduke's conquest of Spain. However, as to 
which to assault first, the Cabinet Council's only recommendation was that the in-theatre 
Council of War leave any attempt on Cadiz until the fleet's return from the Catalan coast. 139 
Undoubtedly, this would have been thought of as prescriptive and certainly the Cabinet 
Council would not have expected to be ignored, but nonetheless, the measure of strategic 
command devolved to the Council of War on this occasion was noteworthy. Operational 
Instructions had been in the past most strictly drafted and, although the Council of War 
usually possessed immediate tactical control, it was rare for this body to be able to exercise 
strategic discretion on the initial operational objectives. 
Two explanations are possible. Firstly, and the reason which brings the appointment 
of the aristocratic Peterborough into focus, London recognised that the war in Spain since 
137 Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 52-3; Francis, The First Peninsula War, pp. 174-3; Hugill, No Peace Without 
Spain, pp. 156-9; Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, ii. 79-80, all comment upon Peterborough's 
character and give explanations for his appointment; as do his principal biographers: W. Stebbing, 
Peterborough (London, 1890), pp. 47-8; F. S. Russell, The Earl ofPeterborough andMonmouth (London, 
1887), i. 166-7;, 4 Memoir of Charles Mordaunt Earl ofPeterborough andMonmouth: With Selectionsfrom 
his Correspondence, ed. G. D. Warburton (London, 1853), i. 14,130-2; Lord Ribblesdale, 'Lord 
Peterborough', FR xxxviii NS (July-Dec., 1885), 206-7. For details on Peterborough's colonial appointment 
in 1703, see Chapter 2, Section ll. ii, pp. 310-11. 
133 BL, Add MSS 70335, unf: Council Minutes, 9,10,13,17,20,22,24,27,28 Apr., 1,6,8 May 1705; 
PRO, SP 104/207, pp. 1-14,18-20: 'Instructions for Our Trusty and Right Welbeloved Cousin and Councillor 
Charles, Earl of Peterborow and Monmouth and Our Trusty and Welbeloved Sir Cloudesly Shovell Knt Joint 
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1703 had been principally one of conquest on behalf of a man whom they had already 
crowned 'King' and who was now in-theatre with his own 'Court'. Etiquette and military 
effectiveness combined to direct that the operational Instructions should allow for some of 
the strategic and tactical detail of the whole war effort in Spain to be generated by the 
Archduke; or, at least, provide for the Council of War's operational decisions to be moulded 
by the in-theatre circumstances of the war. It was of course customary for Councils to take 
account of such immediate theatre conditions when deliberating upon courses of action but, 
on this occasion, there did seem to be a qualitative difference in the Council's discretion over 
individual targets. The second, and probably more compelling explanation, was that the 
Ministry kept the Instructions regarding the operation against Spain vague because a 
combined action against Toulon, previously advocated by Marlborough, was in fact to be 
secretly vouchsafed to both Peterborough and Shovell as the principal objective. These secret 
Instructions, issued on 7 May, explained the recent assurance by the Comte de Briangon 
(chief minister of the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus 11, who had in the autumn of 1703 
broken with Louis to join the Grand Alliance) 139 that the Duke now yielded to the pressure to 
co-operate in an attack against Toulon, and that the start of the combined action awaited only 
confirmation from the English Envoy at Turin, Richard Hill. The previously issued open 
instructions had only recommended succouring the Savoyard Duke if opportunity arose and 
this loose prescription, along with, more particularly, those for the operations against Spain, 
were to provide cover for the Toulon operation. 140 
Unlike the preparations for the projected Anglo-Dutch expedition to the Caribbean in 
1703, Peterborough was not really vexed by delay or a lack of momentum - though this did 
not prevent his occasional complaint. While drafting the Instructions, the Cabinet Council 
had kept a close oversight on those authorities responsible for bringing both the land and sea 
elements of Peterborough's force together. "' The Admiralty and the Secretary of State's 
correspondence certainly demonstrated an urgency to get the warships and auxiliary vessels 
Admiralls of Our Fleet', 1,2,4 May 1705. 
119 G. Symcox, VictorAmadeus M Absolutism in the SavoyardState 167S-1730 (London, 1983), pp. 138-43. 
140 HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 363-4: Copy of instructions to Charles, E. Peterborough and Sir 
Cloudesley Shovell, 7 May 1705; PRO, SP 104/207, pp. 1-14,18-20: 'Instructions for Our Trusty and Right 
Welbeloved Cousin and Councillor Charles, Earl of Peterborow and Monmouth and Our Trusty and 
Welbeloved Sir Cloudesly Shovell Knt Joint Admiralls of Our Fleet', 1,2,4 May 1705. 
141 PRO, ADM 1/4090, f0s. 183-4: Hedges to the Admiralty, 16 May 1705; BL, Add MSS 70335, unf.: 
Council Minutes, 2 Feb. 9,10,13,17,20,22,24,27,28 Apr., 1,6,8 May 1705. 
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fitted out and present at the two troop embarkation ports - Portsmouth and Plymouth. 
Notably though, attention to detail was not sacrificed. In the light of the previous year's 
experience, when several ships ran out of ordnance supplies at the battle of Milaga 
supposedly as a consequence of their prior bombardment of Gibraltar, the Admiralty was 
particularly attentive to its negotiations with the Ordnance Office over all aspects of gunning 
the fleet, including in particular the bomb vessels. Meanwhile, Secretary Hedges contributed 
to the punctilious tone by prompting a transfer to the fleet for one Hepburn, a naval chaplain 
who reputedly possessed a solid knowledge of fortification engineering. 112 
There was from the outset however one aspect of the preparations which, if handled 
badly, threatened to undermine any prospect of the fleet's departure in good time. None of 
the six newly raised regiments for 'sea service' were scheduled to be embarked aboard the 
fleet. Instead three of these regiments (Luke Lillingston's, Owen Wynne's, and Nicholas 
Leppell's) were to replace an equivalent number coming from the Irish Establishment, with 
the other 2500 men of the projected 5000 strong expeditionary force to be provided by three 
previously raised regiments on the English Establishment. 14' As the Irish regiments were 
currently billeted in the south of Ireland, the decision whether their arrival from Cork should 
be awaited or whether a separate convoy to Lisbon should be organised obviously bore upon 
the sailing of the main fleet. Moreover, the potential for delay resulting from bureaucratic 
muddle was raised by the particular arrangements for the transport of these Irish regiments. 
Whereas responsibility for ensuring that three English regiments reached the appropriate 
embarkation port lay wholly with the War Office and its marching orders, the transport of the 
Irish regiments required Secretary-at-War St John to liaise with both the Admiralty and its 
Transport Board. Merchant vessels had to be hired as auxiliaries and complex 'Charter Party' 
negotiations threatened. In the event, the reasonably smooth preparations for the main fleet 
continued for the transport of the Irish Regiments. 144 At the end of April, Captain William 
142 PRO, ADM 1/4090, fos. 181-2: Hedges to the Admiralty, 28 Apr. 1705. 
143 PRO, WO 4/3, pp. 207-8,220: St John to Hedges, 10 Apr. 1705; St John to Southwell, 17 Apr. 1705. The 
three English Establishment regiments were Hans Hamilton's, James Rivers's, and Richard Elliot's; while the 
three regiments from the Irish Establishment were John Caulfield's, Lord Charlemont's, and Richard 
Gorges's. 
144 SP 41/3, fos. 38,40,43,53: St John to Hedges, 3,10,20,30 Apr. 1705; 'Extract of Orders Issued about 
the Three Regiments that go to Sea', 20 Apr. 1705; PRO, WO 5113, fos. 109,114,121 123-5,127: Orders to 
Colonel Hans Hamilton, 6,9,19,20 Apr. 1705; Orders to Colonel Roger Elliot, 19,20 Apr.; 'Dispositions of 
the Three Regiments that are to go onboard the Fleet in England under the Command of the Rt. lion. the Earl 
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Jumper of the Lennox, accompanied by the Grafton and the Burford, was appointed to 
convoy thirteen auxiliary vessels to Cork, which was reached on 18 May. Although it was 
only five days later that the main fleet began making its way down the Channel from 
Portsmouth to collect more troops at Plymouth before, on 30 May, sailing out into the 
Western Approaches, an early decision had in fact been taken that the Irish troops would 
travel separately to Lisbon under Jumper's convoy, thus eliminating any impact upon the main 
fleet's timetable. This was fortuitous inasmuch as, although the regiments were largely ready 
for Jumper to embark on his arrival at Cork, he found them considerably understrength and 
he had to await the enforcement of Lord Lieutenant Ormonde's augmentation order. Hence, 
despite receiving instructions from the Joint Admirals to proceed on 31 May, Jumper was 
unable to leave Cork for another week and only did so with some 200 soldiers short of full 
compliment. 145 
The Grand Fleet arrived at Lisbon in separate groups. The Dutch Admiral Allemonde 
came up the Tagus first on 3 June with the Dutch warships and a majority of the auxiliary 
vessels, to be followed within the week by Peterborough and then Shovell and Fairborne. 
Once the Irish convoyjoined them in late June, the fleet left Lisbon to cruise between Cape 
Spartell and the mouths of the Straits to prevent the junction of the French Brest and Toulon 
fleets - an event which had been feared since the departure from England, despite Vice- 
Admiral Sir George Byng's Channel Squadron keeping watch over Brest. There was 
however little reason to worry for the French had no intention of combining a Grand Fleet in 
1705. On the Anglo-Dutch fleet's departure, Peterborough remained behind to design with 
the Archduke and the Portuguese Court the forthcoming operations, and their discussions 
werejoined on 3 Jyly by the talismanic commander at Gibraltar, Prince George of Hesse- 
Darmstadt. A decision on a specific target proved elusive, however and, although Portuguese 
vacillation came in for much criticism - particularly from Peterborough - the bigger problem 
was the varied agendas of the participants. 
146 Bound by his secret Instructions of 7 May, 
of Peterborough', 23 Apr. 1705; Orders to Colonel James Rivers, 24 Apr. 1705; PRO, ADM 1/3729, unf.: 
Atkinson and Colby to the Admiralty, 27 Feb., 15,27 Mar., 20 Apr., 8,10 May 1705; Atkinson, Roope, and 
Colby to the Admiralty, 1,6, Mar., 5,14 Apr. 1705; Atkinson and Roope to the Admiralty, 10 Apr. 1705. 
145 PRO, ADM 1/3729, unE: Atkinson and Colby to the Admiralty, 27 Feb. 1705; PRO, ADM 1/1980, unf.: 
Jumper to 'Honoured Sir' [Burchett], 27 Apr., 5,8,18,22,31 May, 2,5,7 June 1705. 
146 PRO, SP 42/67, f 61: Copy of a letter of Sir George Byng, 24 June 1705; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir 
John Leake, ii. 277-9; CFKS, Ul 590 0135111, pp. 1-3: 'Journal Kept by Arnet Furly for the Earl of 
Peterborough Proceeding in his Expedition to Spain 1705' [hereafter Turly's Journal'], 10-28 June 1705 
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Peterborough could not contribute frankly to the consultations; while his contributions only 
became more complex throughout July when it became increasingly clear both to himself and 
to London that the operation against Toulon was not going to proceed. Far from confirming 
Victor Amadeus's readiness, the English Envoy, Richard Hill, wrote home that Briangon had 
acted without the Duke's authority, and that the Savoyards could not currently contribute to 
such an scheme. Hill suspected that Briangon's assurances about the attack on Toulon might 
have been a ruse to get the fleet to relieve the westerly Savoyard towns of Nice and 
Villefiranche, which the Duc de la Feuillade's army had occupied in April. But, in any event, 
the Envoy maintained his previous candid advice that the expeditionary force should 
concentrate first on any important operations it had planned for the Spanish coast. In this 
respect, Hesse-Darmstadt's contribution proved equally problematic for he did not, as 
expected, latch on to the suggestion in the original public Instructions of I May to attack 
Barcelona but had instead, before coming from Gibraltar, sent the Archduke a proposal for 
landing the troops in Valencia province whence they might march directly to Madrid. This 
left Cadiz from the Instructions's original suggestions and, apart from the Dutch envoy 
Schonenberg, it attracted little support. 147 It became apparent however that Hesse- 
Darmstadt's reluctance to attack Barcelona was indexed to evidence of the inhabitants' 
enthusiasm. As previously remarked the Catalans were traditionally ill-disposed to the 
ccntrism of the Castilian-based Spanish throne, which they now associated with the Bourbon, 
Philip V; there were nonetheless fears that their rebellious ardour might have been quelled 
following the allies' aborted landing in 1704. The activities of the English agent in Genoa, 
Mitford Crowe, proved essential in challenging such perceptions. On his own suggestion, 
Crowe - who had excellent contacts among the Catalans and who 
knew Hesse-Darmstadt 
from the Prince's time as Governor of Barcelona - had been sent by the Court under the 
cover of a trade mission to Genoa to engage the Catalans about declaring for the Archduke. 
Manipulating his network of associates in the region he was able, despite encountering some 
PRO, SP 104/207, pp. 34-5: Hedges to the Joint Admirals, 12 June 1705; The Byng Papers, ed. B. Tunstall 
(London, 1930), i. 61-3,66,74-8,80-2,85: From Prince George of Denmark, 14 Feb., 6,11 June, 21 July 
1705; From Josiah Burchett, 19 June 1705; From George Clarke, 19 June 1705; HMC, House ofLords MSS 
NS, vii. 500-6: Peterborough to Godolphin, [? July 17051. 
147 PRO, SP 92/27 Part i, fos. 60-3,83-8,93-4: Hill to 'Sir' [Hedges], 8,28 Apr., 13 May 1705 [NS]; PRO, SP 
94/73, unf : Peterborough to Hedges, 12,28 July 1705; RMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vi i. 500-6: 
Peterborough to Godolphin, [? July 1705]; Francis, The First Peninsular War, pp. 176,178; A. Parnell, 7he 
War ofthe Succession in Spain (London, 1888), p. IIIn. I. 
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initial reluctance, to send home encouraging reports about the regional support for the 
Archduke and the likelihood of a rebellion against the Bourbon control in the event of an 
allied landing; moreover, he could point to areas such as Vich, Urgell, Manlleu and Cardona, 
where the local peasantry's armed bands - the Miqueletes - had already been active in 
encouraging opposition to Philip. By mid-June, Crowe had concluded a pact with the 
representatives of the Catalan rebels which, in the short term, afforded them arms, 
ammunition and money in return for supporting the Archduke and raising some 6000 men to 
aid an allied landing; while they also gained the longer term commitment that their traditional 
constitutional and cultural privileges would be upheld if Charles captured the Spanish throne. 
Although the details of this pact did not reach the expeditionary force until it was anchored 
off Altea in late July, Crowe had sent positive reports through to Lisbon as the discussions 
were being held and a consensus - albeit weak, given that Peterborough still retained some 
expectation for the Toulon project - evolved around operations in Catalonia. 
148 
In mid-July the participants to these talks were back on board the fleet and later that 
month, a Council of Flags confirmed that a descent would be made on the Catalan coast. 
Measures were then were taken to augment the expeditionary land force. Two Dragoon 
regiments - Cunningham's and the Royal Regiment - had already been embarked from 
Portugal; while when anchored off Gibraltar between 20-24 July, Elliot's and Catifield's 
regiments were exchanged with a Guards battalion, Barrymore's, Mountjoy's and Donegal's 
regiments, and a detachment of marines - all from the Rock's garrison. It was while off 
Gibraltar that the Archduke landed on the Spanish mainland to be received for the first time 
as 'King of Spain'. 149 
As the fleet made its way around the Spanish coast, it halted next at Altea to water, 
where there proved to be considerable local support for the Archduke, with many inhabitants 
coming directly to the coastline to offer their services. Appropriately, Charles capitalised on 
this by settling a governor ashore and by drafting a manifesto for widespread distribution. He 
149 HMC, House ofLordsMSSNS, vii. 378: Instructions to Mitford Crowe; PRO, SP 79/3 Part iii fos. 500.1, 
510,513,520-1,539,541,545,552,571: Crowe to Hedges, 2,13,30 May, 7,10,12,17 June, 8 July, 5 July 
[NS] 1705; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 161-3; Francis, The First Peninsular War, pp. 175-8. 
149 HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 409-10: Peterborough and Shovell to the Admiralty, 3 Aug. 1705; At a 
Council of War of English and Dutch Flag Officers, 21 July 1705; CFKS, U1 590 0135/11, pp. 3-6: Turly's 
Journal', 28 June-30 July 1705; NMM, SOU/7, f. 169: 'Mr Holland's Journal of the Campaign in the 
Mediterranean' [hereafter 'Holland's Journal']; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSirJohn Leake, ii. 279; Owen, War 
at Sea Under QueenAnne, pp. 136, n. *; Parnell, 7he 
War ofthe Succession in Spain, p. I 11. 
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also made clear his preference at the Council of War, which convened on 2 August, for a 
landing at Barcelona. With details of Crowe's pact with the Catalan rebels also now arriving, 
along with more assurances of support for the Archduke in Barcelona's environs, there 
seemed a real prospect - albeit paradoxical - that Charles might make the principal city of the 
fiercely independent anti-Castilian province of Catalonia his power base for the capture of the 
Castilian-dominated Spanish crown. With further correspondence from Hill and Hedges 
dashing Peterborough's hopes for the secret Instructions, Barcelona was now the only 
realistic target. "O 
The Council on 2 August certainly thought so. It resolved to press forward to 
Barcelona, and the fleet entered the town's bay on II August. On board the Britannia, a 
Council of General Officers met, though, given that any operational item on their agenda - 
troop landings, for example - would necessarily involve the navy, it remains unclear why this 
meeting did not take the form of a combined land and sea Council. Perhaps it was assumed 
that as joint Admiral, Peterborough could act as the naval representative at meetings of the 
General Officers. On this occasion the participants were only required to listen to a 
'handsome speech"51 from the Archduke regarding the necessity of landing the troops 
immediately. To this proposal, all present unanimously agreed. A prevailing easterly causing 
a heavy swell held up the landing on the day of arrival and the sea had improved little the 
following morning as the soldiers began to come ashore when, on exiting the boats, many had 
to wade through water at chest height. Despite some desultory shore fire upon the transports 
first coming to anchor, the landing at Badalona, three-quarters of a league cast of Barcelona 
near the rivers Basoz and Secchia, was unopposed. Moreover, its disciplined execution 
caused some fifteen English and Dutch infantry regiments to be landed within five hours; the 
dragoons and horse followed the next morning. 112 
On 17 August, the Archduke went ashore to the camp which had been established at 
St Martin. Both during his progress there and inside the camp he received a warm reception. 
150 Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 279-80; HMC, House oftords MSS NS, vii. 4 10: At a 
Council of War of English and Dutch Flag Officers, 2 Aug. 1705; Shovell to the Admiralty, 10 Sept. 1705; 
PRO, SP 94/73, unf.: Peterborough to Hedges, 28 July 1705; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 169-70. 
151 CFKS, U1590 0135111, p. 5: Turly's Journal', I lAug. 1705. 
152 HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 410: At a Council of War of English and Dutch Flag Officers, 2 Aug. 
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This however belied a major dispute which had arisen between Charles and his senior generals 
for on the previous day a Council of land officers had rejected his proposal to begin a siege 
against Barcelona. On the grounds of the garrison's reputed strength - as much as 7000 men 
- which was expected to be enhanced by Madrid, and the engineers' assessment that the 
current allied position fronted by marshland was disadvantageous for the construction of 
siege works, the generals concluded that a siege would have no hope of success. They were 
also of the view that an army five times the size of the one encamped at St Martin would 
struggle to capture Barcelona and these troops could be more productively employed in 
helping the Duke of Savoy, who was hard pressed in the Italian theatre, or, as proposed by 
Peterborough, in campaigning through Catalonia and the nearby provinces to secure their 
allegiance. 153 It was thought that a successful prosecution of the latter option might allow the 
Archduke to begin a march on Madrid in the spring. Although in the interval a Council of 
senior naval officers expressed their wish to attempt Barcelona on the basis that this action 
was the clear intent of the Instructions, the General Officers' opposition to a siege remained 
fmn for a further two meetings of their Council (22 and 25 August). 154 
It is noteworthy that combined Councils were still not being called, and since 
Peterborough was both C. -in-C. and joint Admiral, this placed a premium on his views -a 
circumstances which was to have a significant bearing on the immediate direction of the 
combined operation. Until the Council of 22 August, the Earl had agreed with the other 
generals that a siege was not practicable but, on this occasion, he switched his opinion to 
support the Archduke's position as set out in two letters that the Council was then 
considering. In particular, Peterborough argued that Charles's point that Barcelona would 
probably surrender upon a breach being opened was valid; and, further, that the Queen's 
regard for the Archduke should afford his views greater deference, especially about an action 
where there was some hope of success. Peterborough's multiple roles - land commander, 
Admiral, and the force's liaison with the Archduke's 'Court' - combined with his naturally 
is' Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 282 claims that the land officers favoured succouring the 
Duke of Savoy, but this is not evident from the Council's minute - PRO, SP 94/73, unf.: 'At a Council of War 
consisting of General Officers', 16 Aug. 1705. 
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mercurial nature meant that there could not be any certainty that this was his settled opinion 
about the operation. To underline the point, his presentation to the naval Council on 24 
August as to whether the fleet might succour an army campaign ashore after the eighteen 
days of siege requested by the Archduke or whether help could be given to the Duke of 
Savoy if the troops were embarked within seven days, has been described as Prejudiced 
against the siege and thus marking a return to his earlier position. Moreover, when the 
Generals softened their opposition sufficiently at a Council on 26 August to begin 
contemplating a siege, and accordingly asked the fleet to provide daily some 1500 seamen 
ashore, Peterborough advised the Flags to reject the request and recommended instead 
proceeding immediately to Italy. According to Leake's biographer, the Flags refused 
Peterborough's advice and agreed to provide 2500 armed men ashore, though this number 
included those I 100 marines already at the St Martin camp. The minute of the subsequent 
General Officer's Council however stated that the fleet had agreed to release only 900 men of 
whichjust 300 could work everyday, which the soldiers considered insufficient. Whatever 
the exact number of men offered by the navy, the important point was that the General 
Officers returned to a position of implacable opposition to a siege. The conflicting views of 
the soldiers and the sailors, together with Peterborough's varying opinions, led in late August 
to a loss of all coherence and momentum in the operation. 155 
The deadlock was broken, probably unintentionally, by a letter from the Archduke, 
who wrote to Peterborough to affirm once again his resolution to make at least one attempt 
on Barcelona. He also indicated that he had favourably considered the proposal - first aired 
at the General Officers' Council of 16 August - to mount a campaign through the nearby 
provinces. Peterborough seized on this apparent concession and suggested that, while he 
could not contravene his orders from the Queen, if the Archduke promoted Hesse-Darmstadt 
Vicar and Captain-General then a Council might be convened under the Prince's 
chairmanship. It could thus legitimately set aside his and the land officers' settled disposition 
to go to Italy, in favour of a campaign in the provinces. Peterborough was of course being 
disingenuous, for his orders to link up with the Duke of Savoy in Italy were contingent upon 
the Toulon operation, which was clearly not going ahead. His Instructions required that he 
155 PRO, SP 94/73, unf: 'At a Council of War consisting of General Officers', 22,26,28 Aug. 1705; Martin- 
Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 283-6. 
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work through a Council of War, but as noted previously, the Ministry's latitudinarian design 
of the Instructions on this occasion had afforded the Archduke and the in-theatre Council of 
War greater discretion over both strategic and tactical targeting. Hence Peterborough might 
easily at the Archduke's behest have manoeuvred a Council to alter the operation's objective 
to Catalan countryside. In this respect it is noteworthy as Francis points out that, despite 
references to Peterborough seeking a letter of indemnity, there remains no record that Hesse- 
Darmstadt ever convened a Council. Thus, although Charles did appeal separately to Shovell 
to prevent the abandonment of the Barcelona operation, it would simply seem that at the end 
of August he and Peterborough agreed to march the troops first to Tarragona and then 
onwards to Tortosa. As these were two small Catalan towns, the decision was far short of a 
campaign through Valencia and Aragon as first envisaged; but it did nonetheless represent 
action. 156 
The roles of Peterborough and Hesse-Darmstadt over the three days following this 
decision to march forwards to Tarragona has been subject to an intense historical debate. It 
might seem tempting to heed Professor Childs's previous warning against concentrating upon 
an already over-written historiographical dispute. 157 On this occasion however, the debate 
embodies the actual course of events and not simply the expostfacto rationalisation of 
operational failure (as with, for example, the descent on Brest), and thus it merits greater 
attention. 
The origins of the historical controversy lie in the departure on 2 September of a 
thousand-strong detachment of allied troops in the direction of Tarragona but with the secret 
intention instead of swinging round in an arc to attack the Montjuich fortress, which 
commanded Barcelona from the south-westerly heights overlooking the town. There was 
however no consensus amongst the sources as to whether Peterborough or Hesse-Darmstadt 
was responsible for the clandestine plan and, as will be seen, the subsequent success in 
capturing Barcelona gave this debate an added edge. In the early 1930s, G. M. Trevelyan 
seemed to resolve the question in the Earl's favour by drawing fully upon the journal of the 
156 CFKS, U1590 0135/11, p. 9: Turly's Journal', 30-1 Aug. 1705; HMC, llouseofLordsAfSSNSvii. 425: 
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senior allied artillery officer present, Colonel John Richards. 158 Hitherto, the value and 
credibility of other contemporary accounts - such as those by Captain George Carleton, 
Peterborough's secretary Arent Furly, and his physician Dr John Freind"9 - which believed 
Peterborough to be wholly responsible for the attack had been successfully undermined as 
hagiography. 160 This in turn gave rise to histories about the Spanish Succession War like 
Colonel Parnell's, which was irnmoderate in its criticism of Peterborough and considered 
Hesse-Darmstadt to be the sole architect of the Montjuich attack. 161 
TrevelYan argued, however, that Colonel Richards's testimony was of greater weight 
due to his reliable reputation - illustrated by his extant letters and chronicles covering his five 
year involvement on the Peninsula - and also by his presence at Peterborough's side during 
the relevant period of time. His eyewitness account is that intelligence received on 2 
September indicated that Montjuich was poorly defended, and that this prompted 
Peterborough to propose a meeting with Hess-Darmstadt at which it was resolved to attack 
the fortress. This seemed to confirm the opinion of Carleton and others that the attack was 
Peterborough's idea. 162 Historical instinct might agree, but Trevelyan's argument ultimately 
rested on implication: Peterborough was in receipt of the intelligence and arranged the 
meeting therefore he must have put the proposal. In his journal, Richards did not explicitly 
record that the Earl sought the meeting to propose the attack and also that, despite being 
present, he did not record what was said at the conference. Thus the conclusion that the 
Prince suggested the attack during the course of their discussion could be equally valid. A. D. 
Francis draws upon the work of the contemporary Spanish historians, N. Fcliu de la Pena and 
Franciso de Castellvf, 163 to show that it was plausible that the deserters with the intelligence 
'53 G. M. Trcvelyan, 'Peterborough and Barcelona, 1705', CHJ iii (1931), 253-9. On p. 254, Trevelyan noted 
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15' Memoirs of Captain Carleton, ed. C. H. Hartmann (London, 1929); CFKS, U1590 0135/11, pp. 1.59: 
'Furly's Journal'; Freind, An Account ofthe Earl ofPeterborough's Conduct in Spain. 
161 Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 159-60; Trevelyan, 'Peterborough and Barcelona, 1705', pp. 252-3. 
161 Parnell, The War ofthe Succession in Spain, pp. 126-7. 
162 Trevelyan, 'Peterborough and Barcelona, 1705', p. 254; BL, Stowe 471, pp. 15-16: 'Barcelona Memorial, 
1705'. With respect to Richards's reliability, it should be noted that Professor Laughton, DND, xiii. 843, 
believed that, on occasion, Richards wrote his dates wrongly. 
163 N. Feliu de ]a Pena y Farell, Annales de Cataluna, (3 vols, Barcelona, 1709); F. de Castcllvi, Narraciones 
248 
about Montjuich went first to Hesse-Darmstadt who informed the Archduke. Then, on 31 
August, Hesse-Darmstadt and the Archduke convened a meeting with Peterborough and 
Shovell to discuss this news, though ultimately arriving to no firm resolutions. As Richards 
was not present at this meeting, Peterborough was therefore able on 2 September to create 
the impression that not only was the intelligence he then described was fresh but also - by 
calling a meeting with Hesse-Darmstadt - that he had proposals based upon it. With no exact 
record of either meeting, Peterborough and Hesse-Darmstadt could have returned on 2 
September to issues previously discussed, however obliquely. Francis concludes this scenario 
which posits Hesse-Darmstadt as the originator of the Montjuich attack by pointing to the 
lack of surprise in the Archduke's subsequent good luck note (issued after the attack had 
been 'revealed' to him) and also by mentioning that Shovell ordered a landing of men and 
materials below the fortress without first seeking permission. ' 64 
This outline does rather improbably require Hesse-Darmstadt to have shown 
uncharacteristic magnanimity towards Peterborough but nonetheless the Prince perhaps 
thought that his conduct during the attack would make it clear that he was the initiator; 
certainly some of the troops were of this view. "' However, the Prince's leadership at 
Montjuich, as long as it lasted, was not unblemished. 166 When the detachment swept east 
away from Tarragona towards the fortress it got temporarily lost and, although the local 
guides were immediately responsible for this blunder, Hesse-Darmstadt's knowledge of the 
area gained during his time as Barcelona's Governor in the 1690s should have helped prevent 
such an error. In the short term, this diversion meant that the troops were late in arriving on 
the hill slopes upon which Montjuich stood, and with the passing of the night, the element of 
Ifistoricas, eds J. M. Mundet i Gifre & J. M. Alsina Roca (2 vols, Madrid, reprintý 1997). 
164 Francis, The First Peninsular War, pp. 187-8. 
165 A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish Succession War. A Contemporary Narrative, ed. C. T. Atkinson (London, 
1938), p. 14. 
` The ensuing account of the capture of Barcelona is based on the following primary sources and secondary 
authorities: BL, Stowe 471, pp. 15-19: 'Barcelona Memorial, 1705% CFKS, U1590 0135111, pp. 11 -21: 
'Furly's Journal'; NMM, SOU/7, fos. 170-1: 'Holland's Journal'; Memoirs of Captain Carleton, pp. 91-106; 
A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish Succession War, p. 14; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 288-95; 
Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, PP. 82-3; HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 414-15,417-22: At 
a council of English and Dutch flag Officers, 27 Aug., 4,19,22 Sept., 1,8 Oct. 1705; Shovell to the 
Admiralty, 12 Oct. 1705; At a Council of War of English Flag officers, 17,20 Sept. 1705; BL, Add MSS 
47970, pp. 60-4: 'Leake's Journal', 2 Aug. -4 Oct. 1705; H. T. Dickinson, 'Peterborough and the Capture of 
Barcelona, 1705', HTA (1964), 711-15; H. FitzM. Stacke, 'The Capture of Barcelona, 1705: A Little Known 
combined Operation', JRVSI lxxv (I 930)t 343-5; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 183-93; Francis, The 
First Peninsular War, pp. 188-91; Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, ii. 87-91. 
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surprise was lost. The predominately Neapolitan garrison commanded by Lieutenant-General 
de Carracioli spied the allies' arrival and began to fire upon them. Although few were killed, 
Barcelona was loudly notified of the impeding attack thereby enabling Governor de Velasco 
to organise reinforcements. At this point however - probably in an attempt to gain cover - the 
grenadier commander, Colonel Southwell, launched his vanguard detachment into 
Montjuich's covered way in which the troops fortuitously found a good portion of the 
garrison encamped. The grenadiers swiftly expelled the enemy from their tents and the ditch. 
whereupon they fled over the fortress's incomplete outer-works and into the small four 
bastion citadel; and, although the allied ladders proved insufficiently tall for the outer works, 
this action by Southwell's grenadiers had rescued a very uncertain start in time for the arrival 
of Peterborough and Hesse-Darmstadt on the hillside. 
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Fig. 16: The Attack on Fort Mont. juich and Barcclona. 
Their assessment of the position moved Peterborough to retrace his steps to bring Lip 
the I 300-strong force under Brigadier Stanhope, which had been held in reserve at The 
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Covered Cross, a mile from Mon1juich; meanwhile, Hesse-Darmstadt was to lead a 
detachment of troops to cut the communication between the fortress and Barcelona. Some 
historians judged his objective to be the capture of the small St Betram outwork which stood 
mid-way on the coastal path from the town. If this was correct, Hesse-Darmstadt did not get 
near it for, as a result either of losing his way or of consciously taking a prodigious gamble, 
he led his men too near to the principal gate and wall of the citadel whereupon a Neapolitan 
bullet struck the Prince's right thigh. With his femoral artery severed, the Prince quickly bled 
to death. The troops were disordered by this dramatic loss of their charismatic leader and 
Lord Charlemont, who as Lieutenant-General was now the senior officer, coped poorly with 
the command responsibilities that fell upon him. He was vacillating between pressing on or 
retreating when, according to certain reports, the garrison tricked the allied troops into an 
ambush by crying out Viva Carlos Tercerco and seeming to lay down their arms, to then only 
discharge a thunderous fire when Colonel Allan approached with a group of some 200 
soldiers to receive the surrender. Either convinced that retreat was now necessary or simply 
overwhelmed by the troops' alarm, Charlemont did not attempt to stop the men as they began 
a chaotic descent away from the outer works. En route to Stanhope, Peterborough heard the 
firing, and upon receiving some news of the events on the hilltop, he turned back. The scale 
and ill disciplined nature of the retreat soon became apparent and it was then that his quixotic 
character served him well as he fell into the 'Horriblest Passion 9 167 and, with half-pike aloft, 
single-handedly exhorted the soldiers back uphill to reclaim the outer works. 
Although still strongly placed inside Mon1juich's citadel the Neapolitan defenders 
were becoming isolated. Reinforcements sent out by Velasco returned to the city afler their 
commander assumed wrongly - following a conversation with the captured Captain Allan - 
that Peterborough had his whole force at Montjuich. Meanwhile, the local Miquelets 
managed to sever the fortress's line of communication by taking St Betram. The advantage 
was thus increasingly with Peterborough and, although Captain Cavendish's eight-vessel 
naval detachment carrying the additional men and supplies had been delayed by bad weather, 
Richards returned quickly to the Archduke's camp to bring up some artillery pieces, including 
two seven inch mortars. As these began to play upon the citadel's wall, Cavendish brought 
his flotilla to anchor opposite the fortress, and on 4 September began unloading the heavier 
"' BL, Stowe 471, p. 17: 'Barcelona Memorial, 1705'. 
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naval ordnance, which sailors and soldiers were to haul to the top of hill. It was anticipated 
that these would be primarily required for besieging of Barcelona, though it was only luck 
which allowed Montjuich to be reduced after two days of mortar fire. On 6 September, a 
shell providentially landed in the citadel's magazine causing a massive explosion which killed 
Carraccioli and ruptured one of the walls. Isolated, without their commandant, and 
vulnerable to an assault through the breach in the damaged wall, the garrison surrendered .1 
68 
In possession of the strategic height overlooking the town, Peterborough pressed 
forward to besiege Barcelona. Shovell had, upon Peterborough's prior request, already 
agreed the naval contribution with his senior colleagues at a Council on 4 September. This 
endorsed their previous commitment of 27 August to provide over 50 guns with crews 
(thought to amount to about 600 men) and some 2500 armed sailors to help dig trenches and 
construct siege batteries; in addition the Dutch agreed to provide 600 armed men from their 
vessels. Also upon Peterborough's request, the naval Flags detached a small squadron under 
Fairborne close inshore to bombard the town. Although its role was not as significant as that 
of Byng's detachment at Gibraltar inasmuch as the warships discharged no broadsides, the 
shells from its bomb vessels effectively maintained pressure upon the city between the capture 
of Montjuich and the commencement of fire from the largest land battery on 17 September. 
This was positioned just 400 yards from the curtain of Barcelona's new town near to the St 
Antonio Gate and, according to most accounts, both its erection and that of the smaller 
batteries which opened a week earlier, had involved soldiers and sailors in an unprecedented 
degree of logistical co-operation. There was no simple route up from the shore south of 
MontJuich where the naval ordnance was landed. The carpenters had to adapt the naval 
carriages for transport overland; while Captain Littleton of the Cambridge apparently 
163 The exact progress of the early stages of the attack on Montjuich is unclear. Many of the primary sources 
and secondary authorities - CFKS, U1590 0135111, p. 11: Turly's Journal'; A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish 
Succession War, p. 14; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 183; and Francis, 7he First Peninsular War, p. 
188, for example - elide the details. Others, such as Memoirs of Captain Carleton, pp. 91-2 and Dickinson, 
'Peterborough and the Capture of Barcelona, 1705', p. 711, suggest that the detachment largely aff ived as an 
unit which Peterborough disposed for a three pronged attack upon the morning 
light. Richards, however, in 
BL, Stowe 471, p. 16: 'Barcelona Memorial, 1705' was clear that Southwell's grenadiers arrived first to 
engage the Neapolitans in the covered way, and, although as Trevelyan pointed out 
in 'Peterborough and 
Barcelona, 1705', p. 259 there are differences in detail between Richards's account in his 'Memorial' and his 
'Diary' in BL, Stowe 467: 'Diary of J. Richards 1704-1705', 1 have relied on his 'Memorial' for it arguably 
provides the fuller account and relates the grenadiers 
in a forward assault role, which is consonant with recent 
historical experience. My approach is the same as Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, ii. 87, but he gave 
no explanation for relying on this piece of evidence more than the other. 
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foreshadowed Captain Hoste's scientific skills a hundred years later by reputedly devising a 
human harness to facilitate the hauling of the guns. 169 Service integration was not just 
restricted to shared material and logistics, however. With the ships' gun crews manning the 
ordnance ashore, three junior Captains and six Lieutenants were landed on II September to 
work a command rota. Richards was one of the few to grumble about this combined 
endeavour on land and he formed a poor view of the sailors' work ethic. Hisdismissive 
opinion was however influenced by his disapproval of Peterborough's retention of the 
principal army camp at the distant St Martin, to which he had to send for the land train's 
materials, and by the fact that the demands on his time forced him to devolve much of the 
immediate oversight of the siege to Colonel Petit. 
The siege quickly fell into an unremarkable bombardment pattern as the besiegers 
sought the necessary breach prior to launching an assault. As at Montjuich, the advantage 
seemed to be with the allies, for not only did they have open sea based supply line and 
additional naval bombardment, there was also no immediate prospect of a Franco-Spanish 
relief army to threaten the siege works. Moreover, declarations of support for the Archduke 
were now belatedly being made in the principal Catalonian towns and villages surrounding 
Barcelona. A number also came through from the neighbouring provinces of Valencia and 
Aragon. Admittedly, in most cases these declarations were not spontaneous, since a notable 
villager or a band of Miquelets was usually required to galvanise the community, while at 
Tarragona, it was fire from a small naval flotilla commanded by Cavendish which proved 
decisive. They were nonetheless a psychological boost to the Archduke's cause and more 
importantly isolated Barcelona as a Bourbon enclave within the region thereby offering, if the 
siege was successful, the prospect of a secure Catalan base from which to effect the conquest 
of the rest of Spain. 
Possession of these advantages did not mean that the progress of the siege was 
without difficulties. Peterborough quickly deemed his batteries to be of insufficient scale and 
low on resources, while he was also troubled by a shortage of funds for the land force's 
subsistence. Once again, the navy was pressed to help. Following a personal visit by 
Peterborough to Shovel], the Council of Flags agreed on 17 September to release the 
169 M. Duffy, '"Science and Labour". The Naval Contribution to Operations Ashore in the Great Wars with 
France 1793-1815', in P. Hore (ed. ) SeapowerAshore: 200 Years ofRoyal Navy Operations on Land 
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seamen's short allowance money and a substantial proportion of the fleet's contingency fund 
to total 40 000 dollars for the army's living. Furthermore, subsequent Councils over a four 
day period from 19 September sanctioned the landing of 14 more guns and the provision of 
ordnance supplies which would reduce the English ships to a minimum 30 rounds apiece for 
their 18 and 24 pounders; and, although the ratio established for the respective operational 
contributions by England and the United Provinces meant that the Dutch contribution had not 
yet brought their ships' guns to that level, they agreed to supply more shot and powder if 
required. The totals of powder and shot already provided for the 18 and 24 pounders ashore 
had informed this decision and the minute of the meeting at which it was discussed (22 
September) betrayed just the vaguest sense of apprehension amongst the Flags that this might 
not prove sufficient. "O 
Their concerns would have been eased by the events of the night following this last 
meeting. A breach had just recently been opened between the St Antonio Gate bastion and 
the St Pauls demi-lune to the east, against which Peterborough was to dispose his troops 
(albeit that the majority were still some distance away at the St Martin camp) for an assault. 
First though, in accordance with the contemporary conventions, a summons was sent to 
Velasco. Although historians agree that the Governor resolved to surrender, there is 
disagreement on the timing of his decision. One claim was that the Governor rejected the 
summons in the first instance and attempted to shore up the breach with mined earthworks 
only for this gambit to fail when accurate fire from the allied battery exploded the mines. "' 
Another is that Velasco sought a four day respite to make up his mind about surrender. A 
third possibility is that his decision was immediate. 172 It is difficult to locate all these various 
explanations in the primary sources; but on the basis that Stanhope and the Conde de Riberia 
were exchanged as hostages for the duration of the negotiations on 23 September, any delay 
over Velasco's acceptance of the summons could really only have been a matter of hours. 
The negotiations about terms however lasted much longer. Velasco sought a settlement 
similar to that offered by the French in the Nine Years War, vouchsafing him privileges 
(London, 2000), pp. 47-9. 
170 HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 420-1: At a Council of English and Dutch flag Officers, 22 Sept. 
1705. 
171 Dickinson, 'Peterborough and the Capture of Barcelona 1705', p. 712. 
172 Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 189; Francis, The First Peninsula War, p. 190; Parnell, The Mar ofthe 
Succession in Spain, p. 13 6. 
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beyond those commensurate with his present military position. Desiring a quick resolution, 
Peterborough was reportedly sympathetic, but the Archduke's advisor, Lichtenstein, strongly 
disagreed and the two men clashed over the conditions to be imposed upon the French. Even 
when agreement on the 49 Articles was reached on 28 September, the siege was not resolved 
smoothly. Under the agreement, nearly a week was to pass before Velasco, his garrison and 
any supporters were to march out and be transported by the navy to southern Spain. During 
this time, the pro-Habsburg faction in Barcelona began to assert its victory by rioting and 
inciting violence against the town's pro-Bourbon inhabitants. A massacre entirely antithetical 
to the contemporary conduct of war thus threatened and Stanhope, who was still inside the 
town, got word out to Peterborough. The Earl moved quickly to quell this rebellion by 
leading an occupation force into Barcelona on 3 October before the garrison marched out 
and, besides giving rise to the romantic tale of his periwig sustaining a bullet as he carried the 
winsome Duchess de Populi to safety, Peterborough's action proved effective in ensuring the 
security of the town. 
The main fleet under Shovell departed Barcelona for England on 12 October, leaving 
behind Peterborough with the land force, and also a small eight-vessel winter squadron to be 
stationed at Lisbon under Sir John Leake. Within days of Shovell's departure the Archduke 
made his formal entry into the town, attended by considerable ceremony, to be proclaimed 
King. The allies were keen for Charles to take the first opportunity to march onwards to 
Madrid and Peterborough spent the winter of 1705/6 at the head of a body of troops in the 
province of Valencia securing the support previously demonstrated for the Archduke in that 
region. 173 However, Charles's cause was quickly hampered by a lack of money and 
resources, both of which were made worse, according to Peterborough, by the 'wretches for 
Ministers'"', who advised the Archduke. The deflation of the allies' momentum was 
manifest by the French making the first significant move at the turn of the year. 1705 had 
been a poor year for the Bourbon cause in Spain, even though Marshal de Tessd had 
successfully expelled the Anglo-Portuguese force from Estremadura province. Following on 
from the loss of Gibraltar, the French could not afford to relinquish the strategic benefits that 
173 Martin-Lcake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 294-5; CFKS, Ul 590 0135111, p. 21-3: Turly's Journal', 12- 
14,27 Oct. 1705; BL, Add MSS 5438, fos. 7-9: Leake to Burchett, 17 Jan. 1706; A Royal Dragoon in the 
Spanish Succession War, P. 14-17. 
1741 
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Earl ofPeterborough to General Stanhope in Spain, ed. Lord Mahon (London, 1834), p. 
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land base such as Barcelona provided the Archduke. Perhaps even more important was the 
political imperative that Philip V should predominate in the principal city of the region most ill 
disposed to his rule. Accordingly, Louis prompted his already enthusiastic grandson to an 
early attempt by land and sea to recapture Barcelona and thus, as at Gibraltar, the allies were 
forced to mount a combined army-navy operation to maintain and enhance their possession of 
the Catalan City. 175 
Having left Madrid early in the new year, a pessimistic Tess6 arrived in Saragossa on 
21 January 1706 to assemble the army which was to march on Barcelona. About a month 
later, and with some 12 000 men mustered, he was joined by Philip V at Caspe. The 
Marshal's intention while en route to Barcelona had been to cut the allies' communication 
throughout the provinces of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia, and also to secure his own 
flanks. Many of his colleagues however thought this approach ponderous and argued 
successfully that the army's swift appearance in front of Barcelona, combined with the arrival 
of the Toulon fleet under the Comte de Toulouse off the coast, would cause the city to 
capitulate with the same rapidity it had to the allies. Thus, as Prince Lichtenstein's 
intelligence correctly predicted, the force under Philip and Tessd marched directly for 
Barcelona and, despite their failure to pacify the hostile Catalans as they passed through the 
province, the River Llobgregat, which ran down to the Mediterranean just south of 
Barcelona, was reached in the last week of March. The siege of Barcelona was to be pressed 
forward from this position, but first some 9000 reinforcements from Roussillon were awaited. 
Meanwhile, Toulouse had been fitting out a 40-vessel fleet, including some seventeen 
warships, at Toulon whence he was to sail to Barcelona to perform a similar function for 
Tess6 as the allied fleet had for Peterborough. Departing Toulon in the last week of 
February, Toulouse was expected to arrive off Barcelona well in advance of the land force; 
but in the event bad weather greatly hampered him and, when Tessd sought to make contact 
on arriving at the Llobgregat, the Admiral was onlyjust bringing the French fleet to anchor. 
176 
It has been claimed that London knew of the French intentions with respect to 
2: Peterborough to Stanhope, 18 Nov. 1705. 
175 Quincy, Ifistoire Militaire, iv. 655-60; Lynn, The Wars ofLouisXIV, p. 302,3 10-11; Trevelyan, England 
Under Queen Anne, ii. 92-3. 
176 Mimoires el Lettres du Markhal de Tessi. ii. 207-8,217; Marquis de DangCau, Abroge des AVmoirs ou 
Journal de Marquis de Dangeau (Paris, 1817) ii. 412-13; BL, Add MSS 5438, f 71: Lichtenstein to 'Sir' 
[Leakel, 26 Mar. 1706 [NS]; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 202-4. 
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Barcelona by January 1706, but Galway's letter of late November 1705 which referred to the 
westward movements of Philip and Tess6 plus the imminent departure of the Toulon fleet, 
only related them to a general French desire to recover Catalonia and not a specific action 
against Barcelona. 177 The Ministry did plan though to reinforce the Archduke's capability. 
Five regiments - three from England and two from Ireland - were to be dispatched, along with 
six months provisions for the 5000 allied troops plus a commitment to provide for 10 000 in 
the immediate future. It was also agreed that at least nine of the naval vessels convoying this 
supply from England and Ireland would remain in the Mediterranean to augment Leake's 
winter squadron. The dispatch of these reinforcements and provisions was however 
continually delayed throughout the winter months. 178 
Aside from Catalonia, the Ministry attention during these months was partially 
occupied by schemes for the Archduke to capitalise on the reported pro-Habsburg 
incffiations of the Spanish West Indian possessions but mainly by the deteriorating situation 
of the Duke of Savoy. In April 1705, the French had occupied Nice and Villefranche, with 
the former's citadel eventually falling to the Duke of Berwick in the winter; while the Duke's 
stronghold, Turin, was expected to be the Duc de La Feuillade's target for the opening of the 
1706 campaign. Assuming that the Archduke remained secure in the Peninsula, the Ministry 
aimed to use the resources already in the Mediterranean, perhaps along with the additional 
men and materials then being prepared at Portsmouth for Catalonia, to succour the Duke. 
The Court's concern for Victor Amadeus only deepened in the new year when his emissary, 
Conte Annibale Maffei, arrived in town seeking help; and, in early March, the Admiralty tried 
to expedite the departure of the supplies (men and material) for Catalonia by appointing the 
C. -in-C. Portsmouth, Sir George Byng, to the sea-going command of the convoying 
squadron. Byng's Instructions simply referred to the pressing need to reinforce Leake, while 
the latter's orders, issued on 2 April, prioritiscd getting material help through to the Duke; in 
neither document was the fate of Barcelona specifically cited as a concem. 179 This was 
171 The Byng Papers, i. 99; HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 388-9: Extract of a letter from Galway to 
Hedges, 7 Dec. 1705 [NS] [refers to an earlier letter in late November]. 
"' HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 390-4: Extract of a letter from Hedges to Galway, 4 Dec. 1705,8,29 
Jan., 12,26 Feb. 1706; Extract of a letter from Hedges to Methuen, 18,26 Dec. 1705. 
179 PRO, SP 104/207, fos. 57-63,70-3,89-91: Hedges to John Methuen, II Sept. 1705; Hedges to Hill, II 
Sept. 1705; Hedges to the Admiralty, 4 Dec. 1705; Hedges to Peterborough, II Dec. 1705,7 Feb., 2 Apr. 
1706; 'Instructions for Our Right Trusty and Welbeloved Cousin and Councillor Charles Earl of Peterborow 
and Monmouth', 2 Feb 1706; 'Instructions to Our Right Trusty and Welbelovcd Sir John Leake Knt, 2 April 
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curious inasmuch as by spring the signs were that London's ignorance regarding the 
impending threat to Barcelona had been significantly enlightened. French intelligence current 
among the Ministry from the end of February had been referring to a prospective siege of the 
city; while notably Leake's Instructions of 2 April did, albeit as a general point, direct him 
first to ensure Charles's safety in the city, particularly from the French fleet. Ultimately the 
rumours Godolphin referred to on 19 April about Barcelona being besieged from the land 
were confirmed three days later when he received Marlborough's letter of 16 April from The 
Hague, which told of the French opening their trenches. The Lord Treasurer's response was 
simply to hope that Leake would get round the coast in time. 180 
Leake had largely remained as uncertain of the specific threat posed to Barcelona as 
London. The winter months had been spent refitting the fleet and planning an attempt on the 
French galleons thought to be harbouring in CAdiz. Nonetheless, when cruising off Cape 
SPartel in March, he had received news that Toulouse had left Toulon bound for 
Barcelona. "' The fact that on receipt of this information he did not sail immediately to the 
town was doubtless due the optimism of his principal mainland correspondent - 
Peterborough. Now based in Valencia province, the Earl seemed relatively untroubled by the 
developing events to the north, and, perhaps more significantly, he wished the expected 
additional troops to be brought by Leake to augment his force. This remained 
Peterborough's view even though Charles and Liechtenstein had sent Leake letters in mid- 
March outlining the peril faced by the town and requesting that he come with all the 
reinforcements sent from England for Catalonia. Peterborough calculated that the supply 
maintained by Toulouse's fleet was the essential link in the enemy's operation and that 
Leake's squadron would be better placed to chase it from the coast if unencumbered by the 
troop transports. 182 This analysis was not without foundation. By rejecting Tessd's approach 
1706; The Byng Papers, i. 112-14: From Prince George of Denmark's Council, 4 Mar. 1706; Quincy, Ifistoire 
Afilitaire, iv. 589-92,627-35; Symcox, Victor Amadeus II, pp. 149-50. 
18011MC, House ofLordsMSSNS, vii. 393-4: Extract of a letter from 11cdges to Galway, 19,26 Feb. 1706; 
The Afarlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, nos. 539,541,544, pp. 520,522,524: Marlborough to 
Godolphin, 16 Apr. 1706; Godolphin to Marlborough, 19,22 Apr. 1706. 
131 BL, Add MSS 5438, fos. 7-9,17-18,25: Leake to Burchett, 17 Jan., 19 Mar. 1706; Leake to Peterborough, 
18 Feb. 1706; BL, Add MSS 47970, p. 77: Teake's Journal,, 19 Mar. 1706. 
182 HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 427-8: Peterborough to the Admiral or officer commanding-in-chief of 
her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, 18 Mar. 1706; Peterborough to Leake, 19 Mar. 1706; 'King of 
Spain' to Leake, 26 Mar. 1706 [NS]; Lichtenstein to Leakc, 26 Mar. 1706 [NS]; BL Add MSS 5438, fos. 48- 
5 1: Pctcrborough to 'Sir' [Leakc], 7,18 Apr. 1706 [NS1- 
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and proceeding directly to Barcelona, the French army had failed to establish any mainland 
fines of communication and its isolation was increased by the debilitating attacks undertaken 
by the Conde de Cifuentes's band of Miquelets. Using the local topography to full effect, the 
Miquelets seemed to the French to be simultaneously nowhere and everywhere: a raid at 
Philip's headquarters at Sarria nearly resulted in his capture, while another seized some 700 
sheep from the French field depot. "' Whereas at Gibraltar the siege army had largely relied 
on the fleet's additional attack capability, the French land force's maritime dependency at 
Barcelona was total. 
The weakness of the French besiegers was not however apparent to the allies inside 
the town. Although augmented by the arrival of the 1800 strong Gerona garrison 
commanded by Lord Donegal along with some 1500 Miquelets, the regular garrison soldiers 
only totalled approximately 1400.184 Improvements to the city defences had been effected 
under the guidance of Colonel Petit, including the replacement of the St Betram outwork' 85 
with a trench running to Montjuich which made the severing of its communication with the 
city a more elusive military proposition. Notwithstanding, there was little confidence that the 
garrison could resist Tessd's 20 000 men supported by Toulouse's fleet. A measure of this 
was the proposal made during the siege to send the Archduke out of the city to ensure his 
safety, though Charles was ultimately aware of the damage that flight would inflict on his 
claim to the throne and thus decided to stay on. 
' 86 In doing so, he at least aimed to act like a 
King by providing a figurehead for the defence of the town. 
The differing reflections on Barcelona's situation and its relief posed a dilemma for 
Leake, inasmuch as he was not in receipt of a consistent land opinion to guide what was 
necessarily a land and sea venture. Off Gibraltar on 6 April, this circumstance was partially 
resolved by his naval Council when it considered all the correspondence previously received 
from the Archduke and Peterborough and resolved upon Barcelona's relief as a priority. The 
intention was not for the whole fleet to appear immediately before the city, but rather to 
proceed in stages along the Spanish coast in order to gain intelligence about the size of 
Toulouse's fleet. The Council also on this occasion adopted Peterborough's point about the 
"I Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 205; Francis, The First Peninsular War, p. 206. 
184 Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 204; Francis, Me First Peninsular War, p. 206. 
'85 Francis, The First Peninsular War, p. 206 wrote of it still being erect. 
116 Hugi H, No Peace Without Spain, p. 204. 
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benefits of not being hindered by troop transports by ordering all the soldiers to be embarked 
aboard the fleet vessels. Altea was reached on 18 April, whereupon another naval Council 
was held. Although again recognising Barcelona's need, its members were reluctant to sail 
much further without either Byng's reinforcements or the other convoy from Ireland. There 
was also the additional problem that Peterborough continued to press for all the troops to be 
landed at either Altea or Denia and in so doing he attempted to assert his authority by sending 
Leake his commission asjoint Admiral. Leake was not disposed to heed Peterborough's 
demands and upon learning that Byng was not far away, the Council decided to await his 
arrival overnight. Interestingly, during the night Brigadier Gorges appeared with further 
correspondence from the Earl, indicating a subtle shift in his position. He now suggested that 
Leake should retain at least 1000 soldiers on board to be immediately landed as a descent 
force on reaching Barcelona. ' 87 
Peterborough wrote this letter after marching with a number of his troops to a new 
position in the mountains surrounding Barcelona and it may well have been that sight of the 
city informed his shift in opinion. By mid-April, the French had clearly made gains from the 
landward. Siege works had been erected in front of the city walls, but Montjuich was 
targeted first with a constant mortar fire and on 10 April, Tessd, despite having suffered a 
repulse a week earlier, launched a large scale assault under the command of the Marquis de 
Aytona. The commandant of Montjuich, Lord Donegal, mounted a vigorous defence during 
which he and 300 troops died but ultimately the fortress could only hold out for four days 
before surrendering. Undoubtedly this action at Montjuich delayed the enemy's advance on 
the city and also afforded more time for Leake's approach, but as Barcelona's garrison was 
largely unaware of the relief squadron's progress and now faced a besieging force that 
commanded the south-westerly heights of the town, they remained beleaguered. "' 
Leake's squadron was augmented by the arrival of Byng's detachment on 20 April 
and of the Irish convoy only days later. He proceeded through bad weather to Tortosa, 
where on 26 April he received a letter from the Archduke which represented the city's bleak 
"' HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vi. 432-3: At a Council of War of Flag Officers and Captains, 6 Apr. 
1706; BL, Add MSS 5438, fos. 48-50: Peterborough to 'Sir' [Lcake], 7 Apr. 1706; BL, Add MSS 5442, E 
114: 'Att a Councill of War of Flag Officers', 18 Apr. 1706; BL, Add MSS 47970, pp. 78-9: Teake's 
Journal', 4-6 Apr. 1706; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSIr John Leake, ii. 10-16. 
M Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 15-17; de la Ronci6re, Ifistoire de la Marine Franqaise, vi. 
381-2; Hugil 1, No Peace Without Spain, pp. 205-7. 
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situation. More importantly it rebuffed Peterborough's call for the majority of the troop 
reinforcements to be landed elsewhere and directed that they must be brought to Barcelona 
immediately. There was also correspondence from Peterborough in Leakc's mail bag, which 
showed him firm in his belief that Barcelona's relief required only a smaller descent force 
covered by the fleet. To this end he had collected several boat loads of troops at Sitges, 21 
miles west-south-west of Barcelona, which only awaked the fleet's support. Leake however 
remained resolved to bring his whole fleet, including all the reinforcements round into 
Barcelona Bay, and engage Toulouse if necessary. The paradox, which only Peterborough 
had considered, was that Toulouse had no intention of fighting to supply Tess6. On learning 
from a Genoese vessel on the night of 26/27 April that Leake was fast approaching with a 
larger fleet, he signalled the French fleet to weigh and returned to Toulon. '" 
Given that the French siege only lasted for another four days following Toulouse's 
departure, Peterborough's opinion that the allies had only to target the French fleet to relieve 
Barcelona seemed accurate. Nonetheless, just as Leake approached the empty Barcelona 
Bay, the town was at its most vulnerable from the landward. A breach of considerable width 
had been opened in the walls and, with a French infantry assault imminently expected, the 
troops landed from Admirals Byng's and Wassenar's flagships, which Leake had ordered 
ahead, proved invaluable in immediately augmenting the garrison's defence. The remaining 
troops and marines landed when Leake came to anchor and the 1400-strong descent force 
compiled by Peterborough at Sitges enabled the allies to put into Barcelona some 5000 
reinforcements. This so dispirited the French that their threatened assault on the breach was 
never launched and they retreated quickly from the walls, leaving artillery and ammunition 
behind. 190 Toulouse's departure clearly enfeebled the siege, but the landing of all available 
infantry reinforcements had been necessary to neutralise the very immediate threat to 
Barcelona. 
When bringing his descent force from Sitges to the main fleet just before it entered 
"" Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 17-22; HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 437-8: King of 
Spain to Leake, 4 May 1706 [NS]; BL, Add MSS 5438, fos. 53-5: Peterborough to 'Sir' [Leake], 30 Apr. 
1706,5 May 1706 [NS]; BL, Egerton 2521, f 94: Haddock to 'Hon. Sir' [Sir Richard Haddock], I May 1706. 
"0 BL, Egerton 252 1, f. 94: Haddock to 'Hon. Sir' [Sir Richard Haddock], I May 1706; BL, Add MSS 47970, 
p. 80: Teake's Journal', 28 Apr. -I May 1706; Lord Mahon, History ofthe War ofthe Succession in Spain 
(2"d edn, London, 1836), Appendix, pp. vi-viii: To Secretary Sir Charles Hedges, 9,12 May 1706 [NSI; Life 
ofCaptain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, p. 94; Francis, The First 
Peninsular War, p. 212. 
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Barcelona Bay, Peterborough had boarded Leake's flagship and asserted what he believed 
was his superior command by hoisting his flag at the main mast. Peterborough presumably 
predicated this action on his dual commission as C. -in-C. of the land forces and joint Admiral. 
It was unclear whether this commission applied with an Admiral other than Shovel]; certainly 
later in June, Burchett sent out a fresh commission for Peterborough to be joint Admiral with 
Leake but Leake at this stage made no comment. His restraint did not mean that he forgot 
Peterborough's insensitive gesture and future relations between the two commanders proved 
increasingly strained. "' This was significant in the aftermath of relieving Barcelona when a 
Grand Council of War convened by the Archduke on 10 May upheld the resolutions of the 
naval Council of 4 May to combine with the land forces to extend full control over Valencia 
province. However, as the first target was to be Alicante, which it was thought would 
surrender simply at the appearance of the fleet off the coast, no combined land and sea action 
was immediately envisaged and Leake merely had to land Peterborough along with some 600 
troops at either Altea or Denia, where they would be joined by a party of horse marching 
overland. 192 
The squadron left Barcelona on 18 May and within four days Peterborough caused the 
plans to be changed by convincing a Council of War that the troops should be landed at 
Valencia town, so that the enemy might be cleared from the road linking it with Denia. 
Progress was further disrupted when four days later, on arriving off the town on 24 May, 
Leake at last received from London the Instructions of 2 April directing him to the urgent 
succour of Savoy. A naval Council - at which Peterborough was present - took a decision in 
principle to fulfil these Instructions, and the Earl agreed to embark those troops he felt he 
could release for this service. However, to Leake's considerable frustration, Peterborough 
cast these proceedings in doubt the next day by advising the Admiral of the subsequent 
decision of his Council of land officers: that the Archduke should adjudicate on this impeding 
departure to Italy, and that in the interval operations in Valencia province should continue. 
When Leake sought clarification on their next step from Peterborough, the Earl claimed to be 
191 BL, Add MSS 5438, f 31: Leake to the 'Secretary to HRH'[Burchett], 15 May 1705; BL, Add MSS 5441, 
f81: Burchett to Leake, 5 June 1706; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 23,30-9; Trevelyan, 
England Under Queen Anne, ii. 169. 
192 HMC, House ofLordsMSSNS, vii. 439: Ata Council of War, 4 May 1706; CFKS, U1590 0135/11, p. 36- 
40: Turly's Journal', 6 Apr. -I June 1706; Martin-Lcake, Ihe Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 43-5; BL, Add MSS 
5438, f 30: Leake to Peterborough, 6 May 1706. 
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too indisposed to attend a Council of War but wrote that the operation against Alicante 
should continue and that he had readied some of his men to march in that direction so that an 
attack from the landward could be launched in the event that the town did not surrender on 
the appearance of the fleet. Shrewdly, Peterborough had managed simultaneously to out- 
manoeuvre Leakc and to undermine his authority over the fleet. Recalling the Admiral's 
deference to the Archduke's commands for the relief of Barcelona, Peterborough calculated 
that Leake would not or could not ob ect to the referral of the Council's decision to Charles, 
despite the Instructions being solely addressed to him as Admiral. Moreover, the referral 
afforded Peterborough time in which to exercise his authority over a full complement of 
troops and thus place him in a position to determine the direction of both the land operation 
and the combined action with the fleet. This point was manifest when the naval Council of 30 
May agreed fully with Peterborough's resolution and on I June, the fleet weighed for 
Alicante. 193 
The dissociation in command between Peterborough and Leake was further confirmed 
only three days after leaving Valencia. Off Altea, Leake received credible intelligence that 
Major-General Mah6ni was to command for Philip V in Alicante with 500 horse, whereas 
Cartagena had no such defence and inhabitants who were said to be well inclined to the 
Archduke. Considering this information on 5 June, the naval Council inverted the previous 
intelligence perception and resolved that Alicante would have to be besieged from the land 
and sea but Cartagena might submit simply on appearance of the fleet. Peterborough was 
merely to be informed of this decision, with the additional note that the fleet would proceed 
to Alicante later. 194 
Leake and his naval Council were able to assert this independence of action due to the 
presence of a number of marine soldiers on board the fleet. As demonstrated at Gibraltar, 
these men could - depending on their number and the operational circumstances - provide the 
193 BL, Add MSS5442, fos. 118,120,122-3: 'Att a Councill of War, 22,28,30 May 1706; BL, Add MSS 
5438, fos. 32-3,55-6: Leake to Peterborough, 27,30 May 1706; Leake to the 'Secretary to HRII' [Burchett], 
31 May 1706; Peterborough to 'Sir' [Leake], 9,10 June 1706 [NS]; BL, Add MSS 544 1, fos. 126,128: 
Peterborough to 'Sir' [Leake], 9,10 June 1706 [NS]; Martin-Leake, The Life qfSir John Leake, ii. 48-53; 
PRO, SP 104/207, fos. 90-1: 'Instructions to Our Right Trusty and Welbeloved Sir John Leake Knt, 2 April 
1706; CFKS, U1590 0135111, p. 40-1: Turly's Journal', 22,30 May 1706. 
194 Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740, pp. 95-6; Martin-Leake, The Life qfSir John Leake, i i. 53-4; 
BL, Add MSS, f 124: 'Att a Councill of War of Flag Officers and Captains', 5 June 1706; BL, Add MSS 
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fleet with a temporary land capability; and the prospects for reducing Cartagena suggested 
that they would be sufficient, without additional support from Peterborough's infantrymen. 
This was apparent when the fleet reached Cartagena on 12 June, and the Governor and the 
city magistrates requested a day to think about Leake's summons. Fearful that 
reinforcements would get into the town during this 24-hour period, Leake disposed a smaller 
ten-vessel squadron under Sir John Jennings to proceed inside the harbour, with 1000 Dutch 
and English marines to be landed nearby. If the city authorities refused to submit to a second 
summons, Jennings was to cannonade the city and the castle, which stood on a elevation just 
behind the harbour, while the marines would march in to secure the harbour area and act as a 
garrison. This deployment had just begun the following morning when some city 
representatives rowed out to Leake's flagship, the Prince George, to relinquish Cartagena. 
Leaving Jennings in the harbour with four warships and a 600-marine garrison commanded by 
Major Richard Hedges to settle the city affairs, Leake departed Cartagena for Alicante on 18 
June. 195 
The fleet reached Altea Bay on 20 June where Leake received the Archduke's 
response to Peterborough's referral of the Council's earlier decision to succour Savoy 
according to the London Instructions. Not surprisingly, Charles did not want to spare Victor 
Amadeus any troops from the Peninsula, and believed that Queen Anne would be of a similar 
opinion if fully aware of recent events. Certainly, he could not conceive that she wanted to 
render vulnerable those Spanish provinces already secured by the allies nor threaten further 
success. The Archduke stated that he would accept Leake detaching a squadron to Italy, if 
the Admiral believed it might be of help; but that he would prefer Leake to continue the 
combined land and sea operations against the eastern Spanish coast and also to begin 
operations amongst the Spanish island dependencies. The Archduke believed that both 
Minorca, with its commodious Port Mah6n harbour, and Majorca were particularly well 
disposed to him. Along with the Archduke's letter was a typically flighty one from 
Peterborough. He now expressed sympathy with Victor Amadeus and claimed that even 
Marlborough's victory at Ramillies (12 May), which captured Flanders for the allies, would 
195 BL, Add MSS 5442, lbs. 128-30: 'Att A Council of War of Flag Officers', 13,16 June 1706; BL, Add 
MSS 5438, fos. 35-7,3940: Leake to Lord Ambassador Methuen, 20 June 1706; Leake to Peterborough, 17 
June 1706; Leake to the 'Secretary to 1IRH' [Burchett], 20 June 1706; The Byng Papers, i. 121-2: From Sir 
John Leake, IS June 1706; Martin-Leake, The Life qfSir John Leake, ii. 54-8; Life of Captain Stephen 
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not compensate for the loss of Turin. However, hiding behind the Archduke's refusal to 
release troops, Peterborough concluded that a decision about Savoy's succour would have to 
await the arrival of a fleet from England with further reinforcements. Peterborough was not 
then aware that the other combined operations currently being considered in London would 
thwart the early arrival of this fleet in the Mediterranean. On 21 June, Leake presented 
Charles's letter to his Council. In considering the dispatch of a squadron to Savoy without 
troops to be a futile exercise, it clearly did not regard the land capability of the marines 
sufficient on this occasion. This was in addition to the concern that, as marines often helped 
man the ships, the garrisoning of Cartagena combined with the current sickness of crews had 
meant that further manpower detachments could not be made safely from the fleet. 
Operations against the Spanish Mediterranean islands, as suggested by the Archduke, were 
therefore currently ruled out, because those which declared for Charles would probably 
require a garrison from the ships' complements. Recalling Peterborough's previous 
commitment to march upon Alicante from the landward, the Council therefore resolved to 
maintain its earlier decision to proceed there. 196 
Two days into the voyage to Alicante, the Rye brought Leake another set of 
Instructions from England urging him to Savoy's aid. Dated 14 May, these had been drafted 
in the knowledge of Toulouse's retreat to Toulon and Barcelona's relief thereby leaving, in 
London's opinion, Turin as the most imperilled operational theatre. However, as the Court's 
policy had been to devolve control over the conduct of the war in the Peninsula to the 
Archduke, the Instructions directed Leake to seek his opinion first. This had of course 
already been done and Leake concluded he could for the moment postpone further 
consideration of succouring Savoy and continue with the projected action against Alicante. 
This decision was timely, for on the same day as he received the mail from England the fleet 
came into Alicante road. 197 
Leake dispatched a summons to both the Governor and Major-General Mah6ni, who 
Afarlin; 1666-1740, P. 96. 
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had previously been reported as proceeding with 500 horse to provide the main defence of the 
town. '98 It was the latter who responded to Leake by forwarding a copy of a letter he had 
previously sent to Peterborough outlining his commitment to Philip to defend to the last the 
area between Montesa and Cidiz. This of course included Alicante, where he had currently 
based himself Such a negative response to his summons caused Leake to convene a Council 
on the following day to consider the fleet's options. At least two alternatives were 
considered and rejected: sending succour to Italy, and seeking to augment the convoy of the 
returning Turkey merchantmen. On the first, despite the receipt of the Court's recent 
Instructions, there seemed no reason to alter previous resolutions until the Archduke agreed 
to spare some troops; while on the second, more information about the Turkey convoy's 
whereabouts was thought necessary. This left action against Alicante; but, until 
Peterborough's promised troops arrived in support, there was little the fleet could profitably 
do. Hence, Leake's Council could only resolve to remain at anchor in the bay and send word 
to Peterborough at Valencia in the hope that this would hasten the troops southwards. 
Leake received letters from Peterborough on 28 June and 7 July, and both were 
dominated by the question of sending help to Savoy. Ostensibly this was curious for, albeit 
cloaked by the Archduke's refusal, Peterborough had already expressed a settled opinion to 
help Victor Amadeus's once the expected fleet for England arrived with reinforcements. 
However, references in the letters to the Archduke's recent inclination to dispatch aid if at all 
possible, and the pressure he was placing upon Peterborough to effect this, indicated that the 
Earl was trying to manoeuvre Leake or, more accurately, the naval Council to decide whether 
the fleet should sail now with succour. And, as argued by the Admiral's biographer there was 
a devious edge to this correspondence because at this point Peterborough reputedly knew 
privately that the reinforcement fleet from England was designed for another service and thus 
19' 71e ensuing account of the capture of Alicante is based on the following primary sources: DI, Add MSS 
544 1, fos. 152,154: Mah6ni to 'Sir' [Leake] 7 July 1706 [NS], and enclosure, Mah6ni to Peterborough, 5 July 
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1740, pp. 96-7. 
266 
the naval Council's responsibility for the operation would extend to causing a drastic 
reduction in manpower in Catalonia. Peterborough was seeking to avoid the blame for any 
subsequent operational failure but, on this occasion, Leake had the measure of the Earl and 
deftly side-stepped Peterborough's trap by moving his Council to resolve that succouring 
Savoy could not be achieved due to a lack of resources. This left Peterborough in charge of 
his 2500 men in Valencia but it also forced him to continue with the Alicante operation, 
whose prospects he had downplayed in the second of the two letters which announced that 
the land force had been detached. 
The arrival of Brigadier Gorges in charge of four infantry regiments and 200 horse to 
undertake the landward attack on Alicante could not come soon enough for Leake. A force 
of 400 marines had already been put ashore to secure the local militia's possession of the St 
Facie convent, while delay provided the enemy with time to work on their defences. 
However, when the Brigadier came aboard the Prince George on 9 July, he proved as 
pessimistic about the operation as Peterborough. Dismissing any possible contribution by the 
2000 militiamen nearby, Gorges pointed out that his force totalled only 1450 horse and foot 
whereas he believed that Alicante could not be captured by less than 3000 regulars. Leake's 
attempt to call a combined Council of War on this question foundered when Gorges refused 
to give his view without the approbation of his fellow field officers. At their separate Council 
the next day, agreement to begin the siege was made contingent on the fleet making good the 
shortfall of some 1500 troops plus providing all the necessary siege materials. Doubtless not 
wishing the operation to be abandoned, the naval Council acceded to the soldiers' 
requirements and along with the guns and their crews, some 800 marines and 500 sailors were 
to be put ashore. Furthermore, a commitment was made to deploy those marines currently at 
Cartagena, once they had been relieved by the infantry regiment that Peterborough had 
reputedly promised for the town. Even though Leake personally delivered these resolutions 
to the land officers at Luga Nova on II July, it was a week later before Gorges, having been 
prcssed again by Leake, convened another land Council which agreed to commence the siege. 
In a subsequent letter to the Archduke, Leake laid the blame for the tardiness in 
commencing the operation at Alicante wholly upon Peterborough and the conduct of the land 
forces. Undoubtedly there was some truth to this but the Admiral was not blameless. I le 
tended to call a Council upon any daily development, however incidental. For example, upon 
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receiving correspondence on 19 July from both the Archduke and Peterborough which did 
not materially affect the decision to attack Alicante, Leake still considered a Council of War 
necessary to consider the letter. Predictably, this resolved to uphold its former resolutions 
about the impending operation, but it took another meeting of the Council before the attack 
disposition was formulated. 
Finally, on 21 July, the marines and sailors were landed from the fleet just eastwards 
of the bay whence they were to march the following morning to meet Brigadier Gorge's 
force, which was moving south from Elche, about a mile outside the town. For this purpose, 
the sailors, whose number had been increased to 800, were regimented with three naval 
Captains given temporary command as Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel and Major. During the 
night of the landing, a number of bomb vessel threw shells into the town as a preliminary to 
the main bombardment the following morning by an eight-ship squadron commanded by 
Byng. Continuing throughout the day, Byng's cannonade proved remarkably accurate in 
silencing the town's sea batteries, leaving only those mounted in the castle, and this enabled 
the allies' ordnance and crews to be landed. On 23 July, Jennings brought in the marines from 
Cartagena's garrison and, in accordance with the naval Council's commitment, these were 
immediately deployed ashore. 
The action ebbed and flowed over the following five days as Byng's squadron kept up 
its bombardment from the bay, and the recently erected shore batteries engaged those enemy 
emplacements outside of the ships' range or elevation. Little gave on either side however 
until 28 July when in the early hours Gorges's men managed to claim the town's suburbs and, 
in particular, the windmill acting as an enemy forward post, which the allies had held briefly 
four days previously. On the morning of this advance, Leake boarded the Shrewsbury and 
ordered all the fleet's boats - armed and manned - to congregate around it. Placing them 
under Jennings's command, he awaited an obvious weakening in the enemy's sea front against 
which to launch them. The actual occasion of their departure did not initially appear 
propitious, however. A breach had been opened in the Round Tower at the western end of 
the town's wall and, without orders, a small detachment of grenadiers had broken ahead of 
Gorges's main force advancing through the suburbs to attack this post. On observing these 
developments, Leake ordered Jennings's boats in support but, before the sailors got ashore, 
the grenadiers had been repulsed. Nonetheless, rallying around the Captain of the Royal Oak, 
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Evans, who quickly assailed the breach, some three boats' crews got inside the wall. Seamen 
commanded by Captains Passenger and Watkins quickly followed, and it was not long before 
the boat crews under Jennings combined with the soldiers, who had first occupied the 
suburbs, secured the town. As the main gates were opened to Brigadier Gorges and the rest 
of the troops, Major-General Mah6ni in command of a party of horse retreated uphill to the 
castle, situated on an elevation over the town. The siege of Alicante castle lasted for over a 
month until, on 22 August, Mah6ni sought terms. He claimed to have run out of drinking 
water, but when entering the castle a week later the allies found at least a month's provision 
left. Closer inspection revealed this supply to have been spoiled and it seemed that the 
garrison's heavy loss of life had caused Mah6ni's subordinates, many of whom were 
Neapolitans, to indulge in an act of sabotage, to force his surrender. 
The effectiveness of the allied siege was largely due to it being waged both from the 
land and sea. The castle's elevation meant that the onshore batteries manned by the soldiers, 
marines and ship gun crews would have been on their own of little consequence; however 
they were tellingly supported by the bomb vessels. It was to their credit that this co- 
operation between the two services endured considerable tension and alarm during the course 
of the siege. Once again Leake showed tact and restraint when a land Council of War 
requested that he re-embark those sailors ashore - save for the marines and gun crews - 
because it was feared they would loot. The Admiral also suffered a scare that twelve French 
warships were about to appear and trap his detachment in the bay. Absorbing such pressures, 
Leake and Gorges pressed the month-long siege to its conclusion and it proved to be the final 
combined operation undertaken again the Spanish mainland for the remainder of the war. 
- The operational history of the war years 1705 and 1706 produces in the 
Mediterranean theatre and, more specifically, on mainland Spain a number of combined army- 
navy operations. It was apparent even before the beginning of 1705 that the Ministry wished 
to extend the strategic scope of these ventures as an instrument of warfare. A Grand Flect 
and a considerable detachment of troops were combined under the direction of Peterborough 
and Shovell. Guided by latitudinarian Instructions, the in-theatre Council of War had 
considerable independence in determining this force's objectives and eventually Barcelona 
was settled upon. Its capture however required more than a first strike operation for at the 
beginning of the next campaign season the enemy quickly placed the allies' control of the 
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town under threat. With patchy intelligence and communication the Ministry, the land 
commanders -who luckily were split between the garrison and the nearby provinces - and the 
Vice-Admiral commanding the regional naval squadron, all had to co-operate in an operation 
to bring relief to the town. That this proved successful was undoubtedly due in large part to 
good fortune and the enemy's irresolution. With Barcelona secured by April 1706, the allies 
were emboldened to extend the Archduke's control through Spain's eastern provinces. In 
pursuit of this object, combined operations played a role when both Cartagena and Alicante 
were captured, by the fleet either deploying its marines as land soldiers or linking up with 
detachment of troops that had marched through the interior. Nonetheless, by the autumn of 
1706 such operations were at an end. Lcake left Alicante at the behest of the Archduke to 
target Ibiza and on 8 September this island declared for Charles immediately on the 
appearance of the fleet. Majorca, next capitulated on 16 September afler the threat of naval 
bombardment sparked an uprising against the Bourbon governor. Of the three Spanish island 
dependencies, this left Minorca and in particular its prized harbour, Port Mah6n. Two years 
would pass before it fell to a British combined operation; and in the interim the frequently 
touted combined army-navy attack on Toulon would become a reality. 
a IF Sr. . V. The 'Proiect': The Attack on Toulon. June-August 1707. 
During a halt at the Crown Inn, Farringdon, in September 1707, Robert Harley reflected that 
his first conversation with King William in 1691 had concerned a 'very extraordinary 
proposal' about Toulon. '99 Harley's recollection was representative of William's concern to 
establish England as the principal Mediterranean power, in pursuance of which a combined 
land and sea attack on Toulon became a perennial aspiration of England's war policy. In the 
context of the twenty-five year conflict with France (1688-1713), its capture was thought to 
entail a double prize: denying the French the port which served as their main southern naval 
arsenal whence they sought military and commercial control of the Mediterranean rcgion; and 
secondly, providing an point of entry to the French Mediterranean coastline, along which the 
allies might extend their control by linking up with armies marching across the Pyrcnccs from 
Spain or, to the cast, over the Alps from Piedmont-Savoy. Implicit in any attack was also the 
iminediate benefit that the port's importance to France would necessitate a vigorous defence 
I" I IMC, portlandMSS, iv. 451-2: Robert Harley, 25 Sept. 1707. 
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whereby troops and resources would probably have to be withdrawn from other war theatres. 
Accordingly, during the succession war, Toulon was actively targeted from the outset 
and Marlborough, as heir to William's strategic conception, was often the inspiration. The 
Captain-General was not alone, however. Lord Treasurer Godolphin was at times equally 
enthusiastic, and successive Secretaries of State and Admiralty Boards proved receptive; 
proposals also often emerged from continental Europe. Indeed, it has been suggested that a 
plan drafted by an Italian engineer and divulged to Marlborough by the Envoy at Vienna, 
George Stepney, formed the basis of the deployment in 1707.200 Certainly, there had been 
little detailed planning until 1705 when, following Marlborough's advocacy at the Cabinet 
Council, a proposal to mount a combined attack with the Duke of Savoy was contained 
within the secret Instructions issued to Peterborough and Shovell. This plan could not of 
course be implemented because early in the year the French forced the Duke of Savoy on to 
the defensive by capturing Nice and Villefranche and also by threatening his Piedmont 
stronghold, Turin, thereby rendering it impossible for him to lead an army across the Alps and 
westwards into Provence. Victor Amadcus was similarly occupied for most of the following 
year by the celebrated battle for Turin, but once he and the senior Imperial General, Prince 
Eugene, broke the French siege in September and saved the city, the Grand Alliance, and 
England in particular, were able in the winter months of 1706/7 to resurrect the plans for an 
attack on Toulon. 201 
The decision to make this a focus of the 1707 campaign in the Mediterranean again 
owed much to Marlborough's support as the Ministry pressed forward the dispatch of the 
'Project' - expressed in the form of Instructions - in February 1707 to the senior allied 
Admiral in the Mediterranean, Sir Cloudesley Shovell. 202 Shovell had been in the region since 
200 Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 230; Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i. 337 n. 5; 7he Diplomatic 
Correspondence of the Right Honourable Richard Hill, ed. W. Blackley (London, 1845), i, pp. 130-1: 
Godolphin to Hill, 27 June; PRO, SP 105/77, unE: Stepney to Harley, 27 Jan. 1706 [NS]; Spens, George 
Stepney, p. 266. 
201 JIMC, House oftords MSS NS, vii. 363-4: Copy of instructions to Charles, E. Peterborough and Sir 
Cloudesley Shovell, 7 May 1705; Quincy, Histoire Militaire, iv. 589-92,627-35; Symcox, rictorAmadeus 
11, pp. 149-50; 7he Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 
ii. 755-6 n. 5; see also Chapter 2, Section Liv, 
pp. 235-6,238, above. 
202 7he Letters andDispatches ofJohn Churchill, iii. 268: Marlborough to the Prince of Savoy, 27 Dec. 1706; 
BL, Add MSS 28153, fos. 9-17: Instructions for Attack on Toulon, Feb 1707; HMC, House oftords AfSS NS, 
, Vii. pp. 516-17: Extract of a letter from Sunderland to 
Shovell, 23 Dec. 1706; Extract of a letter from 
Sunderland to Shovell, 14 Feb. 1707; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 230; Francis, The First Peninsular lflarý p. 
250. 
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the autumn of 1706, when his fleet arrived at Lisbon along with Earl Rivers's detachment of 
troops. Originally it had been intended that this combined force would undertake a descent 
on the French Atlantic coast, but when this action was cancelled before the fleet departed 
England, the new Instructions charged them with helping the war effort in the Peninsula and 
suggested CAdiz or Seville as possible targets for a descent. In the event, no combined action 
took place for Rivers and the Ministry reckoned that augmenting the allied armies in Spain 
was the more pressing necessity. 203 Shovelljoined Sir George Byng's winter squadron, which 
had been established following the departure in September 1706 of Leake's main fleet, to act 
as an escort convoy to troops and war materials. It was on return to Lisbon from delivering 
troops to Valencia in early March that ShoveU received the February orders about the Toulon 
204 attack . 
The operation outlined in the 'Project' document was similar to the 1705 proposal: a 
combined Savoyard and Imperial army would march from Piedmont through the Alps into 
French Provence. As this force advanced to attack Toulon from the interior, a substantial 
Anglo-Dutch fleet commanded by Shovell would approach Toulon harbour with the aim of 
calibrating a bombardment with the Duke of Savoy's landward assault. The greater detail of 
the 1707 plan compared with the 1705 outline did however give rise to two particular points 
of interest. The prohibition in Article Fourteen against the fleet having troops aboard due to 
the military exigencies of the Peninsula shaped a different combined army-navy dynamic for 
this operation, compared with that of other operations considered. Without a self-contained 
descent force launched from the fleet, the amphibious element was to consist of the co- 
ordination and mutual reinforcement of free-standing land and sea forces. This absence of a 
combined expeditionary force specifically dispatched from England might ostensibly place the 
Toulon operation outside the scope of this study; but, albeit different, the operational plan did 
embody an inherent land-sea relationship which, along with London's administrative and 
policy input in terms of operational design and the material provision manifest in both the 40- 
vessel fleet and war supplies for the land forces, meant that it can be appropriately considered 
as a British combined operation. The second notable 
item to emerge from the instructions 
203 See Chapter 2, Section Lvii, pp. 297-9, for a relation of the abandonment of the Shovell-Rivers descent. 
204 JIMC, House ofLords MSS NS, vii. 516-17: Extract of a letter from Sunderland to Shovell, 23 Dec. 1706; 
Extract of a letter from Sunderland to Shovell, 14 Feb. 1707; BL, Add MSS 28141, fos. 32-3: Shovell to the 
Duke of Savoy, 28 Mar. 1707 [NSI. 
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was the command structure. Hitherto, the sovereign command authority for British combined 
operations had typically been - both in theory and largely in practice - the Council of War. 
The 1707 'Project' for the assault on Toulon however placed full command with the Duke of 
Savoy. Shovell would still have to call a naval Council of War for the regulation of fleet 
actions but, with respect to the overall operation, he was specifically directed to 'confortn' 
1,205 himself to the Duke's 'orders and advises . Accordingly, this was clearly going to place 
heavy responsibilities on the fleet liaison officer to the Duke's Court at Turin, which Shovell 
was ordered to appoint. 
To fill this appointment Shovell turned to his former Flag Captain and recently 
promoted Rear-Admiral of the Blue, Sir John Norris. Aside from their personal friendship, 
Norris had performed a similar role - albeit in an unofficial capacity - as Shovell's emissary to 
the Archduke Charles's 'Court' in late August 1705 when it seemed that the operation to 
capture Barcelona might be given up. He therefore at least had some experience of what 
would in later years be termed a Staff appointment. Norris's early transport to Turin to 
establish the Duke's readiness was clearly an imperative; but Shovell also recognised that he 
had to guard against the possibility that the land march might already have begun, thus 
necessitating the early arrival of the naval squadron off Toulon. Moreover, besides this 
operation, the Admiralty had recently dispatched orders requiring the fleet to keep a presence 
in the Mediterranean and to be ready to undertake whatever tasks were deemed appropriate 
to assist the war effort in Spain. With his own squadron badly in need of a refit and unable to 
sail immediately, Shovell was faced with a problem of resource deployment. The naval 
Council of War at two meetings on 13 March therefore decided that in the absence of 
reinforcements the only way to satisfy the demands upon the fleet was to dispatch Byng and 
the Dutch Admiral Vandergoes to the Mediterranean with as large a squadron as could 
quickly be brought together. It would carry to Valencia the land supplies now ready at 
Lisbon and undertake any other tasks required of it by the Archduke. Norris was to sail with 
13yng's squadron into the Mediterranean and, at an appropriate early moment, he would 
proceed onwards with four warships to Genoa whence 
he would transfer overland to Turin. 
As required by the Instructions, these four ships would remain on the coast guarding the 
Italian ports to prevent enemy egress or coastal transportation; and, if this number was to 
21513L, Add MSS 28141, fos. 24,28-30: Shovell to Norris, 28 Mar. 1707 [NS]; 'The Project'. 
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prove insufficient, Norris could request Byng to detach vessels from his squadron. Equally, 
Byng was to bring his squadron before Toulon if news was received that the Duke had 
punctually begun his march. Meanwhile, Shovell was to prepare his squadron tojoin Byng; 
and, under the anticipated operational timetable, the combined fleet would sail to Toulon. 206 
Byng left Lisbon at the end of March with an Anglo-Dutch squadron of 22 men-of- 
war, six frigates and slooPs, and some auxiliary vessels. He reached Alicante on Spain's 
south-eastern coast in the second week of April. Liaising with its Governor, Major-General 
John Richards, and the commander of the allied forces in Spain, the Earl of Galway, Byng's 
squadron provided coastal transportation for troops and provisions; and, although mundane, 
this service proved vitally important in getting reinforcements to Galway's shattered army at 
Tortosa, where it had retreated fo flowing its defeat by Marshal Berwick at Almanza (14 
April). Whilst engaged with this task and also assisting the organisation of an enhanced 
defensive posture for Alicante, Denia and Valencia, which were now thought to be vulnerable 
as a result of Berwick's victory, the Orford and the Winchester joined from Lisbon on 22 
April with important letters for the Duke. Prompted by their arrival, Byng and Norris 
immediately met aboard the RoyalAnne and decided that the Rear-Admiral should leave 
immediately for Savoy, even though only two of the four ships originally scheduled for this 
voyage were available. The storeship would also have to remain with Byng due to uncertain 
intelligence of a French fleet off Cape Mallorca. The Admirals were nonetheless hopeful that 
Shovell's arrival with the rest of the fleet was imminent, as this would release all the vessels 
thought necessary for the Toulon operation. Norris raised his Flag in the Orford that same 
day and made good time to put into Genoa harbour on 3 May; two days later he reached 
207 
Turin and met the English envoy, William Chetwynd. 
To facilitate agreement on the final details of the plan, Shovcll had fumished Norris 
with a number of heads for discussion, but on presenting himself for the first time in the 
2'"BL, Add MSS28141, fos. 24-8: Shovell to Norris, 28 Mar. 1707[NSI; Harris, Sir CloudesleyShovell, p. 
311; The Byng Papers, L 146-7,152-62: Prince George of Denmark to Shovell, 10 Feb. 1707; At a Council of 
War, 13 Mar. 1707 [There are separate minutes for the two Councils held on the same day]; From Sir 
Clowdisley Shovel], 13,28 Mar. 1707. 
207 The Byng Papers, L 138,162-88: At a Council of War, 10,16,17,18 Apr., 19 May 1707; From Lord 
Galway, 21,23 Apr., 5,8,10,15,17,20,25, May 1707 [NS]; From Major-General Richards, 28 Apr. 1707; At 
a Consultation between Sir George Byng, Kt., Vice Admiral of the Blue and Sir John Norris, Kt., Rear 
Admiral of the Blue, 22 Apr, 1707 [NSI; BL, Add MSS 28141, fos. 31-2: Norris to Sunderland, 3,7 May 
1707. 
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Duke's bedchamber it quickly became clear that Victor Amadeus was unfamiliar with the 
substantive proposal. This was largely London's fault. In an attempt to keep the plan from 
Peterborough, who having finally goaded the Ministry into his recall was expected to travel 
through Italy on his return, Chetwynd had not received any specific instructions about the 
plan to communicate to the Savoy Court. It now meant that the Duke wished to go through 
and respond to each article of the 'Project' but only once his fellow land commander, Prince 
Eugene, had arrived in Turin. Until Eugene appeared, the Duke would only discuss with 
Norris the wider strategic impact and context of the attack, particularly with respect to the 
Peninsula. These discussions did allow Norris to establish Victor Amadeus's enthusiasm for 
the project and his belief that it would ease the military pressure on the allies in Spain. 20' The 
articulation of this latter argument was significant inasmuch as it challenged the increasingly 
prominent view in some allied quarters that the transfer of a substantial number of troops 
from the Italian theatre to the Peninsula would be beneficial measure to the allied cause in 
Spain. Post-Almanza, the Archduke Charles's desire for reinforcement, supported - 
unhappily from the English perspective - by Prince Eugene, threatened to undermine the 
Toulon operation. Their claims were eventually thwarted by Marlborough's intervention 
against any troop transfers and Shovell's resolve to undertake the operation . 
209 
Consultations upon the 'Project' began in earnest when Eugene arrived on 8 May, and 
it was soon clear that troop transfers to Spain was not the only resource issue which 
threatened the operation. Ever since being forced to concede the assault against CAdiz in 
1702 rather than a descent on Naples, the Imperialists had continued to advocate the latter. 
This reflected the Emperor's primary territorial interest in the Spanish Empire's Italian lands 
rather than the mainland crown, and there had been no change in this regard upon the 
succession of the Archduke's elder brother, Joseph 1, following the death of their father, 
Leopold 1, in May 1705. Imperial ambition in northern Italy had only been enhanced by the 
20s BL, Add MSS 28141, fos. 28,39-41: 'Some Heads which Sir John Norris is to Concert with his Royal 
Ifighness the Duke of Savoy'; Norris to Shovell, 12 May 1707. 
209 Ae Letters andDispatches ofJohn Churchill, iii. 382-3,399-400,404: Marlborough to Comte Maffcy, 28 
May 1707 [NS]; Marlborough to Chetwynd, 8 June 1707 [NS]; Marlborough to the 'King of Spain', II June 
1707 [NSI; The Correspondence 1701-1711 ofJohn Churchill, no. 547, p. 332: Marlborough to I leinsius, [c. 
2 Aug. ] 1707 [NS]; The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii, no. 779, p. 768: Marlborough to 
Godolphin, 4 May 1707; BL, Add MSS 28141, fos. 53-4: Shovcll to Norris, 1,3 June 1707 [NS]; Owen, w2r 
at Sea Under QueenAnne, pp. 164-5; Churchill, Marlborough, 
iii. 2334; Harris, Sir Cloudesley Shovell, p. 
313. 
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gains made there - including Milan and the Duchy of Mantua - in the autumn of 1706 afler the 
defeat of the French at Turin. Although the armistice signed by Eugene in March 1707, 
boosted the French army by allowing those remaining French garrisons in northern Italy, a 
route to Naples was now open and the Emperor pressed firmly again for an attack against it. 
in preparation he sought to detach substantial numbers of troops from the army Eugene was 
to join with the Duke's men at Turin, thus undermining the size of the landward attack on 
Toulon. The design of the 'Project' anticipated this turn of events inasmuch as Article Fifteen 
expressly rejected a descent on Naples as both 'impracticable', and 'prejudicial' to the Toulon 
project; and this was the theme Marlborough and Godolphin adopted in conjunction with the 
importance of the proposed operation in that year's strategic thrust when lobbying against the 
withdrawal of troops once the Emperor's intention became clear. It was however to no avail, 
for the joint response by Eugene and the Duke to the 'Project' simply stated that there were 
sufficient troops for both assaults. Nonetheless, the folly of relinquishing between 10 000- 15 
000 troops to Count Daun for the Naples enterprise was inadvertently admitted by Eugene 
when he subsequently complained of a lack of manpower to push forward the siege at 
Toulon. 210 
A lack of heavy ordnance supplies - powder and cannon ball - for the prospective 
siege batteries was the principal resource insufficiency that the Duke pressed on Norris during 
the consultations. According to the Rear-Admiral, this problem would only be increased by 
the Duke's intention to capture Monaco, Villefranche and Antibes during the march upon 
Toulon. It was however largely London's fault that the difficulty over the supply of powder 
and shot had arisen. Firstly, loose phrasing of the 'Project' document did not make it 
expressly clear who was responsible for supplying or paying 
for the ball, though since the 
Admiral had been detailed to provide the cannons, Victor Amadeus with some justification 
assumed this included the shot; secondly, although the 
fleet was to provide some powder, the 
exact amount remained unstated. Norris made 
it plain to the Duke that the fleet could only 
supply such materials consistent with 
its own safety; but, perhaps recognising the implied 
obligations of the planning document, 
he lobbied Secretary Sunderland for additional supply, 
210rhe Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii, nos. 784, pp. 755-6 n. 5,772-3 n. 3: Godolphin to 
Marlborough, 9 May 1707; The Letters andDispatches ofJohn Churchill, iii. 388-90: Marlborough to 
0 Noyelles, 3 June 1707 [NS]; Marlborough to Wratislaw, 6 June 1707 [NS]; BL, Add MSS 28141, 
f s. 3,38: 
-rb e Project'; 'Answers to the Memorial of Sir John 
Norris', II May 1707; Owen, War at Sea Under Queen 
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particularly of ball which he considered harder to obtain. He also worked with Chetwynd on 
procurement deals from Leghorn and Genoa and wrote to Shovell for help. Moderate 
success was achieved inasmuch as Marlborough lent his authority to procurement without 
London's permission and Shovell, now with Byng off Barcelona, dispatched two ships to 
Gibraltar for additional supplies which yielded some 12 000 ball. Nonetheless, Shovell was 
eventually forced to reduce the fleet rounds per gun to 35 and extend his own private credit 
for purchases, which understandably greatly irked him. 211 
The more immediate significance of the continuing bickering over ordnance supply 
was that it delayed the departure of the land force on its march to Toulon. 212 Upon Shovell's 
arrival with the main fleet of some 43 warships off Finale on 2 June, Norr is informed him that 
the army would be ready to march within the week . 
21' Although the fleet auxiliary vessels 
had been loading supplies at Leghorn, Genoa and Savona before and after Shovell's arrival at 
Finale, there was still much to be prepared on the landward side and it was nearly three weeks 
before Eugene began to march his 35 000 strong army from Turin. Norris and Chctwynd 
caught up with him three days later on 22 June at Limone just before he began to make the 
crossing of the Maritime Alps. Negotiating the mountain passes via Tenda, Breil and Sospel, 
the army made reasonable progress by keeping up a steady pace of between ten to fourteen 
rniles daily along arduous terrain, though this caused a number of men and horses to be lost - 
principally from slipping down the mountain side. Resistance was threatened only once from 
a small fort at Sospel with a 100-strong French garrison but it soon surrendered. A day's halt 
was taken there on 27 June to allow the remainder of the army to come up and Norr is took 
Anne, p. 16 1; SyIncox, Victor Amadeus, p. 154. 
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this opportunity to forward the Duke's request that the fleet be anchored near the %% ide Var 
river estuary. just west of Nice to assist the army's crossing of this river. 
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Fig. 17: The Route ofthe Allies' Advance on Toulon 
The rapidly flowing River Var was not only a considerable natUral obstacle, the 
French had dug entrenchments along its western bank some Ibur miles inland firoln the 
estuary, and in these were stationed under Monsieur de Sailly upwards ofseven int". 111tr\ 
battalions and three of horse and dragoons. An additional three battalion strong 
reinforcement was also expected. At a dinner hosted by Shovell aboard the Association 
Flagship on 29 June, it was agreed with the Duke and Prince F'ugene that the 11cet \Nould 
undertake a diversionary action by bombarding the French entrenchments nearest to the 
estuary, thus allowing the army to cross unmolested up river. Norris was appointed to 
command the small nine-vessel inshore squadron and, upon the 
Duke's ordcr at noon the 
following day to begin the bombardment two hours hence, the Rcar-AdmIral began to kkarp 
the squadron in towards the shore line on the French bank ol'the Var near Cagncs. At this 
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Shovell, Byng and the fleet's other Rear-Admiral, Dilkes joined Norris aboard the Monmouth. 
Shovell as the senior Vice-Admiral was now in command and he justified this seniority by 
quickly appreciating that the bombardment was causing the enemy horse to draw away from 
the river side and thus a flank attack by the ships' boats might well capture the angle of the 
redoubt nearest to the water. The descent of some 600 marines and seamen in boats 
commanded by Norris proved even more effective than Shovell envisaged, however, for, on 
the boats' approach, the enemy abandoned their works and fled. On retreat westwards to 
Toulon they came upon reinforcements under the renegade Irishman, Lieutcnant-Gcneral 
Dillon, only eight miles from the Var. Sailly's experience of the allied combined force at the 
river caused him to convince Dillon to abandon his base at the small village of St Paul and 
seek sanctuary in Toulon. Notwithstanding the French garrisons in Antibes and Monaco, the 
road to the port was clearing for the allies. During a two-day rest period at St Laurent 
following the crossing of the Var, Shovell hosted another dinner for the Duke which Eugene, 
Norris and Chetwynd also attended. Shovell and his guests considered the next stage of the 
'Project' and it was now that the Admiral persuaded the Duke to rethink his intention to 
undertake a circuitous march to Toulon. Victor Amadeus had legitimately reasoned that such 
a route would allow the capture of Villefranche, Antibes and Monaco, which would not only 
provide a secure line of retreat in the event of failure but also, when in front of Toulon, 
relieve any anxieties about a French force operating in his rear. On first coming to Finale, 
Shovell, supported by Marlborough, had agreed that these places should be targets but 
considered that the fleet's dependence upon the weather meant that it was better for it to be 
headed for just one place rather than to have to regulate its appearance at various different 
points along the coast. Furthermore, although the French knew of the operation, the allied 
army's elongated disposition when congregating at Turin had kept them guessing as to the 
direction of their march, thereby causing the main French defence force of 26 squadrons and 
53 infantry battalions, which Louis had dispatched under Tessd, to be largely based 
throughout the Dauphin6 and in the Provence-Alpes region. Intelligence returns indicated 
that there were few defenders actually inside Toulon. Shovell now argued convincingly that a 
direct and quick march upon the port might allow its capture before Tess6 arrived to mount a 
credible defence. To allay the Duke's principal concern about 
keeping a secure line of 
retreat, Shovell did commit the fleet to withdrawing the troops 
back along the coast aboard 
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ship if necessary. A naval Council subsequent to the Duke's change of mind also tried to 
address many of his fears and his arguments for a gradual direct approach upon Toulon. In 
the absence of the interior line of communication forfeited by not holding Antibes and 
Monaco, it was decided that two frigates would be left cruising between these places to 
maintain a sea based communication link. Meanwhile, a twelve-ship squadron under Sir 
George Byng would, along with the auxiliary vessels, sail close inshore to shadow the army's 
march, while being ready to land immediately at least twenty guns if required. Shovell would 
sail the remainder of the fleet to a sheltered anchorage at the hes d'Hy6res, where it would 
await the land force's arrival in front of Toulon. The Council also took this opportunity to 
settle upon upwards of 100 guns with proportional powder and shot as the amount of 
ordnance and supplies that the fleet was to provide for the land force. This supply, combined 
with the ammunition that the Duke had eventually agreed to procure, made a total of 60 000 
shot which, even if the fleet was unable to broadside the port, armed the allies' prospective 
siege batteries with considerable fire power. 
The troops began marching again on 4 July and in eleven days they reached the 
environs of Toulon, camping about one-and-half to two miles to the east of the port with the 
village of La Valette serving as the Duke's headquarters. The march had however taken a 
heavy toll on the land force. The road to Cannes had been difficult to pass along and, from 
there, the sixteen mile stretch to Frejus involved an arduous hill climb in insufferable summer 
heat. Not surprisingly, on reaching this place the entire force was exhausted and had suffered 
a number of deaths, including at least two suicides. The commanders had also allowed the 
army to become so stretched out that it took two days for the whole to arrive at Fr6jus. 
Those who were first were occupied in helping to embark some 500 sick soldiers aboard 
l3yng's squadron. More significantly however, this allowed Tessd's force marching from 
Barcclonnette to gain time on the allies and the Marshal acquired another day when the allied 
force rested at Pignans over the weekend of 12-13 July. Ultimately, despite his longer 
distance to march, Tess6 brought some 28 infantry battalions into Toulon on the day before 
the allies arrived at La Valette and, having left them under the Marquis de G6esbriant's 
command, Tesse promptly departed to bring up some more troops. G6esbriant had also bccn 
receiving troops in the town from Provence and, 
in conjunction with the town's small 
garrison, he had directed improvements to the 
defences. 
21 80 
Reconnoitring from the top of Mount Faron, which rose to the north ofthe town. 
Norris along with Eugene and the Duke were able to see that G6esbriant's improvements had 
not yet caused any palisades to be erected along the dry ditch surrounding the ten bastion 
town wall. They did spy the three small redoubts - St Catherine*s, St Ann's and St Anthony's 
- that commanded the land approaches to the town, and also the towers and forts - 
particularly La Grande and L'Equillette towers - along the coastline of the Great and Small 
Roads, which might provide a similar enfilading fire across the sea approach. In addition, 
Norris recorded seeing about 40 sail of the French fleet in the westernmost oftoulon 
harbour's two basins, but hisjournal entry betrays a vague sense of puzzlement that these 
appeared tightly lashed together. The reason (unknown to Norris at the time) for the ships' 
curious alignment was that, although Louis had diverted resources away firom the battlefleet 
to the privateers since the battle of Mdlaga, he did not wish his capital ships to be destroyed 
by allied fire; therefore, he planned their preservation by scuttling them. Unlike the burnt 
timber carcass of a ship set ablaze, water damage to a wooden sailing ship could be rectified 
as long as the submersion had not been too prolonged. Shrewdly however, two three-deckcrs 
- Le Tonnant and Le Yaint Phillippe - had been exempted from the impending general scuttic 
and transformed into buoyant batteries that would subsequently be situated at the eastern end 
of the harbour. 
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Fig. 18: The Attack on TOLdon. 
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On returning to their camp from Mount Faron on 16 July, Norris first became aware 
of an irresolution creeping into the land force's command. In generaL he heard that Prince 
Eugene was beginning to raise doubts about the whole enterprise; and in particular, he 
noticed that no men were sent to secure forward posts. This latter inaction Norris thought 
odd for it was affording the French time to complete the entrenchments around their camp 
outside the town, which the reconnaissance had revealed to be situated in the ground between 
the town's two landward gates, around St Ann's Hill -a much smaller elevation in the 
foreground of Mount Faron. The operational delay was to an extent explained by the desire 
of the Duke and Eugene to consult first with Shovell. The Admiral's progress towards 
Toulon had been eventful. Initially beaten back by a storm on approach to the 11cs d'Hy6res, 
Shovell had then adopted the coastal town of Hy&es as the fleet base following its ready 
submission - upon realising that it was now behind enemy lines - to a detachment of marines 
landed from Byng's inshore squadron. Fortunately, however, it was located westwards of the 
fies and thus Shovell had a shorter distance to travel to Duke's headquarters at La Valette. 
According to Norris's journal, the senior commanders' consultation on 17 July began 
to go over old ground prompted by Eugene and the Duke's questioning of Shovell about the 
size and scale of the fleet support. Shovell again confirmed the ordnance supply and also that 
the fleet would keep open a coastal line of communication along which the troops might 
retreat aboard the ships. He also committed the fleet to undertaking a more comprehensive 
blockade of the town by agreeing to dispose it from the western end of the harbour, where 
the ships were to link up with an army detachment supposedly coming over the hill, through a 
central position in front of the harbour, to a point near Hyares in the east. These discussions 
on details however simply masked a more significant dispute. This had been current since 
crossing the Var and was principally between Shovell and Eugene over the speed of the 
operation. The Admiral, supported by the Duke - albeit not to the extent that the 
latter was 
willing to assert his superior command - now wished an 
immediate assault on the enemy lines 
prior to a direct assault upon Toulon. Eugene 
however refused to countenance such a 
approach, believing that the French defence was too strong and that the element of surprise 
had been forfeited. The consultation also proved an occasion for the Prince to air his general 
scepticism about the whole operation. Since the 
Duke refused to make a definitive ruling, a 
compromise resulted: the fleet would 
begin unloading the ordnance, while a small scale 
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assault would take place on St. Catherine Fort as a first stage in fastening in on Toulon. 
Eugene's real pre-occupations were revealed when Shovell agreed to detach ships to Genoa 
to carry artillery supplies to Naples to succour Count Daun. By not forgetting his Imperial 
employer's primary interest, Eugene demonstrated that he was a shrewd political general. 
The attack launched against the St Catherine's redoubt on the day following the 
consultation proved a success, but only after an additional 2500 troops were brought up 
within a twenty4bur hour period to invigorate an uncertain start. When General Razendorf 
launched an assault on 19 July, the French abandoned the fort and fled, though they 
demonstrated sufficient presence of mind to blow up the magazine and spike their guns prior 
to departure. The successful capture of St Catherine's allowed the allies to move their lines 
forward and site their batteries closer to Toulon. The next few days were taken up by 
breaking the ground for these batteries and continuing to unload and bring up the guns to 
them. Meanwhile, Shovell certainly remained keen to advance the operation; he recogniscd 
that the basins of Toulon harbour could not be penetrated without first neutralising some of 
the forts along the roadsteads' shore line, so, on 21 July, he proposed an attack on the 
starboard sited forts, St Louis and St Margaret. He envisaged that the main thrust would 
come from the landward, though he committed the fleet to a bombardment. Norris and an 
engineer were sent by the Duke to undertake a feasibility reconnaissance, and they concluded 
that both forts were vulnerable. An assault at St Margaret would however have to be without 
the fleet bombardment, for it seemed likely to the engineer that the naval shot would carry 
into the allied camp; whilst St Louis seemed a particularly attractive prospect to Norris 
because of its proximity - with only a narrow neck of land lying between - to Toulon's south. 
castem wall. Accordingly the Duke ordered a battery to be constructed against it. 
Work on this, like all other building or action ashore, seemed to proceed at halr-pacc. 
-Me suspicion for the absence of momentum must fall on Eugene, but the Duke was also now 
beginning to have strong doubts about the operation. Although the shore batteries were 
finished in the last week of July and were manned by a combination of soldiers and scamcn, 
little impression was made on the fortifications of Toulon. Furthermore, the enemy began 
sallies to harass the allied lines and on the night of 24 July about 200 of the enemy attacked 
the right of the allied works and temporarily occupied them. When several French galleys 
also managed to leave the harbour, the Duke 
began to worry that the fleet might withdraw its 
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support and leave his men stranded. On 29 July he sought another meeting with Shovell, 
whom Norris warned to expect the worse. In the event the Duke did not, as perhaps Norris 
feared, propose abandoning the operation; but he did however convey his considerable 
misgivings about its current prosecution. He considered all action to date to have been 
slowly implemented, thus causing them to have sat in front of Toulon for fifleen days without 
progress. While he still befieved the capture of Toulon possible, the siege would have to be 
pushed forward far more vigorously. Shovell kept private his own recently expressed doubts 
in letters to Secretary Sunderland about the likelihood of success at Toulon and, according to 
Norris, he wholeheartedly agreed with the Duke about pressing the siege forward. tic 
furthermore suggested that if the town's capture was to prove beyond their capabilities, they 
should aim to destroy as much as possible of the French shipping in the harbour given that the 
scuttling had begun. The Duke was however again unwilling to assert his superior command 
and he relied upon Eugene for suggestions as to how their conduct of the siege might be 
improved and accelerated. Predictably, the Prince proved diffident, proposing only that the 
Generals be consulted and that the number of the guns on certain of the batteries be increased 
to 90. Despite not using his command authority over Eugene, the Duke had no intention of 
sharing it with other officers, and accordingly the meeting closed with the modest resolution 
to land more naval ordnance and to target actively both forts St Louis and St Margaret. Over 
the course of following fortnight, however, the allied siege continued in a half-heartened 
manner. Prince Eugene's lukewarm attitude began to permeate throughout the army and 
their position only seemed more vulnerable when on 4 August the French launched around 12 
o0o troops along the whole stretch of allied lines. Although they were eventually pushed 
back, a number of allied officers, including the Prince of Saxe-Gotha, and men were killed. 
More significantly the assault had demonstrated that the French capability at Toulon was not 
purely defensive. Off the coast, the fleet was also making little progress. Squadrons under 
Byng and Dilkes had been struggling to capture Fort St Louis and the various gun 
emplacements along the coats which were preventing 
Shovell turning the fleet's fire upon the 
French ships in the westemmost basin. By 7 August, St Louis and St Margaret were taken, 
though the former was actually abandoned by the French; and this allowed Shovcll to place a 
detachment of ships, including the bomb vessels, under Dilkes close into the harbour. This 
manoeuvre had no future apart from targeting the shipping 
in the harbour. The Duke had 
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already decided to raise the siege. On 5 August, he requested that Norris arrange the 
embarkation of the soldiers. When this was taking place at St Margaret's fort, he decided to 
march away with Eugene, leaving the remainder of the army not yet embarked. A couple of 
days later Shovell followed the Duke back to Nice, and on 23 August the land force was 
disbanded. 
The 'Project' to capture Toulon, which had been a perennial item on the Alliance's 
agenda, had upon its first implementation five years into the war simply petered out. The 
army-navy relationship was novel in the context of the succession war; however, it had not 
been at fault. Facilitated by Norris, the commanders of the two frcc-standing forces - the 
Duke of Savoy and Shovell - co-operated effectively throughout, with the Admiral to his 
credit always seeking both to accommodate the Duke's requirements and to prompt him 
forward. The problem lay instead with the Duke's simultaneous exercise of his land and 
supreme operational commands. With respect to the former, he too quickly deferred to 
Prince Eugene; this meant that he subsequently lacked the confidence to assert the latter. 
Eugene, while not a reluctant participant, was certainly sceptical of the operation from the 
outset. As it progressed, he was only able to view it through the prism of a land operation. 
He considered the French defences and manpower at Toulon too strong for his troops, 
without thinking how the combination of land and sea forces might be effectively used to 
neutralise the French strength. Moreover, the Prince made plain his contention that there 
were allied armies in enclosed land theatres which badly needed the troops. Although it had 
been made clear even by Marlborough that resources were in the first instance to be devoted 
to the Toulon 'Project', Eugene's attitude did not engender the critical operational 
momentum. Failure at Toulon was the product of irresolute command which had been 
principally vested with the land service. It is true that combined Councils of War have oflcn 
been identified as the reason for operational failure or underperformance. On this occasion, 
however, one might reasonably speculate that a sovereign Council of War under Shovcll's 
guidance might have provided the necessary operational momentum to propel the army and 
navy to the capture of Toulon. 
j., Vj: The Capture of Sardinia and Minorca, July-September 1708. 
The failure to capture or destroy Toulon meant that, once the scuttled ships had been raised, 
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the harbour could be quickly operational again and the French might continue their strong 
challenge for dominance of the Mediterranean. The allies needed to guard against French 
egress or embarkations and this bore upon another consequence of the previous year's retreat 
- the lack of an adequate port where the allied fleet could winter in the Mediterranean. 
Gibraltar had served usefully since 1705 and, in particular, its situation at the entrance to the 
Mediterranean had helped prevent the conjunction of the French Brest and Toulon fleets. 
Nonetheless, its dockyard could only cope with a small number of refits and, as Leakc's 
squadron discovered upon bringing relief in November 1704, the roadstead was too exposed 
to provide a secure anchorage in all but seasonable weather. None of the other captured 
islands or Spanish coastal towns - Majorca and Barcelona, for example - had appropriate 
facilities either, and the practice had been for a smaller winter squadron to be based at Lisbon. 
This left the allied presence in the Mediterranean semi-permanent, and the vessels of the 
winter squadrons faced a return voyage to Portugal if disabled at sea. 214 
Minorca and its harbour, Port Mah6n, had long been considered the key to the 
permanent exercise of allied, or more specifically British, naval power in the Mediterranean. 
Unlike Gibraltar, Minorca did not share a land border with enemy territory and it was also 
strategically sited within the Mediterranean as the easternmost of the three Balearic Islands, 
with the other two - Majorca and Ibiza - already taken by the allies. As for Port Mah6n, it 
was a commodious and secure harbour, where a sizeable fleet comprising the largest rates 
inight easily winter .2" During the war, Minorca had frequently been suggested as a target, 
most recently in 1706 when Sir John Leake had captured Majorca and Ibiza. Then the 
Archduke Charles had particularly urged its capture, believing the inhabitants to be well 
disposed to the Habsburg cause, and it would probably have fallen to Leake if he had not 
been forced to take the main fleet back to England due to the lateness of the season. 216 The 
Archduke put the island's capture back on the war policy agenda when, in the spring of 1708, 
following a year of military reverses on the Peninsula, he and the Emperor - albeit with 
214 7-hemariborough-Godolphin CorresPondence, ii, no. 977, pp. 975,975 n. 4: Marlborough to Godolphin. 6 
May 1708; BL, Add MSS 543 1, f. 85: 'The report of Mr Dugald Campbell', 5 June 1708; 1 I. T. Dickinson. 
-ne Capture of Minorca 1708', MMli (1965), 195-6; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 43940; for details of 
L, eake's relief of Gibraltar in November 1704 see Chapter 2, Section 1-iii, pp. 224-7, above. 
215 J. Armstrong, The History of the Island of Minorca (2 nd edn, London, 1756). pp. 2-3,17-20; Trcvclyan, 
England Under QueenAnne, ii. 397-8. 
216 See Chapter 2, Section Liv, pp. 263,269. 
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differing interests focusing upon Spain and the Italian coast respectively - urged the British 
Admiralty to winter a fleet within the Mediterranean. This clearly required a forward port 
other than Lisbon, and Minorca seemed the obvious target. The island was still thought to be 
vulnerable, although a new Governor, Diego Leonardo Davila - who had been sent to 
Minorca in January 1707 along with (albeit temporarily) Marshal Villars - had tightened 
Bourbon control and improved the defences. Notwithstanding, London was curiously slow in 
considering the Archduke's request and it was towards the end of June before Godolphin 
wrote to the newly appointed commander of English troops in Spain, Lieutcnant-General 
James Stanhope, pressing upon him the necessity of Minorca's capture. 217 
Interestingly, Stanhope was not sent a set of Instructions and had himself suggested 
La Spezia on the Genoese coast as a winter port. However, as Marlborough had also written 
about the strategic imperative of this action at Minorca and criticised La Spezia, the General 
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was left in no doubt that he should take charge of organising the operation forthwith. Then 
based at Cervera, Stanhope travelled to Barcelona where he began to assemble a land force in 
the middle of August. Despite Imperial reinforcements, troops numbers remained low in the 
Peninsula and Stanhope managed to secure only about 1800 men. Of this number, 
Southwell's was the sole English regiment with the remaining 1300 being Spanish, Neapolitan 
and Portuguese drafts. An artillery train of ten guns and some mortars along with a 
reasonable amount of ordnance supplies was also collected and Stanhope was fortunate to 
obtain the services of the experienced gunner, Albert Borgard, and the engineer, Colonel 
petit. Of course, this represented only half of the operational force for the navy was required 
to project the land detachment on to the island and also - particularly if fierce opposition was 
encountered - to provide fire support and supply. Aware of this, Stanhope 
had upon first 
arriving in Barcelona sent a dispatch with details of the proposed operation and a request for 
217 PRO, ADM 1/4091, Part iii, fos . 622,643: Sunderland to the 
Admiralty, 13 Apr. 1704; Burchett to 
Sunderland, 27 Apr. 1704; PRO, ADM 1/4092, fos. 50-1: Boyle to the Admiralty, 17 Aug. 1708, and 
cnclosure, 'Extract of a Letter 
from Mr Stanhope', 22 June 1708 [NSI; IIMC, Seventh Report, Marlborough 
, 4fSS, pp. 
32-3: Sunderland to Marlborough, 15 June 1708; The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii, 
no. 1025, pp. 1019,1019 n. 
4: Godolphin to Marlborough, 22 June 1708; Mahon, History of the War of 
Succession in Spain, Appendix, pp. lxxii-lxxiii: To the Earl of 
Sunderland, 25 Aug. 1708 [NS]; I lugill, No 
peace Without Spain, pp. 276-7. 
21S The Letters andDispatches ofJohn Churchill, iv. 108: Marlborough to 
Stanhope, 15 July 1708 [NS]; 
Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 440. 
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219 help to the Admiral currently commanding in the Mediterranean, Sir John Leake. 
Following Sir Cloudesley Shovell's death on his return voyage from Toulon when his 
flagship accidentally foundered upon the rocks off the Scilly Isles, Leake had been sent to the 
Mediterranean as the senior Admiral for the beginning of the 1708 campaign. The fleet's 
tasks during the early summer had included transporting troops and supplies to the Peninsula, 
mainly from the Italian coastline controlled by the Imperialists, and also escorting the 
Archduke's fourteen year old bride, Princess Elisabeth Christina of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, 
to whom he had already been married by proXy. 220 At a Council of War on 29 May, the naval 
Flags had resolved to subordinate the fleet to the Archduke's operational authority and, 
having landed the Princess safely at Mataro just north of Barcelona on 14 July, Leake next 
expected Charles to order the capture of the island of Sardinia . 
22 1 Although mountainous, its 
fertile lands yielded large amounts of corn and the contribution this might make to the allies 
subsistence on the Peninsula had been recognised. The principal city, CagliarL located on the 
southern coast, was however well defended by extensive fortifications with over, it was 
reckoned, 200 cannon; and any operation against it would probably require a sizeable land 
force and siege train. Albeit still without a official order, Leake wrote to Stanhope requesting 
materials for a siege and additional troops to bolster the marine soldiers which were expected 
to comprise the burden of the land force. Shortly thereafter, Lcake's intuition was bome out 
when the Archduke did direct him to the reduction of Sardinia. In addition, the fleet was to 
secure the Sicilian and Neapolitan coasts from the privateers and thus open a passageway for 
an imperial-run expedition from Naples to capture Sicily. On 21 July, the naval Council 
considered the Archduke's order and resolved that the fleet would start for Sardinia once the 
marines coming from Tarragona had arrived and the Spanish regiment - which was seemingly 
all the additional manpower Leake's letter to Stanhope had yielded - was embarked. Notably, 
119 BL, Add MSS 2223 1, fos. 76-7: Cope to 'My Lord', 25 Aug. 170 8 [NS]; Mahon, History of the 11 ar of 
Succession in Spain, Appendix, pp. lxxii-Ixxiii: To the Earl of Sunderland, 25 Aug. 1708 [NS]; Martin- 
L, eake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 274-5; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 277. 
220 Ilarris, Sir Cloudesley Shovell, pp. 343-53; BL, Add MSS 543 1, fos. 4-6,66-8: 'Instructions for Sir John 
Leake Kt. ', 8 Jan. 1708 [NS]; 'The King'to Leake, 28 May 1708 [NS]; Martin-Leake, The Life ofSirjohn 
Leake, ii. 242-50; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 440. 
22' The ensuing account of the capture of Sardinia is based on the following primary sources: 131, Add MSS 
543 1: f0s. 10 1-3,107,106,113: Leake to Stanhope, 20 July 1708; 'The King' to Leake. 30 July 1708 [NS]; 
'Att a Councill of War', 21 July 1708; Leake to Wills, I Aug. 1708; Leake to the Marquis of Jamaica; Leake 
to the Chief Magistrates and Inhabitants of the City of Cagliari, I Aug. 1708; Leake to 'The King of Spain', 6 
Aug. 1708; BL, Add MSS 47970, pp. 104-5: Teake's Journal', 25 July-7 Aug. 1708; Martin-Leake, 7he Life 
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the Council also decided that seven warships from the fleet were to be lcft behind with orders 
to patrol the Catalan coast on guard duty. 
With the Conde dc Cifucntes 500-strong regiment aboard and about 600 marines 
brought from Tarragona, Leake signalled the fleet's departure from Barcelona on 25 July. 
The voyage proceeded slowly as the Admiral initially waked for the Essex and the Dunkirk to 
catch up. These ships had respectively delayed their sailing to take on board the recent mail 
and some Sardinian exiles who were to be landed on the island prior to the fleet's arrival to 
fan support for the Archduke. Next, when crossing from the Balearics to Sardinia on 30 July, 
Leake eased sail to allow three warships to go ahead to chase any enemy vessels out of 
Cagliari Bay. It was not until the late afternoon of I August that the fleet, having been joined 
by the Dunkirk earlier that morning following its landing of the exiles, came upon Cagliari. In 
accordance with convention, Leake sent a summons to the Viceroy and the City Magistrates, 
which they returned later that evening requesting a day to think about it. 
As at Cartagena in 1706, Leake was not inclined to afford the authorities time to seek 
terms nor to dispose their defences and he immediately ordered the bomb vessels against the 
town. While they kept up a vigorous bombardment throughout the night - some I 10 shells 
were thrown into the city by the early hours of 2 August - Leake arranged with MaJor- 
General Wills that his marines and Spanish troops would congregate in the fleet's boats 
around the Isabella yacht, which Wills would board, for a landing to the east of the city. This 
force was augmented by 900 sailors who were regimented into 13 companies with the naval 
captain, Evans, as Colonel. Rear-Admiral Norris was also ready with seven warships to 
continue the bomb vessels' bombardment. However, again as at Cartagena, the town's 
authorities sent out an offer to surrender and then agreed to submit to Leake's terms 
immediately upon the attack beginning in the morning of 2 August. The Spanish regiment 
was disposed as a garrison and the marines and the seamen 'regiment' were re-embarked 
aboard the squadron. By 6 August, all the Articles of Capitulation 
had been signed and the 
Conde de Cifuentes, as Governor, assumed control of the island for the Archduke. 
it was twelve days later, just as Leake was preparing his squadron to exact retribution 
in the form of 400 000 crowns from Pope Clement X1 due to his alleged fiscal involvement in 
the 'Old Pretender's' recent attempted invasion of Britain, that Stanhope's letter reached him. 
OfSir John Leake, ii. 251-8,263,279. 
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Also enclosed with this post was a letter from the Archduke which - curiously, given 
Charles's previously expressed enthusiasm for Stanhope's operation - recommended that 
Leake first finish the operations on the Italian coast and then proceed to Minorca; whilst 
correspondence from Godolphin emphasised the importance that Queen Anne placed upon his 
current action against the Pope. To decide the best course of action, the Admiral held a 
Council of War that same day, 18 August. The lateness of the season dictated that only one 
substantive operation might be undertaken. The Dutch were not involved in the action 
against the Pope because the grievance was an issue of British sovereignty and therefore since 
Minorca had long been an attractive prize for the Grand Alliance, the Council decided to 
respond to Stanhope's request. 222 
Once the Defiance had been sent to Majorca and, if necessary Barcelona, to inform 
Stanhope of the Council's resolution, Leake lost no time in putting the main fleet under sail 
for Minorca on the evening of 18 August. After a week's voyage they approached the 
island's southern coast but, with no sign of Stanhope and his force, the Council resolved to 
cruise off the island awaiting his arrival. Back at Barcelona, Stanhope, having embarked his 
troops and train aboard the auxiliary vessels, had encountered a minor problem in securing a 
convoy. Of the seven warships left by the Council off the Catalan coast when the fleet sailed 
for Sardinia, the three Dutch vessels were prohibited from leaving that coastline after 20 
August; whilst the others, in the absence of further directions from Admiral Leake, were 
bound by their original operational orders to remain there on guard duty. 223 Given these 
circumstances, it is usually remarked that Stanhope secured an escort because his brother 
commanded one of the warships - the Milrord - then on that station. 
224 Doubtless fraternal 
loyalty inclined Captain Philip Stanhope to help his elder brother, but a Council of the English 
captains of those vessels left on the coast legitimated the departure of the Mitford and 
Captain Trevanion's York by invoking an article of their Instructions which permitted two 
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vessels, upon the request of Stanhope or the Archduke, to sail between Algiers or Majorca 
convoying corn for Catalonia. As the elder Stanhope wished to go to Majorca first to collect 
more men and materials, there was nothing improper about the Mit(ord and the York 
accompanying him. In the event, however, it would seem that the other captains, including 
the Dutch, also attached their vessels to the convoy because Stanhope's aide-de-camp, John 
Cope, referred to a squadron of ten warships leaving for Majorca over 22-23 August. This 
number was corroborated by the logs from the Mitford and the York-, whilst Leake's 
biographer notes that there were three Dutch vessels present. 22' No extant evidence accounts 
for the increased escort and the reasons for the change in the Council's resolution remain 
unclear. 
Hours prior to Stanhope's arrival Leake had received a letter from him detailing the 
additional marines and material supplies that the expeditionary force had taken on at Majorca 
during its two day stay there (26-28 August) en route from Barcelona. Despite increasing the 
number of troops to around 2000, Stanhope was still concerned that his land force was 
insufficient, particularly as the nature of Minorca's coastline would not allow the fleet to 
provide close fire support for the soldiers on land. Accordingly, he requested that Leakc 
release the maximum possible number of marines to help with the land action and to form a 
garrison in the event of Minorca's successful capture. While awaiting the land force, the 
naval Council had resolved that, due to the lateness of the season, Leake should prepare to 
depart for England with as many warships as a subsequent Council would deem desirable. 
Meeting again on 3 September, it attempted to comply with Stanhope's request by directing 
the departing ships to leave any marines surplus to the vessel's highest complement with 
Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Whitaker's seventeen-strong winter squadron. This naval force 
was to assist in completing the operation at Minorca for as long as the weather allowed, and 
then undertake a number of other tasks such as the transport of imperial reinforcements to 
VX First Peninsular War p. 267; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 277. 
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Spain. 226 Stanhope was subsequently critical of the naval contribution to the operation, even 
alleging that its officers were more difficult to contend with than the enemy; this frustration 
might have had its roots in Leake's failure to commit all the resources under his control, 
which appeared to mark a decline in naval enthusiasm for the operation compared to when 
Leake left off exacting retribution from the Pope. The Admiral's biographer - albeit again 
overstating his case - rescues Leake from such criticism. Autumn was fast approaching and 
as the senior Admiral, Leake had always to have regard for the safety of the whole fleet, 
which included the larger rates that were unstable in poor weather. Moreover, in complying 
with Stanhope's request for marines he increased the land troops by about 500 and the 
General could still call on the support of a sizeable naval squadron. It should also be recalled 
that during the war Leake had frequently commanded in the Mediterranean, including at least 
two tours in charge of a winter squadron, and he was thus unlikely to forget or downplay the 
necessity for a secure Mediterranean harbour. Most significantly, however, Leake did not 
depart immediately but remained to oversee the landing of the marines and other troops. " 
This began in the evening of 3 September at a site about three miles from the town of 
Mah6n well away from the harbour's heavy fortifications. 228 When the landing was 
completed the following morning, Stanhope marched a detachment of 100 grenadiers to 
, %4ah6n which, without opposition, quickly declared for the Archduke. These circumstances, 
along with the formation of a small militia force that was eager to join the allies, seemed to 
confirm Charles's contention that the islands' inhabitants favoured him over the Bourbons. 
Stanhope sought to capitalise on this by dispatching some 400 soldiers north to secure the 
main city, Ciudadela; whilst Rear-Admiral Whitaker did likewise by ordering a couple orships 
to Fornells, where they were to silence the fort guarding its harbour. 
226BL, Add MSS22231J. 78: Cope to 'Sir', 29 Sept. 1708 [NSI; BL, Add MSS543 I, fos. 124,12&8: 'Att a 
Councill of War', I Sept. 1708; Stanhope to Leake, 14 Sept. 1708 [NS]; Lcake to Stanhope, 3 Sept. 1708, 
and enclosure, 'Att a Councill of War'Martin-Leake, 7he Life ofSirJohn Leake, ii. 281-5; llugill, No Peace 
lVithout Spain, pp. 277-8. 
227 Martin-Leake, The Life ofSir John Leake, ii. 297-303; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 440. 
223 The ensuing account the capture of Minorca is based on the following primary sources and secondary 
authorities: 13L, Add MSS 2223 1, fos. 79-84: Cope to 'Sir', 29 Sept. 1708 
[NS]; Cope to 'My Lord', 30 Sept. 
1708 [NS]; PRO, ADM 51/4261, Part vii, unpaginated, Milford. 2-8 Sept. 1708; PRO, ADM 51/4402, Part iii, 
unpaginated, York, 3-13 Sept. 1708; BL, Add MSS 543 1, 
fos. 130-1: Leake to the Admiralty Secretary 
purchett], 4 Sept. 1708; BL, Add MSS 47970, pp. 106-7: Teake's Journal', 8 Aug--8 Sept. 1708; Mahon, 
11isjory of the War ofSuccession in Spain, Appendix, pp. lxxiii-lxxvi: To the Earl of Sunderland, 30 Sept. 
1708 [NS]; Armstrong, The History of the Island ofMinorca, pp. 92-6; Martin-Leake, The Life ofS! r John 
Leak, e, ii. 285-7,293; The Byng Papers, ii. 30 1: Stanhope to Sunderland; Dickinson, 'The Capture of 
292 
Port Mah6n however remained the allies' main objective, but it was also the most 
stoutly defended part of the island. Three forts - Philipet, St Philip and Charles - covered 
both the harbour mouth and the roadstead. Of these three, St Philip was the largest: four- 
bastions, bolstered by three ravelins and a ditch, meant that it was more accurately described 
by John Cope and others as a castle and, combined with its situation on an eminence above 
the harbour, its early capture was imperative. Additional defence for the I 000-strong Franco- 
Spanish garrison commanded inside St Philip by the Frenchman, Colonel de la Jonqui&re, was 
provided by the harbour's perimeter stone wall along which were four towers housing four 
guns each. Due to the poor quality of the ground around the harbour for transporting 
cannon, an attempt was made on 7 September to land the artillery near to this perimeter wall 
but La Jonqui&re effectively directed St Philip's guns to beat this off. It was now - 
notwithstanding that the land force was about to face its sternest test - that Leake's reduced 
fleet departed for England. Stanhope's frustration with the Admiral is perhaps 
understandable, though prior to leaving Leake did at least augment the ordnance. 
Fort 
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Fig. 19: Outline Sketch of Port Mah6n 
On the same day as the fleet's departure, another attempt was made to land the 
artillery. This time a cove to the east of the harbour was selected as the site and, though 
there was no opposition, the land force, helped by some sailors, had to haul the 42 cannon 
and fifteen mortars along a rocky and obstacle strewn countryside 
for upwards of twelve days 
to bring them within range of the harbour wall and Fort St Philip. By 17 September, a nine- 
Minorca', Pp. 198-200; Williams, Slanhope, pp. 75-7; Hugill, No Peace WilhoulSpain, pp. 278-81. 
293 
gun battery positioned against the two middle towers of the perimeter wall was complete and 
it began firing at dawn the following day. Several hours of bombardment successfully 
silenced all the guns in the two towers and opened breaches in the wall. Circumstances were 
increasingly well disposed for an assault over the wall and on against St Philip, even though it 
had yet to be substantially damaged by the battery. In the event, however, Stanhope was 
deprived of the decision as to when to launch the attack by a detachment of grenadiers posted 
to the right of the allied lines under Brigadier Wade, which advanced without orders. To his 
credit, Stanhope viewed this as an opportunity and, like Peterborough on the slopes of 
Montjuich, he rallied the remainder of the troops to the attack with sword in hand. With the 
loss of only 40 men, the allies carried the wall and the area of habitation in front of St Philip. 
The troops lodged themselves amongst the houses here and in the fort's glacis. The Franco- 
Spanish garrison remained strongly placed however and Stanhope demonstrated his military 
pedigree by adapting his method of attack. He had already distributed pro-Habsburg 
propaganda to encourage defections and now he used a captured 12 year old spy as a human 
billboard, covering the boy with notices in French and Spanish about the allies' capture of 
Ciudadela and Port Fortiells, while also offering 2 pistoles to every deserter. The boy's 
return to St Philip had an almost immediate effect for, the next day, La Jonqui6re sought 
terms and a capitulation was signed in early evening. 
The Franco-Spanish surrender was premature and, on entering St Philip, Cope 
expressed his surprise at the potential defensive strength of the garrison. This was Louis 
XIV's view and he imprisoned both Commandant La Jonqui6re and Governor Davila for their 
conduct. It is doubtless correct to point to the influence of the presence of women and 
children inside the garrison and that there was little prospect of a French fleet arriving to 
engage Whitaker and deprive the allied force of supply but the success of the operation 
should also be attributed to the British conduct and Stanhope's command, in particular. The 
General maintained the unity and focus of the combined force. In this he was helped by the 
absence of detailed Instructions from London, which afforded him considerable discretion to 
shape the operation from the outset and then to command its progress. The speed with which 
the operation was conducted along with Stanhope's efforts to deceive the enemy commanders 
about the extent and potential of his force in addition to 
his guile in altering the means of 
Military attack were also important contributing 
factors to the success. Although 
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understandable, Stanhope frustration should not obscure the naval input. Leake did leave 
Whitaker with a substantial squadron along with as much ordnance as he could spare, and 
Stanhope was well served by the sailors put ashore with his brother, Phillip's, enthusiasm for 
229 
the attack costing him his life. 
Louis's subsequent attitude towards his commanders at Minorca did accurately reflect 
the island's importance within the Mediterranean and this was underlined again in 1756 when 
France regained Minorca and the British Admiralty accounted for its loss by imposing a 
capital sentence on the commanding Admiral, John Byng, which was implemented on the 
quarter-deck of his flagship. That was in the future, though. By September 1708 Stanhope, 
with an eye to subsequent peace negotiations, had continued to ensure that although the 
island had been captured in the Archduke's name it was to be garrisoned solely by British 
troops. Britain had therefore gained a Mediterranean port from which the whole fleet might 
operate all the year round . 
23' The permanent penetration of the Mediterranean first sought by 
William in 1694-1695 in order to make England the principal regional power could now be 
effectively consolidated. It is of some significance that the instrument of warfare which 
eventually precipitated this was a combined army-navy operation. 
_1. vii- 
Supporting the Camisards and Coastal Diversions: Unfulfilled and Small Scale 
Combined Operations During the War of the Spanish Succession. 1703-1710. 
During the Spanish Succession war there were a number of occasions when combined 
operations were planned but never undertaken or were dispatched on such a small scale that 
they comprised little more than raids upon the enemy coast line. Despite such limitations, 
interest in these operations remains two-fold. Firstly, the preparations for their dispatch, 
including the determination of the command structure, provided an insight into operational 
form and function, which is material to deliberating upon a definition for combined operations 
during this period. Secondly, the simple fact that they were proposed indicates that, amongst 
their proponents at least, there was a perceived role for them within Grand Strategy. An 
understanding of their strategic purpose - albeit ultimately unfulfilled - 
is inherent to 
contemporary perceptions about combined operations as an 
instrument of warfare. 
229 BL, Add MSS 2223 1, f. 80: Cope to 'Sir', 29 Sept. 1708 [NSI; Hugill, No Peace Without Spain, p. 280; 
Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, ii. 402. 
230 Dickinson, 'The Capture of Minorca', pp. 2014; Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, ii. 403-5. 
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Notably, the strategic context provided a common theme for the unfulfilled operation 
planned in 1706 and also the limited raiding of the southern French coast in 1710. They were 
directed in support of the Camisard rebellion in the Languedoc region of France. The 
Camisards - whose name was commonly though to be derived from the white peasant smock 
or camisia they wore 231 mainly comprised Huguenot peasants who had remained in France 
following Louis XIV's Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Not only had the 
Revocation deprived the French Protestants of their limited religious toleration, but it was 
accompanied by a programme of forced religious conversion. As Languedoc, particularly 
around Mines and the Cdvennes mountain range west of the Rhone, contained a great number 
of Huguenots, it suffered disproportionately. Nonetheless, the inhabitants sought to maintain 
their religious identity and, in the early eighteenth century, several young Protestant prophets 
toured the area and fuelled religious conviction. In 1702, the intendant, Lamoignon de 
Biville, along with his senior Catholic adviser Abbe Chayla, became so concerned with this 
trend that they ordered its suppression. The imprisonment and death of the prophets and 
their families followed and combined with the repressive taxation regime, sparked a revolt. 
Although lacking noble leadership, the peasant rebels organised themselves into a fairly 
effective guerrilla force which operated with varying degrees of intensity out of the 
countryside and the Cdvennes massif for most of the war. 232 
Allied interest in the Camisards was focused upon the scale of the internal distraction 
the rebellion might cause Louis thereby disrupting the French war effort. At an early stage, 
London sought to supply the Camisards with war materials and in 1703 arms and ammunition 
were put aboard Sir Cloudesley Shovell's squadron bound for the Mediterranean. Shovell 
however failed to make contact with the rebels and the initiative passed to the newly arrived 
English envoy to the Duke of Savoy's court, Richard Hill. Savoy's accession to the Grand 
Alliance had broadened the strategic scope of the war, with the possibility of an invasion of 
southern France which the allies harboured hopes of effecting with the Camisards' help. Now 
there was the prospect that the Mediterranean French coast line might be assailed from 
23113. C. Strayer, Huguenots and Camisards as Aliens in France, 1598-1789: The Sirugglefor Religious 
Toleration (Lampeter, 2001), p. 294, suggests that the name might also have stemmed from the notion that 
the rebels were 'burners of idols' as a camis was a Japanese idol; or from the word camisade which embodied 
the activity of attacking Catholic strongholds 
232 A. Ducasse, La Guerre des Camisards: La Risistance Huguenote Sous LouisXIV(Paris, 1970), pp. 9-63; 
Strayer, Huguenots and Camisards, pp. 296-308; Lynn, 7he Wars ofLouis XIV, pp. 277-9. 
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Piedmont in the east and the Languedoc towards the weSt. 
233 
234 Richard Hill had some success in prosecuting what he referred to as his 'Holy War'. 
Money and supplies got through to the rebels in the Languedoc; while Hill also persuaded the 
Duke to succour his own Protestant subjects in the Vaudois in the hope that they might form 
the mainstay of Savoy's contribution to any action which linked up with the Camisards. The 
Duke was nonetheless reluctant to commit his troops to such a venture. The suggestion in 
early 1704 by Colonel Pierre de Belcastel, who commanded a Huguenot regiment on the 
English Establishment, that he lead 3000 troops raised in Switzerland into France in support 
of the Camisards was in part blocked by the Duke on the basis that it threatened to diminish 
his own recruitment prospects in the Cantons. Victor Amadeus's hostility continued even 
when Bclcastel travelled to Savoy to seek help for the Camisards directly from the Duke. 235 
opposition to such schemes did not come solely from Savoy. Despite the inclination of his 
government and, in particular, Lord Treasurer Godolphin towards such ventures, 
Marlborough tended to see little worth in them. When later in 1704, another Huguenot 
officer, the Marquis de Miremont, proposed leading an army of 8000 men from Piedmont into 
the Cdvennes mountains to help the Camisards and also to bolster Savoy's interests in France, 
Marlborough argued that the money would be better spent on raising 8000 Prussians for the 
Duke of Savoy's service. 236 
Thus, although in the early years of the war allied policy recognised that the Camisard 
revolt offered some military and strategic advantages, there was a lack of agreement on the 
extent to which, and how, these might be exploited. Consequently, despite reference being 
made to possible expeditionary landings and overland support from Savoy, limited material 
assistance was all the Camisards received. This proved inadequate as Louis moved quickly to 
suppress the revolt. The initial failures of the local military commander, the Due de Broglie, 
caused him to be replaced at the beginning of 1703 by the Marquis de Montrevel, who began 
233 Symcox, Victor Amadeus II, pp. 145-6. 
234 pRO, SP 92/26, f 398: Hill to Hedges, 17 July 1704. 
235 PRO, SP 92/26, fos. 304-5,324-7,346-7,392-5,412-13,416-17,446-9: Hill to'My Lord', 2,13 Nov. 
1703 [NSI; Hill to Nottingham, II Apr. 1704 [NS]; Hill to Hedges, 1,4 July, 1,12 Aug., 19 Sept. 1704 [NS]; 
7he Afarlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, no. 263, p. 262 n. 3: Marlborough to Godolphin, 21 Jan. 
1704; Symcox, VictorAmadeus A pp. 146-7. 
23" The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, nos. 286,348,369,385,419 pp. 277 n. 3,337 n. 5,359- 
60,376-7,377 n. 1,406-7: Marlborough to Godolphin, 14 Apr., 16 July, 17 Aug., 6 Oct., 5 Dec. 1704; P. J. 
Shears, 'Armand de Bourbon, Marquis de Miremont, PILSL xx (1958-1964), 413. 
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an aggressive campaign against the rebels which he concluded in September by ordering the 
dipeuplement of the Uvennes. At the start of the campaign in the next year, Louis 
dispatched to the region his most able general, Marshal Villars, who shrewdly pursued a 
conciliatory policy of pacification which, in the wake of Montrevel's shock tactics, bore 
considerable fruit. Not only did one of the main Camisard leaders, Jean Cavalier, seek terms 
and then surrender, but the inhabitants of the region began to live more peaceably. 231 
The revolt did, however, rumble on, particularly in the mountainous area under the 
leadership of Rolland; and, even when he was fatally betrayed at Chateau Castclnau in 1705, 
the wellsprings of rebellion remained. 238 In an attempt to reinvigorate this Protestant 
opposition to Louis XIV, another French Huguenot refugee, the Comte de Guiscard, 
presented a proposal to the Cabinet Council for a descent on the western French coast. 
Guiscard envisaged that a large number of troops, comprising several regiments raised among 
the Huguenot refugees, would land between the River Charente estuary to the north and 
Blaye at the mouth of the Garonne to the south; Xantes would then be occupied and the 
Huguenots would lead a detachment forward to the Uvennes to rouse the Camisards. 
Guiscard and his proposal gained support within the Government. Sccretary-at-War St John 
formed a very favourable opinion of him; while critically, Marlborough thought it an 
appropriate moment at which to launch such an assault, particularly as he understood that the 
French would have few troops in that region during the forthcoming campaign. 239 
Tbroughout the winter of 1705 and into the spring of 1706, six Huguenot battalions 
were raised to serve alongside eight infantry and four dragoon regiments from the English 
Establishment and 1000 marine soldiers; while four regiments of foot and three dragoon 
squadrons were to come from the United Provinces. Sir Cloudesley Shovell was the Admiral 
appointed to the naval squadron from which this force would be projected but the principal 
command of the descent was given to Richard Savage, 4"' Earl Rivers . 
240 Although it was 
expected that Rivers would work through a Council of War, his Instructions afforded him 
considerable discretion over the choice of landing site and the 
land force's progress 
2"Y Ducasse, La Guerre des Camisards, pp. 142-82; Lynn, The Wars ofLouls XIV, pp. 278-9,297-8. 
23' Lynn, Ike Wars ofLouis XIV, p. 298; Strayer, Huguenots and Camisards, p. 317. 
239 I"he Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, no. 544, pp. 525-6,525 n. 5,526 n. 2: Godolphin to 
Marlborough, 22 Apr. 1706; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 75. 
'40 Ihe Afarlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, pp. 525 n. 5,541 n. 2; PRO, WO 4/4, p. 268: St John to 
officers of the Ordnance, 3 May 1706; Harris, Sir Cloudesley Shovell, p. 303. 
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thereafter. Indeed, the main emphasis of the Instructions was not the regulation of the 
descent itself but rather its political context. Just as was the case with William III's 
expedition to England some eighteen years previously, Rivers was to ensure that the action 
was viewed, not as a 'conquest', but as an attempt to secure the ancient rights and liberties of 
the French Protestants. To this end, Rivers was upon landing to distribute a manifesto 
outlining such intentions and to punish severely any soldier who acted outside of its 
framework. 241 
The fact that Rivers did not receive these Instructions until the end of July reflected 
the substantial delay which beset the preparation of the descent force. Raising the Huguenot 
regiments proved particularly troublesome. The senior officers were prickly characters who 
easily took offence and made considerable demands upon the ministry; Godolphin was moved 
to call them 'unsufferable'. 242 One of their number, the Marquis de Montandre, raised a 
battalion only to decide late on that he could not serve under his fellow co-religionist, 
Guiscard, and the Colonelcy passed to Brigadier de Vimar6. Guiscard's place in the 
expedition was the subject of a separate debate as Lieutenant-General Thomas Erie was to act 
as Rivers's deputy, a role that Guiscard considered his. The Frenchman was eventually 
mollified with the equivalent rank of Lieutenant-General and third place in seniority. It was 
not only the establishment of the Huguenot regiments which caused delay, however. Many of 
the English troops had to be transported from Flanders to the descent force's camp on the 
Isle of Wight and, not for the first time, the Dutch proved slow in providing their 
contribution. Consequently, it took the majority of the summer for the material preparations 
to come together and it was 10 August before the squadron of 28 warships and numerous 
243 
auxiliary and transport vessels weighed from Portsmouth . 
immediately, the squadron faced stormy weather in the Channel and after being badly 
buffeted for four days, Shovell put about for shelter in Torbay. Further delay was clearly 
going to result and this caused the government and the commanders to question seriously the 
241 7-heMarlborough-GodolPhin Correspondence, ii, nos. 621,628, pp. 613,620: Marlborough to Godolphin, 
4 July 1706; Godolphin to Marlborough, II July 1706; HMC, Bath MSS, i, p. 84: The Queen's Instructions to 
Earl Rivers, 21 July 1706. 
242 The Marlhorough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, no. 556, p. 538: Godolphin to Marlborough, 6 May 1706. 
243 The Afarlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, nos. 556,560,565,568,630 pp. 538,540-1,540 n. 1. 
548-9,623: Godolphin to Marlborough, 6,9,14,16 May, 15 July 1706; 
PRO, WO 4/4, p. 326: St John to 
Rivers, 20 July 1706; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 154; Harris, Sir 
Cloudesley Shovell, pp. 3034. 
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viability of the operation. Doubts based on the increasing lateness of the season had already 
been expressed prior to the squadron's departure from Portsmouth; and, with the diversion 
into Torbay, these simply hardened. Moreover, Guiscard gave equivocal responses to 
questions about the prospects for fanning the revolt in Languedoc, which Rivers and others 
put to him during this pause in proceedings. Upon considering these issues the Queen along 
with her Cabinet Council concluded that the descent was unlikely to meet expectations and 
that certainly it would little justify the considerable cost of it going ahead. WiththeSpanish 
theatre in need of additional troops, it was decided instead that Shovell and Rivers would 
depart for the Mediterranean. Their new Instructions embraced combined operations 
inasmuch as descents at Cidiz or Seville were suggested. However, as has already been 
noted, in the event both Rivers and the Government realised that augmenting the Peninsula 
army was the first priority. 244 
With the abandonment of the 1706 operation, plans to help the Protestant rebels in 
Languedoc went into abeyance as the Government's interest in the French Mediterranean 
coastline was firmly focused upon the capture of Toulon and ensuing support to the Duke of 
Savoy. 245 This did not mean however that the advantages offered by a religious rebellion in 
south central France were forgotten. In 1710, the Archduke commended a proposal - first 
drafted by the French Colonel, N. N. de Seissan, who had been captured at the siege of 
Tournai and then, upon Marlborough's recommendation, had joined the Polish Service - to 
take Cette in Languedoc. Seissan owned an estate there and the main purpose of the action 
was to aid those Cdvennes rebels who still maintained their opposition to Louis XIV, albeit at 
a low level. The proposed operation was not on the same scale as the one planned in 1706 
inasmuch as it was to be put together from those naval and military forces already in the 
Mediterranean and there were no specific Instructions drafted for its regulation. The in. 
theatre Service commanders were to regulate their own conduct, though given precedent it 
was expected that a Council of War would facilitate their co-operation. 
246 
244 Ae Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii, nos. 628,659,664,667, pp. 620,651,656 n. 6,658: 
Godolphin to Marlborough, II July, 15,23 Aug. 1706; Marlborough to Godolphin, 29 Aug. 1706; 1 IMC, 
Bath MSS, i, pp. 89-90: Godolphin to [Rivers], 18 Aug. 1706; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 154-5; 1 larris, Sir 
Cloudesley Shovell, pp. 303-4; above Chapter 2 Section I. v, pp. 270-1. 
245 See Chapter 2, Sections Liv & Ix, pp. 235-7,239,269-84. 
246 PRO, 42/67, unf: 'At a Council of War', 6 July 1710; Norris to Sunderland, 7 July 1710; 7he 
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On 6 July, Admiral Sir John Norris, whose duties as Mediterranean C. -in-C., in the 
early part of the 1710 campaign had comprised assisting the war effort on the Peninsula and 
undertaking raids on the Genoese coast, met his fellow Admirals, Baker and van Somelsdyck, 
to consider the proposed action against Cette. 247 They agreed to undertake it forthwith and 
that Edward Stanhope's regiment at Tarragona, along with a detachment of 300 troops from 
Port Mihon, would be embarked as the land force. Arriving off the Languedoc coast on 13 
July, Seissan was put ashore at the head of a 1000-strong force about a league from Cette. 
At dawn, the troops began marching towards the town, while Norris disposed a number of his 
ships against its principal defence -a fort sited on a mole. The heavy naval ordnance was not 
however required as the town capitulated following a short fire-fight during which some five 
British soldiers were wounded. Leaving Major-General Wills in charge of Cette with a 
garrison of 300 men, Seissan immediately pressed forward to Agde. Norris had reinforced 
the Frenchman with some 300 marines but they were not required as Agde surrendered that 
night without opposition. 
No time was afforded to consolidate these gains as news came through that the 
French military commander in the Languedoc, the Duc de Roquelaure, was planning to 
descend upon Cette from the nearby lake. The organisation of a number of the ships' boats 
on this lake, along with a military force in the environs, to thwart Roquelaure caused a 
breakdown in communication with the troops left guarding Agde and this post was 
relinquished. Seissan and Edward Stanhope wanted to return immediately to retake town but 
the exertions of the troops over the past two days had left them exhausted, and instead the 
force retired to Cette. The next day, further consultation upon this reverse was held with 
Norris offering another reinforcement of 300 men from the fleet so that Seissan might attempt 
recapture of Agde. However, also on 17 July, intelligence was received that the French 
General Noailles was nearby at Mize at the head of a sizeable force, while the Marshal 
Berwick had reputedly detached a number of troops from his army with the aim of dislodging 
the British from Cette. Ajoint Council of War resolved to make a defence of the town; but 
when, in the morning of 18 July, both Noailles and 
Roquelaure brought their forces into its 
outskirts, it was clear that they greatly outnumbered 
Seissan's men and in addition had the 
247 The ensuing account of the operations at Cette and Agde are based on the following primary sources: PRO, 
SP 42/67, unf: 'At a Council of War', 17 July 1710 [comprises the minutes of the two meeting held on 17 
301 
fire support of seven field cannon. Accordingly, as the French Generals began their attack, 
the decision was made to re-embark aboard the fleet. The retreat was completed successfully 
save for the loss of the Company of Foot appointed to cover it along with the men in the fort, 
who, Norris believed, had surrendered accidentally to the French. With the enemy fully 
mobilised along the Languedoc coastline, it was agreed that no further action could take 
place; and, although Norris commended the zeal of the inhabitants towards the British, the 
Protestant rebels were again left without material aid. 
The remaining notable, though unfulfilled, descent proposal during the Spanish 
Succession War was developed by Marlborough at the beginning of the 1708 campaign. 
During a conference at The Hague in April 1708, Marlborough agreed with Eugene that the 
expulsion of the French from the Spanish Netherlands would comprise the focus of the 
coming land campaign and, although a set-piece battle would most probably be the principal 
means of effecting this, the Duke recognised the potential of a diversionary coastal descent to 
disrupt French action in Flanders. During the early summer, some II regiments (around 6000 
troops) under the command of Lieutenant-General Erle were encamped on the Isle of Wight 
with Admiral Byng subsequently detailed to command the naval squadron. As the 
preparations of this force continued, Godolphin was confident that a departure date at the 
beginning of July could be met. Then, however, Marlborough defeated the Duc de Vend6me 
and the Duc de Burgundy at the encounter battle of Oudenarde and Erie's descent force 
became part of the calculation as to how that victory might be effectively followed up. 248 
Heinsius pressed for the force to range along the northern French coastline to 'augment their 
[the French] consternation '249 and Marlborough agreed with this but Erie's men were delayed 
at the Isle of Wight by contrary winds. Fearful that the wind bound force might instead be 
detailed to accompany the Queen of Portugal to Iberia, the Duke suggested that Godolphin 
rejuvenated his longstanding plan for a descent on Abbeville in Picardy. By mid-July, it was 
agreed with both Erle and Byng that a landing would be effected at Saint-Valery on the 
Somme estuary whence the land force would march upon Abbeville some eighteen kilometres 
up-river. This operation was to form part of Marlborough's wider project to invade France, 
July]; 'At a Council of War', 18 July 1710; Norris to Sunderland, 27 July 1710. 
248 2-he marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii, nos. 959,982,1005, pp. 946-7 n. 5,957-8,979,100 1: 
Godolphin to Marlborough, 20 Apr., II May, 3 June 1708; Churchill, Marlhorough, iii. 310-12,333-66. 
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for after linking up with Erle, the Duke would use Abbeville as his principal post on a sea- 
bome, supply route. 250 
The plan to invade France was however thwarted by Eugene who, along with some 
other generals, argued that it was more appropriate to capture Lille first thereby creating a 
secure inland magazine. Probably motivated by the interests of allied unity, Marlborough 
accepted these representations and on moving to invest Lille, the Abbeville descent was 
postponed, though not at this stage abandoned. Indeed, Marlborough hoped that if the Lille 
siege could be concluded by September then there might still be time to invade France along 
with the accompanying descent. Meantime, therefore, Erle's force was ordered to undertake 
raids on the Normandy coast. However there seems to be no evidence that any landings took 
place - certainly, Godolphin reported that a planned raid against the port at La Hogue was 
abandoned on approach due to a heavy French presence in the area - and it was not long 
before Byng returned the descent force to Spithead, having merely caused the French some 
alarm. It was nonetheless soon clear to Marlborough that the siege of Lille was going to last 
longer than he had hoped and that, more significantly, the French defensive strategy for the 
town sought to mount a blockade along the River Scheldt thereby cutting the allies supply 
route and line of communication from Brussels. It was the pressing necessity to circumvent 
this problem which caused the eventual abandonment of the unfulfilled descent of 1708; it 
was decided instead to land Erle's force at the allied held Ostend whence the General might 
organise a supply convoy through to Marlborough. 251 
For the sake of completeness it is worth mentioning that certain proposals for 
descents on either the northern French coast or against the Spanish coastline continued to be 
current until the end of the war. In particular, Cidiz remained an attractive target for both 
the military and the naval commanders in the Mediterranean, with Sir John Jennings in 1709 - 
some seven years on from the Rooke-Ormonde expedition - developing another plan for its 
capture. This though lapsed due to the lateness of the season. In the same year, the Earl of 
249 Yhe Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii, no. 1037, p. 1026: Godolphin to Marlborough, 8 July 
1708. 
"0 7he Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii, nos. 1035,1037,1040-1,1046,1048-9 pp. 1028,1029- 
30,1033,1034,1040-1,1043-5: Godolphin to Marlborough, 6,8,12,18,20 July 1708; Marlborough to 
Godolphin, 12 July 1708; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 372-3. 
251 Yhe Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii, nos. 1061-2,1081-2,1099 pp. 1056-8,1078-90,1098-9: 
Godolphin to Marlborough, 2,20,23 Aug., 8 Sept. 1708; Churchill, Marlborough, iii. 373-7,414-15; 
Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, pp. 229,23 1. 
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Galway developed a project for a second descent on Vigo. Nonetheless, perhaps as a result 
of Marlborough's advice which frowned upon such actions in Spain as a distraction at this 
stage in the war when he thought that efforts should be being made to create the appropriate 
mflitary conditions for peace, it never found favour with the Queen. 252 As will be seen in the 
next section, a proposal for a descent on the north eastern French coast with the land force 
linking up with Marlborough's army in Flanders was floated in 1710. However this was 
bound up with Godolphin's efforts to forestall an expedition to reduce Canada, which he and 
Marlborough disapproved of The Lord Treasurer calculated that if the Marlborough 
proposed alternative employment (such as the descent) for the troops detailed on that 
expedition then the Cabinet Council would opt for it instead. Marlborough was however 
more sensitive to their increasingly weak political position as Anne began in 1710 to remodel 
the Ministry in favour of the Tories and accordingly the Duke was unwilling to reduce further 
his political stock by promoting projects which would undermine the Canadian venture. lie 
therefore failed to respond to Godolphin's suggestion and, although there was a slight 
prospect that the troops might have been employed on a descent when the Canadian 
expedition was cancelled, in the event the proposal never came to fruition and the soldiers 
were sent to Spain. 253 
The evidence for those combined operations which were planned and abandoned, or 
which were very small on scale, provides only a limited insight into the military-naval 
operational relationship. Nonetheless, where operational organisation and planning occurred 
prior to abandonment, this was not dissimilar to the preparations undertaken for those 
operations which went ahead. Similar points of friction and causes of delay emerge, while an 
appropriate determination on command structure had to be reached. More significantly, 
however, these episodes demonstrated a contemporary recognition of combined operations as 
an instrument of warfare with a strategic purpose. 
252 77ie Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii, no. 1376, pp. 1342-3,1342-3 n. 3: Marlborough to 
Godolphin, 15 Aug. 1709. 
253 See Chapter 2, Section II. ii, pp. 339-42. 
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Section IT: Combined Operations and the Colonial Theatre Durin_g 
the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. 
IM: The Overseas Emnire as a Theatre of War. 
The Treaty of Rijswijk, which brought the Nine Years War to a close, did not alter the 
territorial balance of the combatants' overseas empires-' England and France retained control 
of their pre-war island possessions in the Caribbean and continued to share St Kitts; while on 
the North American continent, English colonial authority remained concentrated on the 
eastern seaboard with - aside from the new colony of Louisiana - the principal French 
settlements of La France Seplentrionale 2 to the north west. The points of friction between 
the imperial powers remained, therefore, fuelling both the keen trading contest and the proxy 
conflict fought through the native American Indians. Accordingly, the prophecy of the 
Massachusetts preacher, Cotton Mather, on a fast day in April 1701 that 'there must be 
another Storm, and War 3 reflected an opinion which had become increasingly widespread 
following the death of Carlos II six months previously. 4 The Spanish King's demise was 
significant in the imperial context due to the extensive New World colonies - including 
Florida, Cuba and the Spanish Main (the northern parts of present day Venezuela and 
Columbia) - that the Spanish throne held in addition to its European territories in the 
Netherlands and Italy. The prospect that Louis XIV's grandson might rule these overseas 
possessions threatened a combination of the French and the Spanish empires into a strategic 
trading bloc, which would not only render the Anglo-Dutch plantations vulnerable locally but 
also, more importantly, influence the European balance of power. 5 The protection of trade 
and territory therefore brought the War of the Spanish Succession to the overseas colonies 
prematurely, just as European security was breaking down. 
In early November 1701, Vice-Admiral John Benbow, commanding aI 0-strong 
1A General Collection of Treatys, i. 304-5: Articles Vil & Vill of 'Articles of Peace Between the Most 
Serene and Mighty Prince William 111. King of Great Britain, and the Most Serene and Mighty Prince Lewis 
XIV. the Most Christian King, Concluded in the Royal Palace of Reswick, the 10/20 September 16971. 
2 French for what was more commonly known as La Nouvelle France or 'New France', the central part of 
which was usually referred to as 'Canada'. See P. S. Haffenden, New England in the English Nation 1689- 
1713 (Oxford, 1974), p. 72. 
3 Mather quoted in Leach, ArmsforEmpire, p. 116. 
11affenden, New England in the English Nation, pp. 204-8. 
J. 1. Israel, 'The Emerging Empire: The Continental Perspective, 1650-1713', in Canny (ed. ), 7he Oxford 
History of the British Empire, i. 441-2; Len man, 'Colonial Wars and Imperial Instability', pp. 154-5; Leach, 
, 4rmsfor 
Empire, pp. 116-17; Graham, Empire of the NorthAdantic, p. 83. 
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squadron, arrived in the West Indies. Benbow's purpose, based upon a report that Louis 
XIV and Philip V had ordered their colonial Governors to prohibit and attack the Anglo- 
Dutch trade, was in the first instance defensive. Nonetheless, his Instructions urged him to 
take every opportunity to attack the French and Spanish at sea or, in conjunction with the 
English colonists, on land, and also to seek out the Spanishflo/a which was thought to be 
proceeding from the West Indies under French convoy. 6 Prior to the official declaration of 
war in May 1702, Benbow's tour in the Caribbean proved uneventful. Admiral 
ChAteaurenault arrived in January but the two squadrons never met, and Benbow passed the 
six months either in port at'Jamaica with sick crews, or cruising amongst the islands to check 
their defences and secure the trade. 7 
The declaration of war did not have an immediate impact for the news took nearly 
two months to arrive abroad. Once enlightened, however, the colonists in the Caribbean and 
mainland America began to act against the French and the Spanish. Demonstrating the same 
energy and aggression as his father in the previous war, the younger Christopher Codrington 
(now Governor of the Leeward Islands) mobilised his militia and the local forces of nearby 
islands to expel the French from St Kitts at the beginning of July 1702.8 Such early land 
success was not however followed up at sea. In August, Benbow engaged the small French 
squadron under Ducasse that had arrived to guard the French assiento interests off the 
Spanish Main while Chiteaurenault convoyed the Spanishflota home. A running battle took 
place north-westwards from Ri6hacha, during which at least four of Benbow's captains failed 
to fully bring their vessels up, and, by the end of the sixth day, Benbow, who was then 
directing the fight from a cradle rigged in his quarter deck having suffered a serious wound to 
his right leg, was eventually prevailed upon to give up the chase. On his return to Jamaica, 
the Admiral court-martialled the four captains and two were sentenced to death, although this 
punishment was not carried out before Benbow succumbed to his wounds in November. 
" 
613L, Add MSS 33028, fos. 13-21: 'Instructions for John Benbow Esq. Vice-Admiral of the Blew', 23 Oct. 
1701,19 Feb. 1702. 
7 PRO, SP 42/67, fos. 7-8: Benbow to Vernon, Nov. 1701; Benbow to 'Principal Secretary of State', 9 Dec. 
170 1; Trevelyan, England Under QueenAnne, i. 26 1. 
S CSPC, 1702, no. 968, p. 595: the Council of Trade and Plantations to Hedges, 17 Sept. 1702; 1 larlow, 
Christopher Codrington, pp. 147-5 0. 
9 CpSC, 1702, nos. 936,1063,1063.1,1191, pp. x-xiii, 577-9,673-9,744: Bcckford to Nottingham, 4 Sept. 
1702; Whetstone to the Principal Secretaries of State, 20 Oct., 25 Nov. 1702; Copy of Proceedings at a Court 
Martial held on board HMS Bredah, 8-10,12 Oct. 1702; CPSC, 1702-1703, no. 123, pp. 82-7: Bcnbow to the 
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Despite contemporary and historical misgivings about the events of this battle, the English 
had clearly outgunned the French and the disengagement should be viewed as a missed 
opportunity. 'O Meanwhile, on the American mainland, heightened tension had led to tit-for- 
tat frontier skirmishes in conjunction with the respective Indian allies; indeed, in the south, the 
Carolinians combined with the Creek Confederacy to mount concerted attacks against 
Spanish settlements in Florida. By design these early colonial actions were provided for 
locally and had little impact on the wider conflict. " 
The operational intentions of the Ministry were not merely limited to local insurgency 
operations and defensive station squadrons. Notwithstanding the attraction of another theatre 
in which to stretch the enemy, the mercantilist economy dictated - as it had during the Nine 
Years War - that wartime territorial gain was a positive commercial enterprise. Indeed, even 
before the onset of war Sidney Godolphin (then a Treasury Commissioner), and a coterie of 
like-minded colleagues, had been planning to increase trade through imperial expansion and 
had ensured a reference to trading interests in the Treaty re-forming the Grand Alliance. " Of 
greater significance for the formulation of war policy at the beginning of hostilities was the 
increased Tory representation in Anne's first Ministry, and, in particular, the appointments of 
the Earl of Nottingham and Sir Charles Hedges to the two Secretaryships of State. As has 
already been seen, traditionally the Tories had advocated a 'Blue Water' strategy that 
promoted a maritime war whereby the French were principally opposed at sea, on the trade 
routes, and in the overseas empires, rather than on the European continent. In 1703, 
Nottingham's conceived this strategy as a war conducted 'by a Fleet, and an Army 
accompanying it9 13 and, although the two Secretaries could not frustrate Marlborough's 
design to fight the French in Flanders, they kept the maritime alternatives, and specifically the 
f OCUS. 14 overseas expeditions, in ( 
The operational pattern which emerged for the war overseas was nonetheless 
Secretary of State [Nottingham], II Sept. 1702; Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, i. 2614. 
10 The Admiralty Secretary, Burchett, in his A Complete History ofthe Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea, 
p. 598, was critical of Benbow's conduct, while Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, i. 262-3,471-2 n. 4, 
notes the continuing debate on the conduct of both Benbow and the court-martial led captains. 
" I. K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions offorth America (Oxford, 1994), pp. 153-5; LeaCkArmsfor Empire, pp. 
122-33. 
12 W. G. Bassett, 'English Naval Policy in the Caribbean: 1698-1703', B111R A (1933-1934), 1234; PLA. 
Sundstrom, Sidney Godolphin: Servant ofthe State (London, 1992), p. 87. 
13 NRO, FH 277, pp. 75-6: Nottingham to The Pensioner, 30 Apr. 1703. 
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inconsistent across the empire. The proposal of Lord Cornbury, Governor of New York, in 
September 1702 that England mount a combined army-navy assault against the French in 
Canada was largely ignored as the Ministry concentrated upon the Caribbean. In June, 
Codrington had been ordered to expel the French from St Kitts and also to forward a 
feasibility study for an attack on Martinique. By the time he received Nottingham's letter, the 
Governor had, of course, already completed the expulsion at St Kitts but he responded 
enthusiastically to the Ministry's intention to act in the Caribbean by sending home a proposal 
for'capturing all the French islands. 15 Yet by 1703, when the combined expeditionary force 
sent to the West Indies had failed to make any territorial gains, such operations in the region 
ceased and increasing attention was paid to mainland America's proposals for capturing 
Canada. 16 This pattern contrasts with the Nine Years War when, after Lawrence Wright's 
failure in 1691, a further three combined expeditions were dispatched to the Caribbean and, 
aside from Commodore Norris's and Colonel Gibson's voyage to Newfoundland, no 
combined forces were directly sent from England to America. During the Succession War, it 
was 1708 before the Ministry agreed to send an expeditionary force to America and then over 
the following two years, it broke this commitment twice. Only in 1711, when the Tories 
dominated both the Ministry and the Parliament, was an appropriately sized operation to 
attempt the conquest of Canada resolved upon. 
This section will consider the single combined expeditionary force sent to the West 
Indies in 1702/3 and also the many planned expeditions, but specifically the two actually 
dispatched, to the eastern American seaboard in 1710 and 1711. This should illuminate the 
developing perceptions on combined operational warfare which derive partially from its 
structure and composition, but mainly from its role in the war strategy. As a result, if, as 
suggested above, the momentum behind such warfare in the colonies was increasingly reliant 
upon the political complexion of the Ministry, then a comprehensive analysis of the 
operational history should promote an understanding of the comparative lack of combined 
operations in the Caribbean and the direct, though unreliable, commitment to America during 
14 Gregg, Queen Anne, pp. 156-7; Horwit7, Revolution Politicks, pp. 167-8. 
15 PRO, CO 5/1047 Part 11, fos. 517-18: Cornbury to 'My Lords' [the Board of Trade? ), 29 Sept. 1702; BL, 
Add MSS 29591, fos. 13-15: Nottingham to Codrington, I June 1702, and enclosure, 'Instructions' [Draft); 
11arlow, Christopher Codrington, p. 149 n. 1. 
"' Atkinson, 'Queen Anne's War in the West Indies Parts 1-11', pp. 100-9,183-97; W. T. Morgan, 'Some 
Attempts at Imperial Co-operation During the Reign Of Queen Anne', TRIIS 4h Series x (1927), 171-94. 
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the War of the Spanish Succession. 
TIM: Commodore Hovenden Walker's Expedition to the West Indies and 
Newfoundland, September 1702-October 1703. 
Serious intent lay behind Nottingham's request in June 1702 that Codrington reconnoitre 
Martinique. Soon after being appointed Secretary of State, Nottingham had secured 
agreement that once Sir George Rooke's fleet, which along with the Duke of Ormonde's land 
force was then preparing to depart for Spain, had completed operations against the Spanish 
coastline, an expeditionary squadron would be detached from it for Barbados. Arrangements 
were settled in a 'Secret Committee' whose membership varied, but at its first recorded 
meeting of 26 May it notably included Nottingham's fellow Tories - the Earl of Rochester and 
Sir George Rooke - and also William Blathwayt, whose enthusiasm for imperial expansion 
through wartime combined operations had been demonstrated during the previous war. 17 
There were other members of the Ministry who had to be informed of the proposals 
including, in particular, the Earl of Marlborough. Although he attended later committee 
meetings, Marlborough was at the end of May already abroad concerting matters for the 
forthcoming land campaign with the Dutch. " Conveniently, the detachment from Rooke's 
squadron was projected to be one part of a larger Anglo-Dutch combined force bound for the 
Caribbean; and thus Nottingham took the opportunity, when informing Marlborough of the 
plans, to request that he gain Dutch agreement and their commitment to make a specific 
contribution. '9 
Although he displayed no particular enthusiasm for the project, Marlborough lobbied 
Grand Pensionary Heinsius, while Admiral Sir David Mitchell, who had attended the Secret 
Committee, was sent to The Hague to agree the details. During these negotiations, the Dutch 
were accused of vacillation, though they in turn considered Mitchell an evasive participant. 
Certainly, Marlborough was forced disingenuously to downplay the size of this expeditionary 
force by reassuring Heinsius in confidence that the detachment from Rooke's fleet would 
form the major part of the Maritime Powers's presence in the West Indics. Despite 
17BL, Add MSS29591, fos. 11-12: Note of the 'Secret Committee', 26 May 1702. 
"I BL, Add MSS29591jos. 131-2: Note of the 'Secret Committee', 22 Dec. 1702, records Marlborough as 
present. Snyder notes in The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 
i. 50, that Marlborough left England 
for The Hague as early as 14 March in 1702. 
19 NRO, FH 275, pp. 33-4: Nottingham to Marlborough, 26 June 1702. 
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Marlborough's warm words the Dutch decided not to contribute, but then they rather bore 
out the charge of indecision by changing their minds within a fortnight. 20 Meanwhile, the 
Ministry in London had, as part of the process of drafting Rooke's Instructions, determined 
upon the composition and general function of the detachment that was to be made from his 
fleet. Six sheathed ships were to be sent to Barbados with a minimum of 2000 troops, though 
the Council of War had discretion to increase that number and, if Rooke and Ormonde had 
21 
successfully captured either Cadiz or Gibraltar, then all the troops were to be sent save 
those required for garrison duty. On arrival in the Caribbean, the soldiers were to be 
disembarked either at Barbados or amongst the other Leeward Islands, depending on the 
advice of the colonial governors as to their respective defensive requirements. Garrison duty 
was not however the sole military task envisaged, for the squadron commodore was also 
instructed to assist the local authorities in attacking the French colonies according to the 
resolutions of a Council of War. 22 
About a week after the Dutch finally decided to contribute to the projected larger 
force, the detachment from Rooke's fleet left the southern Spanish coast for the West Indies. 
Although Cddiz had not been captured, the Council of War decided to send some 500 soldiers 
more that the minimum 2000 stipulated in Rookc's Additional Instructions. The four 
youngest regiments (excluding the marines) - Erle's, Hamilton's, Donegal's, and 
Charlemont's - commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bristow were embarked aboard the 
transports. These vessels were to join the six warships over which Captain flovenden Walker 
had been appointed Commodore. 23 parting from Rooke on 25 September, bad weather 
bedevilled the voyage: not only had the standard provisioning stop at Madeira to be forgone 
20 The Correspondence 1701-1711 ofJohn Churchill, nos. 36-8,39a, 40-1,45,55, pp. 18-19,20-1,23,3 1: 
Marlborough to Heinsius, 13,16,18,23 July, 2,14 Aug., 23 Sept. 1702 [NS]; Heinsius to Marlborough, 21 
juillet 1702 [NS]; The Letters andDispatches ofJohn Churchill, i. 8,18-19: Marlborough to Nottingham, 13 
July 1702; Marlborough to Mitchell, 14 Aug. 1702; NRO, FH 275, pp. 46-50,109: 'Instructions for Our 
Trusty and Welbloved Sir David Mitchell Knt', 9 July 1702; Nottingham to Marlborough, 3 Sept. 1702; PRO, 
SP 84/225, nos. 32,35-6,42,45,48-51,53,56: Mitchell to 'My Lord' [Nottingham], 23,28 July, 7,14,25, 
28 Aug., 4,8,16 Sept., 4 Oct. 1702; 7he Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, i, nos. 75,80, pp. 82 n. 5, 
8S. Marlborough to Godolphin, 6,13 July 1702. 
21 This operational design was completed before the changes to Rooke's Instructions on 20 July dropped 
Gibraltar from the target list. 
22 PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 8-10: 'Additionall Instructions for Our Trusty and Welbeloved Sir George Rooke', 7 
June 1702. 
23 See Chapter 2, Section I-ii, pp. 190-201, for an account of the Cddiz operation; BL, Add MSS 38159, pp. 
31,33: 'Ormonde's Journal'; The Journal ofSir George Rooke, pp. 216-17,226; A Full andImparlial 
1jisjory, p. 98- 
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in favour of the squadron making do amongst the various Cape Verde Islands, it took nearly 
three months before Barbados was reached on 5 December. 24 
On arrival, Walker rode at anchor for five days in Carlisle Bay but as no advice from 
the governors was forthcoming, he asked the Barbadian Council for permission to land the 
soldiers and sick seamen. This authorisation took some three weeks to be granted and, 
meantime, Walker fell sick, thereby delaying the disembarkation until the end of December 
when a Council of War signalled that there would be no operational activity over the winter 
months. This Council also expressed its hope for fresh orders. 25 Limited progress had been 
made with this inasmuch as the Earl of Peterborough, who had at the end of October been 
appointed to the vacant governorship of Jamaica, was assigned to command the expeditionary 
force and concert its activities thereafter. An ambitious set of Instructions were drafted for 
the Earl which ordered him firstly to ensure that the French windward colonies had been 
comprehensively attacked before mounting operations from Jamaica against Havana and the 
Spanish Main. In another illustration of the problematic slowness of communications during 
this age, orders to assist Peterborough were also to be sent to Benbow, despite the fact that 
he had been dead for four months by the time these were agreed in February. 26 
The more immediate problem for the Admiralty was however the continued absence 
of the Dutch contribution, which had still not materialised by the turn of the year. Combined 
with the ongoing preparation problems he was encountering in England, Peterborough 
became increasingly disenchanted with the prospect of commanding what was potentially a 
small scale operation in the Caribbean that currently lacked momentum. The Earl would also 
have been aware that in the recent past a colonial governorship had not proved a particularly 
fruitful appointment for martial distinction and that he was more likely instead to get 
14 PRO, ADM 1/2642, unf.: Walker to the 'Secretary to H[is] R[oyal]H[igness, Prince George of Denmark]', 
12 Jan. 1703; CSPC, 1702-1703, no. 164, p. 115: Walker to [Nottingham? ], 12 Jan. 1703. 
25 PRO, ADM 1/2642, unf.: Walker to the 'Secretary to HRIi', 12 Jan. 1703; PRO, ADM 51/128 Part ix, 
unpaginated, Boyne, I Jan. 1703. For Walker's 
journal, historians usually refer to PRO, CO 15215, no. 30, 
fos. 1-71: 'Boyne's Journal, Remarkable Observations and Accidents' but I have found this to be simply a 
shortened copy of the Captain's Log above, and thus 
I shall refer to the Log throughout. 
26 CSpC, 1702, no. 1169, p. 733: Nottingham to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 17 Nov. 1702; BL, 
Add MSS 2959 1, fos. 26-7,131-2: 'Instructions for the Earl of Peterborough', n. d.; Note of the 'Secret 
Council', 22 Dec. 1702; PRO, ADM 2/405, pp. 176-8: Burchett to Nottingham, 27 Oct. 1702 and enclosure, 
'Instructions for Vice-Admiral Benbow'; PRO, ADM 1/4088, 
f0s. 120-4: Nottingham to the Admiralty, 3 
Dec. 1702, and enclosure, 'Instructions for John Benbow Esq. Vice-Admiral of the 
Blew'; CSPC, 1702, no. 
I 19 1, pp. 744-5: Whetstone to the Principal Secretaries of 
State, 25 Nov. 1702, noted Benbow's death on 4 
Nov., but it was 6 Feb. 1703 when it was endorsed K[eceived]. 
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embroiled in local planters' disputes. To a man of Peterborough's energy and conceit, this 
would have been tedious; and so, at the beginning of January, he indicated a desire to step 
back from the projeCt. 27 The ministers had not decided their next step when Admiral 
Vanderdussen brought the long-awaited Dutch military-navy contribution into Spithead in 
stages around 15 January. By this time however both Marlborough and Heinsius were 
expressing doubts about the project and their opinions, in addition to Peterborough's 
equivocation, produced an evident lack of confidence in the eventual dispatch of this Anglo- 
Dutch force. 28 Still unaware of Benbow's death, the Admiralty had sent further Instructions, 
which afforded him far greater operational independence from any force that Peterborough or 
an alternative new Governor of Jamaica might bring out. Specifically, once Hovenden 
Walker had completed his actions in the Windward Islands, Benbow was to lead the two 
squadrons and a contingent of troops to attack the French settlements on Newfoundland. 
Perhaps even more revealing of the lack of confidence was the dispatch of reinforcements for 
Walker's force. Through the winter of 1702/3, an additional five warships were scheduled to 
proceed to the Caribbean, along with a number of auxiliary vessels carrying provisions, 
recruits and Columbine's regiment. Moreover, they were to carry orders for Walker (the 
earliest dating from October) prompting him to begin operations against the French windward 
colonies in conjunction with the Leeward Islands' authorities. 
29 The ministers certainly 
seemed to be signalling that he should not expect support from any prospective Anglo-Dutch 
expeditionary force from England. In the event, that project was officially shelved by the end 
of January; Vanderdussen returned to Holland and Marlborough announced to Heinsius that 
the Dutch could deploy their military and naval contribution on other services. 30 
The Government was nonetheless still keen to dispatch a flag officer to the Caribbean 
27 CPSC 1702-1703, no. 129, p. 94: Peterborough to [Nottingham? ], 3 Jan. 1703; Lord King, The Life and 
Letters ofjohn Locke (New edn, London, 1858), p. 242: Peterborough to Locke, 27 Jan. 1703; 1 larlow, 
Christopher Codrington, p. 152. For further details on Peterborough's character, see Chapter 2, Section Liv. 
p. 237 n. 137. 
28 The Correspondence 1701-1711 ofJohn Churchill, nos. 76-8,80,82-3 pp. 45-9: Heinsius to Marlborough, 
12,16,23,26janvier 1703 [NS); Marlborough to Heinsius, 5,12, Jan. 1703; 1 larlow, Christopher 
Codringlon, p. 152. 
29 PRO, SP 42/67, fos. 33-5: 'Orders to Captain Hovenden Walker', IS Jan. 1703; 'Instructions for John 
1[3enbow Esq Vice-Admiral of the White', 19 Jan 1703; 'Orders to Captain Lyell, Resolution', 19 Jan. 1703; 
PRO, ADM 51/128 Part ix, unpaginated, Boyne, 9 Jan. 1703; PRO, ADM 1/2642, unf: Walker to the 
'Secretary to HRH', 12 Jan. 1703. 
30 The Correspondence 1701-1711 ofJohn Churchill, nos. 84-5, pp. 49-50: Marlborough to Heinsius, 19,22 
Jan. 1703; Harlow, Christopher Codringlon, p. 152. 
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and Rear-Admiral John Graydon was eventually selected. Perhaps in an attempt to present 
the Admiralty as coping successfully with the uncertainty over the Anglo-Dutch squadron and 
ensuring a seamless transition from Peterborough, Admiralty Secretary Burchett's memoirs 
pre-dated the Rear-Admiral's appointment to 19 January. However, unless Burchett was 
being unusually inefficient, the fact that he did not inform the Secretary to the Board of 
Trade, William Popple, about Graydon's appointment until the end of February, belies this 
earlier January date. Given that Graydon inherited the Instructions drafted for Benbow on 19 
January, which included the organisation of an expedition against the French at 
Newfoundland, and that the Admiralty only leamt of the Benbow's death in the first week of 
February, then Graydon should be more accurately considered as his replacement and not 
filling the gap left by Peterborough's withdrawal. " The reality was that both the 
Government and the Admiralty had struggled to bring the original project involving the Earl 
to fruition, and, on its collapse, they lacked an alternative. For the foreseeable future, 
meanwhile, the successful prosecution of the Ministry's war policy amongst the Caribbean 
colonies rested with Commodore Walker's military-naval force. 
Hovenden Walker had not received the Admiralty's earliest orders prompting him to 
action until the second week of January but, once in receipt of them, he began organising the 
expeditionary force for departure to the Leeward Islands. Almost immediately he 
encountered delay as the land officers scrupled at not having separate instructions to embark 
the soldiers; and, when Lieutenant-Colonel Bristow subsequently received these orders, other 
officers demanded a second embarkation at Spikes Bay because they considered it too tedious 
for the soldiers billeted around that area to march to Carlisle Bay. Such trifles do sccm to 
justify later criticism that time was needlessly wasted proceeding from Barbados, but the 
delay was also a product of an acute shortage of crew. Many of the Masters claimed that 
they had insufficient men to embark the soldiers from Carlisle Bay without even considering 
having to sail round to a second embarkation point or, more importantly, on to the Leeward 
islands. Sickness had claimed a considerable number, though equally problematic on this 
occasion were the inducements faced by the sailors to remain on Barbados. The temptations 
of the colonists' generous hospitality (some claimed debauchery) and their help with 
31 Burchett, A Complete History ofthe Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea, pp. 600-3; PRO, SP 42/67, E 
34: 'Instructions for John Benbow Esq', 19 Jan 1703; CSPC, 1702-1703, no. 348, p. 208: 13urchett to Popple, 
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concealment ironically made them complicit in undermining the challenge to the French, 
which they desired. In addition, Walker blamed the irresolution of the Barbadian authorities 
for failing to round up the absentees, though it is unclear how his proposed Act prohibiting 
desertion, which the Assembly failed to pass, would have quickly yielded enough men. 
Eventually, Walker was forced to use soldiers who had some knowledge of seafaring to man 
vessels and, although this was less than satisfactory, it had become and would remain an 
increasingly common wartime solution in this region to the problem of manning. " 
The expeditionary force finally departed Barbados for Antigua on 4 February, with the 
Cumberland staying behind for a couple of days to pick up any stragglers. On receiving the 
Admiralty's orders at the beginning of January, Walker had sent Governor Codrington a note 
of his intentions but remarkably this was also the Governor's first news of the squadron being 
in the region. 33 Codrington was predictably frustrated with the lack of action when he 
received this note on 20 January and his attitude was only hardened by a lack of information 
from London about the problems with the Anglo-Dutch fleet. Nonetheless, characteristically, 
Codrington had already raised a regiment and two independent companies in anticipation of 
Peterborough's arrival and, thinking now that Walker should not be far behind his note, he 
immediately embarked these troops on several locally procured sloops. The Governor was, 
of course, unaware of the delay that had beset Walker in preparing his force for departure 
from Barbados and this meant that Codrington's troops remained aboard for some three 
weeks before the squadron arrived on 18 February. His mood was not lightened by Walker's 
decision to come to Antigua, which he thought wrongheaded inasmuch as the whole force 
would have to beat back against the prevailing trade winds to reach the probable French 
island targets. A rendezvous south of the Leeward Islands would have, according to 
Codrington, been more appropriate. Not only would it have meant just his few vessels 
working against the winds, but it would also have allowed him to annoy Guadeloupe's coast 
22 Feb. 1703; HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, v. 486-90: Instructions for [John] Graydon Esq, 20 Feb. 1703. 
32 PRO, ADM 1/2642, unf: Walker to the 'Secretary to HRH', 12 Jan., 4 Feb. 1703; PRO, ADM 51/128 Part 
ix, unpaginated, Boyne, 1-30 Jan. 1703; CSPC, 1702-1703, no. 362, pp. 213-14: Codrington to 
[Nottingham? ], 24 Feb. 1703; Atkinson, 'Queen Anne's War Part V, p. 103-4; C. T. Atkinson, 'British 
Regiments Afloat. Cape Passaro and Other Incidents', JSAIIR xxiii (1945), 46-53. 
33 Walker had on his arrival at Barbados in December asked the authorities to notify Codrington and, 
although they agreed to so, problems subsequently arose over the cost of 
hiring a vessel. CSPC, 1702-1703, 
nos. 34,56,148, pp. 44,53-4,107: Minutes of the 
Council of Barbados, 10,16 Dec. 1702,7 Jan. 1703. 
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as he sailed by, thus preparing it as a target for a main attack. 34 Even before the respective 
service commanders had first met, a familiar picture of competing land and sea ideas on 
undertaking the combined operations, attended by certain notable points of friction, was 
emerging. 
That first meeting took place on 20 February when a Council of War convened aboard 
the Boyne to consider the immediate course of action for the expeditionary force. 
Nottingham's original intention had been for it to attack Martinique first but at a meeting of 
the 'Secret Committee' in November 1702, all the principal French windward islands had 
been surveyed as targets. 3' This may well have been prompted by Codrington's plan to 
capture them all, though it is not known whether his paper was distributed to the Committee. 
During the autumn, Nottingham wrote to the Governor encouraging him to attend to 
Martinique first but aside from a couple of ambiguous references to this island, none of the 
early Instructions issued for the Caribbean theatre prescribed a plan of operations. The 
Ministry did draft more detailed instructions for Walker and Codrington in January which 
attached certain conditions to their actions. The Governor was specifically directed to attack 
Martinique first and then Guadeloupe; while Walker was ordered (like Wheler in 1692) to 
discontinue operations on 20 May so that he could proceed to Jamaica to link up with 
Benbow (or whoever was then the commanding officer on that station) for an expedition to 
Newfoundland. Walker did not however receive these Instructions until late March and, 
although there is no certain evidence, it would seem likely that Codrington's arrived in the 
same packet. 36 In the event, Codrington and the other land officers dominated the first 
Council of War, which due to the very general nature of the Instructions had full control over 
nearly all aspects of operational planning. The Governor knew that, after his success at St 
Kitts in July 1702, the French had improved the defences throughout all their island 
31 CSPC, 1702-1703, nos. 200,230, pp. 132,150: Codrington to [Nottingham? ], 18,23 Jan 1703; PRO, ADM 
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possessions and that, in particular, an extra 1800 men had been put on Martinique. With the 
English expeditionary force having already lost upwards of 1000 men to sickness, the Council 
ruled out Martinique on the grounds of its garrison strength. As in the spring of 1691 when 
Commodore Lawrence Wright and Codrington's father were considering their target options, 
Guadeloupe was again considered a viable alternative. It was nonetheless necessary for 
Walker to agree to bolster the land force to around 3000 men by contributing a 'regiment' of 
some 400 seamen commanded by two naval Captains and a First Lieutenant. Having 
determined upon Guadeloupe, the Council did not at this stage deliberate further upon the 
assault's tactics and simply resolved to depart within a couple of days. 37 
Two days lengthened into six when, according to Walker, Codrington failed to meet 
his promise of a quick departure. Subsequent to this delay, the squadron's approach to 
Guadeloupe became disjointed as a result of the cumulative effect of a variety of small but 
troublesome events. Walker's flagship and the Samuel and Henry collided, necessitating 
repairs to both vessels; while Codrington pressed the Commodore to detach two warships to 
the leeward side of Guadeloupe to meet the separate hired vessels carrying the Creole 
Regiment from Antigua. When the ma ority of the squadron under Walker reached 
Guadeloupe's coast, just north of the island's principal town, Basse-Terre, on 7 March, an 
anchorage could not be quickly found as the pilots lacked the essential coastal knowledge and 
inany of the bays proved too deep. These circumstances forced the squadron close inshore, 
thus rendering it vulnerable to the French shore defence; and it was only good fortune that 
brought the squadron unscathed to an anchorage in Guavas Bay on 10 March. Almost 
immediately, Walker launched a series of small scale raids to ravage the shore line in what 
seemed to be preparation for a landing. However, the land officers had determined on a site 
much closer to the principal target, Basse-Terre, and accordingly, the squadron quickly 
weighed from Guavas Bay and headed south, leaving only part of the late arriving Creole 
Regiment under Colonel Byam ashore to continue devastating the coastline. " 
37 PRO, ADM 51/128 Part ix, unpaginated, Boyne, 21-2 Feb. 1703; CSPC, 1702-1703, no. 362, p. 214: 
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of Codrington and the land officers by deten-nining to look for a site further southwards and 
settfing upon La Bayfiff. Captain Fairborne was to command the landing, which was to 
comprise a series of mutually reinforcing detachments. The remainder of the Creoles, along 
with Major Johnson's company of grenadiers from Whetham's regiment and 150 other men, 
would go ashore first in the early hours to establish a bridgehead and they would then be 
followed within three hours by a tranche of 1200 soldiers from the four regiments brought by 
Walker. The Chichester and the Sunderland were to provide fire support by plying the 
nearby coastline and, in particular, silencing La Bayliff s defences. Once secure inside the 
village, Codrington was to march the troops forwards to Basse-Terre. 40 
This landing proved a good illustration of how operational planning can be upset by 
the unexpected during its execution. For unknown reasons, the Creoles and the grenadiers 
were delayed until dawn, by which time the first detachment of regulars should have been 
ashore for over an hour. Codrington then either precipitously or in an attempt to inject some 
urgency into the operation - depending upon the service provenance of the source - 
dispatched 500 of the 1200 troops which had rendezvoused on the Yarmouth. The urgency 
possibly caused the lapse in judgement that steered these boats to a well entrenched area of 
the landing site, whence the French were organising a vigorous fire. Meanwhile, as the 
Sunderland had been driven off the coast on losing its anchor, only the Chichester could 
provide any sea-based fire support - although the Maidstone was belatedly ordered to assist. 
Not surprisingly, it took Codrington and Colonels Whetharn and Wills over an hour to force 
the French from the trenches, and it was night before La Bayliff village was secure. 
Additional troops had to be landed for Codrington's assault on the hill batteries and the 
fortified church which overlooked the village, but, once these had been captured, the 
resistance to Colonel Moses's night attack on the village plantation was negligible. 
41 
Perhaps sensing that the operation was at last gathering some momentum, Codrington 
was keen to press on towards Basse-Terre, which was now only a few miles distant. A 
comparison of the contemporary descriptions suggest that 
its defensive fortirications had been 
augmented since the attack in 1691. The 'cavalier', which 
had been linked by trenches to the 
"0 PRO, ADM 51/128 Part ix, unpaginated, Boyne, 10-12 Mar. 1703; PRO, CO 152/5, C 174: enclosure, 
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158-9. 
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castle now appeared substantially more like a fort - and was described as such - than a raised 
outpost. The strength of both buildings remained enhanced by their positioning on a 
precipice overlooking the town and on either bank of the Galion river that discharged into the 
harbour below. It was however the main area of habitation around the sea-front that the land 
force fust approached on 13 March, having taken the coastal route from La Bayliff. Here, no 
resistance was encountered for the town's defenders fled uphill to the fort ifications. As 
Codrington's land Council recognised when it convened the following day, the French 
abandonment of the lower town was tactically shrewd: command from the heights retained 
control of the town and rendered the English position vulnerable to bombardment. Militarily, 
Codrington's only option seemed to be the construction of a battery in the hope that it would 
open a breach in the French position. Accordingly, Walker agreed to the Council's request 
that he provide six fully crewed 12 and 18 pounders, which the naval 'regiment' ashore would 
position provided enough ships' carpenters could be spared to craft land carriages. The 
landing of this ordnance from the Boyne, Cumberland, Chichester and the. 4nglessey was 
ordered on 15 March. 
The Governor and his fellow land officers were nonetheless aware that even if a 
breach could be opened, the assault troops would have to work uphill against a potentially 
devastating fire. Moreover, the strength of the French position was notjust its elevation: the 
fort and castle were mutually reinforcing through a network of trenches, while a ditch 
encompassed both. Thus, although they resolved to request the naval ordnance, the Council 
considered alternative means of attack. One possibility suggested by Codrington was to 
target the island's Dos D'Asne - simply a fortified camp which was a characteristic feature of 
eighteenth century West Indian colonies. The Council reasoned that if this camp was 
surprised with a majority of the island's inhabitants inside, then the garrison defence in the 
fort and castle would dissolve. It was decided that Codrington would lead some 2000 
soldiers against the Dos D'Asne and that the squadron was to provide the four days 
provisions required for the march into the island's interior where such camps were usually 
located. Walker raised no objection to the naval contribution, but he failed to prioritisc its 
requirements by first attempting to resolve the victualling problems which 
had arisen between 
the two Services since the landing. Immediate surprise was critical to a successful attack on 
the Dos D'Asne and the two day delay before the provisions came ashore sufficicntly 
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diminished the prospect of success to cast doubt on the merit of now launching the operation. 
This view was quickly confirmed when news reached Codrington that the French had landed 
several hundred reinforcements from Martinique. The attempt to side-step an attack on the 
fortified upper reaches of Basse-Terre thus lapsed, and the expeditionary force turned its 
attention to constructing the battery. 42 
Less two 18 pounders which the squadron failed to land, the battery began firing on 
22 March and it quickly proved to be of sufficient weight and accuracy by opening up a 
breach within a couple of days. Although Captain Moses - one of the naval officers 
commanding the sailors ashore - reported to Walker that this breach was sizeable, the land 
officers' passivity indicated that they did not yet consider it sufficiently wide to risk an 
infantry assault. Having already sent off additional powder and supplies, Walker took this 
opportunity to warn Moses that in his view the continued dispatch of further supplies was 
inconsistent with the squadron's safety. 43 Harlow is surely correct to suggest that the 
hardening of Walker's attitude was partially a consequence of having just received the 
Admiralty orders regarding the post-20 May expedition to Newfoundland, but his charge that 
Walker behaved like most sailors of this period in having 'a rooted objection to sacrificing the 
44 
navy for the benefit of land operations' cannot be sustained. This accusation represents 
Walker as committed to a general principle whereas in this instance he was simply protecting 
the navy's interests in accordance with the operational circumstances. Walker had generally 
provided - albeit often delayed - whatever the land force requested; he had even proved 
receptive to Codrington's suggestions about the stationing of individual ships -a 
responsibility usually jealously guarded by the naval commander. The Governor meanwhile 
might be seen as rather awkward and uncommunicative about both his intentions and the 
progress of the action ashore. Notably, Codrington fell silent on his own request for the 
dispatch of a ship to the windward side of Guadeloupe when Walker - admittedly perhaps 
mischievously - selected the Yarmouth, which required the withdrawal of its sailors from 
42 PRO, CO 152/5, f. 175: enclosure, Council of War Minutes, 14 Mar. 1703; PRO, ADM 51/128 Part ix, 
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serving ashore. Furthermore, the Governor's dispatch of various emissaries to Walker with 
digests of the latest events on the island was spasmodic and, as is clear from the 
Commodore's journal, it was difficult to for him gain a consistent picture of the action 
ashore. The differing reports of Lieutenant Nesbitt and Captain Keck, for example, sowed 
confusion as to whether the Dos D'Asnc had in fact been attacked; while it was four days 
after fffst receiving word of the breach before Walker was informed that there were indeed 
assault plans. 45 
It is in this context that Walker's resistance on 28 March to Codrington's request for 
more battery supplies, including extra guns, and also to anchor all the ships off Basse-Terre, 
should be interpreted. Echoing his previous warning to Captain Moses, Walker now 
explained to Lieutenant-Colonel WiRs that the issuing of additional supplies would leave the 
squadron short and thus compromise its safety - especially if it subsequently encountered the 
French at sea - which was contrary to his orders. He did nonetheless agree that each ship 
with more than 30 rounds for the 12 pounders would send the excess shot and proportional 
powder ashore, along with the small arms supplies that had also been requested. As for 
positioning the whole squadron off Basse-Terre, Walker was exceptionally reluctant. The 
Captains of those ships already anchored there informed him that it was a very poor roadstead 
and, with so many sailors working ashore, crews would have to be transferred between ships 
to bring them down individually from the other anchorage at Petits Habitants. Walker's 
explanation to Wills was merely representative of his growing anxiety with Codrington's 
conduct and the progress of the operation; indeed the private pages of his journal vouchsafed 
his contention that the Governor was actively seeking disagreement to create a naval 
scapegoat. Consequently, Walker believed it essential for the operation's continuance that a 
combined land and sea Council of War convene to review its progress. 
46 
Codrington and his land force did not however share Walker's analysis. At their 
separate Council of 30 March, they agreed to request again that 
Walker provide a further 300 
shot cartridges for both the 12 and 18 pounders and moreover that 
he deploy the ships' boats 
in a feint attack on the other side of the Galion river. Provocatively, they also 
labelled the 
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Commodore's views on the operation, including the request for an army-navy Council, as the 
6 47 effects of ill nature, ill manners and ignorance' . The Council's proceedings sparked an 
unedifying exchange of views with Walker in the course of which he implied that the soldiers 
demonstrated a lamentable disregard for the navy and the operational Instructions; while the 
land Council rejoined that Walker interpreted the Instructions 'ridiculously' and 'very 
rnalicioUS1y%48 More significantly, the land officers expressed their opinion that the navy had 
been 'principally sent' to serve the army and that this subordinate role could, if accepted by 
Walker, provide for the squadron's safety. 49 The failure by the land Council to recognise the 
combined and co-operative nature of the current action seemed to Walker to confirm that 
Codrington sought service discord as an insurance policy against operational failure; it also 
forced him to convene his own separate Council of sea Captains to determine the squadron's 
future conduct. " With two separate service Councils of War convening, the operation on 
Guadeloupe seemed to have relinquished all pretensions to being a combined army-navy 
venture. 
This problem over separate Councils of War had arisen not, as Harlow claimed, 
through a lack of unified command, but rather because the original operational Instructions 
which afforded this combined Council of War sovereign command authority were not 
prescriptive about its membership. 5' Notwithstanding, the Instructions Walker received at the 
end of March did direct a combined Council and thus his reluctance to convene the naval 
Captains separately is understandable, especially when, at their meeting on 31 March, they 
decided that they could only accede to the land Council's demand for more ordnance supplies 
and to undertake the feint attack. As Walker recognised, the Captains' options were limited. 
if the recent Admiralty orders had been received before leaving Antigua then the squadron 
could have remained at that island to await the Resolution, which was bringing supplies from 
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England. However, given that this alternative had been missed by several weeks and that 
operations had already begun, the Captains were obliged to prosecute its successful outcome. 
In terms of the skewed dynamic of combined command, they were reduced to protesting to 
the two land officers sent by Codrington as observers about the extent of the naval 
commitment and their corresponding treatment by Codrington. 52 
The preparations for the feint attack indicated that Codrington was close to launching 
an infantry assault, though additional heavy bombardment was still thought necessary to 
weaken further the French defences. To that end, Walker detailed the Yarmouth and the 
Sunderland - whose particular gun complement meant that they had not contributed any 
ordnance supplies ashore - to bombard the French fortifications and to disrupt their 
communication trenches. In conjunction with the battery, they opened fire on the afternoon 
of 2 April. With the infantry assault and the feint coastal attack scheduled for the following 
day, Walker went ashore to observe this bombardment and Raise with Codrington. This was 
the second time the two commanders had met since the deterioration in relations. The first 
occasion had been just after the meeting of the naval Council and elicited no comment from 
either man, but this time, Walker complained that his personal safety while ashore had been 
endangered by Codrington's indifference. In any event, the senior commanders' relationship 
was not tested further at this stage for the current focus of their combined action - the naval 
feint attack in conjunction with an assault on the breach - was shelved. In the early morning 
of 3 April, the artillery bombardment alone had forced the French from the castle to the 
trenches and fort on the other side of the river, and, by simply retargetting their preponderant 
fire, the English were soon able to clear these defences of the enemy too. Codrington's 
forces thus marched unimpeded to take possession of the upper half of Basse-Terre. 53 
The capture of Basse-Terre placed the English in a commanding position but they still 
lacked full control of the island: the Dos D'Asne remained a place of defensive strength for 
the French, which might be reinforced from neighbouring islands. By effecting a close coastal 
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sea command and disposing their troops over the island, however, the English had a fair 
prospect of blockading the camp into submission; or, alternatively, they could mount a direct 
attack with the hope of capturing it immediately. A couple of days after the success at Basse- 
Terre, Codrington and Walker seemed to be leaning towards the former approach by seeking 
to extend their presence throughout Guadeloupe. The Governor boarded the Yarmouth to 
reconnoitre Guadeloupe, windward of Point Eitan. The Maidstone, which along with six 
other sloops, formed part of this mission, returned within a day to collect enough boats to 
carry 500 men. Codrington had found breast-works and small plantations along the island's 
eastern shore, which these men under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Martin were going 
to raid. This incursion and other raids were successfully completed and on 17 April, a 
Council of land officers unanimously rejected a direct assault on the Dos D'Asne on the 
grounds that it presented too many insurmountable difficulties. Blockade and a gradual 
extension of control over the island, had thus finally been determined upon - albeit perhaps by 
default - as the means to wrest Guadeloupe fully from the French. 54 
The Council moved to demonstrate its resolve in this decision by immediately 
organising a large scale raid of Grand-Terre, the principal settlement on the other half of 
Guadeloupe. Some 600 soldiers, including at least 60 grenadiers, under the command of 
Colonel Whetham. and his fellow field officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter and Brigade 
Major Bowles, were to be distributed throughout three warships with a fourth attending in 
support. However, as the ships manoeuvred get into the narrow road in front of Grand- 
Terre, the operation was cancelled as a result of intelligence Major-General Hamilton 
received, which indicated that the French were waiting to contest the landing with an 
additional 400 men that had been recently brought into the plantation. The circumstances of 
the abandonment of the Grand-Terre raid, revealed the considerable difficulties associated 
with the longer term, and attritional, approach to capturing Guadeloupe that the English had 
adopted. The drip feed of intelligence - credible or not - that the French had augmented their 
forces on the island or that a number of their men-of-war were now operating close by spread 
anxiety and cast doubt amongst the English as to whether they had sufficient manpower and 
provisions to complete the operation. Confidence was moreover only further undermined by 
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the impact of disease, which significantly felled the two senior service commanders towards 
the end of April. During this period the operation lost focus, which it was not to recover. 
Indeed, on the last day of April, Codrington was so sick that he took passage to Nevis to 
recover his health; but, by transferring his command to Colonel Whetham, who was also 
gravely ill, the authority of daily operational command passed Walker, whose health had 
temporarily rallied. 
This was a significant development for two reasons. Firstly, whereas earlier 
Codrington's separate land Council had dominated the operation, Walker's preference for 
combined Councils would now allow naval opinion to be actively represented rather than 
forced to acquiesce. Secondly, and more significantly, this opinion had already demonstrated 
its intent to give up the operation. Walker's private reckoning on 24 April was that no more 
could be achieved against the enemy on Guadeloupe and the squadron should prepare to re- 
cmbark the soldiers. Two days later his naval Council came to a similar conclusion. 
Shrewdly, however, the Captains did not at that stage call for a withdrawal of the troops; 
instead, emphasising that at least a fortnight would be required between leaving Guadeloupe 
and departing for Jamaica as directed by Walker's Instructions, they resolved only to re- 
embark the sailors posted ashore so that the squadron could be prepared for sea. This 
decision effectively called time on the operation and it required only concurrence of a 
combined land and sea Council formally to end it. Codrington's departure and then 
Whetham's request to take passage with three companies from his regiment in the ships 
transporting some field guns to Antigua provided Walker with an ideal opportunity to 
convene and preside over this combined Council. It met on 3 May, and afler reviewing the 
dearth of provisions for both the land and sea forces, the decision was taken withdraw from 
C; uadeloupe in five days time. As with the attack on Guadeloupe in 1691, the naval clement 
of the combined force had largely brought about the conclusion of the operation. 
55 
in the early hours of 7 May all the troops were successfully re-cmbarkcd without loss 
of life, while Basse-Terre was set ablaze. In 
hisjournal, Walker expressed considcmblc regret 
at the withdrawal, especially since Guadeloupe was clearly pre-eminent among 
France's 
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colonial possessions in the Caribbean; but, rather disingenuously given that on 24 April he 
was of the opinion that operationally little more could be achieved, the Commodore noted 
that the island might have been held with only a modest increase in resources, if the 
appropriate orders had been issued. Walker's focus upon the operational orders can be 
explained inasmuch as he viewed his Instructions of 18 January as a political and professional 
insurance policy. Even upon a most rigorous interpretation from the land force's perspective, 
the Instructions sanctioned his manoeuvring to conclude the operation and depart for 
Jamaica. Thus, this was Walker's defence when two days after arriving in Nevis Road, 
Codrington sent General Hamilton to argue that the Admiralty orders should not be viewed as 
absolute and that Walker should instead winter amongst the Windward Islands. A 
commander who was temperamentally disposed to gamble against authority might have been 
seduced by Codrington's arguments. However, Walker's character had already proved to be 
unimaginative and with the crucial support of Colonel Bristow, he held fast to the timetable 
set out by the Instructions. 56 
The original intention of Walker's orders following the 20 May deadline had been for 
him to meet Benbow at Jamaica, whence they would sail north for Newfoundland. Graydon's 
appointment in Benbow's stead had altered these circumstance insofar as he was to meet 
Walker first at Barbados or the Leeward Islands to supervise the conclusion of the operations 
in the Windward, and then both men would proceed eastwards to Jamaica to execute the 
orders as drafted for Benbow. However, as a result of a skirmish with four French warships 
on his outward journey - for which (as will be seen) the House of Lords subsequently 
censured his failure fully to engage - Graydon in the Resolution reached the West Indies too 
late to fulfil the supervisory role and he eventually came upon Walker's dilapidated 
expeditionary force in Nevis Road on 23 May. In light of Codrington's allegedly bad. 
tempered response to Graydon when he had requested bread the previous day at Antigua, it 
was fortunate that the Vice-Admiral had first collected supplies at Barbados. Clearly 
conscious of the time, these provisions were distributed throughout the squadron 
in less than 
a day, while Walker removed to the Cumberland to allow 
Graydon, as the senior o fliccr, to 
Boyne% 25 Apr. 1703; Wills to Walker, 1,2 May 1703; Walker to Wills, 
2 May 1703. 
5" PRO, ADM 51/128 Part x, unpaginated, Boyne, 24 Apr., 7-10 May 1703. 
326 
raise his Flag in the Boyne. 57 
Port Royal, Jamaica was reached on 5 June but the subsequent twenty day stay there 
was doubtless longer than Graydon had envisaged. It was neither settling the defensive 
station squadron of four warships and two fireships nor landing the additional 400 garrison 
soldiers which proved time consuming; but rather, it was a quarrel which arose over the 
supply of additional provisions and men for the departing squadron. By his own admission 
Governor Handasyd failed to persuade the Council to provide supplies, thus leaving Graydon 
dependent upon individual colonists' private charity, which yielded smaller returns. Despite 
this insult, Graydon was ill-advised to undertake the aggressive press of men throughout the 
island. The Council minuted their discontent and a steady number of mercantile protest 
petitions were still being sent back to London after the squadron had arrived home. indeed, 
as also recogniscd by the Lords' subsequent censure, Graydon's general conduct at Jamaica 
had only a negative impact on the Ministry's often fractious relationship with the colonies, 
particularly with respect to the military-naval provision. 
" 
it was the beginning of August before the expeditionary squadron neared 
Newfoundland's Cape Race, having obviously decided that time did not permit putting into 
Boston for additional help. 59Notwithstanding some small settlements dotted elsewhere, this 
Cape represented the southerly boundary of the English colonial settlements that were 
concentrated on the eastern coast of Newfoundland's Avalon Peninsula. French plantations 
dominated the southern coastline westwards to their main settlement at Placentia, which was 
the principal target for Graydon's combined army-navy force. During the voyage from 
Jamaica, there had been one Council of land and sea officers about the disposition and 
necessary resources for a landing, but on first approach, it was thought prudent to send the 
barges from three ships on a reconnaissance mission along the River Trapassey which ran 
57 PRO, SP 42/67, fos. 33-5: 'Orders to Captain Hovenden Walker', 18 Jan. 1703; IIMC, House oftords AISS 
NS, v. 486-7: Instructions for [John] Graydon Esq., 20 Feb. 1703; CSPC, 
1702-1703, no. 1128, pp. 717-18: 
Graydon to Nottingham, 8 Oct. 1703; PRO, ADM 51/222 Part v, unpaginated, Cumberland, 
18-15 May 1703. 
53 CSpC, 1702-1703, nos. 885,916,1128,1224, pp. 535,554,717-18,791: Ilandasyd to the Council of Trade 
and Plantations, 7 July 1703; Minutes of the 
Council of Jamaica, 14 July 1703; Graydon to Nottingham, 8 
Oct. 1703; Petitions of Merchants and Planters, 1703; PRO, 
ADM 51/222 Part v, unpaginatcd. Cumberland, 
25 May-29 June 1703; PRO, ADM 1/2642, unf: Wavell to'Honoured 
Sirs', 5 Nov. 1703. 
59 The ensuing account of Graydon and Walker at Newfoundland 
is based on the following primary sources: 
PRO, ADM 51/222 Part v, unpaginated, Cumberland, 
29 June, 13,17 July, 12-13,22 Aug., 3,8 Sept. 1703; 
HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, v. 488: Instructions for 
[John] Graydon Esq., 20 Feb. 1703; CSPC, 1702- 
1703, no. 1071, pp. 667-8: Minutes of a Council of 
War, 3 Sept. 1703. 
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south-westerly from Ferryland. This yielded no intelligence of substance, however, and in its 
progress towards Placentia, the squadron moved round the coast to St Mary's harbour, 
dropping anchor on 12 August. 
Although Placentia was the priority target, Graydon's Instructions encouraged when 
possible the destruction of other French settlements. Despite the worsening weather, 
moderate success in this regard was achieved throughout the latter half of August. A number 
of raiding parties were landed in bays along the coast from St Mary's, with at least one 
reaching some distance westwards as a result of intelligence about the existence of a large 
fortified French settlement. It was however found to comprise only three small houses and a 
number of boats. This event highlighted poor intelligence provision, which previous 
incursions had obviously not enhanced; the small and insignificant settlement typified the 
majority of those destroyed by these raids. By the end of August, the bastion of French 
strength on Newfoundland still remained and, as the Norris-Gisbon expedition during the 
previous war had demonstrated, 60 Placentia required to be comprehensively destroyed to 
effect French expulsion. In this respect, Graydon's coastal forays in late August were 
strategic irrelevancies. 
Of more immediate operational concern however, was the negative tactical impact of 
these raids. With the weather deteriorating through August, there could have been little 
expectation that it would improve with the onset of autumn and thus the opportunities to 
mount the attack on Placentia were diminishing. Moreover, as the majority of the squadron 
had been at sea without a proper refit and repair since leaving Spithead for Spain in July 
1702, they were increasingly unseaworthy in poor weather. The problems posed by 
diminished equipment were only compounded by the frailty of the expeditionary force. Many 
of the soldiers and sailors continued to suffer from the disease which had been prevalent in 
the Caribbean, while the scarcity of provisions reduced further their immunity and morale. 
Certainly, these were the issues along with a shortage of war supplies upon which Graydon's 
Council of War deliberated on 3 September when it met to consider how best to attack 
Placentia. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Council regarded its weaknesses too great when set 
against the reputed French strength at Placentia and it decided to abandon the operation 
against that settlement and return to England forthwith. 
60 See Chapter 1, Section ll. vi, pp. 119-38, for an account of this expedition. 
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Despite committing themselves to sail together, the squadron arrived back home 
piecemeal. The two naval commanders - Graydon and Walker - parted company between 
Land's End and the Scilly Isles in late October when Walker's Cumberland failed to make the 
passage through these landmarks and he was forced into the first port of sanctuary - Milford 
Haven - by sickness among his crew. Professionally and politically, however, no home port 
was to provide shelter for either Graydon or Walker . 
61 Both their expeditions had been abject 
failures, which within a few months fell under Parliamentary scrutiny. Admittedly, there was 
less immediate interest in the operational shortcomings of Graydon at Newfoundland, though 
this was largely because the investigating House of Lords Select Committee, appointed in 
February 1704, was more concerned with his activities while at Jamaica and the graver 
allegation that he had failed properly to engage a small French squadron on his outward 
journey. As previously mentioned, the Lords censured Graydon's conduct in both respects 
and his naval career was ended with their recommendation to the Queen that he should not be 
62 employed again. Although political considerations clearly underlay such resolutions passed 
by a Whiggish House of Lords over a Tory Admiral, the events at Newfoundland might be 
seen as justifying the judgement of the House of Lords. At least one subsequent report from 
the main English settlement, St John's, could not understand why the expedition had failed, 
and it specifically criticised the commanders' ignorance of Newfoundland's coastal 
topography and meteorology. However, given that the Council of War's decision on 3 
September to return home was a consequence of the strength of the French defences at 
Placentia rather than the weather, it is not obvious that Graydon would have aimed to press 
ahead even if he had known that the fog tended to dissipate closer to the shore. An 
intelligence report in late September, underscored the Council's apprehensions by indicating 
that, upon spying Graydon's squadron in the nearby bay, the French added 500 men to the 
3000 already at Placentia, and that they also apparently held plans to put more warships on 
that station with a view to attacking St John's. The only contention of the House of Lords 
about the Newfoundland expedition was to stress the lapses in its secrecy. Paradoxically, the 
report from St John's which criticised Graydon also implicitly recognised these circumstances 
by recommending that a successful expulsion of the French would require at least fiflecri 
61 PRO, ADM 51/222 Part v, unpaginated, Cumberland, 9 Sept., 18 Oct., 25 Nov. 1703. 
62 HMC, House ofLords MSS NS, v. 462-8; LJ, xvii. 507-11. 
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warships carrying some 2500 troops fresh from England: such manpower and equipment, 
63 Graydon simply never possessed . 
The specific combined operational cndeavour at Guadeloupe came under greater 
scrutiny as result of Codrington's protests. Despite still being very ill and hoping for leave, 
the Governor accused Walker in early August of a dereliction of duty with respect to the 
action at Guadeloupe. Clearly this was a grave charge, and one which Codrington did not 
dilute in his subsequent account of the operation. Although the Ministry decided to replace 
Codrington as Governor of the Leeward Islands instead of affording him temporary leave, 
they were obliged to consider seriously his correspondence. A Committee of the Privy 
Council was established to investigate Walker's conduct with respect to three points: that he 
remained too long at Barbados, while having failed to notify Codrington of his arrival; that he 
came to the leeward of Guadeloupe; and that he ceased actions before the 20 May. 64 
Walker did not have much difficulty rebutting these charges when he appeared before 
the Committee on 29 April. It was already on record that illness and the decision of a 
Council of War to await new orders had caused the delay at Barbados; while Walker had also 
specifically directed the responsibility for notifying Codrington to the Barbadian authorities 
soon after his arrival. The sanction of a Council of War was similarly cited for the stop in 
operations prior to 20 May, notwithstanding Walker's manipulation of the circumstances 
attendant to its meeting. As for the second charge of going to the leeward of Guadeloupe, it 
remains unclear what aspect of the operation this referred to. If, as seems most likely, the 
reference was to Walker coming leeward of Guadeloupe to rendezvous with Codrington at 
Antigua, then the Commodore's defence that the Governor agreed with this approach on the 
grounds that the ships would struggle to beat to the windward is doubtful for two reasons. 
Firstly, there was no consultation between Codrington and Walker about their point of 
rendezvous; and secondly, the Governor was, on the contrary, critical of Walker coming to 
Antigua because all the ships would have to beat back to the windward to target the French. 
63 CSpC, 1702-1703, nos. 1131,1191, pp. 719-20,770: Roope to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 10 
Oct. 1703; Copy of an Examination of Laville and Belase, 2 deserters from Placentia, 29 Sept. 1703; Li, xvii. 
551. 
64 PRO, CO 15215, fos. 137-8,149-50: Codrington to the 'Board', 8 Aug. 1703,6 Feb. 1704; Nottingham to 
the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 16 Nov. 1703; PRO, ADM 51/222 Part v, unpaginated, Cumberland, 5-29 
Apr. 1704; PRO, CO 15318, fos. 66-75,212-15: the 'Board' to Codrington, 8 Sept. 1703; Codrington to the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations, 28 June 1704; the Lords of Trade and Plantations to Nottingham, 19 Oct. 
1703; Lords of Trade and Plantations to Codrington, 28 Oct. 1703. 
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Although Walker's defence on this Point could be contradicted, his Instructions had 
nonetheless required him to liaise with the Leeward Islands' authorities and thus his 
proceeding to Antigua could not be condemned wholesale. 
The Earl of Peterborough, who was appearing for Codrington at the Committee, 
seemed to appreciate the strength of Walker's defence for his response shifted focus from 
these three points. He now accused Walker of refusing to supply ordnance materials and of 
sending Codrington a letter that was peremptory in tone. Again, the Commodore easily 
parried the claims. The decisions of the Council of naval captains could justify all such 
supplies as were sent ashore and while he accepted that Codrington may have taken offence 
at the letter, their relationship had been equal and gentlemanly. Walker was of course being 
at once insincere and devious. Questions on relationships between commanders were largely 
contingent upon anecdotal and subjective personal evidence whereas the operational 
proceedings could be accounted for in the documentary evidence. A recommendation to 
consult these records was Walker's parting shot to the Committee when, at its second 
session, he was excused from further attendance. 65 
The Commodore's early dismissal indicated that his evidence had impressed the 
Committee and indeed, when it reported on 4 May, Walker's conduct was not criticised. 
Instead its findings blamed the Barbadian authorities for failing to notify Codrington of the 
squadron's arrival and also the generally poor state of the expeditionary provisions. Perhaps 
understandably, Codrington was unimpressed with this judgement: he looked to apportion 
blame, whereas the Ministry seemed to have been, in his opinion, too easily contented with 
the events at Guadeloupe. Certainly, Codrington might have wondered that the Privy Council 
Committee made no reference to the operation's command structure. At the end of February 
1703 before the beginning of the operation, Codrington had complained to Nottingham about 
the absence of a unified command and suggested - as his father had done in July 1691 after 
the failure of his action on Guadeloupe with Commodore Wright - that both the land and sea 
forces be under his sole jurisdiction. 66 In 169 1, the Admiralty had been reluctant to concede 
65 PRO, ADM 51/222 Part v, unpaginated, Cumberland, 29 Apr. 1704; CSPC, 1702-1703, no. 230, p. 150: 
Codrington to [Nottingham? ], 23 Jan. 1703; PRO, SP 44/208, pp. 8-10: 'Additional] Instructions for Our 
Trusty and Welbeloved Sir George Rooke', 7 June 1702; PRO, ADM 1/2642, unf: Walker to the 'Secretary to 
HRH', 12 Jan., 4 Feb. 1703; PRO, ADM 51/128 Pad ix, unpaginated, Boyne, 9 Jan. 1703. 
66 PRO, ADM 1/5249, pp. 414-16: Court Minute, 4 May 1704; Harlow, Christopher Codrington, pp. 174-5; 
PRO, 152/5, fos. 256-7: Codrington to the 'Board', 8 July 1704; CSPC, 1702-1703, no. 362, pp. 213-14: 
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this and instead had enhanced the authority of the combined Council of War with respect to 
the movements of the expeditionary or station squadron. However, given the younger 
Codrington's unwillingness to work through the combined Council, there could not on this 
occasion be any effective assessment of its command performance. Besides, the Privy 
Council was quite correct to emphasise the failings of other operational requirements. 
Clearly, the lack of provisions - both the victuals and war supplies - had hastened the action 
on Guadeloupe to a conclusion regardless of success or failure. As a detachment from 
another operation the land force was without a dedicated artillery train, and it was unrealistic 
to expect Walker (as Codrington did) to deprive his warships of a minimum amount of 
powder and shot. Moreover, once in receipt of the Instructions detailing the Newfoundland 
operation, the Commodore had to think of reserving enough foodstuffs for that expedition 
and for the return home without knowing the extent of the supplies being sent to him or what 
might be gained at Jamaica. 
It was not that the combined operations in the colonial theatre in 1703 suffered from a 
poorly managed army-navy dynamic - although a more positive relationship between the 
senior commanders would undoubtedly have facilitated their actions - rather it was that poor 
logistics undermined the essential mutuality of the endeavour. This weakness can to be 
traced to the origin of the expeditionary force in Rooke's larger fleet off the Spanish coast 
and also to the failure of the larger Anglo-Dutch fleet to materialise. Notably however, there 
was no attempt during the Spanish Succession War to dispatch a combined expeditionary 
force from England solely bound for the West Indies and this in turn highlights the political 
wellsprings - the Tory Secretary of State, Nottingham - of these early operations. 
Nottingham's departure from the Ministry in 1704, followed by the increasing dominancc of 
the Whigs through to 1710, underscores this point. From 1704, there were fewer advocates 
for a 'Blue Water' strategy in the Caribbean and such sympathy the predominately Whiggish 
Ministry bad for combined army-navy ventures was disposed to acting with the North 
American colonists. Even then though, the organisation of an expeditionary force was not 
forthcoming and it required the re-emergence of the Tories in 1710 to provide the necessary 
impetus. It is to these events that this study must now turn. 
Codrington to [Nottingham? ], 24 Feb. 1703; CSPc, 1689-1692, nos. 
1617, pp. 490-1: Codrington to the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations, 3 July 1691. 
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1I. iii: The Combined Expeditions to North America, 1708-1711. 
The proposal by the New York Governor, Lord Cornbury, in September 1702 that England 
undertake a combined land and sea operation to expel the French from Canada was not an 
original suggestion. During the Nine Years War, Sir William Phips had aimed to do likewise 
with an assault against Quebec from the St Lawrence River, while a separate land force 
marched from Albany upon Montreal. Phips's attempt in 1690 failed but, with the colonies 
having provided all the men and material, he and others maintained that the action might 
easily be successful if London was to commit substantial land and sea forces. Combury's 
proposal was very similar to Phips's operation and he emphasised the necessary role of the 
home country by requesting that England provide at least eight fully supplied fourth rates and 
some 1500 troops. However, despite there being similar defensive and economic motivations 
for such an action in the continental colonies as amongst the West Indian islands, London's 
attention was, during the early war years, focused on the Caribbean. Cornbury's proposal 
was therefore largely ignored; when the war-time defence of North America was raised in the 
Cabinet Council, the outcome was that money and some supplies would be sent to improve 
fortifications along with encouragement to the colonial militia forces operating on the 
frontiers. 67 
London's response did not however discourage the colonial authorities. Both 
Combury and the Massachusetts Governor, Joseph Dudley, continued to append operational 
suggestions to their news dispatches. These often followed details of the latest skirmishcs 
with the French and their Indian allies and, as an attack on Canada was frequently mcntioncd, 
61 
it became clear that the colonists considered it an essential defensive measure. Othcr 
proposals related more to extending the commercial foundation of the empire. The immincnt 
union of England and Scotland prompted Dudley to propose an expedition to secure Acadia 
as a colony for the 'North Britons. Included in his plans was the destruction of Port Royal 
67 PRO, CO 5/1047, fos. 517-18: Cornbury to 'My Lord' [the Board of Trade], 29 Sept. 1702; PRO, Co 
5/1048, f 146: Court Minute, 3 Apr. 1703; Morgan, 'Some Attempts At Imperial Co-operation', pp. 172-3; 
see Chapter 1, Section II. i, pp. 60 n. 10, for 
details on Phips's operation in 1690. 
" PRO, CO 5/912, fos. 41,143,305,473-5: Dudley to the Board of Trade, 25 July 1705,1 Feb., 9 Oct. 1706; 
'A Memoriall humbley Presented by Colonel Dudley FM Governor of Massachusetts and New I lam pshire 
referring to the French Settlements in America' n. 
d. [Received: 19 July 1708]; PRO, CO 5/1849 B Part 11, fos. 
220-1: Cornbury to 'My Lords' [the Board of Trade], 6 Nov. 1704; PRO, CO 5/1049, no. 97: Cornbury to the 
Board of Trade, 20 Aug. 1708. 
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previously briefly captured for Frigland during the Nine Years War by Sir William Phips - as 
its harbour provided a safe haven for French privateers. The Government injtialýN engaged 
with his proposal and its encouragement led Dudley to organise a colonial expeditionary forcc 
of 20 brigantines and 1000 musketeers in preparation of reinforcements arriving firom 
London. However, the defeat at Almanza (14 April 1707) and the political momentum 
behind the Toulon operation caused the ministers to drop any thoughts of sending Dudlcý 
material help and his expedition had to be undertaken solely by local forces. Thcse proved 
insufficient even to attempt Port Royal and the troops simply raided the Acadian coast 
plantations before rctiring. o') 
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There is no clear reason why 1708 marked a change in London's commitment to the 
war in North America. British war fortunes in that theatre had not suffered a significant 
reverse which required remedial action; nor had there been any substantial alteration in the 
strategy on the European continent or in the Mediterranean. Marlborough's victory at 
Oudenarde had doubtless eased pressure on the allies and, a year on from Almanza, the 
Imperialists had begun to provide additional troops for the Peninsula; but equally the Ministry 
did not lack military and naval projects within Europe. An important development was 
probably the personal presentation of the colonists' case by Samuel Vctch. Vctch, an 
4eighteenth century knight errant'70 was a Scotsman who had fought for William in his native 
country during the Revolution and had then participated in the failed Darien scheme to 
establish a Scottish colony on the Panamanian isthmus. Upon leaving there in 1699, he 
established himself as a trader with the Indians, first in New York and then in Albany, and his 
increasing mercantile prominence in addition to his close links with the natives caused him to 
be variously employed as an emissary by the colonial authorities. In 1705, Dudley sent him to 
Quebec to arrange a prisoner exchange and assess the offer of a neutrality treaty by the 
French Governor, the Marquis de Vaudrefl. 71 It was rejected then and on a number of 
subsequent occasions but Vetch used his time in Canada profitably to gain information on the 
French colony. Upon his return, he wrote a long memorandum entitled 'Canada Survcy'd'. 
This work provided a comprehensive assessment of the region, including its geography, 
government and economy, and aimed not only to underscore the necessity of the conquest or 
Canada but also its vulnerability to a well resourced combined operation similar to that 
suggested by Combury: an attack upon Quebec from the St Lawrence River and ovcrland 
72 
against Montreal . 
An obvious strength of Vetch's pamphlet was the clarity with which it outlined the 
economic case for conquest - albeit based upon a negative premise. Using figures from the 
City of London, Vetch calculated that the war with France was costing English traders yearly 
some tens of thousand of pounds in lost Indian trade and that, overall, the English continental 
empire was losing several hundred thousand pounds. As Canada was the headquarters of the 
French commercial and trading challenge, it followed that it would be cheaper to shut it 
70 Morgan, 'Some Attempts At Imperial Co-operation 9, p. 179. 
71 j. C. Webster, Samuel Yetch: An Address (Annapolis Royal, 1929), pp. 5-7. 
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down. 73 Supporting Vetch in London was another colonial veteran, Colonel Francis 
Nicholson, who had served in a variety of posts overseas; and, despite having been recalled in 
1705 from his most recent appointment as the Governor of Virginia due to his high Tory 
politics, the Whig Ministry afforded him an audience. 74 The members of the Council of Trade 
also contributed to the momentum by reporting positively upon Vetch's proposal and 
shrewdly added weight to theirjudgement by not commenting upon its military form, lest the 
Ministry considered their support of colonists uncritical. It was doubtless a measure ofthc 
strength of the arguments in 'Canada Survey'd' (and also a demonstration that the divisions 
in war strategy were not as absolute as was often characterised) that the Whig ministers who 
instinctively, favoured the European continental war over the maritime context of the colonial 
conflict agreed to support and supply a combined operational assault against Canada . 
7, 
In February 1709, preparations began in earnest for the dispatch of this operation, 
which was scheduled to begin by mid-May. A pressing fwst task was the provision of 
transport to take Vetch and Nicholson back across the Atlantic so that they might make the 
necessary arrangements in America; for not only was the operation going to be ajoint army- 
navy enterprise, it was also going to combine forces from the colonies and Britain. Vctch's 
Instructions - issued at the beginning of March - stipulated that New York, New Jcrscy, 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania were to contribute a total of 1500 mce for the attack upon 
Montreal; meanwhile New England and Rhode Island were to raise 1200 men for the 
seaborne assault against Quebec. In addition, all the men raised by the colonies were to be 
appropriately armed and provisioned for three months, whilst the 1200 were to be cmbarkcd 
aboard transports in order to join the British naval squadron on its arrival at Boston. 77 
Vetch and Nicholson departed Spithead in the Dragon on II March with a 
considerable amount of war supplies aboard and by the end of April they had put ashorc rrom 
Nantucket Bay, Boston. Not surprisingly, given the tenor of recent dispatches homc, thcy 
rnet a favourable response upon delivering the Queen's orders to the various colonial 
' PRO, CO 324/9, fos. 221-45: 'Canada Survey'd', 27 July 1708. 
73 ibid. 
71 S. S. Webb, 'The Strange Career of Francis Nicholson', W&MQ xxiii (1966), 51348. 
75 CSpC, 1708-1709, nos. 221,221.1, pp. vii, 164-5: the Council of Trade and Plantations to Sundcrland, I 
Dec. 1708, and enclosure, the Council of Trade and Plantations to the Queen. 
76 The following quotas of men were to make up this total: 800 from New York; 200 from New icrscy; 350 
from Connecticut; and 150 from Pennsylvania. 
77CSpCP 1708-1709, no. 387, pp. 230-2: H. M. Instructions to Colonel Vetch, I Mar. 1709. 
336 
governors and also when seeking the local legislatures' authority to raise the troops. Only in 
the predominately Quaker New Jersey and Pennsylvania did problems emerge. Both refused 
to provide men, though after much argument they agreed as a compromise to vote some 
fundS. 78 At the colonists' end therefore the operation remained largely on schedule when on 
25 May, the land force for Montreal marched out to a staging post at Wood Creek, south of 
Lake Champlain. Vetch's Instructions had not made provision for the command of this force 
and the New York Assembly pressed for Nicholson's appointment. Opposition to this 
development focused upon Nicholson being ill-suited to liaise with the Five Nation Indians 
who were to join this overland force but the preferred alternative - Peter Schuyler - was 
selected as Nicholson's deputy and he had in any event been one of the proponents of 
Nicholson's appointment. 79 
At Wood Creek, the force was organised for the attack on Montreal, which amongst 
other things involved building the canoes for the transfer along to the north end of the lake. 
While these preparations and those in New England continued throughout the summer, the 
colonists fully expected the British squadron to arrive at Boston. By August, however, there 
was still no indication that its arrival was imminent and the authorities in America became 
increasingly restless. Their arrangements had been in place for a number of weeks and the 
strain of keeping men at arms, whether aboard transports at Boston or in camp at Wood 
Creek, was beginning to show. Indeed, Nicholson's forces skirmished with some French 
outguards and their Indian allies near to Lake Champlain thereby advertising not only their 
presence in that area but also the fact that an operation was imminent. The continuing delay 
thus allowed the French time to prepare their defences. By early September, it was clear to 
78 PRO, CO 5/9, fos. 96-9: 'Journal of the Proceedings of Col. Vetch and Col. Nicholson from New York to 
Sunderland' [hereafter 'Journal of Vetch and Nicholson'], 21 June 1709; PRO, ADM 51/269, Part vi, 
unpaginated, Dragon, 28 Fcb. -30 Apr. 1709; CSPC, 1708-1709, nos. 580,605,671 pp. 349,406,409-10: 
Gookin to Nicholson and Vetch, 17 June 1709; Nicholson and Vetch to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 
28 June 1709; Cockerill to Popplc, 2 July 1709. It is noteworthy that on p. ix of his Preface, the editor of the 
CSPC 1708-1709, Cecil Headlam, stated that Pennsylvania gave neither men nor money; while Morgan, 
'Some Imperial Attempts at Co-operation', p. 182, claimed that it voted E2000. Curiously, the document 
Hcadlam cites as evidence - CSPC, 1708-1709, no. 580, p. 406: Gookin to Nicholson and Vetch, 17 June 
1709, - refers to the Pennsylvanian Assembly raising L500 as a present for Queen Anne; he does not seem to 
have considered that this might have been looked upon as funding for the expedition. It is not clear whether 
the E2000 Morgan refers to was voted in a bloc or whether, taking into account the above L500, an additional 
L1500 was subsequently found. Nonetheless, on the substantive question as to whether Pennsylvania did vote 
this sum, Morgan, 'Some Imperial Attempts at Co-operation', p. 182 n. 3, cites an impressive list of local 
evidence unavailable to this study. 
79 PRO, CO 5/9, fos. 96-9,100-1: 'Journal of Vetch and Nicholson'; Nicholson to Sunderland, 8 July 1709. 
337 
Vctch that the opportunity to begin the operation had passed and he convened a governors' 
conference to decide what to do next. 80 
Vetch's instinct that the squadron was not going to appear was correct. London had 
tried to maintain the momentum of its preparations begun in February with the appointment 
of Vice-Admiral John Baker" and Brigadier MacCartney to the squadron and the land force 
commands; meanwhile vessels were brought down to Spithead and five regiments were 
identified to form the land force. Progress slowed in April however as a new land 
commander - Brigadier Whetham - had to be appointed upon MacCartney's embroilment in 
criminal proceedings following an allegation of rape by his housekeeper. When, in May, 
Whctham was issued with two sets of Instructions, it was no longer assumed that the 
operation against Canada would take place. Given the increasing lateness of the season, a 
Council of War to be convened by Whetham on his arrival at Boston was now to determine 
upon its practicability. The Ministry's evident and increasing scepticism about the departure 
of the force was manifest towards the end of May when Baker was told to wait with his 
squadron for further orders. Ten days later, he attended the Queen in Council to be told that 
the Canadian expedition had been abandoned and that his squadron was to depart with seven 
regiments for the Mediterranean. The lateness of the year, the prospects for peace and the 
demands of the Peninsula including, in particular, another proposal to reduce CAdiz were 
given as the reasons. 82 Of these three, only the first stands up to scrutiny. Ever since the 
failure of the Rooke-Ormonde expedition in 1702, Cddiz had been a perennial paper target for 
the allies and 1709 was no different in that the operation never occurred. Contrary winds 
delayed Baker's departure until the middle of August by which time it was thought to be too 
late for operations against the Spanish coast and, on entering the Mediterranean, Byng 
80 PRO, CO 5/9, fos. 96-9,102-5: 'Journal of Vetch and Nicholson'; Vetch to Sunderland, 2 Aug. 1709 and 
'Postscript Letter', 12 Aug. 1709; Dudley to Sunderland, 13 Aug. 1709. 
g' Snyder wrongly claimed in The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii, 1269 n. 3 that Baker was to 
convey the force to America to capture Port Royal. It is clear from Baker's journal - NMM, JOD/22, unf : 
Journal of Vice-Admiral John Baker, 1709-1711,19 Mar. 1709 - that his orders required his participation in 
the assault against Quebec. 
82 NMM, JOD/22, unf.: Journal of Vice-Admiral John Baker, 1709-1711,19 Mar. -5 June 1709; PRO, ADM 
1/4092, fos. 20 8-10,224-5: Sunderland to the Admiralty, 26,28 Feb., 20 Mar. 1709; PRO, ADM 1/4093, fos. 
8,14,44: Addison to Burchett, 3 Apr. 1709; Sunderland to 'My Lord', 12 Apr. 1709; Sunderland to the 
Admiralty, 9 May 1709 and enclosure, 'Copy of Her Majesties Additional Instructions to Brigadier 
Whetham', 9 May 1709; PRO, WO 4/8, pp. 138: Walpole to Bridges, 2 Mar. 1709; PRO, WO 4/9, p. 39: 
Walpole to Whetham, II June 1709; 7he Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, ii. 1180 n. 1; The 
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directed Baker to land the troops at Barcelona. Peace negotiations were admittedly current 
but to abandon one operation on the basis that these talks showed signs of success only to 
promote another (the Cddiz proposal) suggested either muddled thinking or 
disingenuousness. Marlborough certainly thought it inappropriate to be planning operations 
in Spain when peace was under discussion, though notably he omitted to apply this stricture 
to Flanders. 83 The time of year was however crucial for with the squadron still at Spithead 
well beyond the date previously set for the start of the operation across the Atlantic, 
dispatching it now would probably result in a waste of resources. As was to be discovered at 
great cost in 1711, the St Lawrence River - up which the squadron would have to pass to 
reach Quebec - was navigable in only the most seasonable conditions. 
On 27 July, Sunderland wrote officially to inform the colonists of the recent decision 
but the slowness of communication meant that the news did not reach them unta the second 
week of October. Dudley conveyed the information to a conference of senior New England 
colonists and general officers, including Vetch and Nicholson, and they began to consider 
Sunderland's suggestion in his letter that they use the force amassed to target Acadia, with an 
attack on Port Royal especially recommended. Reluctant to see all their preparations put to 
waste the colonists agreed that some of the forces should be used against Port Royal but the 
participation of the naval vessels then on the North American station had to be sought first. 
Although some of the Captains were personally sympathetic to an action, only one - the 
Captain of the Chester - agreed on the basis that his ship's station was to attend to the 
Governor of New England whereas the others claimed that their Instructions did not allow for 
it. Perhaps because both operations for 1709 had now fallen through, the colonists 
maintained the pressure upon London by petitioning for another expedition to be organised 
early in 1710. This time however their demands were scaled back inasmuch as they promoted 
the assault against Port Royal rather than the conquest of Canada. It was reckoned that for 
the former operation Britain need only supply four men-of-war and a bomb vessel plus some 
Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii, nos. 1295,130 1, pp. 1269,1275: Godolphin to Marlborough, 
31 May, 5 June 1709. 
83 The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii, nos. 1317,1324,1353,1375,1376, pp. 1287 n. 2,1293, 
1319 1342-3: Godolphin to Marlborough, 26 June, 20 July, 14 Aug. 1709; Marlborough to Godolphin, 15 
Aug. 1709. 
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500 marines or army troops with a couple of large mortars. " The Conference's implicit 
calculation that London would be more likely to deliver on this reduced provision by the 
beginning of March thereby allowing Port Royal to be quickly captured, meant that there still 
might be time to revive plans for the expulsion of the French from Canada. 
In the new year, Nicholson returned to England accompanied by Schuyler and four of 
the Five Nation Indian Chiefs to present the Conference's petition to the Ministry. The 
Chiefs aroused some interest in London and their exotic presence may have encouraged 
ministers to begin planning the dispatch of another expedition to conquer Canada, despite the 
colonists having limited their ambitions to Port Royal. Godolphin reported that the failure of 
the peace negotiations then taking place at Gcrtruydenberg had persuaded the Cabinet 
Council to renew hostilities and make another attempt in North America. " Such an operation 
was thought to be 'of great consequence and also very feisible'. 86 It was clear though the 
Lord Treasurer was unconvinced and that Marlborough was positively hostile, though he kept 
his opposition private. The Duke argued that experience showed that little was gained from 
such expeditions except great expense and the ruin of the regiments involved. 87 
Marlborough's opinion was not necessarily directed against combined army-navy operations 
as an instrument of warfare - he had after all been a proponent of them since the 1690 
campaign in Ireland. Rather, his opposition was focused on the fact that this operation was to 
be an overseas colonial expedition which, due to the distances involved, would deprive him of 
the troops for the whole of the campaign season; whilst it was also rooted in the changing 
political background against which war policy was being formulated. Inearlyl. 710, the 
84 PRO, C0519, fos. 111-16,123,125-6,125A, 127-8: Dudley, Nicholson, Vetch and Moody to'My Lord' 
[Sunderland], 24 Oct. 1709; Dudley, Vetch and Moody to 'My Lord' [Sunderland], 25 Oct. 1709 and 
enclosure, 'Votes at the Congress'; Dudley, Nicholson, Vetch and Moody to Ingoldsby, 18 Oct. 1709; Dudley, 
Nicholson, Vetch and Moody to Mathews, Tate, Clifton, Smith and Davis [Commanders of Her Majesties 
Ships at Nantucket], 19 Oct. 1709; Dudley, Nicholson, Vetch and Moody to Martin, 19 Oct. 1709; Smith to 
Dudley, 20 Oct. 1709; Martin to Dudley, 20 Oct. 1709; BL, Add MSS 61500, f 22: Minutes of the Cabinet 
Council, II June 1709. 
25 Trevelyan, England Under Queen Anne, iii. 162; Morgan, 'Some Attempts At Imperial Co-operation', pp. 
188-9; The Marlhorough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii, nos. 1504,1510, pp. 1467-8,147 1: Godolphin to 
Marlborough, 20,25 Apr. 1710. See The Marlhorough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii. 1467 n. 9 for an 
explanation regarding Godolphin's curious tendency to refer to this proposed expedition to Canada in North 
America as one bound for the West Indies. 
"' The Afarlhorough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii, no. 15 10, p. 147 1: Godolphin to Marlborough, 25 Apr. 
1710. 
" The Marlhorough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii, nos. 1504,1510,1515,1522-4, pp. 1467-8,1471,1475, 
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Tories were reviving as a political force. Their effective exploitation of the Ministry's crass 
handling of the impeachment of the Popular high-flying divine Dr Sacheverell, combined with 
their subtle reflection of the increasing national war weariness, persuaded the Queen (deftly 
guided by Robert Harley) in the early spring of 17 10 to remodel her Ministry incrementally in 
their favour. Despite being inclined to the Tories during their early years as courtiers and 
then attempting to rise above the political party fi-ay, Marlborough and Godolphin had firmly 
identified with the Whigs since 1708 largely on the basis of the support that party gave to the 
European continental war. The Duke and the Lord Treasurer were therefore becoming 
increasingly isolated within the Government and could not rely on popular support as a 
bolster. 88 Consequently, their domination of war policy was no longer total and, for 
Marlborough, the Canadian expedition pointed to a reduction of his military efforts on the 
continent with the emphasis to be more exclusively upon the maritime and, specifically, the 
colonial context. 
From the outset, Godolphin had suggested to Marlborough that he should propose an 
alternative fon-n of employment for the selected regiments in the hope that the Cabinet 
Council would opt for his suggestion instead. Initially the Duke failed to respond to 
Godolphin's invitation as he did not wish to be blamed for the failure of the Canadian venture 
but eventually there was a suggestion of a project that Godolphin had long advocated, namely 
a landing of troops on the north eastern French coast which might then link up with 
Marlborough's Flanders army. 89 The Cabinet Council had meanwhile been pressing ahead 
with the preparations for the North American venture. Just as was the case with the 1709 
operation, the colonists - Nicholson and Schuyler - were quickly returned home to raise the 
quotas of men and material before the arrival of the British contribution. Prior to his 
departure in mid-March, Nicholson was issued with Instructions appointing him Commander 
of all forces directed against any French possessions in the region, with Port Royal 
specifically mentioned. Doubtless this was a response to the colonists' complaint that in 1709 
" G. Holmes, The Trial ofDoctor Sacheverell (London, 1973), pp. 238-9,250-1; B. Hill, Robert Harley., 
Speaker, Secretary ofStateandPremier Minister (New Haven& London, 1988), pp. 125-8; G. Holmes, 
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their inability to command the participation of the naval captains in the action against Port 
Royal had caused it to be abandoned. 90 Nonetheless, although the Ministry had seemingly 
conferred on Nicholson a supreme command for any action in North America, they had no 
intention that this would extend to the principal attempt to expel the French from Canada. 
Upon Nicholson sailing with six vessels and some 400 marines, arrangements were begun for 
the force that was to follow him. In addition to Nicholson's small squadron and those already 
on station, the Admiralty was ordered to provide three men-of-war and sufficient transports 
to carry the five regiments which had been selected to form the mainstay of the land force. 
The command of these soldiers along with the troops that were to be raised by the colonial 
authorities was given to Lord Shannon. He received his Instructions in July and these further 
circumscribed Nicholson's command by directing Shannon on his arrival in Boston to 
convene a Council of War of senior British and colonial land and sea officers. Just as with 
Whetham's Instructions in 1709, this Council was to decide the viability of the Canadian 
operation and also what else might be undertaken in the event of its early success or 
abandonment. " Nicholson's command was therefore confmed to much smaller and 
provincial-dominated operations against targets such as Port Royal. 
in the event, Nicholson was to exercise this authority as the progress of the operation 
against Canada followed the same pattern as the previous year. It was mid-July before he 
arrived back in Boston and could set the provincial authorities to raising their quotas and 
procuring the necessary war materials. The belated start to these tasks caused them not to be 
completed until the second week of September, which was too late to begin any credible 
action against Quebec. 92 This second successive failure to make an attempt to expel the 
French from Canada should not however be wholly be blamed on the slowness of the colonial 
preparation. Some ten days after Nicholson's return to New England, London decided to 
cancel the dispatch of Shannon's force. The regiments were encamped on the Isle of Wight 
but their embarkation and the squadron's departure was being prevented by the current 
90 BL, Add MSS 61500, fos. 80,85,87,96 107: Minutes of the Cabinet Council, 4,28 Dec. 1709,3,26 Jan., 
21 Feb. 1710; PRO, C05/865 unf.: Boston News-Letter, No. 345,3OOct. -6 Nov. 1710; PRO, C05/9, E 106: 
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prevailing winds. On II July, the Cabinet Council met to consider advice about sailing times 
to Boston and Quebec and consequently, Godolphin expressed his doubts that the operation 
could proceed given the current time of year. He restated this view a week later as the winds 
remained contrary and then fmally reported to Marlborough on 24 July that Shannon's force 
was definitely not going to depart. 93 
The letter informing the colonists of this decision was not sent until the last day of 
August, by which time the Queen had finally been persuaded to dismiss Godolphin and to put 
the Treasury under a Commission headed by the First Commissioner, Lord Poulett, but 
controlled by Robert Harley as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Fearing a lack of political 
support, Marlborough had never responded specifically to Godolphin's invitation to suggest 
alternative employment for Shannon's troops and despite the possibility that they might have 
comprised the landing force for a descent upon the northern French coast which was then 
being canvassed, these soldiers were, as in 1709, sent to Spain. 94 It is not clear exactly when 
Nicholson received this news but the Boston News-Letter implies that he was in any event 
intent on using his own Instructions to mount an attack against Port Royal. 95 In possession of 
the authority to compel the station naval captains to participate - though there is no 
suggestion that he had to exercise it - Nicholson had by 18 September gathered in Nantucket 
Bay a five-strong squadron with one bomb vessel and a number of transports and auxiliaries. 
Embarked aboard were four colonial regiments and the 400-odd marines from Britain along 
with the necessary war supplies. The squadron stood out to sea that day and reached the 
Wolves islets at the entrance to Passmaquoddy Bay on 21 September. There it remained until 
the early hours of 24 September when the ships crossed the Bay of Fundy to the estuary of 
the Port Royal river. The combination of a calm and an ebb tide forced the squadron to come 
temporarily to anchor but, once the tide was spent, the ships proceeded up river except for 
the Cceser which ran aground after sailing too close to the shore. On reaching an anchorage 
93 The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, iii, nos. 1605,1609,1622,1630, pp. 1560,1566 n. 2,1572, 
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just above Goat Island, Nicholson convened an evening Council of War, which decided that 
two reconnaissance parties commanded by Colonels Vetch and Reading would go ashore in 
the early morning to determine whether the north or the south side of the river would provide 
the better landing site and camp. Their reports recommended the south side, where Port 
Royal's fort was situated, and, despite cannon fire from the fort as they put ashore, the troops 
were by the evening encamped in a nearby wood. 
At day break on 26 September, Nicholson marched his force from the wood upon 
Port Royal town. This was easily taken despite the ambush of the marine vanguard 
commanded by Major Livingston as they ascended the hill overlooking the town. Skirmishing 
increased as the force neared the fort, when they were also subjected to its cannon fire. 
Nicholson however detached an advanced guard of grenadiers which managed to entrench 
themselves some 400 paces from the walls and in so doing swept many of the enemy back 
inside the fort. That night, while the bomb vessel maintained the pressure upon the fort's 
garrisons, Vetch led a party of 100 men to Spurs Point where he hoped to construct a twelve 
mortar battery to cover the passage up-river of the boats loaded with cannon and stores. The 
ground proved unsuitable however, and the landing of the field artillery was temporarily 
suspended. Fortunately, no substantive delay ensued as the war materials were brought up 
over the course of the following two days under the cover of a more effectively deployed 
bomb vessel. Although only a few hundred men, the Port Royal garrison kept up a fire 
disproportionate to their number ensuring that the movement of artillery cost Nicholson a 
number of men. Nonetheless, by the end of the month, a thirteen cannon battery supported 
by some 24 coehoorn mortars and two land mortars had begun to play against the fort and 
Governor Subercasse quickly sought terms. These were concluded within the week and on 6 
October the French marched out of the fort with the full honours of war. Upon taking 
control, the colonists raised the Union Flag and renamed the fort Annapolis Royal in honour 
of the Queen. Its possession and the immediate environs held the key to the whole of Acadia, 
which also now fell to the British and was renamed Nova Scotia. The combined action of the 
Royal Navy, marines and colonial troops had therefore secured some success from the plans 
for the 1710 campaign. Nonetheless, it was the expulsion of the French from Canada which 
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the colonials sought above all else and, leaving Vetch to organise a new garrison at Annapolis, 
Royal, Nicholson departed for England to press again the case for the more ambitious 
operation. 
Nicholson was to return to much changed political circumstances in Britain. The 
Tories had consolidated their political revival with a crushing General Election victory over 
the Whigs in October 1710, which meant that they now dominated Parliament and the 
Ministry. Although led by the moderate Chancellor of the Exchequer, and later Lord 
Treasurer, Robert Harley, the more politically aggressive side of the Party was represented at 
a senior level by Henry St John, who had been appointed Secretary of State for the Northern 
Department a month before the election, while there were also numerous vigorous partisans 
on the backbencheS. 96 These political developments had important implications for the 
direction of war policy. Previously, mixed and Whiggish governments had pursued both the 
traditional maritime and continental strategies, but it was now probable that the new Tory 
government would alter the strategic emphasis. Their election campaign had exploited an 
increasing national war weariness that was largely founded upon the discontent with the four 
shillings in the pound land tax and the inability of the continental campaigning (which 
necessitated the high tax) to bring victory. In 1709, Marlborough had again defeated the 
French on the battlefield but this victory at Malplaquet (31 August 1709) was considered 
pyrrhic by many inasmuch as it had not brought the French to peace in 17 10, despite the huge 
loss of life. Moreover, by the end of that year, the allies had effectively lost the war on the 
Peninsula. The campaign had begun well with the Archduke occupying Madrid for a second 
time following victories at Almenara (17 July 17 10) and Saragossa (8 August 17 10), but the 
city rose for Philip and, to avoid being cut off in Castile, the allied commander, Starhcmberg, 
decided to withdraw eastwards towards Catalonia. This retreat turned into a rout however 
with the rear of his army commanded by James Stanhope defeated at Brihuega (28 November 
1710); while the remainder was badly galled and pinned back into Catalonia, despite a tactical 
victory against Vend6me at Villa Viciosa (29 November 1710). Thus, although there were 
few advocating immediate withdrawal from the war, there was undoubtedly a sense that war 
policy should now reflect such discontent and aspirations towards peace; while also 
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recognising that a strong military showing would enhance Britain's negotiating position as 
informal peace contacts with the French were re-established in the winter of 17 10/1 1.97 
For St John, an expedition to capture Canada seemed an ideal operation in such 
circumstances. Its distance from Europe and the possible deployment of some of the best 
regiments from Marlborough's Flanders army would send the double signal that the Ministry 
was now less concerned with European continental campaigning but also aware that a 
significant military victory which captured territory was required as negotiating collateral. 
There was also the possible party political advantages to be reaped from undertaking an 
operation which appealed to the City and the merchants, who had never been traditional 
supporters of the Tories. " Accordingly, St John described it as a project about which he was 
neither 'light nor whimsical'. 99 Although keenly supported by the Board of Trade, which had 
been a proponent of the action since reading Vetch's 'Canada Survey'd', it was not clear in 
early 1711 that St John had convinced Harley. There was little trust between the two men 
and though at this stage their relationship remained intact, each desired to limit the other's 
role in the Ministry. Harley moreover suspected St John's avarice inasmuch he might aim to 
make money from the expeditionary victualling contracts, particularly those concerning the 
clothing. 100 As the senior of the two and with greater access to the Queen, Harley possessed 
the advantage in the long term if he wished to frustrate the proposal and there was 
undoubtedly a plaintive tone in St John's appeal to him that 'I hope you will support me in it 
since I have gone so far. "01 Luck was however with the Secretary when during a Privy 
Council examination of the dissident French Huguenot, Guiscard, the suspect stabbed Harley 
with a pen-knife. Although the wound was not life threatening, Harley was forced into 
several weeks convalescence and St John seized the opportunity of his absence to push 
forward the expedition to Canada. 102 
The Secretary built on the proposal of previous years, which meant that there was no 
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change to the basic operational structure. A detachment of colonial troops was to march 
overland from Albany to attack Montreal, while a combined army-navy force sent from 
Britain would put in first at Boston and then sail around the north American coast to proceed 
up the St Lawrence river for an assault on Quebec. The capture of both places would allow 
the two forces to combine and complete the expulsion of the French from Canada. St John 
was nonetheless able to mould, and arguably, determine the fate of the operation through the 
choice of the commanders and by effecting its preparation under a blanket of secrecy. With 
respect to the former, the charge that personal and party politics influenced his choice cannot 
be evaded. G. S. Graham clearly made the point that Rear-Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker's 
naval career hardly recommended him to the command of the squadron to be dispatched from 
Britain, while his expedition to the Caribbean in 1703 had not only failed to achieve its 
objectives but had also descended into a squabble amongst senior commanders. Walker's 
friendly relations with St John and the fact that he was a known Tory were strongly suspected 
as having caused his selection in place of Sir Thomas Hardy, who was reputedly the first 
preference. 103 Complex political and personal calculations undoubtedly underlay the choice 
of Brigadier John Hill to command the land forces aboard the fleet. Hill had proved himself a 
reasonably capable regimental soldier but that did not mean he was suited to general 
command. Marlborough certainly did not think so and Hill's promotion in June 17 10 had 
been forced upon him by the Queen. Marlborough had earlier that year successfully vetoed 
the Brigadier's translation to the Colonelcy of the late Earl of Essex's Dragoon Regiment. 
His opinion of Hill was nonetheless coloured by his wife's estrangement from the Queen, 
which the Duchess blamed on Abigail Masham, one of Anne's bedchamber maids and sister 
of John Hill. Sarah Churchill's animosity was especially bitter; she had as Mrs Masham's 
cousin recommended her to the Queen, but Abigail proved politically to be strongly inclincd 
to the Tories. This was, of course, antithetical to the Duchess's staunch Whiggism and 
Abigail had made matters worse by acting as a conduit between the Queen and I larlcy when 
the latter began intriguing against the Whig government soon after his dismissal from the 
Secretaryship in 1708.104 In these circumstances, and with flaricy absent from Court, St John 
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saw opportunities in Hill's appointment inasmuch as it might through Abigail interest the 
Queen in the expedition and, more generally, offer the prospect that he could replace Harley 
as the Queen's principal contact with the Tories. He achieved the first objective as Anne 
gave the expedition such strong support that upon his return to work Harley was unable to 
prevent its deployment. This remained the case even when the death of the Emperor Joseph I 
in April undermined the strategic wellsprings of British policy. The 'election' of Joseph's 
brother the Archduke Charles as Emperor Charles VI, meant that Britain was no longer 
fighting against Bourbon domination of France and Spain to ensure a balance of power in 
Europe but for Hapsburg domination of Spain and central Europe. Upon this development, 
the Earl of Rochester changed his mind about the expedition and Harley encouraged him to 
persuade the Cabinet Council to do likewise but Rochester's efforts proved unsuccessful. 
Nonetheless, despite the support St John received from the Court on the specific issue of the 
expedition, he did fail to reduce the Chancellor's standing with the Queen and in May 1711 
Harley was elevated to an earldom and the Treasurership. 'O' 
The experience of the previous two years had demonstrated that the squadron would 
have to depart Britain by early spring if the operation was to be viable. St John therefore 
pressed forward the preparations throughout March. The land force was to comprise some 
seven infantry regiments and half a marine regiment. Of the seven, five battalions were to be 
withdrawn from Marlborough's army in Flanders. 106 Perhaps understandably, given the 
recent contention over Hill's promotion, the Duke was reluctant to relinquish these men as it 
would demonstrate his diminishing control over military affairs at the start of what would be 
his last campaign as Anne's Captain-General. St John had not however chosen the regiments 
to embarrass Marlborough personally as he had liked and respected the Duke since serving as 
Secretary-at-War from 1704 to 1708. The Secretary did however want seasoned and 
experienced troops, while withdrawing them from Flanders would underline the strategic 
importance of the expedition compared with the European continental campaigns. In this, St 
John had the Queen's express support and so the troops were brought over from Ostend in 
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good time to join the fleet at Spithead by the beginning of April. 107 
St John's obsession to keep the expedition secret went far beyond the customary 
desire that the enemy be kept in ignorance. On this occasion even the Admiralty were 
unaware as to the exact purpose or destination of the squadron and, although this did not 
necessarily impede preparations, it meant that in order to maintain the mystery, St John 
requested that the squadron be victualled for only three months rather than for the eight 
months projected to complete the operation. St John's intention was that further provision 
could be taken on board when Walker reached Boston but the implications of this additional 
colonial supply were not considered and, as will be seen, the problems which arose over this 
arrangement damaged the prospects of success at an early stage. 108 Another aspect of St 
John's secrecy was that he shared the contents of the operational Instructions with only a 
very few people and Walker and Hill were not among them. The Admiral's initial 
commission referred to a 'secret expedition"09 and, although both men attended the Queen in 
person to receive their Instructions, these were to remain sealed until the squadron was at 
sea. Upon opening them, Walker was likely to have been disappointed. During his 
expedition to the Caribbean in 1703, the Admiral had possessed some discretion - albeit 
mediated through a Council of War - on targeting and the conduct of any attack. However, 
his Instructions for the expedition to North America laid out in considerable detail how the 
operation was to progress after his arrival in Boston and also on its return voyage when 
Placentia was to be reduced. Perhaps more significantly Article V11 placed him subordinate 
to Hill in respect of the landing at Quebec and also in terms of command authority over the 
marines. "o Walker's inferior role was confirmed by Article X of Hill's Instructions which, 
after outlining the action to be taken at Quebec, stated that the Ministry's determination was 
that the Admiral 'do give speedy and full assistance to you in all these matters, or in any other 
107 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 13 n. 2,9 1; Letters and Correspondence, Public and Private, of the 
Right Honourable Henry St John, Lord TIscount Bolingbroke, ed. G. Parke (London, 1798). i. 94,129: St 
John to Marlborough, 13,27 Mar. 1711. 
108 Letters and Correspondence, Public and Private, of the Right Honourable Henry St John, Lord Viscount 
Bolingbroke, i. 106-7,111-12: St John to Drummond, 16,20 Mar. 1711; The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 
pp. 19-21. 
'09 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, p. 159: Hovenden Walker's Commission, 3 Apr. 1711. 
110 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 91-2,97,163-8: A Journal And Full Account of the Expedition to 
Canada [hereafter 'Walker's Journal'], 6-14 Apr., 9 May 1711; Instructions for our trusty and well beloved 
Sir Hovenden Walker, Knt, II Apr. 1711; Additional Instructions for our trusty and well-belovcd Sir 
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matter or thing'. III Notably, a Council of War was not on this occasion expressively referred 
to in either Instructions as the sovereign command authority and, although a Council meeting 
might have seemed the implication of the references to Hill advising with the Admiral or that 
they act together on a particular task, it seemed that the Government (or more likely St John) 
sought to exercise pre-determined tactical control though the Instructions. Where this was 
not possible, the Brigadier was to exercise a superior command. 112 
These various efforts by the Secretary to conceal the operation had mixed results as 
far as the French were concerned. Their intelligence provision picked up in early spring the 
preparations being completed in England and also the transfer of regiments from Flanders - 
though at this stage Quebec and Canada were simply listed among a number of possible 
targets. Nonetheless, a renegade French sailor who wished to join the expedition told Walker 
that he had heard he was bound for Canada and, by July, Governor Vaudreil knew that his 
jurisdiction faced attack. Vaudreil's information had doubtless been bolstered by the 
increasing activity within the American colonies following Nicholson's return on 8 June. A 
conference of colonial authorities was convened in New London towards the end of that 
month during which Nicholson presented the Queen's orders that the colonists raise men and 
material both for the overland force to Montreal and also to augment the British 
expeditionary squadron. Despite the large amounts of money they had invested to no return 
in the previous two years, the colonists responded enthusiastically once again. Also tabled at 
this conference were the detailed Instructions for the New York Governor, Robert Hunter, 
who had additional responsibility for co-ordinating the dispatch of the purely colonial force 
commanded by Nicholson, which was to attack Montreal. 
' 13 
Following the conclusion of the conference, the Massachusetts Governor, Joseph 
Dudley, returned to find the expeditionary force had already arrived. Under increasing 
pressure from St John and Hill, Walker had weighed from Plymouth Sound on 5 May with a 
Hovenden Walker, Kt., II Apr. 1711; for details on the nature of Walker's command in the Caribbean in 
1703 see above Chapter 2, Section 11. ii, pp. 309,314,321-2,324. 
"' The Walker Expedition to Quebec, p. 282: Queen Anne's instructions to General Hill, II Apr. 1711. 
112 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 163-8,279-86: Instructions for our trusty and well Moved Sir 
Hovenden Walker, Knt, II Apr. 1711; Additional Instructions for our trusty and well-beloved Sir I lovenden 
Walker, Kt., II Apr. 1711 Queen Anne's instructions to General Hill, II Apr. 1711; Additional Instructions 
to General Hill, 15 Apr. 1711. 
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squadron of some 64 vessels, including ten warships. Although the crossing of the Atlantic 
had been bedevilled by changeable weather and the thick fogs which were common to the 
north American coastline, the squadron had put into Nantucket Bay at the end of June. The 
soldiers were disembarked on Noddles Island for exercise, while Walker and Hill travelled to 
Boston. An immediate departure for Quebec was not possible, for the colonists had onlyjust 
begun their preparations while Walker and Hill had to procure the expeditionary force's 
provisions for the following months. It was now that St John's decision that the fleet would 
proceed from Britain without full supply began to have a damaging impact upon the 
operation. With the colonial authorities trying to provide for their own troop quotas and the 
British commanders not only seeking food for the immediate subsistence of their men but also 
a future supply, demand in the Boston area simply outstripped supply. As a result prices rose 
and it was believed that some merchants were deliberately stockpihg goods in order to 
increase them. In such a market, London's Exchequer Bills were devalued and it was quickly 
clear to Walker that he would have to raise some hard cash and also request the colonial 
authority to issue him some Bills of Credit. Sterling was however set at an unfavourable 
exchange rate with the colony's currency and this reduced Walker's purchasing power with 
the colonial Bills. Eventually, provisions of reasonable quality were secured but the issue had 
caused about a months delay and had strained relations between the British commanders and 
the colonial authorities. ' 14 
While trying to sort out the procurement problem, Walker also became aware how 
little knowledge both within the squadron and Massachusetts there was on the navigation of 
the St Lawrence river. In Boston he stayed with Cyprian Soutack, who had been appointed 
to command the lead ship, the Province Galley, up river. However, Soutack made it known 
to Walker that he had been no higher up the St Lawrence than the Sept fies, which layjust 
inside the river estuary. Moreover, contrary to expectations, there was a lack of willing local 
pilots to join the expeditionary force. The Boston pilot, Captain Bonner, for example, 
113 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 17-19,95,238-47,268-76,302-7: 'Walker's Journal'. 3 May 1711; 
Da Costa Bella to Pontchartrain, 23,24 July 1711; Instructions for Robert Hunter, 6 Feb. 1711; Minutes of a 
Council of War, 21 June 1711; Walker, 'Queen Anne's Canadian Expedition', pp. 468-70. 
'" 7he Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 23-5,101-22,319-24,340-6: 'Walker's Journal', 26 June-20 July, 
1711; Colonel King's Journal - Part One, 28 June-20 July 1711; General Hill's Journal, 28 June-20 July 
1711; PRO, CO 5/9, fos. 52-7: Hill to Dartmouth, 31 July 1711; Morgan, 'Queen Anne's Canadian 
Expedition', pp. 478-81. 
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although reputed to posses the best knowledge of the route, had only previously made the 
sailing in a sloop and was therefore unwilling to guide any larger vessel. A Governor's 
warrant was eventually issued to compel those trying to avoid the service but, given that 
Walker subsequently came to rely upon a French Master captured near to the mouth of the St 
Lawrence, it would seem that this local action had proved largely ineffective. ' 15 Bythe 
middle of July, both Walker and Hill believed the prospects for success so remote that they 
considered abandoning the operation against Quebec and undertaking an attack elsewhere. 
However, not only did they find their Instructions strictly drafted to prohibit such a decision, 
but also that there was no provision for them to call a Council of War, which would probably 
have countenanced an abandonment of the action. Indeed, Walker was later to believe that 
London had deliberately omitted to provide for a Council for that reason, and also in order to 
ensure that the two commanders would have to bear full responsibility for any operational 
decisions. Despite their strong reservations, both commanders agreed therefore that they 
would at least have to make an attempt on Quebec. 116 
Over the course of the next fortnight, the final arrangements for the operation were 
completed. Nicholson arrived in Boston with Colonel Vetch, who was to sail with Walker, 
and reported that the French had drawn the majority of their forces down to Montreal and 
that there was a lack of powder in Canada. Walker had hoped that Nicholson's visit would 
speed the preparations along but with the problems over victualling and pilots continuing and 
an increasing desertion rate amongst the ships' crews, particularly those of the auxiliary 
vessels, there was no quickening of the pace. In an attempt to stem the flow of deserters, 
Walker secured a proclamation from the colonial authorities but he did little for his relations 
with them by complaining when they informed him that they had exceeded their quota of men 
for the land forces that it was sailors he needed. Thus on 20 July -a good deal later than 
anticipated - the soldiers began re-embarking from Noddles Island and eleven days later the 
squadron weighed from Boston. ' 17 
The expeditionary force, comprising nine warships and two bomb vessels along with 
115 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 102,110,115,196-7: 'Walker's Journal', 26 June, 2 July 1711; 
Walker to Dudley, 9 July 1711; Dudley to Walker, 9 July 1711; The Warrant to summon the Pilots, 9 July 
1711. 
116 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 116-17: 'Walker's Journal', II July 1711. 
117 The Walker apedition to Quebec, Pp. 117-31,323-6,344-8: 'Walker's Journal', 12-30 July 1711; Colonel 
King's Journal - Part One, 11-30 July 1711; General Hill's Journal, 12-29 July 1711. 
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around 7500 troops and marines aboard about 60 transports, made steady progress to reach 
Cape Sable on the eastern coast of Nova Scotia by 3 August. ' 18 Walker then asked Colonel 
Vetch to sail ahead in the Dispatch along with three smaller rates to identify potential 
anchorages and to wam of possible dangers. To help with the navigation, the Admiral sent 
Vetch a French pilot he had taken aboard at Plymouth; Vetch however formed a low opinion 
of the man's abilities and relied instead upon his own local knowledge to bring the squadron 
safely round to the i les St Pauls, just north of Cape Breton island -a remarkable feat 
considering that Vetch's service experience had been predominately military. According to 
the Colonel, it was while lying off St Pauls on 12 August that he again boarded the Flagship 
to consult with Walker about the progress up the St Lawrence. The Admiral apparently 
asked Vetch to join the squadron's smallest vessel, the Sapphire, to lead the sail up-river. 
Vetch felt that it would be too much trouble to transfer his equipage from the Dispatch and 
on leaving the Edgar he believed that Walker had concurred with his refusal to switch ships. 
Yet, the following day he received a note from the Admiral informing him to await the signal 
to take up the lead position. This might of course have meant Vetch in the Dispatch but as 
the signal was not then forthcoming and Captain Rouse of the Sapphire began to enquire as 
to Vetch's whereabouts, it seemed that Walker had aimed to bounce his colleague into 
transferring ships. This approach lacked subtly and Vetch simply informed Rouse that 
Walker had already sanctioned him remaining in the Dispatch; the signal never was posted 
and the squadron proceeded onwards through the Gulf of St Lawrence. Walker made no 
mention of these events in his journal and the whole affair might have remained a digression 
of Vetch's recollections if the squadron had not subsequently foundered in the St Lawrence. 
Because it did, however, it raised the question that Walker's intransigence about Vetch 
transferring ships may have deprived the squadron of a guide whose piloting skills had most 
recently been tested. This was certainly Vetch's view but equally, given the circumstances, 
his punctiliousness over having his equipage about his person seemed small-minded. 
" The ensuing account of the attempt to capture Quebec is based on the following primary sources and 
secondary authorities: The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 30-8,132-43,329-31: 'Walker's Journal', 3-27 
Aug. 1711; Colonel King's Journal -Part Two, 15-26 Aug. 1711; PRO, C05/9, fos. 70-5,219-220: 1 fill to 
Dartmouth, 9 Sept. 1711; Lee to 'Hon. Sir', 12 Sept. 1711; 'Journal of a Voyage designed to Quebeck from 
Boston in New England in July 1711', 30 July-25 Aug. 1711; PRO, SP 42/68, unf.: Walker to Burchett, 14 
Aug., 12 Sept. 1711; 'At a Council of Sea Officers', 25 Aug. 171; Morgan, 'Queen Anne's Canadian 
Expedition', pp. 483-5; Churchill, Marlborough, iv. 330-1. 
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Walker was now principally relying on the skills and knowledge of another French 
sailor - Captain Paradis - who had been bribed to pilot the squadron after being captured by 
the Chester while sailing off Nova Scotia. Although there is no substantive evidence that 
Paradis sought to frustrate the squadron's progress, two circumstantial events remain 
persuasive. First, in conversation with Walker he caused the Admiral to be even more fearful 
and thus cautious of proceeding up the St Lawrence to Quebec. Second, while the squadron 
lay north of the Bird Islands near to Cape St Lawrence on 13 August, he was one of three 
who advised that Walker tack southwards so as to run by Anticosti Island safely. This caused 
the squadron to sail backwards for some six hours when, according to Vetch, the wind was 
favourable to take them into the St Lawrence. A calm subsequently descended for several 
days and when on 18 August a north-westerly blew up, it was too strong for the squadron to 
weather Cape Gaspd. Forced to ride out the elements in Gaspd Bay, the squadron missed out 
on a wind which would have been particularly favourable for its progress up river. 
On 20 August, Walker weighed from Gaspd and two days later the squadron had 
turned past the north-westerly point of Anticosti Island into the St Lawrence. During the 
evening of 23 August, with the wind veering and a thick fog descending which obscured the 
land, Walker consulted with his pilots and senior officers and brought the squadron too on a 
larboard tack. The Admiral had however misjudged his position inasmuch as a powerful 
north-westerly current from Anticosti had driven the squadron much further westwards 
towards the iles aux CEufs and the 'north' or west bank of the river. This misunderstanding 
was compounded later in the evening when Walker's Flag Captain, Paddon, reported a land 
sighting. The Admiral erroneously assumed that this was the southern shore and thus the 
order to tack to the leeward simply brought the squadron even closer to the north shore. 
Twice after retiring to bed, Walker was roused by Captain Goddard of Seymour's Regiment 
who told him that he had spotted breakers around the ship. On the first occasion Walker 
dismissed the Captain on the grounds that an anny officer would know nothing of the sea and 
that Paddon had not yet mentioned the breakers. However, on Goddard's second appearance 
at Walker's cabin, a commotion above caused him to ascend immediately to the quarter deck 
in his dressing gown and slippers. It quickly became clear that the north shore was looming 
to the leeward and it was only Walker's quick order to cut the anchor cable and make all sail 
that brought the Edgar safely out into mid-channel. Nine auxiliary vessels were however not 
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so fortunate and during the night of 23/24 August they foundered on the north shore of the St 
Lawrence. Seven of these vessel were transports and nearly 900 soldiers from the regiments 
of Windress, Clayton, Kane, and Seymour were lost. This represented nearly half of the land 
force and when Walker met Brigadier Hill on 25 August, the latter insisted, despite their 
Instructions, that a Council of War be convened to determine the next course of action. 
The Council, comprising the naval Captains with the senior army officers attending, 
met later that day. Taking evidence from the available pilots, it concluded that it was not 
practicable to continue up the St Lawrence due to a lack of knowledge about the river. Only 
Colonel Vetch protested, though not during the Council meeting but subsequently in a letter 
to Walker so that it appeared as if he was seeking a personal insurance policy against the 
failure of the expedition. Nonetheless, the points Vetch made in his letter were pertinent. 
Even with some 900 soldiers lost, the strength of the expeditionary force was thought to 
exceed the French garrison at Quebec; while the fact that the pilots' ignorance of the river 
had been known before departing Boston meant that to abandon the attempt now on this 
pretext would cast the earlier decision to proceed in a very unfavourable light. Perhaps most 
significantly, however, Vetch noted the poor consequences the expedition's failure would 
have for the British colonial empire in North America. His fellow colonist Colonel Nicholson 
clearly agreed with him and on hearing the news while with his troops at Lake George, he 
was reported to be enraged at having once again to return the colonial force to Albany for 
disbandment. The relationship between imperial parent and the colony suffered another set- 
back and was the culmination for the colonists of four years of disappointment and missed 
chances. Professor Morgan is doubtless right to suggest an inclusion of these Canadian 
expeditions in any broad assessment of the causes of the American Revolution. ' 19 
Although the operation against Quebec had been abandoned, there was still the 
reduction of Placentia to be considered. Both Hill's and Walker's Instructions had directed 
them to this task on the returnjourney from Canada, though significantly it was recognised 
that the time of year would determine whether the action could go ahead. By 4 September, 
when the squadron was safely congregated in the Spanish Road north of Cape Breton, the 
senior commanders began to consider the next stage. Walker wrote subsequently in his 
journal of his reluctance to return home without having attempted Quebec and that with the 
"9 Morgan, 'Some Attempts at Imperial Co-operation', p. 171. 
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increasing lateness of the season rendering action against Placentia unlikely, he suggested 
returning to New England for the winter. The Admiral claimed that both his Flag Captain and 
the Colonel of the Artillery Train, Richard King, agreed with him, whereas Hill was 
determined to make the return voyage. King'sjournal does not corroborate Walker's record 
but, in any event, it was quickly apparent that the Admiral was principally motivated by the 
fear of a political and professional storm on his return. When Hill suggested that they 
convene another general Council of War, thereby holding out the prospect of spreading the 
responsibility for any operational decisions, Walker readily agreed. Recently captured letters 
indicating that the French knew about the imminent action against Placentia formed the 
background to the meeting of the Council on 8 September; and, although, this intelligence 
highlighted Placentia's weakness, the Council's deliberations were dominated by the 
anticipated lack of provisions. With only ten weeks short allowance remaining from 12 
September, which was considered the earliest sailing date from the Spanish Road, and no 
prospect of supply from New England until November, it was doubtful if there was sufficient 
supply to mount an attack against Placentia. Such doubts about the viability of the operation 
were only reinforced by reports that the Newfoundland coast was difficult to navigate in late 
season. Accordingly, the Council resolved that it was not practicable to attempt the 
reduction of Placentia and that the expeditionary squadron should return to Britain. 120 
Walker and Hill arrived home in mid-October, though not to the expected row. it 
was not in the Tories' interest to begin enquiring about the conduct of the operation and their 
political stranglehold was still sufficiently strong a year after the General Election to prevent 
the Whigs making political mischief out the operation. Indeed, despite the failure of the 
operation which was to have embodied a shift in strategy from the military campaigns on the 
continent, the Tories still managed to demonstrate their inclination on this issue by 
engineering the dismissal of Marlborough barely a month following the expedition's return. 
Moreover, Walker and Hill were both employed within the year: the Admiral sailed as 
Commodore of the Jamaican squadron, while Hill was promoted to Major-General in 
command of the force rendered as security at Dunkirk for the duration of the Utrecht peace 
negotiations. Such blame as was apportioned in Britain tended to fall on the colonists, with 
120 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 38-9,144-8,331-3,361-2: 'Walker's Journal', 4-8 Sept. 1711; 
Colonel King's Journal - Part Two, 4-7 Sept. 1711; Vetch to Walker, 26 Aug. 1711; PRO, SP 42/68, unf: 
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the problems over supply alluded to in particular. 121 That specific issue however originated 
with St John's decision that the fleet was not to carry the full complement of provisions for 
the whole of the expedition, and it raised the important point that any credible assessment of 
the operation's failure must perforce take into account the preparatory role of the Secretary 
of State. 
Not only had St John's desire for secrecy caused problems with respect to provisions, 
his tight control produced Instructions so strictly drafted that Whitehall had effectively 
regulated the tactical direction of the operation before it had begun. Admittedly, Councils of 
War were perceived to dilute command authority and, in the context of combined operations, 
they had proved to lack dynamism with respect to in-theatre command. Equally, however, 
the antidote to these problems was a unitary command vested in either the naval or land 
commander and not pre-set executive control from home. Brigadier Hill did hold a superior 
command to Admiral Walker, but it was not unitary; and the command discretion afforded 
him could only have been put to effective use by a vigorous commander who was resolute in 
pursuit of the operational objectives. Hill did not fit that mould and his failing in this respect 
proved critical when Walker mismanaged, and ultimately gambled on, the piloting of the 
squadron up the St Lawrence. The dearth of pilots and the lack of knowledge of those 
available was obvious prior to departing from Boston and Walker simply compounded these 
problems by a display of unthinking seamanship once in the river. St John was responsible for 
the appointment of both commanders and it is especially here in which he is vulnerable to 
criticism. 
The common theme linking combined operations in the context of the North 
American continent between 1708-1711 was the negative impact of London's political and 
governmental process. Twice in 1709 and 1710, a failure of political and administrative will 
caused planned operations to be abandoned; while on the third occasion in 1711, the party 
political and personal motivations of the Secretary of State impaired his judgement when 
preparing the expeditionary force so that the seeds of its failure had been sown even before it 
crossed the Atlantic. It was for these reasons that during the Spanish Succession War, there 
was a notable failure of combined operations on the very continent which would several 
'Resolution of a Council of War of Sea and Land Officers', 8 Sept. 1711; Walker to Burchctt, 12 Sept. 1711. 
121 The Walker Expedition to Quebec, pp. 45-6,50. 
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decades later witness some of Britain's most notable amphibious successes. 
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Section III: Combined Operations and the War of the Spanish 
Succession, 1702-1713. 
The largely static set-piece battle on land or at sea undoubtedly dominated the operational 
history of the War of the Spanish Succession and, consequently, current historiography tends 
to concentrate on the military successes of Marlborough in Flanders or the allied failings on 
the Iberian Peninsula. Nonetheless, one of the first operational deployments of the war was 
the Rooke-Ormonde operation against Cddiz in 1702. This proved be the first of thirteen 
combined army-navy actions deployed throughout the war with a number of others planned 
but not executed. Quantitatively at least, successive ministries demonstrated a sustained 
commitment to combined operations and hence a clearer definition of them as an instrument 
of warfare should be possible. In this respect, it is necessary to consider these examples 
within the context of the five categories of definition - objectives, theatre of war, composition 
of force, bureaucratic control and command structure - which were established when 
considering the operational history of the Nine Years War. In so doing, the form, function 
and strategic purpose of combined operations in the early eighteenth century should be 
Hluminated. 
Although there was a greater functional equivalence between those operations 
dispatched to capture Spanish coastal towns and the colonial expeditions - Walker's army- 
navy detachment for the Caribbean was after all initially part of the Rooke-Ormonde force - 
than similar overseas operations and the 'descents' during the Nine Years War, operational 
form was still dependent upon the specific objectives and the theatre of the war. In the 
Mediterranean, the fleet could be instructed to capture or destroy enemy territory without 
necessarily having been dispatched from England with a dedicated land force. The attack on 
Toulon in 1707, for example, involved the co-ordination of a free standing army and naval 
forces. On that occasion the combined service relationship was partially a product of the 
recent success of the Duke of Savoy against the French in the Italian theatre, which enabled 
him to march an army over the Maritime Alps into Provence, and also the lack of a safe 
landing site near to Toulon harbour. There seemed a greater potential for success if the navy 
acted in conjunction with a land force already advancing through the interior rather than one 
it projected from the fleet. The relief of Gibraltar in November 1704 and in March 1705 and 
Barcelona in April 1706 were also examples of combined operations that were shaped by the 
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objective and the war theatre. Securing the allied garrisons in both places from the French 
besieging force on land and at sea could not simply be a question of the navy transporting to 
them additional manpower and supplies. Instead, the respective service commanders had to 
engage in ajoint operational relationship to neutralise the French threat. Even when French 
capability at sea was dealt with first, the army-navy co-operation in-theatre had to be 
maintained to beat off the landward attack and, in this respect, seamen and naval ordnance 
were often put ashore to bolster the landward defences. These operations lasted several 
months, affording them an attritional quality not present at the earlier first strike to gain 
control of the towns; but, as secure capture was the overriding objective, both phases should 
be considered together to form one long combined operational campaign. 
This broadening of the definition of combined operations by the object and theatre of 
war is furthered by a consideration of the composition of the force. The combination of the 
regular army and navy remained a benchmark but, during the Spanish Succession war, the 
marine soldiers assumed an increasingly prominent role. These troops often formed a large 
part of the land force set ashore or, as at the initial assault on Gibraltar in July 1704, 
comprised - save for a number of Spanish irregulars and latterly some seamen - the whole. 
The marines at Gibraltar were those of the regiments raised for 'sea service' in April 1702, 
which was the third time since the Restoration that this type of soldier had been mobilised. 
The ambiguities between the legislation which made the navy responsible for their 
administration and command, and their regimentation as infantry battalions which undertook 
soldierly functions ashore, suggested that actions completed by them in conjunction with 
naval vessels could be considered as combined operations. In this respect, it is the question 
of whether there was operational co-operation between at any rate some form of military 
force on land and a navy at sea which defimes the combined operation. The composition of 
the force, including its function, as a category of definition must therefore be widened to 
incorporate operations that are not strictly undertaken by the regular English army and the 
Royal Navy. 
The two categories - bureaucratic control and command structure - which principally 
emerged during the Nine Years War as integral to the definition of combined operations 
continued to be of use during the Spanish Succession war. The former was not however 
subject to any notable development. A non-personal administrative process to prepare the 
army and naval components was still lacking and, although certain individuals - Admiralty 
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Secretary Burchett and successive Secretaries of State, for example - appreciated the 
necessity and importance of their bureaucratic relationships, the organisation of operations 
continued to suffer delay, no consistent trend of increased efficiency emerged as the war 
progressed. Debates over command structure continued, with the contributions from the 
service commanders and members of the Cabinet Council demonstrating its enduring 
contemporary relevance to operational design. Unlike the question of bureaucratic control, 
the issue of command became even more germane due to the increasing complexity and 
interplay of the theatres of the war in which such operations were deployed. Overseas, 
colonists such as Christopher Codrington and Francis Nicholson again sought a determinate 
voice; while in the Mediterranean, and specifically on the Peninsula, London had to devolve a 
certain amount of operational authority to the Archduke Charles as 'King of Spain'. The 
response of the various service commanders, including in particular the Earl of Peterborough 
and Sir John Leake, to this shaped historical perceptions of combined operational endeavour 
both in terms of its substance and spirit. 
The devolved command structure in the Peninsula emerged from the strategic 
considerations of war policy. As was the case in the Nine Years War, the frequency of 
combined operations (broadly deffied) demonstrated that they comprised part of the military 
component of Grand Strategy as a support to the maritime and continental strategic traditions 
favoured, as previously explained, by the Tories and the Whigs respectively. As Queen 
Anne's ministries - until the exclusively Tory government of 1710 - were led by the political 
'undertakers' Godolphin and Marlborough, and supported for a good part of the war by the 
instinctive political manager Robert Harley, war policy tended to blend both strategies. 
Combined operations were therefore concurrently deployed overseas in the maritime context 
and planned against the French coast to facilitate the progress of the continental land war. 
Professor Hattendorf has argued that Britain's strategic touchstone during this 
conflict was the future role and governance of Spain in the European states system., To this 
he might have added the establishment of a permanent strategic presence in the 
Mediterranean. When in 1703, Britain committed itself to placing the Archduke Charles on 
the Spanish throne, this concern with Spain and the Mediterranean reinforced the 
simultaneous application of both the continental and maritime strategies to the same end. 
1 Hattendorf, England in the War ofthe Spanish Succession, p. 267. 
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Armies fought on the Spanish mainland and the navy strove to command the Mediterranean 
as a line of communication and also to safeguard trade. Within this military and strategic 
context, combined operations were consistently deployed. The capture of Gibraltar and, 
more particularly, Barcelona, provided the Archduke with a vital foothold on the mainland 
whence military operations might be begun from a base other than the Portuguese border. 
Army-navy actions were also frequently used as the means to capture an appropriately sized 
Mediterranean port where the main fleet could be based permanently. It might be argued that 
when an island such as Minorca was targeted then a combined operation would perforce have 
to be deployed for the soldiers could only be put ashore from the sea. But at Minorca and 
elsewhere, there was a planned and continuing combined operational relationship beyond the 
initial projection of the land force. Conversely where mainland ports like Cddiz could have 
been attacked solely from the landward, an army-navy conjunction was still deemed to be the 
more appropriate instrument of warfare. 
Professor Lynn's 'war-as-process" paradigm can be applied to the operational history 
of the War of the Spanish Succession, but it does not fully account for the frequent planning 
and deployment of combined operations nor their component strategic role. An 
understanding of their form and function remained dependent upon the five categories: 
objectives, theatre of war, composition of force, bureaucratic control and command structure; 
but as the content of each was broadened by the operational examples, a universal definition 
of combined operations remained elusive. During the Spanish Succession war, combined 
army-navy actions - broadly defined - were more obviously an elemental part of the war 
policy. They were consistently deployed in pursuance of Britain's ambition to gain a 
permanent presence in the Mediterranean, while also integrated within the continental land 
campaigns, particularly on the Peninsula. Again there can be no claims that these combined 
actions were at this stage considered as an independent strategic instrument of war; rather, 
they were conceived as support for both the maritime and continental approaches. 
Nonetheless, their integration within both strategic traditions combined with the fact that the 
lineaments of British war policy looked set to maintain both a continental commitment and 
also command of the sea, meant that combined operations can be perceived in the early 
eighteenth century to be evolving as a strategic instrument of warfare. 
' Lynn, The Wars ofLouis XIV, pp. 3 67-76. 
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Conclusion 
This study has shown that it is impossible to arrive at a blanket definition for British 
combined operations as an instrument of warfare during the wars of 1688-1713. Instead, 
five categories of definition - objectives, theatre of war, composition of force, 
bureaucratic control and command structure - have been advanced and, against these, the 
historical experience of combined army-navy actions can be set to illuminate their form 
and function. Although it has been demonstrated that combined operations were neither 
conceived nor deployed as independent strategic actions, they formed a fundamental role 
in support of both the continental and maritime strategic traditions embedded within 
Grand Strategy. Moreover, with respect to certain policies, such as the penetration of the 
Mediterranean, these operations often came to provide the mainstay of Britain's military 
contribution. At the end of the Spanish Succession War, therefore, it was possible to look 
ahead to a later period when Britain's practised expertise in combined operations as an 
instrument of warfare was recognised and thought distinct from the anny-centred and 
infantry-dominated continental campaigning of other European powers. However, this 
raises the question of whether it is possible to identify the reasons for success, and 
conversely for failure, of the operations of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, which would make it possible to comprehend in some detail the historical 
development of the form and function of combined operations as amphibious warfare. 
Over the course of the two wars considered in this study only seven operations 
were wholly successful inasmuch as they fully achieved their objectives: the two actions in 
Ireland (1689 and 1690); Gibraltar (1704-5); Barcelona (1705-6); Ibiza and Majorca 
(1706); Sardinia (1708) and, finally, Minorca (1708). This is clearly a diverse fist of 
combined operations which do not conform to one operational mould. For example, 
unlike Cork or Kinsale, Gibraltar never featured as the sole target of a set of operational 
instructions determined by the Ministry; nor did its capture involve the use of regular 
army regiments, which were to participate to a great extent in the action which seized 
control of Barcelona. Moreover, it has been argued that the capture of both Gibraltar and 
Barcelona should be seen as the product of attritional combined operations extending over 
the course of a year, rather than the first-strike action which proved sufficient to take the 
Balearics. IdentSying specific common reasons for the success of combined operations 
which might shape the future development in this form of warfare is thus an elusive task. 
Equally, of the eight actions which failed entirely to meet any of their objectives - 
captain Wrenn's expedition to the West Indies (1692); the descent on Brest (1694); 
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Admiral Russell Mediterranean expedition (1694-5); the expeditions of Admirals Wheler 
and Walker to the Caribbean and North America (1693,1702 and 1711); the Rooke- 
Ormonde assault on Cddiz (1702); and the attack on Toulon (1707) - their operational 
forms were sufficiently distinct to prohibit a universal explanation for their failure. 
Discord between the respective service commanders evidently hindered the actions in the 
colonies but, even then, the failure of Wheler's expedition to the Caribbean was 
principally dictated by the strict chronological framework set down in his Instructions. 
This forced him to leave the region by a specific date and therefore rendered him unable to 
continue operations against either Guadeloupe or Martinique, even though there were 
reasonable prospects for success despite his bickering with Governor Codrington. 
Similarly, although in the European theatres inter-service conflict undermined joint 
operations, it has been shown, for example, that at the assault on Cddiz in 1702 this factor 
was less important than has been previously thought; while it was wholly absent from 
operations such as the descent on Brest in 1694. Failure on that occasion resulted from 
the Ministry's prioritising of targets, which caused the commanders to continue at Brest 
despite the increasing realisation that the French defences and (more importantly) the 
inability to land a significant body of troops with momentum meant that that the tactical 
conditions were not propitious. A similar argument about the lack of common 
characteristics defining success or failure might be made about those three operations - 
Commodores Wright's and Wilmot's expeditions to the Caribbean (1690-1 and 1695 
respectively), and Commodore Norris's action at Newfoundland (1697) - which 
ultimately failed but which notched up some partial successes along the way. 
To a large extent, the fact that it is difficult to isolate some common operational 
characteristics to explain success or failure is inherent in the already recognised inability to 
arrive at a comprehensive definition for combined operations in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century. The operations related in this study can be viewed, and were so 
viewed by contemporaries, as joint land and sea actions; but they took many forms, and 
their operational history therefore yields only very general characteristics which made a 
consistent positive contribution to the progress of the operations. The importance of 
leadership and, in particular, the ability of personal command to respond effectively to the 
exigencies of combined operations should not be underestimated. Although similar to all 
military and naval conmmders in that they faced operational circumstances contingent 
upon factors outside their direct control, the leaders of combined operations had from the 
outset to establish and to maintain a cohesive joint operational momentum of the land and 
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sea forces. Moreover, it was rare for these commanders to be afforded an unitary 
command structure in which to effect this; instead, it was customary for them to have to 
accommodate a Council of War of diverse opinions. Mercurial and talismanic 
commanders like the Earl of Peterborough and Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt could 
immediately transform the progress of an operation. Hesse-Darmstadt's (ultimately fatal) 
demonstration that it was essential to cut the enemy's line of communication between 
Barcelona and the Montjuich fortress along with Peterborough's charge up the hill of 
Montjuich to rally Lord Charlemont's retreating troops were turning points in the first- 
strike phase of the operation in 1705 to capture the city. The dominant personalities of 
such commanders ensured that they were well equipped to push at the parameters of their 
operational Instructions and more importantly to dominate the membership of the 
Councils of War, which were typically prescribed by the Ministries as the sovereign 
command authority. The failure of, respectively, Sir Francis Wheler in 1693 and 
Commodore Norris in 1697 to impose their wills on their Councils of War left the former 
bound to his prescriptive Instructions directing his departure from the Caribbean and the 
latter circumscribed by timidity. Instinctive and dominating commanders were, of course, 
often difficult to work within the context of ajoint service action; hence the equally 
positive contribution made by the more methodical and steadily resolute commanders 
should also be noted. Britain's successes in the Mediterranean between 1705-1708 was in 
a large part due to the stolid leadership of Admiral Sir John Leake. Where others failed, 
he forged a tense but effective partnership with Peterborough. His determined 
seamanship preserved and ensured the deployment of the squadron during the successive 
winters of 1704-5 and 1705-6, when he established an operational relationship over the 
longer term with the land commanders in besieged Gibraltar and Barcelona. 
Naturally, a commander from either service who genuinely understood the 
necessity of the co-ordination of the land and sea forces and who actively promoted their 
interplay could only be beneficial to the progress of such operations. However, in the 
wars concerned with here, only the Duke of Marlborough demonstrated such an ability. 
This, though, was only glimpsed during his actions in Ireland in 1690 when he had in any 
event the benefit of a near unitary command structure. Later, during the Spanish 
Succession War, although he undoubtedly promoted the strategic role of combined 
operations as part of Britain's attempt to penetrate the Mediterranean, he was never 
actively involved in the operations. In that respect, no clear model of a joint service 
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commander emerged; notwithstanding, leadership remained a positive constituent in 
ensuring the success of a combined operation.. 
During the wars concerned in this study, the pamphlets by Edward Littleton were 
the only significant attempts to theorise on the practice of combined operations. Their 
focus was not, however, upon the techniques of landing troops and then upon the conduct 
of the two services as progress was made upon the target but rather upon the immediate 
strategic and tactical benefits which night accrue from the joint actions that Littleton 
termed 'descents'. This absence of a theoretical model of the conduct of a combined 
operation was, of course, consonant with the lack of a comprehensive definition of them 
as a type of warfare. It also reflected the nature of success and failure as contingent on 
the quality of the command. Some commanders were developing techniques peculiar to 
combined operations - such as the landing of troops in sequential waves, as intended by 
Tollemache at Camaret Bay, or the increasing practice amongst naval commanders to 
detail frigates to shepherd and provide fire cover for the ships' boats as they neared the 
shore - and it might be suggested that over the course of the two wars the conduct of the 
commanders was increasingly informed by the practices and experience of others. 
Certainly, at Cddiz, Ormonde deployed a modified version of Tollemache's landing 
disposition at Brest in 1694. This sought to reap the maximum momentum afforded by 
landing in sequential waves, while also avoiding the more obvious errors committed 
during the Brest operation such as the disorderly progress of the forward landing craft. 
There remains, however, no evidence to suggest that the failings at Brest had been 
absorbed at an institutional level and specifically vouchsafed to Ormonde; nor is it possible 
to know for certain whether Ormonde had studied Tollemache's command prior to the 
Cddiz expedition in 1702. Nonetheless, the Duke's instruction for landing indicated a 
familiarity with the earlier operation and this underscores the individual and experiential 
foundation of learning in combined operational command. In a similar manner, the 
positive quality of Sir John Leake's stolidness in command (referred to above) was as 
much a product of his prolonged service in the Mediterranean where he was the lead 
Admiral in several combined operations as it was of his naval personality. Overall, the 
absence of a theoretical framework and a structured learning process for commanders 
meant that the dominant contingent nature of their conduct kept the execution of 
combined operations largely ad hoc. 
This essential improvisation placed a premium upon the commanders' avaHable 
resources, which were usually, though not exclusively, a product of the preparatory 
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activity back in Britain. It is therefore the appropriateness and the quality of the 
operations' resource base which comprises another general characteristic that across the 
broad spectrum of operations could have a constant positive or negative effect. For 
example, Secretary St John's expeditionary preparations in the early spring of 1711 left 
Walker without sufficient provisions on arrival at Boston with which to maintain an 
operational momentum; while governments in general rarely seemed to take account - 
despite the evidence - of the high attrition of manpower in the Caribbean through 
sickness. When resources were sufficient for the operational purpose, as in the case of 
Stanhope's operation which captured Minorca in 1708, then a serious potential obstacle 
to the success of the operation was removed. 
It is not possible to foreshadow in detail the form and function of combined 
operations as practised to considerable effect in the wars of the nid-to-late eighteenth 
century. This was largely a product of the amorphous nature of such operations in the 
earlier part of the century; although they could be identified as a type of warfare with a 
strategic role, there was then no one successfid operational mould to be developed or, 
conversely, a common failing form to be avoided. Nonetheless, laying to one side the 
often essential contribution of good fortune, it can be argued that overall operations were 
positively influenced by the leadership of commanders who were either mercurial or 
stolidly determined, or who genuinely embraced the combined action of both services; 
equally, due to these contingencies of command, successful operations were required to 
posses a sufficient resource base for the set objectives. Such conclusions night seem 
straightforward but, ironically, it is this straightforwardness which is noteworthy. 
Appropriate operational command and sufficient resource provisions would be considered 
a pre-requisite for the successful direction of the conventional types of warfare, whether a 
set-piece land battle or a naval engagement. It is therefore a measure of the development 
in the form, function and acceptance of the strategic utility of combined operations in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries that as a instrument of warfare they were 
demonstrating the same characteristics for success as the more orthodox forms of combat 
in the early modem period. Moreover, as this progress became increasingly understood at 
the highest levels of the government and the military, combined operations became 
throughout the eighteenth century a dominant form of warfare upon which Britain's 
imperial reach and exercise of world power rested. It is of considerable significance that 
the wellsprings and nascent growth of this development can be traced to Britain's naval 
and military co-operation in the wars of 1688 to 1713. 
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